Related categories

332 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 332
  1. Graphomania and the All-or-Nothing Problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    When Milan Kundera introduces the concept of graphomania, he seems to register only two extremes: the person who writes for a few known people and the person who writes for a very large audience. Joe Horton’s all-or-nothing problem provides a way of making sense of this conceptualization of the situation, though in a way that breaks with Kundera’s emphasis on a writer’s craving for audience attention.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Farewell to Arms? The All-or-Nothing Problem Again.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Joe Horton’s all-or-nothing problem concerns a situation in which it is morally permissible to do nothing and to save two people but not to save only one. This description seems to entail that we should do nothing rather than save only one. I object to Horton’s solution and challenge a principle he draws attention to, which is required to generate the problem but which Horton regards as beyond dispute.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Note: An Adult Version of the All-or-Nothing Problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    I present an example in which the all-or-nothing problem involves adults, rather than children in danger.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. The Flowchart Solution to the All-or-Nothing Problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This paper presents what I call “the flowchart solution” to Joe Horton’s all-or-nothing problem. Rather than three options – don’t save any child, save one, or save two – there is a flowchart with a choice of don’t save or save, and then within save, save one or save two.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. A Compensatory Solution to the All-or-Nothing Problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    The all-or-nothing problem, formulated by Joe Horton, presents us with a situation in which you can do nothing or save one child or save two. It is dangerous to save any, making doing nothing morally permissible, but there is no extra danger in saving two, so it seems wrong to just save one. But then doing nothing is morally better than saving one. I present a solution in response to this problematic result, which is that doing nothing is not an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. A Metaphysical Solution to the All-or-Nothing Problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    In this paper, I present a metaphysical solution to the all-or-nothing problem, which rejects the description of the choices in favour of lower-level descriptions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Does the Anthropocene Require Us to Be Saints?Bennett Gilbert - manuscript
    The question of the moral demands that humans, posthumans, and nonhumans in the Anthropocene put up on persons now living generally takes the form of supererogatory demands—that is, moral obligations with a perfectionist structure leading to obligations “above and beyond the call of duty” and extreme individual and collective sacrifice. David Roden construes this by deontology; Toby Ord, following Derek Parfit, by consequentualism. Such obligations are akin to the martyrdom of saints: but must our expectations of the Anthropocene necessarily lead (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Finlay's Radical Altruism.Gerald Hull - manuscript
    The question “Why should I be moral?” has long haunted normative ethics. How one answers it depends critically upon one’s understanding of morality, self-interest, and the relation between them. Stephen Finlay, in “Too Much Morality”, challenges the conventional interpretation of morality in terms of mutual fellowship, offering instead the “radical” view that it demands complete altruistic self-abnegation: the abandonment of one’s own interests in favor of those of any “anonymous” other. He ameliorates this with the proviso that there is no (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. All Reasons Are Moral.Daniel Muñoz - manuscript
    Morality doesn't always require our best. Prudent acts and heroic sacrifices are optional, not obligatory. To explain this, some philosophers claim that reasons of self-interest must have a special "non-moral" significance. A better explanation, I argue, is that we have prerogatives based in rights.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    This is Chapter 5 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that those who wish to accommodate typical instances of supererogation and agent-centered options must deny that moral reasons are morally overriding and accept both that the reason that agents have to promote their own self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this reason can, and sometimes does, prevent the moral reason that they have to sacrifice their self-interest so as to do more to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. What’s the Use of Non-Moral Supererogation?Alfred Archer - forthcoming - In The Springer Handbook of Supererogation. Springer.
    While moral philosophers have paid significant attention to the concept of moral supererogation, far less attention has been paid to the possibility that supererogation may also exist in other areas of normativity. Recently, though, philosophers have begun to consider the possible existence of prudential, epistemic, aesthetic and sporting supererogation. These discussions tend to focus on aspects of our practices in these areas of normativity that suggest an implicit acceptance of the existence of supererogation. In this chapter, I will offer a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Supererogation and Optimisation.Christian Barry & Seth Lazar - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Must We Be Perfect?: A Case Against Supererogation.Megan Fritts & Calum Miller - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63.
