"Spinoza in English" is the first bibliography to bring together the entire 325-year record of books, monographs, dissertations, and articles in English on Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677), including translations of his works into English. Well over 2100 citations are presented, bringing this record through early 1991. Arranged alphabetically by author or editor and internally cross-referenced for ease of use, this bibliography also cites its own sources where appropriate and, in many cases, provides guidance on how to obtain (...) unpublished or out-of- print titles. Additionally, it restores or corrects a good deal of earlier bibliographic detail, identifies dozens of publications hitherto overlooked, and, beginning with titles from the mid-1800's, presents the citations in a uniform style. (shrink)

Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise (1670) is one of the most important philosophical works of the early modern period. In it Spinoza discusses at length the historical circumstances of the composition and transmission of the Bible, demonstrating the fallibility of both its authors and its interpreters. He argues that free enquiry is not only consistent with the security and prosperity of a state but actually essential to them, and that such freedom flourishes best in a democratic and republican state (...) in which individuals are left free while religious organizations are subordinated to the secular power. His Treatise has profoundly influenced the subsequent history of political thought, Enlightenment 'clandestine' or radical philosophy, Bible hermeneutics, and textual criticism more generally. It is presented here in a new translation of great clarity and accuracy by Michael Silverthorne and Jonathan Israel, with a substantial historical and philosophical introduction by Jonathan Israel. (shrink)

This new and complete translation of Spinoza's famous 17th-century work fills an important gap, not only for all scholars of Spinoza, but also for everyone interested in the relationship between Western philosophy and religion, and the history of biblical exegesis. The existing Elwes translation of 1883 has long been regarded as insufficient by Spinoza scholars for its misleading rendering of the Latin and its many omissions. Samuel Shirley, well-known for his excellent best-selling translation of Spinoza's "Ethics," (...) now presents this new, complete translation of Spinoza's "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus" in lucid English, which meets the highest standards of modern critical scholarship. The book includes an Index of Subjects and a detailed Index of Biblical References as well as an Introduction by Brad Gregory, which sets Spinoza squarely in the context of his time and intellectual tradition. (shrink)

The book includes an Index of Subjects and a detailed Index of Biblical References as well as an Introduction by Brad Gregory, which sets Spinoza squarely in ...

INTRODUCTION BRAD S. GREGORY Until now those interested in Spinoza have lacked an adequate English translation of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. ...

This article explores Spinoza's distinctive contribution to the eudaimonistic tradition, which considers happiness (eudaimonia) to be the highest good. Most (if not all) ancient eudaimonists endorse some sort of hierarchy between mind and body, where one is always dependent on, or subordinate to, the other. In particular, many of them endorse ethical intellectualism, where mental things are considered more valuable than bodily ones. I argue that Spinoza, in contrast, considers mind and body ontologically and ethically identical and equal, (...) thereby bringing something new to this ethical tradition. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider Schelling’s early understanding of intellectual intuition. I argue that although the common interpretation of intellectual intuition traces it back to Fichte’s enumerations in the First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre of 1797, an examination of the early Schelling reveals that he was employing the term well before Fichte (already in 1795) and in a way that is decisively distinct from Fichte. Thus, I disagree with well-known Schelling scholars, including Xavier Tilliette, who regard the (...) class='Hi'>early Schelling as a mere disciple of Fichte. In contrast, I argue that the more influential thinker in Schelling’s earliest development, especially with regard to intellectual intuition, is Spinoza. I illustrate through close textual analysis of Schelling’s Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), that Schelling is employing a conception of intellectual intuition that mirrors Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge. I emphasize, however, that in spite of Schelling’s proximity to Spinoza, he retains a certain distance—one which he repeatedly emphasizes. I consider and provide an explanation of why Schelling continues to distinguish himself from Spinoza, in spite of the clear similarities in their understanding of knowledge and in their conception of the absolute as causa sui. (shrink)

