- Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.details
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Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Normativity of Meaning: An Inferentialist Argument.Shuhei Shimamura & Tuomo Tiisala - 2023 - Synthese 202 (4):1-21.details
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The Dual Aspects Theory of Truth.Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):209-233.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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Fictional Persuasion and the Nature of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 174-193.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Deflationism about Truth-Directedness.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (4):2022-0069.details
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Inferentialism, degrees of commitment, and ampliative reasoning.Jesús Zamora Bonilla, Xavier de Donato Rodríguez & Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 4):909-927.details
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The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False).Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (2):219-242.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism.Daniel Whiting - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624.details
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Précis of The Range of Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-7.details
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):407-427.details
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Disbelieving the Normativity of Content.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):441-456.details
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An Evaluative Norm for Belief.Michael-John Turp - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (2):227-239.details
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Unfollowed Rules and the Normativity of Content.Eric V. Tracy - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):323-344.details
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How Norms (Might) Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.details
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The Normative Autonomy of Logic.Diego Tajer - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2661-2684.details
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A simple solution to the collapse argument for logical pluralism.Diego Tajer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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The Knowledge Norm of Belief.Zachary Mitchell Swindlehurst - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):43-50.details
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The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1213-1227.details
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Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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The contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):21-34.details
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Inferentialism, degrees of commitment, and ampliative reasoning.Rodríguez Xavier de Donato, Bonilla Jesús Zamora & Javier González De Prado Salas - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 4):909-927.details
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Belief Norms & Blindspots.Thomas Raleigh - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):243-269.details
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No Reasons to Believe the False.Javier González De Prado Salas - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):703-722.details
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No Reasons to Believe the False.Javier González Prado - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):703-722.details
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Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
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Rescuing Doxastic Normativism.Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2012 - Theoria 78 (4):293-308.details
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Epistemic norms, all things considered.Kate Nolfi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6717-6737.details
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Normativity as a Kind of Conformity: Towards a naturalistic account of epistemic normativity.Basil Müller - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):49-74.details
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Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ from an Epistemic Point of View?Moti Mizrahi - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):829-840.details
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Belief Holism and the Scope of Doxastic Norms.Alexander Miller & Seyed Ali Kalantari - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):575-584.details
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The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.details
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Fitting belief.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):167-187.details
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Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.details
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Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.McHugh Conor - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
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The Norms of Belief as the Norms of Commitment: A Case for Pluralism.Alireza Kazemi - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy (00):1-17.details
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The norms of belief as the norms of commitment: A case for pluralism.Alireza Kazemi - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):474-490.details
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Transparency and the truth norm of belief.Alireza Kazemi - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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On the Nature of Belief in Pluralistic Ignorance.Marco Antonio Joven-Romero - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):23-45.details
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Belief and pluralistic ignorance.Marco Antonio Joven Romero - 2020 - Filosofia Unisinos 21 (3):260-267.details
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Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide.Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.details
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The Normativity of Doxastic Correctness.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):379-388.details
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