Pre-natal exposure to acute maternal trauma or chronic maternal distress can confer increased risk for psychiatric disorders in later life. Acute maternal trauma is the result of unforeseen environmental or personal catastrophes, while chronic maternal distress is associated with anxiety or depression. Animal studies investigating the effects of pre-natal stress have largely used brief stress exposures during pregnancy to identify critical periods of fetal vulnerability, a paradigm which holds face validity to acute maternal trauma in humans. While understanding these effects (...) is undoubtably important, the literature suggests maternal stress in humans is typically chronic and persistent from pre-conception through gestation. In this review, we provide evidence to this effect and suggest a realignment of current animal models to recapitulate this chronicity. We also consider candidate mediators, moderators and mechanisms of maternal distress, and suggest a wider breadth of research is needed, along with the incorporation of advanced -omics technologies, in order to understand the neurodevelopmental etiology of psychiatric risk. (shrink)

Philosophers have recently focused on critical, epistemological challenges that arise from the opacity of deep neural networks. One might conclude from this literature that doing good science with opaque models is exceptionally challenging, if not impossible. Yet, this is hard to square with the recent boom in optimism for AI in science alongside a flood of recent scientific breakthroughs driven by AI methods. In this paper, I argue that the disconnect between philosophical pessimism and scientific optimism is driven by a (...) failure to examine how AI is actually used in science. I show that, in order to understand the epistemic justification for AI-powered breakthroughs, philosophers must examine the role played by deep learning as part of a wider process of discovery. The philosophical distinction between the 'context of discovery' and the 'context of justification' is helpful in this regard. I demonstrate the importance of attending to this distinction with two cases drawn from the scientific literature, and show that epistemic opacity need not diminish AI's capacity to lead scientists to significant and justifiable breakthroughs. (shrink)

Deep learning (DL) has become increasingly central to science, primarily due to its capacity to quickly, efficiently, and accurately predict and classify phenomena of scientific interest. This paper seeks to understand the principles that underwrite scientists’ epistemic entitlement to rely on DL in the first place and argues that these principles are philosophically novel. The question of this paper is not whether scientists can be justified in trusting in the reliability of DL. While today’s artificial intelligence exhibits characteristics common to (...) both scientific instruments and scientific experts, this paper argues that the familiar epistemic categories that justify belief in the reliability of instruments and experts are distinct, and that belief in the reliability of DL cannot be reduced to either. Understanding what can justify belief in AI reliability represents an occasion and opportunity for exciting, new philosophy of science. (shrink)

This article is an account of the dynamics of interaction across the social sciences and neurosciences. Against an arid rhetoric of ‘interdisciplinarity’, it calls for a more expansive imaginary of what experiment – as practice and ethos – might offer in this space. Arguing that opportunities for collaboration between social scientists and neuroscientists need to be taken seriously, the article situates itself against existing conceptualizations of these dynamics, grouping them under three rubrics: ‘critique’, ‘ebullience’ and ‘interaction’. Despite their differences, each (...) insists on a distinction between sociocultural and neurobiological knowledge, or does not show how a more entangled field might be realized. The article links this absence to the ‘regime of the inter-’, an ethic of interdisciplinarity that guides interaction between disciplines on the understanding of their pre-existing separateness. The argument of the paper is thus twofold: (1) that, contra the ‘regime of the inter-’, it is no longer practicable to maintain a hygienic separation between sociocultural webs and neurobiological architecture; (2) that the cognitive neuroscientific experiment, as a space of epistemological and ontological excess, offers an opportunity to researchers, from all disciplines, to explore and register this realization. (shrink)