Medieval and early modern Jewish philosophers developed their thinking in conversation with various bodies of literature. The influence of ancient Greek – primarily Aristotle (and pseudo-Aristotle) – and Arabic sources was fundamental for the very constitution of medieval Jewish philosophical discourse. Toward the late Middle Ages Jewish philosophers also established a critical dialogue with Christian scholastics. Next to these philosophical corpora, Jewish philosophers drew significantly upon Rabbinic sources (Talmud and the numerous Midrashim) and the Hebrew Bible. In order to (...) clarify the unique as well as shared elements in the thought of medieval Jewish philosophers, we will begin this chapter with a brief study of some early Rabbinic sources on the purpose of the world, i.e., why it came to be and why it is sustained in existence. In the second part of this chapter, we will study Maimonides’ critique of the veracity and usefulness of the belief in (anthropocentric) teleology, and the critical reception of his views by later philosophers. The third part will address discussions of divine teleology in Kabbalistic literature. Our exposition will concentrate mostly on a specific early-eighteenth-century text that is one of the most lucid and rigorous presentations of Lurianic Kabbalah. The fourth and final section will elucidate Spinoza’s critique of teleology, its precise target and scope, and its debt to earlier sources discussed in this chapter. (shrink)

In his renowned collection Philosophy as a Way of Life, Pierre Hadot suggests that the original trait of philosophy as a method by which one exercises themselves to achieve a new way of living and seeing the world fails with the rise of modernity. In that time, philosophy increasingly takes on a merely theoretical aspect, tending toward a system. However, Hadot himself glimpses at the dawn of modernity some instances of the original trait of philosophy still very much present, and (...) in his wake, Michel Foucault warns that between the late 16th and early 17th centuries the philosophical question of the reform of the mind attests to a still very close link between asceticism and truth. This book aims to develop just such an idea by thoroughly analyzing the most representative works of the reform of the mind in the early modern period: Francis Bacon's New Organon (1620), René Descartes' Discourse on the Method (1637), and Baruch Spinoza's Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (1677). From this analysis it will emerge that these modern works fully deserve to be counted among the tradition of philosophy as way of life. On closer inspection, the inquiries about method elaborated in these works are fully understandable only when read in the light of a broader and more complex philosophical need: to establish the spiritual conditions for accessing truth and aspiring to full self-realization. (shrink)

Omnia quae sunt, vel in se, vel in alio sunt. "Everything which is, is either in itself, or in something else." With regard to the history of philosophy the either\or in this first axiom of Spinoza's Ethics has to be read inclusively. The works of philosophers have to be studied in themselves, but also in the works of contemporaries, adherents, and opponents. Siebrand's investigation into the early reception of Spinoza's philosophy of religion should therefore be welcomed. There (...) exists only scarce material on the Dutch contemporaries of Spinoza. The study may therefore give further insights into the development of Spinoza's thinking as well as the general background of the problems which he so ardently tried to solve. This last objective can justify the approach which Siebrand chooses in the first part of his book, namely to discuss both the adherents and the opponents by using "the method of logical reconstruction, with emphasis on the reciprocal relations between their views on Spinozism and general philosophical and theological questions in the seventeenth century". A defense of this method is promised in the second part of the book by means of validating a theory of reception. (shrink)

This book supports the idea that the ancient conception of philosophy as a way of life does not disappear in early modernity, but is transformed into a search for how to cure, guide, and free the human mind.

This chapter seeks to highlight some of the main threads that Leibniz used in developing his views on infinity in his early years in Paris. In particular, I will be focusing on Leibniz’s encounters with Descartes, Galileo, and Spinoza. Through these encounters, some of the most significant features of Leibniz’s view of infinity will begin to emerge. Leibniz’s response to Descartes reveals his positive attitude to infinity. He rejects Descartes’s view that, since we are finite, we cannot comprehend (...) the infinite and therefore should refrain from studying it. Likewise, Leibniz rejects Descartes’s view that the term ‘infinite’ should be reserved to God alone, as well as Descartes’s distinction between the infinite and the indefinite. Leibniz’s encounter with Galileo brings out his rejection of infinite number in response to Galileo’s paradox. This, in turn, leads him to face another formidable challenge, viz., to defend the claim that an infinite being is possible, while an infinite number is not. Leibniz’s encounter with Spinoza, I suggest, highlights the way he is approaching this problem by distinguishing between quantitative and non- quantitative senses of infinity. The strategy of employing different senses of infinity in different contexts will remain central in Leibniz’s approach to infinity for the rest of his career. (shrink)