    In this paper we offer an argument against supererogation and in favour of moral perfectionism. We argue three primary points: 1) That the putative moral category is not generated by any of the main normative ethical systems, and it is difficult to find space for it in these systems at all; 2) That the primary support for supererogation is based on intuitions, which can be undercut by various other pieces of evidence; and 3) That there are better reasons to favour (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Pacifists Are Admirable Only If They're Right.Blake Hereth - forthcoming - Public Affairs Quarterly.
    The recent explosion of philosophical papers on Confederate and Colonialist statues centers on a central question: When, if ever, is it permissible to admire a person? This paper contends it’s not just Confederates and slavers whose reputations are on the line, but also pacifists like Martin Luther King, Jr., and Daisy Bates whose commitments to pacifism meant they were unwilling to save others using defensive violence, including others they talked into endangering themselves for the sake of racial equality. Other things (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Springer Handbook of Supererogation.David Heyd (ed.) - forthcoming - Springer.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Permissiveness in Morality and Epistemology.Han Li & Bradford Saad - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Morality is intrapersonally permissive: cases abound in which an agent has more than one morally permitted option. In contrast, there is a dearth of cases in which an agent has more than one epistemically permitted response to her evidence. Given the structural parallels between morality and epistemology, why do sources of moral permissiveness fail to have parallel permissive effects in the epistemic domain? This asymmetry between morality and epistemology cries out for explanation. The paper's task is to offer an answer (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Impartiality, Eudaimonic Encroachment, and the Boundaries of Morality.Errol Lord - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
    Many hold that morality is essentially impartial. Many also hold that partiality is justified. Susan Wolf argues that these commitments push us towards downgrading morality's practical significance. Here I argue that there is a way of pushing morality's boundaries in a partialist direction in a way that respects Wolf's insights.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Schofield, Paul. Duty to Self: Moral, Political, and Legal Self-Relation. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 240. $74.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW]Daniel Muñoz - forthcoming - Ethics.
    Summarizes Schofield's book, sings praises, gives objections.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Resuscitation During the Pandemic: Optional Obligation? Or Supererogation?Jonathan Perkins, Mark Hamilton, Charlotte Canniff, Craig Gannon, Marianne Illsley, Paul Murray, Kate Scribbins, Martin Stockwell, Justin Wilson & Ann Gallagher - forthcoming - Sage Publications: Clinical Ethics.
    Clinical Ethics, Ahead of Print. This paper is a response to a recent BMJ Blog: ‘The duty to treat: where do the limits lie?’ Members of the Surrey Heartlands Integrated Care Service Clinical Ethics Group reflected on arguments in the Blog in relation to resuscitation during the COVID-19 pandemic.Clinicians have had to contend with ever-changing and conflicting guidance from the Resuscitation Council UK and Public Health England regarding personal protective equipment requirements in resuscitation situations. St John Ambulance had different guidance (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Latitude, Supererogation, and Imperfect Duties.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - In David Heyd (ed.), Springer Handbook of Supererogation. Springer.
  21. Supererogation.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - In J. E. Crimmins & D. C. Long (eds.), Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism.
    This is a general introduction to supererogation in relation to utilitarianism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism.Theron Pummer - forthcoming - New York: Oxford University Press.