In recent years scholars have begun to question the usefulness of the category of ''religion'' to describe a distinctive form of human experience and behavior. In his last book, The Ideology of Religious Studies (OUP 2000), Timothy Fitzgerald argued that ''religion'' was not a private area of human existence that could be separated from the public realm and that the study of religion as such was thus impossibility. In this new book he examines a wide range of English-language texts (...) to show how religion became transformed from a very specific category indigenous to Christian culture into a universalist claim about human nature and society. These claims, he shows, are implied by and frequently explicit in theories and methods of comparative religion. But they are also tacitly reproduced throughout the humanities in the relatively indiscriminate use of ''religion'' as an a priori valid cross-cultural analytical concept, for example in historiography, sociology, and social anthropology. Fitzgerald seeks to link the argument about religion to the parallel formation of the ''non-religious'' and such dichotomies as church-state, sacred-profane, ecclesiastical-civil, spiritual-temporal, supernatural-natural, and irrational-rational. Part of his argument is that the category ''religion'' has a different logic compared to the category ''sacred,'' but the two have been consistently confused by major writers, including Durkheim and Eliade. Fitzgerald contends that ''religion'' imagined as a private belief in the supernatural was a necessary conceptual space for the simultaneous imagining of ''secular'' practices and institutions such as politics, economics, and the Nation State. The invention of ''religion'' as a universal type of experience, practice, and institution was partly the result of sacralizing new concepts of exchange, ownership, and labor practices, applying ''scientific'' rationality to human behavior, administering the colonies and classifying native institutions. In contrast, shows Fitzgerald, the sacred-profane dichotomy has a different logic of use. (shrink)

Does science have a place when it comes to making public policy? The answer might not be as simple as many people think. Ideally, scientists discover facts, and those facts inform policy. But policy undermines the open-ended nature of scientific inquiry, and scientists end up representing an agenda rather than presenting objective truths to be used to make decisions that impact the public. Through a variety of perspectives, this volume explores who wins and who loses when science and politics mix.

A perennial debate in the field of global ethics revolves around the possibility of a universalist ethics as well as arguments over the nature, and significance, of difference for moral deliberation. Decolonial literature, in particular, increasingly signifies a pluriverse – one with radical ontological and epistemological differences. This book examines the concept of the pluriverse alongside global ethics and the ethics of care in order to contemplate new ethical horizons for engaging across difference. Offering a challenge to the current state (...) of the field, this book argues for a rethinking of global ethics as it has been conceived thus far. (shrink)

Three experiments are reported that address the issue of awareness in evaluative learning in two different sensory modalities: visual and haptic. Attempts were made to manipulate the degree of awareness through a reduction technique (by use of a distractor task in Experiments 1 and 2 and by subliminally presenting affective stimuli in Experiment 3) and an induction technique (by unveiling the evaluative learning effect and requiring participants to try to discount the influence of the affective stimuli). The results indicate overall (...) that evaluative learning was successful in the awareness-reduction groups but not in the awareness-induction groups. Moreover, an effect in the opposite direction to that normally observed in evaluative learning emerged in participants aware of the stimulus contingencies. In addition, individual differences in psychological reactance were found to be implicated in the strength and direction of the effect. It is argued that these results pose serious problems for the contention that awareness is necessary for evaluative learning. (shrink)

This article is about the future of sociology, as transformations in the digital and biological sciences lay claim to the discipline’s jurisdictional hold over ‘the social’. Rather than analyse the specifics of these transformations, however, the focus of the article is on how a narrative of methodological crisis is sustained in sociology, and on how such a narrative conjures very particular disciplinary futures. Through a close reading of key texts, the article makes two claims: (1) that a surprisingly conventional urge (...) towards disciplinary reproduction often animates accounts of sociology’s crisis; (2) that, even more surprisingly, these same accounts are often haunted by a hidden metaphorical architecture centred on biology, vitality, vigour and life. The central gambit of the article is that, perhaps in spite of itself, this subterranean image of life actually hints at less reproductively conventional ways of understanding – and intervening in – sociology’s methodological ‘crisis’. Drawing, empirically, on the author’s recent work on urban stress and, theoretically, on Stefan Helmreich’s (2011, 2016) account of ‘limit biologies’, the articles ends with a call for a ‘limit sociology’ – a form of attention that could, similarly, expand rather than contract the present moment of transformation. At the heart of the article is a hope that thinking with such a limit may help sociologists to imagine a less deadening future than that on offer from a canonised discipline cathected by endless crisis-talk. (shrink)