Although the works of the authors of the Golden Age of Latin Literature play an important formative role for Early Modern philosophers, their influence in Early Modern thought is, nowadays, rarely studied. Trying to bring this topic to light once again and following the seminal works of Kajanto (1979), Proietti (1985) and Akkerman (1985), I will target Spinoza’s Latin sources in order to analyze their place in his philosophy. On those grounds, I will offer an overview of (...) the problems of the reception of classical literature in Early Modernity and then dwell on the particular case of Ovid and Spinoza. The present paper will argue that although Spinoza’s references to Ovid fill a rhetorical purpose as suggested by the existing literature, these mentions have a prior philosophical motivation. That is, the references in the Ethics are not merely illustrative; instead, they indicate that Spinoza acknowledges Ovid’s beliefs about human experiences and deliberately elaborates on Ovid’s view to construct and defend his own theses. To this end, the paper will analyze some citations mapped by Proietti (1985) and add a new one in an attempt to enlarge the list of places and topics that merit further investigation. To conclude, I will point out how the references to Ovid are part of Spinoza’s own defense of the powers of imagination. (shrink)

The roots of the controversial readings of Spinoza during Soviet times date back to the history of Russian Marxism. Spinoza was a most influential figure whom different Marxist currents and thinkers wanted to have on their side. This article examines the most relevant interpretations. First, it sketches some fundamental traits of Plekhanov’s understanding of Spinoza’s ontology and epistemology, from his critique of German revisionism at the end of the 1890s to his polemics against empiriocriticism and its Russian (...) impact. Spinoza was a particularly relevant and authoritative thinker for the so-called “Machists” as well, and some of their different interpretations are analyzed as representing their critical approach to Marxism. Finally, Lunacharskiiʼs discussion is considered as a peculiar alternative to Plekhanov’s orthodox understanding not only of Spinoza but of Marxism itself. While Plekhanov judged Spinoza’s “theological” language a relic of his epoch, Lunacharskii maintained that it was precisely his “religious” feelings that made Spinoza a forerunner of Marxism. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to add to the debate on the normative status and legitimacy of indoctrination in education by drawing on the political philosophy of Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677). More specifically, I will argue that Spinoza’s relational approach to knowledge formation and autonomy, in light of his understanding of the natural limitations of human cognition, provides us with valuable hints for staking out a more productive path ahead for the debate on indoctrination. This article combines an (...) investigation into the early modern history of political ideas with a philosophical inquiry into a persistent conceptual problem residing at the heart of education. As such, the aim of the article is ultimately to offer an account of indoctrination less fraught with the dangers of epistemological and political idealism that often haunt rival conceptions. (shrink)

This article turns to the neglected pedagogical concept of ingenium in order to address some shortcomings of the admiration–emulation model of Linda Zabzebski’s influential exemplarist moral theory. I will start by introducing the problem of the admiration-emulation model by way of a fictional example. I will then briefly outline the concept of ingenium such as it appears in a Renaissance context, looking particularly at the pedagogical writings of Juan Luis Vives. This will set the stage for the next part, looking (...) at how early modern philosopher Benedict Spinoza adopts a Vivesian notion of ingenium, adjusting it so as to fit into the setting of his political theory. Next, I will turn to Spinoza’s use of the concept of ingenium in relation to his portrayal of exemplary persons, offering a pedagogical model of moral exemplarism that can counter some of the perceived problems of the admiration–emulation model as it highlights the necessary fallibility of efficient exemplars as well as acknowledges the socio-political dimension of emotions. Finally, I will lay out some preliminary consequences for educational theory, hoping to offer a way of reconciling moral exemplarism with a more realistic pedagogical and psychological framework. (shrink)

