This chapter examines what role new behaviour-modification policies – commonly known as “nudges” – might play in cultivating virtues. At first sight, they would appear to be ruled out as a candidate means; but, by offering a more nuanced analysis, the chapter argues that some nudges have virtue-cultivating properties. It distinguishes between two kinds of nudges – 'automatic-behavioural' and 'discernment-developing' – and shows that what divides them is the ability of the latter, which the former lacks, to play (...) an ecological-educative role in developing the virtue of practical reason, which is required for the other virtues too. It thus provides an answer to the question of whether virtue-cultivating nudges are possible, while remaining neutral on whether virtue cultivation is, or under what conditions it could be, a legitimate aim of liberal-democratic states. (shrink)

This book features new essays by philosophers, psychologists, and a theologian on the important topic of virtue development. The essays engage with work from multiple disciplines and thereby seek to bridge disciplinary divides. The volume is a significant contribution to the emerging interdisciplinary field of virtue development studies.

In this paper, the authors argue for two main claims: first, that the epistemic results of group deliberation can be superior to those of individual inquiry; and, second, that successful deliberative groups depend on individuals exhibiting deliberative virtues. The development of these group-deliberative virtues, the authors argue, is important not only for epistemic purposes but political purposes, as democracies require the virtuous deliberation of their citizens. Deliberative virtues contribute to the deliberative synergy of the group, not only in terms of (...) improving the quality of the group's present decisions, but also improving the background conditions for continued group deliberation. The authors sketch a preliminary schedule of these group-deliberative virtues modelled on Aristotle's conception of virtue as the mean between two extreme vices. The virtues discussed in this article include deliberative wit, friendliness, empathy, charity, temperance, courage, sincerity, and humility. (shrink)

In her groundbreaking text Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker evaluates types of harms incurred by individuals undergoing unrecognized and inarticulable oppression. At issue in epistemic and hermeneutic injustice are prejudicial comportments to and evaluations of reality. In the following, I focus on hermeneutic and epistemic injustice in relation to the formation of intellectual and ethical virtues. When reading Fricker and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics together, there is a clear pathway to improve ethical development. In particular, ethical development ought to cultivate the proper (...) virtues that promote understanding. Gadamer’s emphasis on the qualities of a researcher and the epistemic virtues that Fricker highlights reveal an educative path for addressing injustice. In other words, cultivating these virtues counteracts injustice wherein recognition and articulation of reality is challenged or at issue. (shrink)

This paper focuses much-needed attention on the ethical nature of customer relationship management (CRM) strategies in organisations. The research uses an in-depth case study to reflect on the design, implementation and use of ‘best practice’ associated with CRM. We argue that conventional CRM philosophy is based on a fairly narrow construct that fails to consider ethical issues appropriately. We highlight why ethical considerations are important when organisations use CRM and how a more holistic approach incorporating some of Alasdair MacIntyre's ideas (...) on virtue ethics could be relevant. (shrink)

This paper focuses much‐needed attention on the ethical nature of customer relationship management (CRM) strategies in organisations. The research uses an in‐depth case study to reflect on the design, implementation and use of ‘best practice’ associated with CRM. We argue that conventional CRM philosophy is based on a fairly narrow construct that fails to consider ethical issues appropriately. We highlight why ethical considerations are important when organisations use CRM and how a more holistic approach incorporating some of Alasdair MacIntyre's ideas (...) on virtue ethics could be relevant. (shrink)

Auditors’ virtue comprises those qualities of character that manifest the ideals of the audit community (c.f., Maclntyre, 1984, After Virtue. (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame)), and are instrumental in ensuring that auditors’ professional judgment is exercised according to a high moral standard (Thorne, 1998, Research on Accounting Ethics. (JAI Press, Greenwich, CT)). Nevertheless, the lack of valid and reliable quantitative measures of auditors’ virtue impedes research that furthers our understanding of how best to promote (...) class='Hi'>virtue in the audit community. To address this gap, we develop two measures of auditors’ virtue. We report the results of the validity and reliability of the scales. In addition, we use the findings from the administration of these scales to professional accountants to refine and validate the theoretical characterization of virtues developed by Pincoffs (1986, Quandaries and Virtues. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS) and Libby and Thorne (2004, Business Ethics Quarterly). In so doing, this study provides a foundation by which future audit research can study ways to ensure that auditors’ virtue is promoted throughout the audit community. (shrink)

