Morality is often thought of as non-rational or sub-rational. In Moral Notions, first published in 1967, Julius Kovesi argues that the rationality of morality is built into the way we construct moral concepts. In showing this he also resolves the old Humean conundrum of the relation between 'facts' and 'values'. And he puts forward a method of reasoning that might make 'applied ethics' (at present largely a hodge-podge of opinions) into a constructive discipline. Kovesi's general theory of concepts - (...) important in its own right - is indebted to his interpretation of Plato, and his three papers on Plato, first published here, explain this debt. This new edition of Moral Notions also includes a foreward by Philippa Foot, a biography of the author, and a substantial afterword in which the editors, Robert Ewin and Alan Tapper, explain the signficance of Kovesi's work. (shrink)

Proceedings of the 1970 Stanford Workshop on Grammar and Semantics.

Salience reasoning, many have argued, can help solve coordination problems, but only if such reasoning is supplemented by higher-order predictions, e.g. beliefs about what others believe yet others will choose. In this paper, I will argue that this line of reasoning is self-undermining. Higher-order behavioral predictions defeat salience-based behavioral predictions. To anchor my argument in the philosophical literature, I will develop it in response and opposition to the popular Lewisian model of salience reasoning in coordination games. This model imports the (...) problematic higher-order beliefs by way of a ‘symmetric reasoning’ constraint. In the second part of this paper, I will argue that a player may employ salience reasoning only if she suspends judgment about what others believe yet others will do. (shrink)

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick Ferré. These essays, informed by the insights of Ferré and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick FerrZ. These essays, informed by the insights of FerrZ and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

Maslow, A. A. Towards a humanistic biology.--Murphy, G. The inside and the outside of creativity.--Stacy, D. L. Art and human creativity.--Parnes, S. J. Creative potential and the educational experiment.--Laszlo, E. "Reverence for natural systems."--McInnis, N. Gestalt ecology.--Harman, W. H. Alternate futures and habitability.--Smith, R. A. Synergistic organizations.--Reiser, O. L. The cosmic lens, the galactic disc, and the archetypal holograms.--Smith, R. A. "Unibutz."--Stulman, J. Beyond crisis.

One of the questions that any future history of British moral philosophy in the twentieth century should investigate and document is how it came about that Moore's Principia Ethica was appropriated by what we can call the Humean tradition of moral philosophy. I shall not trace that development now but only argue that there was no excuse or justification for it.

Dieser Titel aus dem De Gruyter-Verlagsarchiv ist digitalisiert worden, um ihn der wissenschaftlichen Forschung zugänglich zu machen. Da der Titel erstmals im Nationalsozialismus publiziert wurde, ist er in besonderem Maße in seinem historischen Kontext zu betrachten. Mehr erfahren Sie hier.

Dieser Titel aus dem De Gruyter-Verlagsarchiv ist digitalisiert worden, um ihn der wissenschaftlichen Forschung zugänglich zu machen. Da der Titel erstmals im Nationalsozialismus publiziert wurde, ist er in besonderem Maße in seinem historischen Kontext zu betrachten. Mehr erfahren Sie hier.

The concept of the energid (which refers to “energy,” or “vital force”; in modern terms, adenosine triphosphate, ATP) is that the smallest unity of life is the nucleus and the amount of protoplasm the nucleus can “control” metabolically. The concept of the cell as a nucleus-protoplasm “unit” confined by either a cell membrane or cell wall (e.g., mammalian or land plant cells) is rejected. Examples of multinucleate organisms such as coenocytic algae are presented as “proof of concept” of the energid. (...) [Abstract and keywords not in original.]. (shrink)

According to the standard view, a belief is based on a reason and doxastically justified—i.e., permissibly held—only if a causal relation obtains between a reason and the belief. In this paper, I argue that a belief can be doxastically justified by a reason’s mere disposition to sustain it. Such a disposition, however, wouldn’t establish a causal connection unless it were manifested. My argument is that, in the cases I have in mind, the manifestation of this disposition would add no positive (...) epistemic feature to the belief: a belief that is justified after the manifestation of a reason’s causal powers must have already been justified before their manifestation. As a result, those who adhere to the standard causal view of the basing relation face a hard choice: they should either abandon the enormously popular view that doxastic justification has a basing requirement or modify their view of the basing relation. (shrink)

