Changing faces of war and war-like situations have led in recent years to new forms of military deployment. They range from the so called "war on terrorism" with e.g Operation Enduring Freedom or humanitarian interventions (e.g. Kosovo 1999) to deployments within disaster relief missions as lately in Haiti. These pose not only moral, legal, and organizational challenges to states and the international community but also put individual soldiers and military (medical) personnel in situations that their classical formation does not prepare (...) them for. For they face (i) situations not sufficiently covered/ regulated by international humanitarian (IHL) law and/or (ii) tasks that are not within the range of the "classical soldier". These changing needs require new forms of education in the military and highlight the role of ethical education as many of the dilemmas cannot be resolved by sole reference to the IHL. In addition to a solid knowledge of the law of armed conflict (LOAC), military personnel should therefore acquire fundamental skills of ethical reasoning in dilemma situations. Our article aims at (i) outlining the goals of a military medical ethics education that responds to these needs and the practical challenges of present-day military deployment and (ii) present how the ICMM tries to integrate these goals in its educational program. (shrink)

Encyclopedia article on the historical development and current interpretation of Just War Theory.

In emergency situations and while medical resources are sufficient, doctors are expected to prioritize and treat patients according to medical criteria only. In MASSCAL situations and when medical resources become insufficient, patient selection and prioritization changes. Rules of triage are applied with the aim of getting the best result possible under the circumstances, e.g., saving the largest number; collective health outweighs individual health. Still, according to the standard ethical principles, non-medical criteria should never influence the doctors’ decision of who will (...) be treated. In military contexts, so-called medical rules of eligibility (MROE) provide rules that include non-medical criteria. This chapter aims to analyze if, why, and under what circumstances it may be ethically acceptable to prioritize patients according to non-medical criteria. (shrink)

Der Einfluss der Lehre vom gerechten Krieg bzw. der Idee des gerechten Friedens auf den Umgang mit heutigen Konflikten lässt sich besonders gut anhand der so genannten „humanitären Interventionen“ und dem aus dieser Praxis entwickelten neuen Ansatz der „Responsibility to Protect“ (RtoP/ R2P) bzw. Schutzverantwortung zeigen. Bei der Be- gründung als humanitär erachteter Interventionen seit den 1990er Jahren wurde und wird auf die Kriterien des gerechten Krieges bzw. gerechten Friedens zurückgegriffen. Nachfolgend spielten diese auch bei der Formulierung des Prinzips der (...) Schutzverantwor- tung eine wichtige Rolle und sind so erneut für die Ausbildung völkerrechtlicher Normen herangezogen worden. Im Folgenden soll zunächst kurz das Kernproblem humanitär begründeter Interventionen skizziert werden und in einem zweiten Schritt dann gezeigt werden, wie die Konzepte von gerechtem Krieg und gerechtem Frieden in der Denkweise und den Prinzipien der Schutzverantwortung verankert sind. (shrink)

This paper examines the question whether physicians are obligated by their professional ethos to defend a pacifist position. The question is a more concrete and applied formulation of the general thesis that there are what I will call “pacifist professions”: professions whose ethos requires their members to act in a pacifist way. Since the present paper is rather one in applied philosophy than a theoretical one about the foundation of pacifism, it will concentrate on the practical issue of whether and (...) how physicians can execute their profession in or during war. Theoretical questions on the nature and extent of pacifism will be considered only to the extent necessary to treat the main issue. The introductory section will give a short overview of some histori- cal aspects of physicians’ participation in war and show the relevance of the issue with recent examples. The remainder of this section will thus serve to set the stage and to outline the connections between the medical profession and questions of war and peace. The paper will then be divided into three other main parts: the first part will be devoted to defining in a general manner so-called “professional pacifism”. The second part will investigate whether and to what extent the medical profession can be classified as a pacifist profession, and the third part will look at the consequences of such a classification. (shrink)

Over the last few years, virtually all forms of non-state violence have been labeled as “terrorism”. As a result, differences between various forms of war and violence are lost in the analysis. This article proposes a conceptual distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare by analyzing their differences and similarities. Definitions of terrorism and guerrilla warfare are presented. Starting with these definitions, the question of the legitimacy of terrorism and guerrilla violence is answered with reference to just war theory. Particular attention (...) is paid to the issue of the so called “innocent victims” of terrorism. (shrink)

This article briefly outlines what the medical duty is, and its special role in international law, before discussing the problems resulting from the dual role as doctor and soldier, which military doctors can expect to meet conceptually, and unfortunately in reality as well. With arguments based on international humanitarian law and ethics, this article shows that greater weight should be given to the medical role.