Responsible conduct of research training typically includes only a subset of the issues that ought to be included in science ethics and sometimes makes ethics appear to be a set of externally imposed rules rather than something intrinsic to scientific practice. A new approach to science ethics training based upon Pennock’s notion of the scientific virtues may help avoid such problems. This paper motivates and describes three implementations—theory-centered, exemplar-centered, and concept-centered—that we have developed in courses and workshops to introduce students (...) to this scientific virtue-based approach. (shrink)

I review several theoretical and empirical developments relevant to assessing contemporary virtue epistemology’s theory of knowledge. What emerges is a leaner theory of knowledge that is more empirically adequate, better captures the ordinary conception of knowledge, and is ripe for cross-fertilization with cognitive science. I call this view abilism. Along the way I identify several topics for future research.

Virtue words, such as justice, fairness, care, and integrity, frequently feature in organizational codes of conduct and theories of ethical leadership. And yet our modern organizations remain blemished by examples lacking virtue. The philosophy of virtue ethics and numerous extant theories of leadership cite virtues as essential to good leadership. But we seem to lack understanding of how to develop or embed these virtues and notions of good leadership in practice. In 2012, virtue ethicist Julia Annas (...) pointed to a training program which she touted as a practical application of virtue ethics. The program Annas identified is called The Virtues Project, and while promising, she warned that in its current state, it lacked theorizing. We address this by aligning its practical strategies to extant theory and evidence to understand what virtues it might develop and how it might facilitate good leadership. Doing so makes two key contributions. First, it lends credence to The Virtues Project’s potential as a leadership development program. Second, it provides a means of applying theories of good leadership in practice. Our overarching objective is to advance The Virtues Project as a means of incorporating virtues into workplace dynamics and embedding virtues in the practice of organizational leadership. (shrink)

Auditors' virtue comprises those qualities of character that manifest the ideals of the audit community ), and are instrumental in ensuring that auditors' professional judgment is exercised according to a high moral standard ). Nevertheless, the lack of valid and reliable quantitative measures of auditors' virtue impedes research that furthers our understanding of how best to promote virtue in the audit community. To address this gap, we develop two measures of auditors' virtue. We report the results (...) of the validity and reliability of the scales. In addition, we use the findings from the administration of these scales to professional accountants to refine and validate the theoretical characterization of virtues developed by Pincoffs and Libby and Thorne. In so doing, this study provides a foundation by which future audit research can study ways to ensure that auditors' virtue is promoted throughout the audit community. (shrink)

Drawing on conceptual works by Murphy (1999) and Solomon (1999), we develop a virtue ethics scale. Other ethics scales, which are grounded in deontological and teleological principles, may be used to classify people according to their beliefs about (1) the criteria they use to make ethical decisions, or (2) the ethicality of those decisions. We suggest augmenting these scales with our virtue ethics scale, which may be used to classify people according to their beliefs about the virtuous qualities (...) of businesspeople. (shrink)

Brings together three important processes for business ethics: casuistry, virtue ethics, and the business case method. In doing so, it considers the overlap and synergy of casuistry and virtue ethics, the similarities and differences of casuistry and the business case method, and the relationships between emerging and well-established cases. The goal of the book is twofold: to provide a distinctly practical method for moral decision-making within the context of business and to illustrate how contemporary vexing issues are similar (...) to those of the past and how they might be resolved satisfactorily. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea—rife in various recent theories in moral education—that virtue ethicists, psychologists, and educators interested in the cultivation of character should pool their resources in order to launch wide-ranging initiatives in virtue development. I uncover the roots of this idea and maintain that the reason why the desired cooperation has not yet come about lies primarily in psychology's failure to deliver the required empirical evidence about the ingredients of a morally good life. I trace the (...) origin of this failure to certain mistaken assumptions made by psychologists—in particular to their conflation of the “is–ought distinction” with the “fact–value distinction”—leading to an unreasonable fear of normativity. I suggest how, by overcoming this fear and entering the field of factual moral values , psychologists could make a lasting contribution to the development of virtue. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Six cardinal leadership virtues based on Aristotelian and Confucian typology were advanced through this study by developing a measurement instrument and examining its predictive validity by studying the causal association with perceived leader happiness. Based on a sample of 183 school principals engaged in various types of schools, the results of both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses generated satisfactory empirical outcomes by finding adequate support for the overall leadership virtue scale and the constituent subscale elements. The paper concluded (...) with the theoretical and practical implications for this developed instrument of leadership virtue especially in the context of school education. The major contribution of the paper lies in developing a measurement scale of virtues for school leaders. (shrink)