    When do you have to sacrifice life and limb, time and money, to prevent harm to others? When must you save more people rather than fewer? These questions might arise in emergencies involving strangers drowning or trapped in burning buildings, but they also arise in our everyday lives, in which we confront opportunities to donate time or money to help distant strangers in need of food, shelter, or medical care. With the resources available, we can provide more help--or less. -/- (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. How Reasons Determine Moral Requirements.Thomas Schmidt - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 18. Oxford, Vereinigtes Königreich:
    Cases of heroic supererogation have been taken to suggest that non-moral reasons are morally relevant. While non-moral reasons are unable to make actions morally required, they can prevent moral reasons from doing so. I argue that non-moral reasons are morally relevant in yet another way, since they can also play an essential role in making it the case that an action is morally required. Even though non-moral reasons are not able themselves to make actions morally required, they can prevent reasons (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Being Rational Enough: Maximizing, Satisficing, and Degrees of Rationality.Wes Siscoe - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Against the maximizing conception of practical rationality, Michael Slote has argued that rationality does not always require choosing what is most rational. Instead, it can sometimes be rational to do something that is less-than-fully rational. In this paper, I will argue that maximizers have a ready response to Slote’s position. Roy Sorensen has argued that ‘rational’ is an absolute term, suggesting that it is not possible to be rational without being completely rational. Sorensen’s view is confirmed by the fact that, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Reasons, Competition, and Latitude.Justin Snedegar - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 16. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The overall moral status of an option—whether it is required, permissible, forbidden, or something we really should do—is explained by competition between the contributory reasons bearing on that option and the alternatives. A familiar challenge for accounts of this competition is to explain the existence of latitude: there are usually multiple permissible options, rather than a single required option. One strategy is to appeal to distinctions between reasons that compete in different ways. Philosophers have introduced various kinds of non-requiring reasons (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. Weighing Reasons Against.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Ethicists increasingly reject the scale as a useful metaphor for weighing reasons. Yet they generally retain the metaphor of a reason’s weight. This combination is incoherent. The metaphor of weight entails a very specific scale-based model of weighing reasons, Dual Scale. Justin Snedegar worries that scale-based models of weighing reasons can’t properly weigh reasons against an option. I show that there are, in fact, two different reasons for/against distinctions, and I provide an account of the relationship between the various kinds (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. Parity, Moral Options, and the Weights of Reasons.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Noûs.
    The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We’ll see that this simple view leads to paradox in at least two (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Supererogatory Duties and Caregiver Heroic Testimony.Chris Weigel - forthcoming - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly.
    Nurses in hard hit cities during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic and family caregivers for people with late-stage Alzheimer’s disease present two puzzles. First, traditional accounts of supererogation cannot allow for the possibility of making enormous sacrifices that make one’s actions supererogatory simply to do what morality requires. These caregivers, however, are doing their moral duty, yet their actions also seem to be paradigmatic cases of supererogation. I argue that Dale Dorsey’s new account of supererogation can solve this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Exploring and Expanding Supererogatory Acts: Beyond Duty for a Sustainable Future.Gareth R. T. White, Anthony Samuel & Robert J. Thomas - forthcoming - Journal of Business Ethics:1-24.
    Supererogation has gained attention as a means of explaining the voluntary behaviours of individuals and organizations that are done for the benefit of others and which go above what is required of legislation and what may be expected by society. Whilst the emerging literature has made some significant headway in exploring supererogation as an ethical lens for the study of business there remain several important issues that require attention. These comprise, the lack of primary evidence upon which such examinations have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Utilitarianism, Altruism, and Consent.Meacham Christopher - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (1).
    A number of criticisms of Utilitarianism – such as “nearest and dearest” objections, “demandingness” objections, and “altruistic” objections – arise because Utilitarianism doesn’t permit partially or wholly disregarding the utility of certain subjects. A number of authors, including Sider, Portmore and Vessel, have responded to these objections by suggesting we adopt “dual-maximizing” theories which provide a way to incorporate disregarding. And in response to “altruistic” objections in particular – objections noting that it seems permissible to make utility- decreasing sacrifices – (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. The Ethics of Partiality.Benjamin Lange - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 1 (8):1-15.
    Partiality is the special concern that we display for ourselves and other people with whom we stand in some special personal relationship. It is a central theme in moral philosophy, both ancient and modern. Questions about the justification of partiality arise in the context of enquiry into several moral topics, including the good life and the role in it of our personal commitments; the demands of impartial morality, equality, and other moral ideals; and commonsense ideas about supererogation. This paper provides (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Supererogation and Conditional Obligation.Daniel Muñoz & Theron Pummer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1429–1443.
    There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. Überforderungseinwände in der Ethik.Lukas Naegeli - 2022 - Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.
    Gibt es überzeugende Überforderungseinwände gegen anspruchsvolle moralische Auffassungen? In diesem Buch werden Überforderungseinwände präzise charakterisiert, systematisch eingeordnet und argumentativ verteidigt. Unter Berücksichtigung der wichtigsten philosophischen Beiträge zum Thema wird gezeigt, weshalb gewisse Moraltheorien und -prinzipien dafür kritisiert werden können, dass sie zu viel von einzelnen Personen verlangen.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. She-Hulk: Superhero?James Okapal - 2022 - The Janet Prindle Institute of Ethics.