Battlefield euthanasia, the purposeful killing of wounded soldiers (or even civi- lians) in order to hasten their foreseeable death, has been an issue in military medicine and in soldiers’ moral codes at all times. During conflicts since anti- quity, there have been severely wounded who would not die immediately but whose fate seemed clear, nevertheless. But can it ever be morally justified to kill those wounded out of mercy in order to end their suffering? Can death ever be the better (...) option? And if so, what conditions have to be fulfilled? This paper investigates some of the moral aspects of battlefield euthanasia. Analogies to physician-assisted suicide in civil settings will be drawn and contrasted with the additional aspects that the military environment adds to the problem. (shrink)

Outbreaks of epidemics like Ebola trigger difficult ethical challenges for civilian and military health care personnel. This book offers theoretical reflections combined with reports from recent military and NGO missions in the field. The authors of this volume focus on military medical ethics adding a distinct voice to the topic of epidemics and infectious diseases. While military health care personnel are always crucially involved during disaster relief operations and large-scale public health emergencies, most of the current literature treats ethical issues (...) during epidemics from a more general perspective without taking into account the specifics of the military context. The contributions in this volume provide first-hand insights into some of the ethical issues encountered by military health care personnel in missions during the Ebola outbreak in 2014/2015. This practical perspective is complimented by academic analyses and theoretical reflections on ethical issues associated with epidemics. (shrink)

Kriege, Terrorismus, Völkermord, humanitäre Interventionen und andere Formen kollektiver Gewalt sind in den letzten Jahren auch in der Philosophie verstärkt in den Blickwinkel gerückt. Dabei wurde der Tradition des 'gerechten Krieges' neue Aufmerksamkeit zuteil und somit der Frage, ob und wann Kriege als 'moralisch gerechtfertigt' bewertet werden können. Die grundlegendere Frage, wie 'Gewalt' definiert werden kann, ist hingegen kaum nicht beachtet worden. Im Mittelpunkt des vorliegenden Buches steht die Frage nach Gründen für die moralische Rechtfertigung oder moralische Verurteilung gewaltsamen Handelns. (...) Zur methodischen Vereinfachung wird nur so genannte interpersonale Gewalt, also der Einsatz von Gewalt durch genau eine Person gegen eine andere Person, betrachtet. Das Buch gliedert sich in drei Teile: Im ersten Teil wird die Idee vom 'gerechten Krieg' vorgestellt und gezeigt, das grundsätzlich auch heute noch an die klassischen Autoren angeknüpft werden kann. Der zweite Teil liefert einen Überblick über philosophische Positionen zum Begriff der Gewalt. Der dritte Teil führt die Ergebnisse zusammen und liefert (i) eine Explikation des Begriffs interpersonaler Gewalt und (ii) einen Rahmen zur Bewertung verschiedener Fälle derartiger Gewalt. Damit eine konkrete Gewaltanwendung als gerechtfertigt gelten kann, muss sie einer Liste von Kriterien genügen. Dieses Buch diskutiert die Bedingungen, die in Ausnahmesituationen vorliegen müssen, damit das prima facie-Verbot des Einsatzes von Gewalt situativ aufgehoben wird und Gewalt moralisch legitim sein kann. (shrink)

This book sheds light on various ethical challenges military and humanitarian health care personnel face while working in adverse conditions. Contexts of armed conflict, hybrid wars or other forms of violence short of war, as well as natural disasters, all have in common that ordinary circumstances can no longer be taken for granted. Hence, the provision of health care has to adapt, for example, to a different level of risk, to scarce resources, or uncommon approaches due to external incentives or (...) requirements. This affects the practice of health care as well as its ethics. This book offers a panoramic overview on various challenges healthcare faces in extraordinary situations and provides new insights from practitioners’ as well as from academic scholars’ perspectives. (shrink)