This chapter highlights that what is today perhaps most commonly called a “theory of meaning” (i.e., one where there is a robust sense of “theory” not exemplified in Wittgenstein's work) will in most cases be “pure” in Rorty's sense (i.e., it will have no direct epistemological concerns) and can (in Dummett's sense) only be a modest one, since it does not explain what “being in command of a concept” consists in. It typically treats a logical system of the kind developed (...) by Frege as a point of comparison to shed light on some aspects of natural languages. Aspects of language that might be brought into focus by such a comparison are the “calculus” side of language (the side to which our “algebraic understanding” applies). (shrink)

In discussing the ways in which we hold each other accountable for immoral conduct, philosophers have often focused on blame, aiming to specify adequate responses to wrongdoing. In contrast, theorizing about the ways we can appropriately respond to minor moral mistakes – i.e., criticizable conduct that is bad but not wrong – has largely been neglected. My first goal in this paper is, thus, to draw attention to this blind spot and argue that a separate account of blameless moral criticism (...) is desirable. My second goal is to propose one way to explicate the contrast between blaming and blameless moral criticism in terms of the contrast between moral anger and moral disappointment: while moral anger, as many argue, is an appropriate response to moral wrongdoing, moral disappointment, but not moral anger, is an appropriate response to these minor moral mistakes. (shrink)

Zweifellos ist es normalerweise moralisch falsch, eine Person zu töten. Was jedoch sind die Gründe? Im ersten Kapitel rekonstruiere ich einen der elaboriertesten Ansätze zur Ethik des Tötens: den zweigleisigen Ansatz Jeff McMahans. Das erste Gleis dieses Ansatzes basiert auf der konsequentialistischen Annahme, dass Töten insofern pro tanto falsch ist, als es beim Opfer objektiven Schaden erzeugt, indem es dieses der Güter beraubt, die es erlangt hätte, hätte es weiterleben können. Das zweite Gleis ist für Personen reserviert: Es baut auf (...) der kantianischen These auf, dass es stets im gleichem Maße falsch ist, Personen zu töten. Im zweiten Abschnitt erläutere ich, worin meiner Ansicht nach die Schwierigkeiten dieses Ansatzes liegen, und plädiere für eine Differenzierung zwischen subjektivem und objektivem Schaden. Im dritten Abschnitt argumentiere ich bezüglich des ersten Gleises für eine subjektivistische Variante des schadensbasierten Ansatzes. Im vierten Abschnitt diskutiere ich das zweite Gleis: die These der gleichen Schlechtigkeit der Tötung von Personen, und komme zu einem skeptischen Resultat. (shrink)

Common sense realism, by E. G. Bewkes.--Theology and religious experience, by Vergilius Ferm.--A reasoned faith, by G. F. Thomas.--Can religion become empirical? By J. S. Bixler.--Value theory and theology, by H. R. Niebuhr.--The truth in myths, by Reinhold Niebuhr.--Is subjectivism in value theory compatible with realism and meliorism? By Cornelius Krusé.--The semi-detached knower: a note on radical empiricism, by R. L. Calhoun.--The new scientific and metaphysical basis for epistemological theory, by F. S. C. Northrop.--A psychological approach to reality, by Hugh (...) Hartshorne.--A definition of religious liberalism, by D. S. Robinson. (shrink)

This paper applied the philosophical theory of critical realism to the problem of evil. Using the method of critical analysis of related literature, the paper discovered, among other things, that e...

According to Regulatory Focus Theory, two systems determine our strategies to pursue goals – the promotion and the prevention system. Individuals with a dominant promotion system focus on achieving gains, i.e., promoters, and individuals with a dominant prevention system focus on avoiding losses, i.e., preventers. Regulatory Fit Theory suggests that a fit between this focus and the situation causes superior performance and makes individuals feel right. We transfer the fit idea to the interaction of dominant regulatory focus with motivational direction. (...) We investigated these interaction effects on individuals’ performance and their experience within creativity workshops. In Study 1, using multi-level analyses, we found that a promotion focus was associated with fluency and a prevention focus with elaborated ideas. This effect was stronger, when preventers also scored high on avoidance motivation. Further, preventers experienced more autonomy support and were more satisfied when they scored high on avoidance. Promoters high on approach motivation reported more autonomy support and more satisfaction than preventers high on approach motivation. For Study 2, we used an experimental design: After measuring regulatory focus, we manipulated approach vs. avoidance motivation in creativity workshops. Using multi-level analyses, we did not find main or interaction effects on fluency or elaboration but we found interaction effects on participants’ experience of the creativity workshop. Preventers were more satisfied when they received the avoidance condition. Promoters reported less autonomy support, lower satisfaction, and more perceived conflicts within their teams in the avoidance condition. (shrink)