This paper aims at reconstructing the ethical issues raised by Spinoza's early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Specifically, I argue that Spinoza takes issue with Descartes’ epistemology in order to support a form of “ethical intellectualism” in which knowledge is envisaged as both necessary and sufficient to reach the supreme good. First, I reconstruct how Descartes exploits the distinction between truth and certainty in his Discourse on the Method. On the one hand, this distinction acts (...) as the basis for Descartes’ epistemological rules while, on the other hand, it implies a “morale par provision” in which adequate knowledge is not strictly necessary to practice virtue. Second, I show that Spinoza rejects the distinction between truth and certainty and thus the methodological doubt. This move leads Spinoza to substitute the Cartesian Cogito with the idea of God as the only adequate standard of knowledge, through which the mind can attain the rules to reach the supreme good. Third, I demonstrate that in the Short Treatise Spinoza develops this view by equating intellect and will and thus maintaining that only adequate knowledge can help to contrast affects. However, I also insist that Spinoza's early epistemology is unable to explain why human beings drop conceive of the idea of God inadequately. Thus, I suggest that in his later writings Spinoza accounts for the insufficiency of adequate knowledge in opposing the power of the imagination and passions by reconnecting the nature of ideas with the mind's conatus. (shrink)

Practices of the self are prominent in Spinoza, both in the Ethics and On the Emendation of the Intellect. The same can be said of Descartes, e.g., his Discourse on the Method. What, if anything, distinguishes their practices of the self? Michel Foucault’s concept of “spirituality” isolates how Spinoza ’s practices are relatively unusual in the early modern era. Spirituality, as defined by Foucault in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, requires changes in the ethical subject before one (...) can begin philosophizing, and claims to result in a complete transfiguration or perfection of the subject. Both these characteristics are present in Spinoza ’s Emendation while both are lacking in Descartes’ Discourse. Turning to the Ethics’ practices of the self, I show how affects can be moderated through other affects, and that this text establishes a thorough training of the self which will strengthen one’s overall power well into the future. My treatment of the Ethics differs in emphasis from many other readings which focus on reason’s power over affects, or on cognitive therapy which moderates individual affects to lessen current sadness. In both works, Spinoza ’s practices of the self promise significant changes to those who undergo them. (shrink)

Discovering Spinoza's early modern psychology some 35 years into his own clinical practice, Ian Miller now gives shape to this connection through a close reading of Spinoza's key philosophical ideas. With a rigorous and expansive analysis of Spinoza's Ethics in particular, Miller explores how Spinozan thought simultaneously empowered the original conceptual direction of psychoanalytic thinking, and anticipated the field's contemporary theoretical dimensions. Miller offers a detailed overview of the philosopher's psychoanalytic reception from the early work (...) of German-language psychoanalytic thinkers, such as Freud and Andreas Lou-Salome, forward into its Anglophone reception, influencing both mid-century humanistic American psychoanalysis as well as anticipating thinkers such as Bion and Winnicott. Covering key concepts in psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice, this book demonstrates how knowledge of Spinoza's philosophical work can help to both illuminate and improve modern psychoanalytic therapies. (shrink)

Samuel Newlands presents a sweeping new interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysical system and the way in which his metaphysics shapes, and is shaped by, his moral program. Engaging with contemporary metaphysics and ethics, Newlands reveals just how exciting and vibrant Spinoza's philosophical outlook remains for philosophers today.

Spinoza's Ethics is one of the most remarkable, important, and difficult books in the history of philosophy: a treatise simultaneously on metaphysics, knowledge, philosophical psychology, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. It presents, in Spinoza's famous 'geometric method', his radical views on God, Nature, the human being, and happiness. In this wide-ranging 2006 introduction to the work, Steven Nadler explains the doctrines and arguments of the Ethics, and shows why Spinoza's endlessly fascinating ideas may have been so troubling (...) to his contemporaries, as well as why they are still highly relevant today. He also examines the philosophical background to Spinoza's thought and the dialogues in which Spinoza was engaged - with his contemporaries, with ancient thinkers, and with his Jewish rationalist forebears. His book is written for the student reader but will also be of interest to specialists in early modern philosophy. (shrink)

This work examines the unique way in which Benedict de Spinoza combines two significant philosophical principles: that real existence requires causal power and that geometrical objects display exceptionally clearly how things have properties in virtue of their essences. Valtteri Viljanen argues that underlying Spinoza's psychology and ethics is a compelling metaphysical theory according to which each and every genuine thing is an entity of power endowed with an internal structure akin to that of geometrical objects. This allows (...) class='Hi'>Spinoza to offer a theory of existence and of action - human and non-human alike - as dynamic striving that takes place with the same kind of necessity and intelligibility that pertain to geometry. This fresh and original study will interest a wide range of readers in Spinoza studies and early modern philosophy more generally. (shrink)