This chapter introduces to the main topic of the volume, namely the influence of the changing nature of warfare on the provision of medical care and the ethical challenges that occur. It presents the main ideas of relevant concepts such as asymmetrical warfare, hybrid warfare, and complex emergencies before illustrating the ethical challenges that new forms of warfare create for military and humanitarian health care providers. Examples of ethical challenges include embedding medical personnel in combating forces, questions regarding the treatment (...) of detainees, the need to uphold medical neutrality, and pitfalls of using medicine to non-medical ends. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of the volume. (shrink)

This paper gives a review of the academic literature on the duty to care during epidemics and the question of how much risk has to be accepted by medical personnel during their work. It will then address ask to what extent military personnel have this duty in the same way as their civilian counterparts or whether military health care personnel might act under a different moral obligation – with more or less encompassing or at least different duties.

This article argues that medical personnel of armed forces occupy a ‘peace role’, which continues and dominates their professional ethos during armed conflict. The specific role and its associated legal and ethical obligations are elaborated, and on that basis arguments are provided why and how the work of military healthcare providers is interpreted as a continuation of peace during war.

Minors are increasingly reaching countries far from their homes as migrants, and their ages are often unknown. In Europe, up to 1500 people per country annually have medical examinations and procedures to estimate their chronological age.1 These procedures can cause considerable harm to individuals, particularly if performed without appropriate safeguards. Inappropriate age estimation may deter minors from applying for asylum in specific countries, and doctors may find themselves exploited in the service of migration policy. During missions, military doctors face demands (...) to estimate the age of child soldiers destined for potentially unlawful detention or interrogation. Doctors therefore need to be aware of the limitations of medically estimating age and the associated ethical problems. (shrink)

In der philosophischen Literatur finden sich eine ganze Reihe von Positionen zur Definition und zur moralischen Bewertung von Terrorismus. Die meisten Philosophen definieren Terrorismus als eine Form politischer Gewalt. Viele heben die Angsterfahrung der Opfer hervor, die das erste Ziel der Gewalt ist, und unterscheiden sie von weiteren Zielen wie Nötigung oder politischen Veränderungen. In Bezug auf die moralische Bewertung von Terrorismus herrscht Uneinigkeit sowohl was die Grundlage der Bewertung angeht, als auch hinsichtlich des Urteils selbst. Konsequenzialisten bewerten Terrorismus, wie (...) auch andere Handlungen, im Licht seiner Konsequenzen. Deontologen argumentieren hingegen, dass die moralische Bewertung nicht von den Folgen abhängt, sondern vor allem davon, was Terrorismus ausmacht. Folglich schwanken die Positionen zur Moralität von Terrorismus von seiner Rechtfertigung bis hin zu seiner vollkommenen Verurteilung. All diese Positionen kommen in diesem Band zu Wort, der eine Auswahl an philosophischen und politikwissenschaftlichen Essays aus den letzten drei Jahrzehnten versammelt. Die praktische Bedeutung des Themas muss nicht betont werden. Aber Terrorismus ist auch von großem theoretischen Interesse. Denn er liefert eine besonders dramatische Fassung der Frage der Legitimität politischer Gewalt. Und er spitzt eine grundlegende ethische Frage beispielhaft zu: Sollen basale ethische Verbote wie das Verbot des Tötens oder Verstümmelns Unschuldiger als absolute Verbote angesehen werden, oder können sie in Ausnahmefällen angesichts extrem gewichtiger Konsequenzen überschrieben werden? (shrink)

Modern medicine consumes vast amounts of resources, ranging from human to technological and financial. In a well-functioning and well-equipped health system, resource allocation considerations rarely impact clinical decision-making as all patients that need care will (eventually) receive it. In light of this, health care providers (HCPs) are often taught to focus on the patient in front of them, driven by a type of patient-centred ethics (of care) that prioritizes the individual person’s well-being above the aggregate. Informed by the principle of (...) autonomy and respect for individual self-determination, patients in well-resourced health systems often have the autonomy to make decisions that require high resource utilization with little concern directed to how these choices may impact the care provided to other patients or groups of patients. In fact, it is generally accepted that if resources are sufficient, patients and their providers should be able to make medical decisions unencumbered by considerations related to broader resource allocation (with some caveats related to personal or national health insurance schemes). This means that the average HCP in the best case and in their daily routine spends little time considering how their clinical choices might impact the care available to others—concerns related to how resources are allocated, and who receives care are far removed from clinical interaction and related medical decision-making. (shrink)