Healthcare whistle blowing, despite the benefits it has brought to healthcare systems in many developed countries, remains generally regarded as a pariah activity by many of the most influential healthcare professionals and regulatory institutions. Few if any medical schools or law department health law and bioethics classes, teach whistle blowing in a formal sense. Yet without exception, public inquiries initiated by healthcare whistle blowers have validated their central allegations and demonstrated that the whistle blowers themselves were sincere in their desire (...) to implement the fundamental virtues and principles of medical ethics, bioethics and public health law. In many jurisdictions, the law, this time remarkably in advance of professional opinion, has offered legislative protection for reasonable allegations of whistleblowers made in good faith and in the public interest concerning a substantial and imminent threat to public safety. One reason for this paradoxical position, explored here, is that healthcare whistle blowing lacks a firm virtue-based theoretical bioethical and jurisprudential foundation. The hypothesis discussed is that the lack of this bioethical and jurisprudential substrate has contributed to a situation where healthcare whistle blowing suffers in terms of institutional support due to its lack of academic legitimacy. This article commences the process of redressing this imbalance by attempting to lay the theoretical foundations for healthcare whistle blowing. As a case study, this article concludes by discussing the Personal and Professional Development course at the ANU Medical School where healthcare whistle blowing is a formal part of a virtue-based curriculum that emphasises the foundational importance of conscience. Illustrative elements of that program are discussed. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that although the Aristotelian ideal of leading a virtuous life for its own sake is admirable, conventional Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian accounts of how it might be realised are empirically inadequate: Habituation is unlikely to produce ‘a love of virtue’, practical experience cannot then produce practical judgement or phronesis, and Aristotle's conception of a virtuous life excludes all but an idealised elite. Instead, I argue that two conceptually distinct aspects of moral development can be identified: (...) the ‘Aristotelian’ and the ‘Humean’. In the former, the desire to lead a virtuous life for its own sake is produced through certain forms of challenging experience which, by disturbing and decentring the egoistic self, evoke a personal moral transformation. In the latter, the capacity to act well in specific social situations is the outcome of a process of socialisation, first in upbringing and later through initiation into the practices of adult life. Both aspects should be promoted in moral education for together they produce something akin to full virtue in the Aristotelian sense: Practical wisdom and practical judgement—or phronesis. Moreover, ‘the good life’ is best conceived as encompassing a variety of transcendent goods. To live a virtuous life for its own sake constitutes one good or form of human flourishing; but it is not the only one. (shrink)

Bernadette M Tobin; Development in Virtues, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 201–214, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9.

Bernadette M Tobin; Development in Virtues, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 201–214, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9.

_Families of Virtue_ articulates the critical role of the parent-child relationship in the moral development of infants and children. Building on thinkers and scientists across time and disciplines, from ancient Greek and Chinese philosophers to contemporary feminist ethicists and attachment theorists, this book takes an effective approach for strengthening families and the character of children. Early Confucian philosophers argue that the general ethical sensibilities we develop during infancy and early childhood form the basis for nearly every virtue and that (...) the parent-child relationship is the primary context within which this growth occurs. Joining these views with scientific work on early childhood, _Families of Virtue_ shows how Western psychology can reinforce and renew the theoretical underpinnings of Confucian thought and how Confucian philosophers can affect positive social and political change in our time, particularly in such areas as paid parental leave, breastfeeding initiatives, marriage counseling, and family therapy. (shrink)

The reformed tradition on moral virtue -- Barth's objections -- Objections overcome -- The shape of reformed virtue after Barth -- Living out the reformed virtues.