    The first episode of She-Hulk: Attorney at Law raises questions concerning the moral responsibilities of superpowered individuals. It suggests that such individuals have a duty of beneficence towards others. But, to be a superhero requires that you perform acts that go beyond duty, i.e,, supererogatory acts. These two ideas, however, seem to be in tension: if you have a duty of beneficence than it is not clear that any of your actions can be supererogatory. A way between this apparent dilemma (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Vocation to Love: Supererogation in Aquinas.James Dominic Rooney - 2022 - International Journal of Systematic Theology 24 (2):156-172.
    Thomas Aquinas’ account of religious vocation has been interpreted as involving a qualified duty, where ordinary people fall short of living up to the moral ideal of becoming a monk or nun. Such an account of religious vocation makes a hash of Aquinas’ thought and misses important aspects of his ethics. Aquinas holds that religious life is praiseworthy, but not morally required, because there are multiple sources of normativity. I conclude by proposing that, while elements of Aquinas’ notion of supererogation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Rational Supererogation and Epistemic Permissivism.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):571-591.
    A number of authors have defended permissivism by appealing to rational supererogation, the thought that some doxastic states might be rationally permissible even though there are other, more rational beliefs available. If this is correct, then there are situations that allow for multiple rational doxastic responses, even if some of those responses are rationally suboptimal. In this paper, I will argue that this is the wrong approach to defending permissivism—there are no doxastic states that are rationally supererogatory. By the lights (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. The Dual Scale Model of Weighing Reasons.Chris Tucker - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):366-392.
    The metaphor of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double-pan balance) scale. The reasons for φ go in one pan and the reasons for ~φ go in the other. The relative weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two pans of the scale, determine the deontic status of φ. This model is simple and intuitive, but it cannot capture what it is to weigh reasons correctly. A reason pushes the φ pan down toward permissibility (has justifying weight) (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  38. Commentary on the Identity and Supererogatory Actions of Companies.Laszlo Zsolnai - 2022 - Business and Society Review 127 (2):395-402.
    Business and Society Review, Volume 127, Issue 2, Page 395-402, Summer 2022.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Morally-Demanding Infinite Responsibility: The Supererogatory Attitude of Levinasian Normativity.Julio Andrade - 2021 - Springer Verlag.
    This book presents a conceptual mapping of supererogation in the analytic moral philosophical tradition. It first asks whether supererogation can be conceptualised in the absence of obligation or duty and then makes the case that it can be. It does so by enlisting the resources of the continental tradition, specifically using the work of Emmanuel Levinas and his notion of infinite responsibility. In so doing the book contributes to the ongoing efforts to create a common ethical terminology between the analytic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. A Critical Note on Sporting Supererogation.Steffen Borge - 2021 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 48 (2):247-261.
    Alfred Archer recently argued that there is good reason to think that sporting supererogation exists. In the present paper, I take a closer look at Archer’s two key cases from association football...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. The optionality of supererogatory acts is just what you think it is: a reply to Benn.Iskra Fileva & Jonathan Tresan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2155-2166.
    As standardly understood, for an act to be optional is for it to be permissible but not required. Supererogatory acts are commonly taken to be optional in this way. In “Supererogation, Optionality and Cost”, Claire Benn rejects this common view: she argues that optionality so understood—permissible but not required—cannot be the sort of optionality involved in supererogation. As an alternative, she offers a novel account of the optionality of supererogatory acts: the “comparative cost” account. In this paper, we rebut Benn’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.
    Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I should how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to the toggling (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  43. Three Paradoxes of Supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):699-716.
    Supererogatory acts—good deeds “beyond the call of duty”—are a part of moral common sense, but conceptually puzzling. I propose a unified solution to three of the most infamous puzzles: the classic Paradox of Supererogation (if it’s so good, why isn’t it just obligatory?), Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, and Kamm’s Intransitivity Paradox. I conclude that supererogation makes sense if, and only if, the grounds of rightness are multi-dimensional and comparative.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  44. Exploitation and Effective Altruism.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 20 (4):409-423.