This book focuses on resource allocation in military and humanitarian medicine during times of scarcity and austerity. It is in these times that health systems bend, break, and even collapse and where resource allocation becomes a paramount concern and directly impacts clinical decision-making. Such times are challenging and this book covers this very important, yet, scarcely researched topic within the field of bioethics. This work brings together experts and practitioners in the fields of military health care, philosophy, ethics, and other (...) disciplines to provide analysis on a variety of related topics ranging from case studies and first-hand experiences to policy and philosophical analysis. It is of great interest to to academics, practitioners, policy makers and students who are looking for analyses and guidance regarding the fair provision of medical care and the use of medical rules of eligibility under adverse conditions. (shrink)

New mechanisms to ensure that counter ter ror ism ac t ivit ies do not contravene international law or ethical values and principles will require careful design. Apart from the ethical and legal grounds, there are good practical rea-sons to design more effective counterter-rorism measures. Preventable harms to population health contribute to mistrust and instability and undermine the stated objectives of the intelligence services.

Philosophie nach Georg Meggle zeichnet sich aus durch kommunikative Offenheit, durch begriffliche Unbestechlichkeit und durch ihr Engagement in der Welt. Die Beiträge in diesem Band orientieren sich an diesem Philosophieverständnis und sind aus Anlass eines Symposiums zu Ehren von Georg Meggle als Originalbeiträge geschrieben worden. Der Band verbindet die theoretischen und praktischen Aspekte der analytischen Philosophie: So sind die Essays zur Hälfte der theoretischen, meist sprach-analytischen, zur Hälfte der praktischen, meist praktisch-politischen Philosophie zuzuordnen. Die Texte vereint das Ideal des Strebens (...) nach begrifflicher Klarheit und welthaltiger Relevanz, nach Dialog. Sie beschreiten neue Wege der analytischen Philosophie und weisen somit den Weg in die Zukunft der Philosophie als gesellschaftlich relevanter Disziplin. Mit Beiträgen u.a. von: Franz von Kutschera, Peter Singer, Wolfgang Lenzen, Wolfgang Spohn, Reinhard Merkel, Rainer Hegselmann, Peter Rohs und Georg Meggle. (shrink)

Privacy and surveillance scholars increasingly worry that data collectors can use the information they gather about our behaviors, preferences, interests, incomes, and so on to manipulate us. Yet what it means, exactly, to manipulate someone, and how we might systematically distinguish cases of manipulation from other forms of influence—such as persuasion and coercion—has not been thoroughly enough explored in light of the unprecedented capacities that information technologies and digital media enable. In this paper, we develop a definition of manipulation that (...) addresses these enhanced capacities, investigate how information technologies facilitate manipulative practices, and describe the harms—to individuals and to social institutions—that flow from such practices. -/- We use the term “online manipulation” to highlight the particular class of manipulative practices enabled by a broad range of information technologies. We argue that at its core, manipulation is hidden influence—the covert subversion of another person’s decision-making power. We argue that information technology, for a number of reasons, makes engaging in manipulative practices significantly easier, and it makes the effects of such practices potentially more deeply debilitating. And we argue that by subverting another person’s decision-making power, manipulation undermines his or her autonomy. Given that respect for individual autonomy is a bedrock principle of liberal democracy, the threat of online manipulation is a cause for grave concern. (shrink)

Since 2016, when the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal began to emerge, public concern has grown around the threat of “online manipulation”. While these worries are familiar to privacy researchers, this paper aims to make them more salient to policymakers — first, by defining “online manipulation”, thus enabling identification of manipulative practices; and second, by drawing attention to the specific harms online manipulation threatens. We argue that online manipulation is the use of information technology to covertly influence another person’s decision-making, by targeting (...) and exploiting their decision-making vulnerabilities. Engaging in such practices can harm individuals by diminishing their economic interests, but its deeper, more insidious harm is its challenge to individual autonomy. We explore this autonomy harm, emphasising its implications for both individuals and society, and we briefly outline some strategies for combating online manipulation and strengthening autonomy in an increasingly digital world. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude of believing. In a recent and influential discussion, Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi raise a number of serious objections to this view. In this paper, I concede that Bykvist and Hattiangadi's criticisms might be effective against the formulation of the norm of truth that they consider, but suggest that an alternative is available. After outlining that alternative, I argue that it is not vulnerable to objections parallel to those (...) Bykvist and Hattiangadi advance, although it might initially appear to be. In closing, I consider what bearing the preceding discussion has on important questions concerning the natures of believing and of truth. (shrink)