In this paper, we elucidate the moral psychology and what we might call the moral sociology of Mencius and of Hume, and we argue for three claims. First, we demonstrate that there are strong similarities between Mencius and Hume concerning some of the principal psychological sources of the virtue of humanity. Second, we show that there are strong similarities between the two concerning some of the principal social sources of the virtue of humanity. Third, we argue that there (...) are related, though weaker, similarities between Mencius and Hume concerning some of the principal cognitive sources of the virtue of humanity. We conclude by suggesting that the number and nature of these similarities demonstrate the need for future research on the conceptual connections between Confucian and Humean moral philosophy, especially on the psychological and social sources of benevolent moral development. (shrink)

The encyclical proclaims the centrality of human development, which includes acting with gratuitousness and solidarity in pursuing the common good. This paper considers first whether such relationships of gratuitousness and solidarity can be analysed through the prism of traditional theories of social psychology, which are highly influential in current management research, and concludes that certain aspects of those theories may offer useful tools for analysis at the practical level. This is contrasted with the analysis of such relationships through Aristotelian (...) class='Hi'>virtue ethics (in particular as interpreted by MacIntyre 1985 , 1998 , 1999 ), which is emerging as a strong force in the field of business ethics, and which has strong conceptual similarities with the ideas put forward by Benedict XVI. Aristotelian virtue ethics offers a better fit with the aims of the encyclical at the theoretical level but it presents a number of challenges at the practical level, which the paper suggests may be addressed through the integration in its analysis of human action of models derived from social psychology. (shrink)

This book considers what virtue theory can tell us about parenting in relation to both moral development and specific ethical dilemmas. It is of interest to those who work in virtue theory, applied ethics, and the ethics of parenthood.

Persons interested in developing virtue will find attending to, and attempting to act on, the right reason for action a rich resource for developing virtue. In this paper I consider the role of self-knowledge in intentional moral development. I begin by making a general case that because improving one’s moral character requires intimate knowledge of its components and their relation to right reason, the aim of developing virtue typically requires the development of self-knowledge. I (...) next turn to Kant’s ethics for an account which explains the reflexivity involved in moral reasoning generally, and the significance of self-knowledge to morality. I then take up Robert Audi’s interesting notion of the harnessing and unharnessing of reasons as a potential way of strengthening the agent’s connection to right reason, and his concerns about our limited and indirect resources for becoming virtuous. I argue that harnessing and unharnessing are not plausibly characterized as activities to be accomplished by an exertion of will, rather they involve a dynamic, cognitive, reflective attempt to gain self-knowledge and align oneself with one’s moral reasons for action. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reformed Virtue after Barth: Developing Moral Virtue Ethics in the Reformed Tradition by Kirk J. NolanAmos Winarto Oei, PhDReformed Virtue after Barth: Developing Moral Virtue Ethics in the Reformed Tradition Kirk J. Nolan LOUISVILLE, KY: WESTMINSTER JOHN KNOX PRESS, 2014. 192 PP. $30.00In this addition to the Columbia Series in Reformed Theology, Kirk Nolan attempts to overcome the theological obstacles that Karl (...) Barth raises to Reformed moral virtues ethics. He hopes that his work will contribute to the broader discussion regarding Christian virtue ethics in two ways: the relational dimension of virtue and its prophetic contribution to challenge and influence personal life and future social arrangements (viii–ix). Nolan's thesis is that the attempt to overcome theological obstacles requires grounding virtue ethics in a covenant based in God's free election (8). Though virtue ethics may seem out of place in Reformed theology, especially in the thought of Karl Barth, Nolan argues that Barth's theology actually proves virtue ethics can be compatible with the Reformed tradition. [End Page 213]He elaborates the thesis by identifying those areas of greatest theological concern in the tradition and seeking to address them. He first looks at John Calvin's theology, the Westminster Confession, and Jonathan Edwards's theology (chapter 1). One concern to address is the problem of "Constantinianism" in their thought where they all "presume church-state relations in which the church is the dominant force in society" (35). Karl Barth challenges such presumption by pointing out that the church's role is not to coerce her morality on others but instead simply to present the power of the Holy Spirit. Virtue ethics is not top-down management.Nolan then looks at the theology of Karl Barth himself (chapters 2 and 3), especially those areas that may present difficulties to virtue ethics: Christocentric anthropology, rejection of the Analogia entis, and rejection of habitual grace. Nolan explores these difficulties by engaging with others such as Erich Przywara and William Werpehowski, arriving at so-called "virtue ethics without recourse to natural morality" (71). What does a virtue ethic without natural morality look like (chapter 4)? The key feature is that it is grounded in God's revelation instead of "an overly optimistic view of the effects of sin on humankind" (108). This implies, using a modified Thomist terminology, that all virtues in this ethic are infused; in this case, they are all shaped by grace, and this grace continues to work in the life of believers even when they stubbornly resist it (simul iustus et peccator).In the final chapter (chapter 5), Nolan shows the practice of virtue ethics by addressing a short history of social witness in the Presbyterian Church (USA). Virtue ethics after Barth will commit to practical wisdom, frugality, and charity. The PC(USA) should make these commitments explicit and then should integrate its institutional focus on social injustice with concern for individual moral change since "virtue ethics, with its link between the flourishing of society and the flourishing of individuals, provides rich resources for this integrative task" (133).Kirk Nolan has creatively argued for a Barthian virtue ethics, developing a virtue ethics based on Barth's doctrine of revelation. This is an important addition to the discussion of virtue ethics. One question comes up through the reading of this work: Can a virtue ethics without natural morality be really called Reformed? Reformed tradition, in the works of people such as John Calvin, Heinrich Bullinger, Peter Martyr Vermigli, and Francis Turretin had a well-developed view of the conscience as having an innate or implanted knowledge of the natural law—albeit one that could not motivate unregenerate sinners to do the good which pleases God. [End Page 214]Amos Winarto OeiAletheia Theological Seminary (Indonesia)Copyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Aristotle is traditionally read as dividing animal souls into three parts, while dividing human souls into four parts (a rational part, with theoretical and pr...