Popular culture could be understood as a political battleground where conflicting meanings are inscribed into the “ordinary objects” that constitute that public sphere. This is also true for science fiction television series. This article critically examines how political matters and ethical agencies are represented within The Expanse, a series that takes place within a speculative twenty-fourth century milky way. Firstly, I will situate The Expanse within its generic “system of reference.” Then, I will illustrate how political matters are represented as (...) conjoined with the ethical. While the ethical refers to actions of persons, politics refers to fictional conceptions of what Tristan Garcia’s terms we-ourselves, understood as conflicting and overlapping conceptions of “we.” The conjunction between the political and the ethical in The Expanse is spatiotemporal: the characters, the events they are entangled in, and the spaces that connect discrete events develop through fictional and literal time. I argue that the science fictional representations of “we-ourselves,” and the specific spatiotemporal representational capacities of the television series format, can be understood through the application of Mikhail Bakhtin’s concepts of the chronotope and the dialogic. That is, The Expanse’s we-representations are chronotopic and the refractive rhetoric of television is dialogic. (shrink)

Recent studies have shown that the basic evaluative conditioning (EC) effect (originally neutral stimuli acquiring an affective value congruent with the valence of the affective stimulus they were paired with) seems to be limited to participants who are unaware of the stimulus pairings. If participants are aware of the pairings, reactance effects occur (i.e., changes in the opposite direction of the valence of the affective stimulus). To examine whether these reactance effects are due to processes of conscious countercontrol or whether (...) the ratings reflect intrinsic feelings towards the stimuli, a new procedure was developed that included a bogus‐pipeline condition. In this procedure, which was adapted from attitude research, participants were connected to bogus lie detector equipment leading them to believe that their “true” affective‐evaluative responses were being observed. In Experiment 1, reactance effects occurred also in this procedure, suggesting that the effect is spontaneous and not due to processes of conscious countercontrol. In Experiment 2, these effects were replicated using a between‐subjects design in addition to the standard within‐subjects control condition. (shrink)

Albert of Saxony was one of the great logicians of the Middle Ages, on a par with William Ockham and John Buridan. The Twenty-Five Disputed Questions on Logic treat of central issues in logic, both then and now, such as the nature of meaning, of universals, of truth, and of tense and modality; and the quality and quantity of propositions, the role of negation, and the relations of contradiction and equivalence between them. Dr. Fitzgerald has studied Albert's work extensively, (...) and previously edited the Twenty-Five Disputed Questions from the original manuscripts. This translation makes available for the first time in English this careful and exemplary examination of logical notions by an outstanding medieval thinker.-Stephen Read, University of St. Andrews. (shrink)

This book is available as open access through the Bloomsbury Open Access programme and is available on www.bloomsburycollections.com. Digital technology has transformed the way that we visualise the natural world, the art we create and the stories we tell about our environments. Exploring contemporary digital art and literature through an ecocritical lens, Digital Vision and the Ecological Aesthetic (1968-2018) demonstrates the many ways in which critical ideas of the sublime, the pastoral and the picturesque have been renewed and shaped in (...) digital media, from electronic literature to music and the visual arts. The book goes on to explore the ecological implications of these new forms of cultural representation in the digital age and in so doing makes a profound contribution to our understanding of digital art practice in the 21st century. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that the development and convergence of information and communication technologies (ICT) is creating a global network of surveillance capabilities which affect the traveler. These surveillance capabilities are reminiscent of 18th century philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, and as such the emerging global surveillance network has been referred to as the travel panopticon. I argue that the travel panopticon is corrosive of personal autonomy, and in doing so I describe and analyse various philosophical approaches to personal autonomy.