Clark has recently suggested that predictive processing advances a theory of neural function with the resources to put an ecumenical end to the “representation wars” of recent cognitive science. In this paper I defend and develop this suggestion. First, I broaden the representation wars to include three foundational challenges to representational cognitive science. Second, I articulate three features of predictive processing’s account of internal representation that distinguish it from more orthodox representationalist frameworks. Specifically, I argue that it posits a resemblance-based (...) representational architecture with organism-relative contents that functions in the service of pragmatic success, not veridical representation. Finally, I argue that internal representation so understood is either impervious to the three anti-representationalist challenges I outline or can actively embrace them. (shrink)

Participants watched themselves in a mirror while another person behind them, hidden from view, extended hands forward on each side where participants’ hands would normally appear. The hands performed a series of movements. When participants could hear instructions previewing each movement, they reported an enhanced feeling of controlling the hands. Hearing instructions for the movements also enhanced skin conductance responses when a rubber band was snapped on the other’s wrist after the movements. Such vicarious agency was not felt when the (...) instructions followed the movements, and participants’ own covert movement mimicry was not essential to the influence of previews on reported control. (shrink)

The American justice system, from police departments to the courts, is increasingly turning to information technology for help identifying potential offenders, determining where, geographically, to allocate enforcement resources, assessing flight risk and the potential for recidivism amongst arrestees, and making other judgments about when, where, and how to manage crime. In particular, there is a focus on machine learning and other data analytics tools, which promise to accurately predict where crime will occur and who will perpetrate it. Activists and academics (...) have begun to raise critical questions about the use of these tools in policing contexts. In this chapter, I review the emerging critical literature on predictive policing and contribute to it by raising ethical questions about the use of predictive analytics tools to identify potential offenders. Drawing from work on the ethics of profiling, I argue that the much-lauded move from reactive to preemptive policing can mean wrongfully generalizing about individuals, making harmful assumptions about them, instrumentalizing them, and failing to respect them as full ethical persons. I suggest that these problems stem both from the nature of predictive policing tools and from the sociotechnical contexts in which they are implemented... (shrink)

What is understanding? My goal in this paper is to lay out a new approach to this question and clarify how that approach deals with certain issues. The claim is that understanding is a matter of compressing information about the understood so that it can be mentally useful. On this account, understanding amounts to having a representational kernel and the ability to use it to generate the information one needs regarding the target phenomenon. I argue that this ambitious new account (...) can accommodate much of the data that has motivated theories of understanding in philosophy of science, and can also be generally applicable in epistemology and daily life as well. (shrink)

An influential proposal is that knowledge involves safe belief. A belief is safe, in the relevant sense, just in case it is true in nearby metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper, I introduce a distinct but complementary notion of safety, understood in terms of epistemically possible worlds. The main aim, in doing so, is to add to the epistemologist’s tool-kit. To demonstrate the usefulness of the tool, I use it to advance and assess substantive proposals concerning knowledge and justification.

We argue that one important aspect of the “cognitive neuroscience revolution” identified by Boone and Piccinini :1509–1534. doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0783-4, 2015) is a dramatic shift away from thinking of cognitive representations as arbitrary symbols towards thinking of them as icons that replicate structural characteristics of their targets. We argue that this shift has been driven both “from below” and “from above”—that is, from a greater appreciation of what mechanistic explanation of information-processing systems involves, and from a greater appreciation of the problems (...) solved by bio-cognitive systems, chiefly regulation and prediction. We illustrate these arguments by reference to examples from cognitive neuroscience, principally representational similarity analysis and the emergence of dynamical models as a central postulate in neurocognitive research. (shrink)