    How could it be wrong to exploit—say, by paying sweatshop wages—if the exploited party benefits? How could it be wrong to do something gratuitously bad—like giving to a wasteful charity—if that is better than permissibly doing nothing? Joe Horton argues that these puzzles, known as the Exploitation Problem and All or Nothing Problem, have no unified answer. I propose one and pose a challenge for Horton’s take on the Exploitation Problem.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. From Rights to Prerogatives.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):608-623.
    Deontologists believe in two key exceptions to the duty to promote the good: restrictions forbid us from harming others, and prerogatives permit us not to harm ourselves. How are restrictions and prerogatives related? A promising answer is that they share a source in rights. I argue that prerogatives cannot be grounded in familiar kinds of rights, only in something much stranger: waivable rights against oneself.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  46. Impermissible yet Praiseworthy.Theron Pummer - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):697-726.
    It is commonly held that unexcused impermissible acts are necessarily blameworthy, not praiseworthy. I argue that unexcused impermissible acts can not only be pro tanto praiseworthy, but overall praiseworthy—and even more so than permissible alternatives. For example, there are cases in which it is impermissible to at great cost to yourself rescue fewer rather than more strangers, yet overall praiseworthy, and more so than permissibly rescuing no one. I develop a general framework illuminating how praiseworthiness can so radically come apart (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  47. Von Gutmenschen, guten Menschen und geflüchteten Menschen: Dankbarkeit als Supererogation oder Pflicht?Marie-Luise Raters - 2021 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 4 (1):121-141.
    ZusammenfassungViele Menschen erwarten Dankbarkeit von den Geflüchteten, die in Europa aufgenommen werden. Nun kann mit dem Satz „Geflüchtete sollen dankbar sein“ eine moralische Pflicht oder ein Ratschlag gemeint sein. Mein Essay zeigt in einem ersten Schritt, dass es keine Pflicht zur Dankbarkeit geben kann. Dankbarkeit ist vielmehr Supererogation, nämlich eine moralisch wertvolle Handlungsweise, die keine Pflicht sein kann. Das gilt auch für Geflüchtete. Anschließend zeige ich, dass Dankbarkeit als sympathischer Ausdruck einer Tugendhaltung jedermann anzuraten ist. Wer sich für erwiesene Wohltaten (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Samariter*innen in Weiß?Marie-Luise Raters - 2021 - In Roland Kipke, Nele Röttger, Johanna Wagner & Almut Kristine V. Wedelstaedt (eds.), Zusammendenken: Festschrift Für Ralf Stoecker. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 89-115.
    Ausgehend von einem NRW-Gesetzesentwurf vom 5. April 2020 wird die moralphilosophische Frage einer Nothilfepflicht für die Gesundheitsarbeiter*innen einer pandemischen Zeit diskutiert. Methodischer Leitfaden sind Ralf Stoeckers Fragen zu ‚Samariter-Situationen‘. Nach einer Einleitung wird eine allgemeine moralische Nothilfepflicht verteidigt. Weil eine Triage zwar keine verbotene Hilfeleistung, aber ein moralisches Dilemma ist, kann es keine Pflicht zur Triage geben. Falls Gesundheitsarbeiter*innen hohe persönliche Risiken eingehen müssen, können sie ebenfalls nicht verpflichtet werden: Ein Einsatz wäre bewundernswerte Supererogation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. What is morality?Kieran Setiya - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1113-1133.
    Argues, against Anscombe, that Aristotle had the concept of morality as an interpersonal normative order: morality is justice in general. For an action to be wrong is not for it to warrant blame, or to wrong another person, but to be something one should not do that one has no right to do. In the absence of rights, morality makes no sense.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Too Far Beyond the Call of Duty: Moral Rationalism and Weighing Reasons.Chris Tucker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):2029-2052.
    The standard account of supererogation holds that Liv is not morally required to jump on a grenade, thereby sacrificing her life, to save the lives of five soldiers. Many proponents defend the standard account by appealing to moral rationalism about requirement. These same proponents hold that Bernie is morally permitted to jump on a grenade, thereby sacrificing his life, to spare someone a mild burn. I argue that this position is unstable, at least as moral rationalism is ordinarily defended. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 332