I argue that university supervisors should not use student evaluations of teachers (SETs) as a measure of teaching effectiveness in personnel assessments because the evidence suggests SETs likely violate several duties university supervisors have toward their instructional employees. I focus on the duty to not knowingly impose a wrongful risk of harm on nonconsenting and innocent others. Many university employers impose a wrongful risk of harm on instructors by not using relevant, merit-based performance indicators that have adequate construct validity, by (...) using uncorrected indicators that likely perpetuate discrimination, and by incentivizing instructors to do wrong. The use of SETs imposes unjust risk of harm on all instructors, but the risk is higher for women, minorities, and those in precarious, teaching-focused roles. In conclusion, I tentatively suggest some other means of evaluating student learning and assessing instructors. (shrink)

The question of the analyticity of Hume’s Principle (HP) is central to the neo-logicist project. We take on this question with respect to Frege’s definition of analyticity, which entails that a sentence cannot be analytic if it can be consistently denied within the sphere of a special science. We show that HP can be denied within non-standard analysis and argue that if HP is taken to depend on Frege’s definition of number, it isn’t analytic, and if HP is taken to (...) be primitive there is only a very narrow range of circumstances where it might be taken to be analytic. The latter discussion also sheds some light on the connections between the Bad Company and Caesar objections. (shrink)

We argue that the effects of evaluative learning may occur (a) without conscious perception of the affective stimuli, (b) without awareness of the stimulus contingencies, and (c) without any awareness that learning has occurred at all. Whether the three experiments reported in our target article provide conclusive evidence for either or any of these assertions is discussed in the commentaries of De Houwer and Field. We respond with the argument that when considered alongside other studies carried out over the past (...) few decades, our experiments provide compelling evidence for a theory that posits a dissociation between evaluative learning and contingency awareness. (shrink)

How much should someone contribute to trying to prevent unnecessary deaths and severe hardships? MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord propose tithing for most of the rich (as measured by income), which has been influential in the effective altruism community. My aim in this article is to contribute, through amending their proposal, to their important project of searching for a weak or very weak principle of sacrifice that would still revise upward how much money goes to the most effective organizations. I do (...) so by presenting four objections to their argument based on demandingness, fairness, net wealth, and historical and contemporary injustices. Then, I show that a principle of progressive can overcome these objections and better fits the reasons MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord give in favour of their principle than their proposed operationalization of tithing. (shrink)

This book provides international perspectives on the law of copyright in relation to three core themes - copyright and developing countries; the government and copyright; and technology and the future of copyright. The third theme includes an examination of the extent to which technology will dictate the development of the law, and a re-examination of the role of copyright in fostering innovation and creativity. As a critique, one chapter discusses how certain rights can create or reinforce social inequality under copyright (...) royalty systems. Underlying these themes is the role the law of copyright has in encouraging or impeding human flourishing. (shrink)

Quick reference guide includes illustrated explanations of the most common terms used in general math classes. Discusses how students can use manipulatives and basic math tools to improve their understanding. With measurement conversion tables, guides to geometric shapes, and more.

Modern medicine has produced many wonderful technological breakthroughs that have extended the limits of the frail human body. However, much of the focus of this medical research has been on the physical, often reducing the human being to a biological machine to be examined, understood, and controlled. This book begins by asking whether the modern medical milieu has overly objectified the body, unwittingly or not, and whether current studies in bioethics are up to the task of restoring a fuller understanding (...) of the human person. In response, various authors here suggest that a more theological/religious approach would be helpful, or perhaps even necessary. Presenting specific perspectives from Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the book is divided into three parts: "Understanding the Body," "Respecting the Body," and "The Body at the End of Life." A panel of expert contributors—including philosophers, physicians, and theologians and scholars of religion— answer key questions such as: What is the relationship between body and soul? What are our obligations toward human bodies? How should medicine respond to suffering and death? The resulting text is an interdisciplinary treatise on how medicine can best function in our societies. Offering a new way to approach the medical humanities, this book will be of keen interest to any scholars with an interest in contemporary religious perspectives on medicine and the body. (shrink)

An overview of the philosophical and bioethics literature on conscientious refusals by health care professionals to provide abortion and contraceptive services.