Virtue ethics attempts to identify certain commonly agreed-upon dispositions to act in certain ways, dispositions that would be accepted as ‘good’ by those affected, and to locate the goodness or badness of an act internal to the agent. Basically, virtue ethics is said to date back to Aristotle, but as Alisdair MacIntyre has pointed out, the whole idea of ‘virtue ethics’ would have been unintelligible in Greek philosophy for “a virtue was an excellence and ethics concerned (...) excellence of character; all ethics was virtue ethics.” Virtue ethics as a method to approach problems in medical ethics is said by some to lend itself to working through cases at the bedside or, at least, is better than the conventional method of handling ethical problems. In this paper I want to explore some of the shortcomings of this approach, examine other traditional approaches, indicate some of their limitations, and suggest a different conceptualization of the approach. (shrink)

This transdisciplinary study will examine how the narration of self, motivation, and eudaimonic virtues like wisdom and compassion develop within a social ecology of family master narratives and social institutions that either foster or constrain the development of such virtues. Drawing from a larger, longitudinal study of character development and life stories in adulthood, we will interview individuals and their families about virtue-relevant events in life, such as conflicts of belief, virtue-focused projects and activities, and self- and family-defining (...) memories. Narratives will be analyzed qualitatively and critically as well as quantitatively and in relation to other measures of eudaimonic and personal development. We expect that specific virtues will serve as motivational themes in personal and family stories and that these narrative themes will predict specific paths of virtuous self-development. We further expect that specific inequalities in family and social-institutional contexts will correspond to specific conflicts in the development of eudaimonic qualities in individuals’ lives. (shrink)

From folk tales to movies, stories possess features which naturally suit them to contribute to the growth of virtue. In this article I show that the fictional exemplars help the learner to grasp the moral importance of internal states and resolves a tension between existing kinds of exemplars discussed by virtue ethicists. Stories also increase the information conveyed by virtue terms and aid the growth of prudence. Stories can provide virtuous exemplars, inform learners as to the nature (...) of the virtues and offer practice in developing situational judgement. As such they are a significant resource for virtue ethics and moral education. (shrink)