Simon May has argued that the notion of a principled compromise is incoherent. Reasons to compromise are always in his view strategic: though we think that the position we defend is still the right one, we compromise on this view in order to avoid the undesirable consequences that might flow from not compromising. I argue against May that there are indeed often principled reasons to compromise, and that these reasons are in fact multiple. First, compromises evince respect for persons that (...) we have reason to think of as our epistemic peers, and acknowledgement of our own finitudes as moral reasoners. Second, compromises are often made morally necessary by the shortfalls that unavoidably separate democratic institutions from democratic ideals. Third, compromises express a desirable form of democratic community. And fourth, compromises are often justified from a consequentialist point of view, in that they allow for the realization of values that would not be realized as well by the failure to compromise. (shrink)

When the costs of acquiring knowledge outweigh the benefits of possessing it, ignorance is rational. In this paper I clarify and explore a related but more neglected phenomenon: cases in which ignorance is motivated by the anticipated costs of possessing knowledge, not acquiring it. The paper has four aims. First, I describe the psychological and social factors underlying this phenomenon of motivated ignorance. Second, I describe those conditions in which it is instrumentally rational. Third, I draw on evidence from the (...) social sciences to argue that this phenomenon of rational motivated ignorance plays an important but often unappreciated role in one of the most socially harmful forms of ignorance today: voter ignorance of societal risks such as climate change. Finally, I consider how to address the high social costs associated with rational motivated ignorance. (shrink)

For several years, scholars have (for good reason) been largely preoccupied with worries about the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) tools to make decisions about us. Only recently has significant attention turned to a potentially more alarming problem: the use of AI/ML to influence our decision-making. The contexts in which we make decisions—what behavioral economists call our choice architectures—are increasingly technologically-laden. Which is to say: algorithms increasingly determine, in a wide variety of contexts, both the sets of (...) options we choose from and the way those options are framed. Moreover, artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) makes it possible for those options and their framings—the choice architectures—to be tailored to the individual chooser. They are constructed based on information collected about our individual preferences, interests, aspirations, and vulnerabilities, with the goal of influencing our decisions. At the same time, because we are habituated to these technologies we pay them little notice. They are, as philosophers of technology put it, transparent to us—effectively invisible. I argue that this invisible layer of technological mediation, which structures and influences our decision-making, renders us deeply susceptible to manipulation. Absent a guarantee that these technologies are not being used to manipulate and exploit, individuals will have little reason to trust them. (shrink)

Everyone wants to be healthy, but many of us decline to act in healthy ways. Should these choices have any bearing on the ethics of clinical practice and health policy? How may personal responsibility for health be manipulated in health policy debates.

The distinction between objective and subjective reasons plays an important role in both folk normative thought and many research programs in metaethics. But the relation between objective and subjective reasons is unclear. This paper explores problems related to the unity of objective and subjective reasons for actions and attitudes and then offers a novel objectivist account of subjective reasons.

A large body of research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience draws on Bayesian statistics to model information processing within the brain. Many theorists have noted that this research seems to be in tension with a large body of experimental results purportedly documenting systematic deviations from Bayesian updating in human belief formation. In response, proponents of the Bayesian brain hypothesis contend that Bayesian models can accommodate such results by making suitable assumptions about model parameters. To make progress in this debate, I (...) argue that it is fruitful to focus not on specific experimental results but rather on what I call the ‘sources of epistemic irrationality’ in human cognition. I identify four such sources and I explore whether and, if so, how Bayesian models can be reconciled with them: processing costs, evolutionary suboptimality, motivated cognition, and error management. 1 Introduction 2 The Bayesian Brain 3 The Problem of Epistemic Irrationality 3.1 Bayesian inference and rationality 3.2 Intuitive Bayesian inference 4 Sources of Epistemic Irrationality 4.1 Processing costs 4.2 Evolutionary suboptimality 4.3 Motivational influences 4.4 Error management 5 Conclusion. (shrink)