Michael Walzer argues that the just cause for humanitarian intervention is not met if there are only “ordinary” levels of human rights abuses within a state because he believes that respecting the right to collective self-determination is more morally important than protecting other individual rights. Several prominent critics of Walzer advocate for a more permissive account of a just cause. They argue that protecting individuals’ human rights is more morally important than respecting a right to collective self-determination. I argue that (...) these two accounts are far more similar than either Walzer or his critics realize because collective self-determination requires the protection of some human rights in order to allow each person the opportunity to participate in collective choices. Consequently, the just cause for intervention is met whenever at least some important human rights of one person are violated and others are being credibly threatened. The counter intuitive conclusion of my argument is that justified interventions can actually promote rather than undermine collective self-determination because just interventions allow innocents, who otherwise would have excluded from this process, the opportunity to contribute to collective choices. Of course, a just cause is insufficient in itself for intervention to be permissible because other just war precepts must also be met. (shrink)

Origin essentialism gained prominence following Saul Kripke's endorsement of the view in Naming and Necessity. Since Kripke, several authors have developed arguments for origin essentialism; yet, no argument currently on offer adequately defends the view. In this thesis, I examine four arguments for origin essentialism and argue that each is unsuccessful. I offer a counter-model against the view that origin essentialism is a consequence of Kripke's work in Naming and Necessity. I show that Nathan Salmon's refinement of Kripke's argument for (...) origin essentialism fails because it assumes an implausible principle. I discuss Graeme Forbes's argument, which proceeds from the assumptions of the necessity of identity and that there are no bare truths concerning identity, and show that origin essentialism is not a consequence of those assumptions. Lastly, I show that a branching model of possibility fails as a basis for a persuasive defence of origin essentialism due to implausible consequences. (shrink)

If it could be shown that one of Gentzen's consistency proofs for pure number theory could be shown to be finitistically acceptable, an important part of Hilbert's program would be vindicated. This paper focuses on whether the transfinite induction on ordinal notations needed for Gentzen's second proof can be finitistically justified. In particular, the focus is on Takeuti's purportedly finitistically acceptable proof of the well-ordering of ordinal notations in Cantor normal form. The paper begins with a historically informed discussion of (...) finitism and its limits, before introducing Gentzen and Takeuti's respective proofs. The rest of the paper is dedicated to investigating the finitistic acceptability of Takeuti's proof, including a small but important fix to that proof. That discussion strongly suggests that there is a philosophically interesting finitist standpoint that Takeuti's proof, and therefore Gentzen's proof, conforms to. (shrink)

If one of Gentzen’s consistency proofs for pure number theory could be shown to be finitistically acceptable, an important part of Hilbert’s program would be vindicated. This paper focuses on whether the transfinite induction on ordinal notations needed for Gentzen’s second proof can be finitistically justified. In particular, the focus is on Takeuti’s purportedly finitistically acceptable proof of the well ordering of ordinal notations in Cantor normal form.The paper begins with a historically informed discussion of finitism and its limits, before (...) introducing Gentzen and Takeuti’s respective proofs. The rest of the paper is dedicated to investigating the finitistic acceptability of Takeuti’s proof, including a small but important fix to that proof. That discussion strongly suggests that there is a philosophically interesting finitist standpoint that Takeuti’s proof, and therefore Gentzen’s proof, conforms to. (shrink)

If one of Gentzen’s consistency proofs for pure number theory could be shown to be finitistically acceptable, an important part of Hilbert’s program would be vindicated. This paper focuses on whether the transfinite induction on ordinal notations needed for Gentzen’s second proof can be finitistically justified. In particular, the focus is on Takeuti’s purportedly finitistically acceptable proof of the well ordering of ordinal notations in Cantor normal form.The paper begins with a historically informed discussion of finitism and its limits, before (...) introducing Gentzen and Takeuti’s respective proofs. The rest of the paper is dedicated to investigating the finitistic acceptability of Takeuti’s proof, including a small but important fix to that proof. That discussion strongly suggests that there is a philosophically interesting finitist standpoint that Takeuti’s proof, and therefore Gentzen’s proof, conforms to. (shrink)

The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...) but also by genuinely visual representations as well as beliefs. I conclude with some brief remarks on the role of object-directed bodily action in conferring a sense of unseen presence on an object's occluded features. (shrink)

We have seen important work on questions such as: whether there is a uniquely female approach to ethics, whether ethics should be par.

In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements—an (...) act of what I call ‘make‐perceive’. (shrink)