Finding a Fit Among Philosophical Finitisms

In Bharath Sriraman (ed.), Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Cham: Springer. pp. 443-461 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

David Hilbert sought to secure the epistemic foundations of mathematics by providing consistency proofs of axiomatized mathematical theories from within the finite standpoint. This standpoint requires concrete constructions without reference to completed infinities. In 1938, Gerhardt Gentzen proved the consistency of first-order Peano Arithmetic relying on the well-ordering of certain ordinal notations. This was thought by Gentzen and Paul Bernays to be finitistically acceptable. However, a finitistically acceptable proof of the relevant well-ordering was not available until Gaisi Takeuti’s proof in 1978. Beginning with the proposition that Takeuti’s proof conforms to the finite standpoint, this chapter explores the limits of a finitism based on the methods of Gentzen and Takeuti. It is argued that the upper limit is the Feferman-Schütte ordinal, and thus that finitism may be extended to strong subsystems of second-order arithmetic-systems strong enough to provide a theory of the ordinals for which Gentzen employed notations.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,075

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Takeuti’s Well-Ordering Proof: Finitistically Fine?Eamon Darnell & Aaron Thomas-Bolduc - 2018 - In Amy Ackerberg-Hastings, Marion W. Alexander, Zoe Ashton, Christopher Baltus, Phil Bériault, Daniel J. Curtin, Eamon Darnell, Craig Fraser, Roger Godard, William W. Hackborn, Duncan J. Melville, Valérie Lynn Therrien, Aaron Thomas-Bolduc & R. S. D. Thomas (eds.), Research in History and Philosophy of Mathematics: The Cshpm 2017 Annual Meeting in Toronto, Ontario. Springer Verlag. pp. 167-180.
On the philosophical significance of consistency proofs.Michael D. Resnik - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1/2):133 - 147.
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. [REVIEW]T. W. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 10 (4):726-726.
Unificatory Understanding and Explanatory Proofs.Joachim Frans - 2020 - Foundations of Science 26 (4):1105-1127.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-04-27

Downloads
2 (#1,805,981)

6 months
2 (#1,202,487)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Eamon Darnell
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Aaron Thomas-Bolduc
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references