The view that special science properties are multiply realizable has been attacked in recent years by Shapiro, Bechtel and Mundale, Polger, and others. Focusing on psychological and neuroscientific properties, I argue that these attacks are unsuccessful. By drawing on interspecies physiological comparisons I show that diverse physical mechanisms can converge on common functional properties at multiple levels. This is illustrated with examples from the psychophysics and neuroscience of early vision. This convergence is compatible with the existence of general constraints on (...) the evolution of cognitive systems, and does not involve any ad hoc typing of coarse-grained higher level properties. The mechanisms that realize these common higher level properties are really distinct by the criteria laid down by critics of multiple readability. Finally, I present an account of how such functional properties might constitute special science kinds by playing a central explanatory role in a range of cognitive models. Behavioral science kinds in particular are the functionally defined constituents picked out by our most successful models of the multilevel systems and mechanisms that explain cognitive capacities. (shrink)

Memory perfttrmattce of 118 individuals who had been iu close dating relationships for at least 3 months was studied. For a memory task ostensibly to be performed by pairs, some Ss were paired..

It is commonplace to claim that it is good to believe the truth. In this paper, I reject that claim and argue that the considerations which might seem to support it in fact support a quite distinct though superficially similar claim, namely, that it is bad to believe the false. This claim is typically either ignored completely or lumped together with the previous claim, perhaps on the assumption that the two are equivalent, or at least that they stand or fall (...) together. Such assumptions, I argue, are mistaken. While it is not always good to be right, it is always bad to be wrong. This is an interesting and overlooked asymmetry, which calls for further investigation. (shrink)

It is commonly held that p is a reason for A to ϕ only if p explains why A ought to ϕ. I argue that this view must be rejected because there are reasons for A to ϕ that would be redundant in any ex...

Moral distress in healthcare has been an increasingly prevalent topic of discussion. Most authors characterize it as a negative phenomenon, while few have considered its potentially positive value. In this essay, I argue that moral distress can reveal and affirm some of our most important concerns as moral agents. Indeed, the experience of it under some circumstances appears to be partly constitutive of an honorable character and can allow for crucial moral maturation. The potentially positive value, then, is twofold; moral (...) distress carries both aretaic and instrumental value. Granted, this position is not without its caveats, but by making these clear, I provide a novel framework for policy recommendations regarding when, if ever, we should work to reduce moral distress. (shrink)

Recent research in cognitive and computational neuroscience portrays the neocortex as a hierarchically structured prediction machine. Several theorists have drawn on this research to challenge the traditional distinction between perception and cognition – specifically, to challenge the very idea that perception and cognition constitute useful kinds from the perspective of cognitive neuroscience. In place of this traditional taxonomy, such theorists advocate a unified inferential hierarchy subject to substantial bi-directional message passing. I outline the nature of this challenge and then raise (...) two objections to the cognitive architecture it proposes as a replacement: first, standard ways of characterising this inferential hierarchy are in tension with the representational reach of conceptual thought; second, there is compelling evidence that commonsense reasoning is structured around highly domain-specific intuitive theories that are difficult to situate within a single hierarchy. (shrink)

Actions can have, or lack, moral worth. When a person’s action is morally worthy, she not only acts rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for doing what is right. In this paper, I develop and defend an analogue of the notion of moral worth that applies to belief, which I call epistemic worth. When a person’s belief is epistemically worthy, she not only believes rightly, but (...) does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for believing what is right. The notion of epistemic worth, I suggest, is of interest to both epistemologists and ethicists. (shrink)

Much has been written about the fittingness, epistemic, and standing norms that govern blame. In this paper, we argue that there exists a norm of blame that has yet to receive philosophical discussion and without which an account of the ethics of blame will be incomplete: a norm proscribing comparatively arbitrary blame. By reflecting on the objectionableness of comparatively arbitrary blame, we stand to elucidate a substantive, and thus far overlooked, norm governing our attributions of responsibility. Accordingly, our aim in (...) this paper is to develop a comparative non-arbitrariness condition on blame that can enrich our understanding of the ethics of blame. (shrink)

The dominant legal and regulatory approach to protecting information privacy is a form of mandated disclosure commonly known as “notice-and-consent.” Many have criticized this approach, arguing that privacy decisions are too complicated, and privacy disclosures too convoluted, for individuals to make meaningful consent decisions about privacy choices—decisions that often require us to waive important rights. While I agree with these criticisms, I argue that they only meaningfully call into question the “consent” part of notice-and-consent, and that they say little about (...) the value of notice. We ought to decouple notice from consent, and imagine notice serving other normative ends besides readying people to make informed consent decisions. (shrink)