This paper argues that God's immanent causation and Spinoza's account of activity as adequate causation (of finite modes) do not always go together in Spinoza's thought. We show that there is good reason to doubt that this is the case in Spinoza's early Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well‐being. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza defends an account of God's immanent causation without fully endorsing the account of activity as adequate causation that he will (...) later introduce in the Ethics (E3def2). We turn to an examination of how God's immanent causation relates to the activity of finite things in the Ethics. We consider two ways to think about the link between God, seen as immanent cause, and the activity of finite things: namely, in terms of entailment and in terms of production. We argue that the productive model is most promising for understanding the way in which the activity of finite things and God's immanent causality are connected in Spinoza's (mature) philosophy. (shrink)

Spinoza is widely understood to criticize the role that fear plays in political life. Yet, in the Political Treatise, he maintains that everyone desires civil order due to a basic and universal fear of solitude. This chapter argues that Spinoza represents the fear of solitude as both a civilizing passion and as an affect that needs to be amplified and encouraged. The turbulence of social and political life makes solitude attractive, but isolation undermines the conditions of human power. (...) Although it may seem uncontroversial to understand isolation as something to avoid in political life, this chapter argues that Spinoza deflates the appeal of la vita solitaria even for philosophers and those seeking ethical perfection. (shrink)

Spinoza has very little to say concerning the creative arts. A careful consideration of those passages in which he discusses art, however, reveals art to have an importance for him that far outstrips what his relative silence might suggest. In this paper, I argue that Spinoza situates art at the genesis of rational, philosophical knowledge. The importance of abstract reason, Spinoza’s “second kind” of knowledge to which most of philosophy belongs, has been well appreciated by scholars. In (...) the Ethics, Spinoza offers a developmental account of this kind of knowledge: reason develops out of the knowledge of sense experience. By tracing his account of this process, I argue that art has an important role to play in the transition from sense experience to philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the issue of what kind of distinction separates the attributes of Spinoza’s substance. I propose to consider the distinction between attributes neither as a real distinction nor as a pure distinction of reason. Instead, I ventilate the alternative of understanding attributes as distinguished by a hybrid distinction, of which I trace the development during the Medieval and Early Modern eras. With the term hybrid, I capture distinctions which are neither a real distinction between (...) substances or real accidents; nor a pure distinction of reason, produced or fabricated by the intellect. I shall argue that Spinoza’s notion of attribute falls under the scope of a hybrid distinction, thus sidestepping the longstanding debate between objectivism and subjectivism. (shrink)

With the publication of the notes from Bergson’s early courses it has become possible to investigate the tradition of thinking that Bergson understood himself to be working within. A historical investigation of this understanding is valuable for at least two reasons: first, it allows us to appreciate the decisive interventions that Bergson’s thought makes within the post-Kantian tradition. Part of Bergson’s popularity was due to his insistence upon ‘beginning anew’ in thinking. However, while there is certainly much that is (...) new in Bergson’s thought, to emphasize this element of novelty at the price of occluding Bergson’s scholarly work on the history of philosophy is to simultaneously deprive Bergson’s own philosophy of the depth and relevance that it gathers through its resonance with other great thinkers and, inversely, to fail to understand the critical force of Bergson’s intellectual creativity. In addition to being valuable as an elaboration of the stakes in a particular moment of the history of philosophy, a historical investigation of Bergson’s reading of Spinoza affords us the opportunity to work out and think through the motivating questions that animate Bergson’s own thought and which become visible in the way that he takes up other philosophical concepts and systems. Clearly, such a historical investigation is unconcerned with the question of whether or not Bergson “understood” Spinoza, or “got him right.” That Kierkegaard “misunderstood” Hegel is hardly a profound or even philosophically interesting statement. However, it becomes constructive when it drives us to ask, for instance, how it is that Kierkegaard misunderstands Hegel. What concerns motivate Kierkegaard to reject Hegel’s system? What are the points of disagreement and, perhaps most importantly, what new concepts, what new directions of thought, do these points allow Kierkegaard to create? This point can be generalized as follows: the historical investigation of a philosopher’s engagement with the philosophical tradition is productive (i.e. creative rather than reductive) when this engagement is taken up and interpreted as indicative of the new and distinctive concerns that drive the more recent philosopher’s thought – a thought whose distinction at the same time marks the distinctiveness of his or her historical interlocutor. As Deleuze writes of the concept of the subject, “it is never very interesting to criticize a concept: it is better to build the new functions and discover the new fields that make it useless or inadequate.” By extension, an “interesting” reading of Bergson’s interpretation of Spinoza ought not to emphasize the points of agreement and disagreement between them – as though it could be taken for granted that they have the same or equivalent concerns – but would inquire into the direction of Bergson’s thought that makes Spinoza simultaneously one of his closest philosophical allies and, at the same time, a thinker from whom Bergson repeatedly distances himself and critiques in order to elucidate his own thinking. (shrink)