As the black clouds of war lift from the surface of the Continents of Europe and Nearer Asia, the eye looks round upon a shattered civilization. The once busy tide of labour on the field and in the factory, beneath the soil and within dock, ebbs slowly away; the accustomed rewards of toil, food, warmth and clothing, become daily more difficult of attainment. Authority trembles in its seat, and money loses its once all-powerful attraction. Inevitably the scholar recalls the tale (...) of the Decline and Fall of the Roman-Hellenistic world, and calculates the prospect of a second millennium of darkness and suffering. And he is not unconscious that he stands himself accused of having brought about, or at least failed to avert, the doom of the nations. For, he is told, the governing classes of all the nations that clashed in mutual destructiveness were constituted of men brought up in the classical tradition, whose minds in their fresh boyhood were fed on the so-called glories of Alexander the Great and of Julius Caesar, and who sought in rivalry to win, each for his nation, the haughty supremacy of imperial Rome. And he hears the clamour of those who demand a clean sweep of the false ideals and selfish ambitions of the past, and the building upon new foundations of a world of contentment and peace, inspired by the basic conception of a citizenship in which no man shall seek his own gain at the cost of another's loss. Towards the building up of this new world, it is claimed, the study of the past can do nothing to help; by effacing itself it will cease to be a hindrance. And in response to this accusation there arise in all directions schemes for a reconstructed world, a reconstituted nation, and a new education, which shall be alike in this one point—that they take for granted the elimination of the study of antiquity and the disappearance of the atmosphere of the Humanities. (shrink)

Concepts, Kovesi argued in Moral Notions and elsewhere, are formed from a point of view; they express relevant needs, wants, interests, ideals, and attitudes, and are formed from a point of view that can be anybody’s. The point of view need not be everybody’s (not everybody is interested in chess, for example), but it is a point of view that can be taken by anybody. The point of view expresses our purpose in forming the concept (p. 48)1; it is the (...) point of view of somebody dealing with certain sorts of problems, and that determines which material elements will come under the concept. But Kovesi refuses to explain in any of his writings what the moral point of view is, and says that it is no part of his project to explain that (see especially pp. 105 ff). This is not a matter of his refusing to say whether he is taking a Utilitarian point of view or an Emotivist point of view of anything of that sort. His question is a much more basic one about the logical structure of moral concepts and their relationships to the problems morality is formed to deal with. His refusal to explain the moral point of view is puzzling. The moral point of view that Kovesi envisaged, I think, is the point of view of members of a species the members of which have to get on together, a species members of which have the qualities of character that enable them to get on together. (shrink)

Julius Kovesi was a moral philosopher contemporary with Alasdair MacIntyre, and dealing with many of the same questions as MacIntyre. In our view, Kovesi’s moral philosophy is rich in ideas and worth revisiting. MacIntyre agrees: Kovesi’s Moral Notions, he has said, is ‘a minor classic in moral philosophy that has not yet received its due’. Kovesi was not a thinker whose work fits readily into any one tradition. Unlike the later MacIntyre, he was not a Thomistic Aristotelian, nor even (...) an Aristotelian. He saw his viewpoint as Platonic, or perhaps more accurately as Socratic. His writings, unlike MacIntyre’s, have little to say about justice. However, Kovesi did offfer a theory of practical reason. His main contention was that all human social life embodies a set of concepts that govern and guide that life, concepts without which that life would be impossible. These include our moral concepts. For Kovesi, moral concepts are not external to, but constitutive of social life in any of its possible forms. But in the course of his argument he also developed a way of thinking about how concepts work, which we term ‘conceptual functionalism’, and which we will elucidate. (shrink)