Background: Community-based education (CBE) involves educating the head (cognitive), heart (affective), and the hand (practical) by utilizing tools that enable us to broaden and interrogate our value systems. This article reports on the use of virtue ethics (VE) theory for understanding the principles that create, maintain and sustain a socially accountable community placement programme for undergraduate medical students. Our research questions driving this secondary analysis were; what are the goods which are internal to the successful practice of CBE in (...) medicine, and what are the virtues that are likely to promote and sustain them? -/- Methods: We conducted a secondary theoretically informed thematic analysis of the primary data based on MacIntyre’s virtue ethics theory as the conceptual framework. -/- Results: Virtue ethics is an ethical approach that emphasizes the role of character and virtue in shaping moral behavior; when individuals engage in practices (such as CBE), goods internal to those practices (such as a collaborative attitude) strengthen the practices themselves, but also augment those individuals’ virtues, and that of their community (such as empathy). We identified several goods that are internal to the practice of CBE and accompanying virtues as important for the development, implementation and sustainability of a socially accountable community placement programme. A service-oriented mind-set, a deep understanding of community needs, a transformed mind, and a collaborative approach emerged as goods internal to the practice of a socially accountable CBE. The virtues needed to sustain the identified internal goods included empathy and compassion, connectedness, accountability, engagement [sustained relationship], cooperation, perseverance, and willingness to be an agent of change. -/- Conclusion: This study found that MacIntyre’s virtue ethics theory provided a useful theoretical lens for understanding the principles that create, maintain and sustain CBE practice. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo ofrece una lectura de la pintura renacentista según los principios establecidos por Leon Battista Alberti, uno de los primeros teóricos de la perspectiva en cuyo Tratado de pintura se refiere al cuadro como “una ventana abierta a la historia”. El concepto de historia empleado por Alberti, que se presta a numerosas interpretaciones, es abordado a partir de las reflexiones de Erwin Panofsky en torno a la perspectiva como “forma simbólica”, avanzando hacia una hipótesis en torno al carácter (...) simbólico de la configuración y representación del tiempo en el cuadro-ventana albertiano.This paper offers a reading of the renaissance painting according to the principles established by Leon Battista Alberti, one of the first theorists of perspective in painting which Trattato della pittura define the frame of the painting as “an open window into history”. The concept of history employed by Alberti, which lends itself to many interpretations, is approached from the reflections of Erwin Panofsky about the prospect as “symbolic form”, moving towards a hypothesis about the symbolic nature of the configuration and representation of time in the alberti’s window. (shrink)

Social robots are increasingly developed for the companionship of children. In this article we explore the moral implications of children-robot friendships using the Aristotelian framework of virtue ethics. We adopt a moderate position and argue that, although robots cannot be virtue friends, they can nonetheless enable children to exercise ethical and intellectual virtues. The Aristotelian requirements for true friendship apply only partly to children: unlike adults, children relate to friendship as an educational play of exploration, which is constitutive (...) of the way they acquire and develop virtues. We highlight that there is a relevant difference between the way we evaluate adult-robot friendship compared to children-robot friendship, which is rooted in the difference in moral agency and moral responsibility that generate the asymmetries in the moral status ascribed to adults versus children. We look into the role played by imaginary companions (IC) and personified objects (PO) in children’s moral development and claim that robots, understood as Personified Robotic Objects (PROs), play a similar role with such fictional entities, enabling children to exercise affection, moral imagination and reasoning, thus contributing to their development as virtuous adults. Nonetheless, we argue that adequate use of robots for children’s moral development is conditioned by several requirements related to design, technology and moral responsibility. (shrink)

I argue that the epistemological virtues of concrete thinking, self-transparency, and narrative understanding developed by care ethicists can help international development practitioners combat their own temptations to engage in “unconscious unjustified paternalism” (UUP). I develop the concept of UUP—a type of paternalism in which one party unjustifiably substitutes her judgment for another's because of difficulty distinguishing her desires for the other from the other's good. I show that the temptation to UUP is endemic to development and that care ethics contains (...) virtues for combating it. Key to my claim is a view of caregiving as a practice of negotiating conflict. (shrink)