Some recent scholars have argued that Spinoza's conception of causation should be understood in terms of the Aristotelian notion of a formal cause. I argue that while they are right to identify causation in Spinoza as a relation of entailment from an essence, they are mistaken about its philosophical pedigree. I examine three suggested lines of influence: (a) the late scholastic conception of emanation; (b) early modern philosophy of mathematics; and (c) Descartes's notion of the causa sui. (...) In each case, the evidence indicates that causation in Spinoza should be categorized in Aristotelian terms as efficient and not formal. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to investigate the intertextual relationship between Spinoza and Tacitus in the Political Treatise, underlining how Spinoza uses Tacitus’ quotes against his main political enemy: Tacitism. I will show that Spinoza’s use of Tacitus is very selective and can be aptly characterized as a twofold political use: Tacitus’ quotes shape Spinoza’s political insights, but they are also used to confront Tacitism. To develop this twofold reading, after a brief introduction, I (...) will consider Tacitus’ reception in Early Modern period, describing Tacitism and its political standpoints. Then, I will analyse Spinoza’s use of Tacitus, considering his approach to three core themes: the nature of peace and sedition, the nature of the masses and the use of secrets (arcana). Finally, I will draw a comparison between the use to which Tacitus’ quotes are put by Spinoza on the one hand and by the Tacitists on the other, stressing how this comparison contributes to our understanding of their opposed political positions: democracy for Spinoza and monarchy for the Tacitists. (shrink)

In this paper I defend an eudaimonistic reading of Spinoza’s ethical philosophy. Eudaimonism refers to the mainstream ethical tradition of the ancient Greeks, which considers happiness a naturalistic, stable, and exclusively intrinsic good. Within this tradition, we can also draw a distinction between weak eudaimonists and strong eudaimonists. Weak eudaimonists do not ground their ethical conceptions of happiness in complete theories of metaphysics, epistemology, or psychology. Strong eudaimonists, conversely, build their conceptions of happiness around an overall philosophical system that (...) extends far beyond ethics, while nevertheless being directed at the promotion of a happy life. I will show that Spinozistic happiness is not only naturalistic, stable, and exclusively intrinsically good, but that Spinoza is also a strong eudaimonist because his ethical account of happiness is incomprehensible without appeal to metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological doctrines. As well, I will explain how the apparent subjective and relativistic features of Spinoza’s ethics do not undermine the eudaimonistic reading, because both Spinoza and the ancient eudaimonists grant that the beliefs/feelings of the subject play a necessary (but insufficient) role in happiness as the highest good. (shrink)

The very first line of Spinoza’s magnum opus, the Ethics, states the following surprising definition: By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing [Per causam sui intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus natura non potest concipi, nisi existens]. As we shall shortly see, for many of Spinoza’s contemporaries and predecessors the very notion of causa sui was utterly absurd, akin to a Baron (...) Munchausen attempting to lift himself above a river by pulling his hair up. How can a thing cause itself into existence, if before the causal activity, the cause did not exist at all? Indeed, in one of his earliest works, Spinoza himself claimed: “No thing, considered in itself, has in itself a cause enabling it to destroy itself (if it exists), or to make itself [te konnen maaken] (if it does not exist)” (KV II 26|I/110/14-16). Moreover, in other early works, Spinoza refers to God as an “uncreated thing” (TIE §97) or “uncreated substance” (CM II 1|I/237/20), and not as a cause-of-itself as in the Ethics. What made Spinoza desert the common, traditional, view of God as the uncaused first cause, or uncreated substance, and adopt instead the apparently chimerical notion of God as causa sui? A very likely explanation for this development suggests that Spinoza’s rationalism, his commitment to the principle that everything must have a reason both for its existence and for its non-existence – a commitment stated clearly both in the Ethics (see, for example, E1p8s2 and E1p11d2), and in Spinoza’s other writings (see, for example, Ep. 34 (IV/179/29)) – made him realize that the notion of an uncreated, or uncaused, thing is of no use for him: if everything must have a cause, then the first cause, or the most fundamental being, must be a cause-of-itself. All this is well and good, but we should not let Spinoza off the hook so easily, for the immediate question which arises now is whether Spinoza is not simply cheating his readers. Does Spinoza have a reason – i.e., argument – that could convince us that causa sui is indeed a more adequate characterization of God and not merely an opportunistic and ad hoc façade for the good old uncaused cause? While there are many important questions surrounding Spinoza’s notion of causa sui, it is the last question which will be the focus of this short chapter. In the first part of this chapter, we study, briefly, Descartes’ engagement with the notion of causa sui. In the second part, I show that Spinoza understood the causation of causa sui as efficient, and not formal, causation. The third and final part will attempt to locate precisely the alleged problem with the notion of causa sui, and consider how could Spinoza defend the intelligibility of this notion. Regrettably, limitations of space will force us to leave the examination of Spinoza’s closely related notion of being-conceived. (shrink)

: Two common ways of explaining akrasia will be presented, one which focuses on strength of desire and the other which focuses on action issuing from practical judgment. Though each is intuitive in a certain way, they both fail as explanations of the most interesting cases of akrasia. Spinoza 's own thoughts on bondage and the affects follow, from which a Spinozist explanation of akrasia is constructed. This account is based in Spinoza 's mechanistic psychology of cognitive affects. (...) Because Spinoza 's account explains action asissuing from modes of mind that are both cognitive and affective, it captures the intuitions that motivate the two traditional views while avoiding the pitfalls that result from their one‐sided approaches. This project will allow us a fuller understanding of Spinozist moral psychology. In addition to this historical value, the Spinozist theory may offer a satisfactory explanation of certain hard cases of akrasia while avoiding the problems be set by other theories. For this reason, the Spinozist account could also be seen as a useful contribution to our philosophical understanding of the phenomenon of akrasia. (shrink)

The editors of this volume, in their introduction, take Jonathan Bennett’s A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics as the exemplar for the eleven essays collected here, hailing Bennett’s book as setting “new standards for philosophical research on Spinoza”. Bennett’s work is indeed a worthy model. Aside from its more generic virtues, such as learnedness and conceptual rigor, perhaps what is most distinctive about Bennett’s treatment of Spinoza is his method, which he calls the “collegial approach.” This method proceeds (...) by studying “the texts in the spirit of a colleague, an antagonist, a student, a teacher—aiming to learn as much philosophy as one can from studying them.” Bennett has, employing this approach, produced a large number of useful works on early modern philosophers, and his efforts concerning Spinoza are among the best of them. But does Bennett’s example provide any unity for this collection? A number of these essays, Della Rocca’s and Manning’s, for example, indeed take what could be fairly described as a collegial approach to the study of Spinoza. Still others, however, such as Kulstad’s, place more emphasis on historical scholarship than the collegial approach prescribes. This matters, however, very little. Exemplary as Bennett’s work is, the study of the history of early modern philosophy has, in recent years, benefited from the work of scholars using a wide variety of methods. I think it fair to say that the essays collected in this volume, not at all to their detriment, reflect this diversity. (shrink)

The philosophy of Spinoza is increasingly recognised as holding a position of crucial importance and influence in early modern thought, and in previous years has been the focus of a rich and growing body of scholarship. In this volume of essays, leading experts in the field offer penetrating analyses of his views about God, necessity, imagination, the mind, knowledge, history, society, and politics. The essays treat questions of perennial importance in Spinoza scholarship but also constitute critical examinations (...) of his worldview. Scholars of modern philosophy will value this volume as a collection of some of the very best work done on Spinoza's philosophy. (shrink)