This paper examines the developments in the aftermath of Caesar’s assassination on the Ides of March 44 bce in the context of developments concerning the allocation of the consular provinciae of that year. It argues that the consuls, M. Antonius and P. Cornelius Dolabella, initially sought compromise with the conspirators, and the passage of the lex de permutatione provinciarum on the Kalends of June represents a genuine turning point. The historical implications of its provisions led to increasing hostility, and ultimately (...) the Mutinian War. Last, but not least, this paper seeks to demonstrate the integral role of C. Octavius in prompting this consequential change in attitude. (shrink)

The current issue of the American Journal of Bioethics illustrates the scope of disagreement among professionals about normothermic regional perfusion (NRP). A similar range of opinions has been de...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:George Engel’s Legacy for the Philosophy of Medicine and PsychiatryBradley Lewis (bio)KeywordsBiopsychosocial model, George Engel, pragmatism, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of psychiatryEach of the respondents to this paper raises critical and important concerns. I am grateful for the quality of their insights. David Brendel’s response, along with his recent book, Healing Psychiatry: Bridging the Science/Humanism Divide, resembles my efforts in several ways. Like Brendel, I too believe that the (...) American pragmatic philosophy can be helpful in healing the splits and divisions within psychiatry. And, like Brendel, I believe that psychiatry would benefit from what he calls the “four ps” of pragmatism. Where we differ with regard to George Engel and his biopsychosocial model seems to be less about philosophy and more about strategy. Brendel argues that Engel was too scientistic in his manifest reasoning to be considered a pragmatist. I agree with this description of Engel. But, strategically, we can go beyond Engel’s manifest reasoning to draw out the implications of Engel’s writings in a pragmatic fashion. I am not saying that Engel did this himself; I am only saying that it is very possible to reinterpret Engel along these lines.Brendel also argues that the biopsychosocial model itself needs improvement. But, just as it is possible to update Engel’s theoretical scaffold, we can also update Engel’s biopsychosocial model. Along the lines of Brendel’s concerns, we can easily revise the model so that we remember that not all problems need complex analysis and interventions. Some problems are relatively simple and can have a simple solution. We can also revise the model so we include questions of consumer participation and the provisional nature of the clinical encounter. I see nothing in the biopsychosocial model that contradicts either of these concerns. Yes, the biopsychosocial model needs to be updated, refurbished, expanded, and reimagined. That is my point in the paper.The traction of Brendel’s concerns is not can we reinterpret Engel? or can we refresh the biopsychosocial model?—of course we can. The traction of his concern seems to be “should we?” To this strategic question, Brendel’s answer is no and my answer is yes. I argue that it is a good idea to refresh and refurbish Engel and his biopsychosocial model because it helps to create a connection with an important tradition within both medicine and psychiatry: the tradition of balanced, broadminded, nuanced, patient-centered and anti-reductionistic [End Page 327] care. This tradition is important because medicine and psychiatry seem perpetually vulnerable to the temptations of reductionist approaches and to what Engel, and Nassir Ghaemi more recently, call “dogmatism” (Engel 1977, 130; Ghaemi, 2003, 301). Whether reductionism and dogmatism take the form of biopsychiatry, or psychoanalysis, or antipsychiatry, or cognitive-behavioral therapy, the problems of dogmatism are the same.I am sure Brendel would agree with this, which is why he raises pluralism to such a prominent position in his own reasoning. The difference is that Brendel believes we can better get to this kind of balanced clinical care by letting go of the past figures like Engel and moving into the bright light of the twenty-first century. Maybe so. But my thinking when I wrote the paper goes the other way around. For me, if clinical medicine and psychiatry more carefully tended to its history and tradition, it would be less likely to fall sway to the next Johnny-come-lately reductionistic model.Jeffery Spike’s memories of George Engel during the years they worked together at the University of Rochester School of Medicine provide a good sense of why Engel is an important figure to remember and to pay homage. As Spike puts it, Engel was not only a “legendary figure” with an “almost mythical diagnostic ability,” Engel “probably had more influence on the philosophy of medicine in the United States than any other person, physician, or philosopher.” Both of these accomplishments help to explain why Engel is worth remembering.Those of us in medicine and psychiatry all know mythical clinicians and teachers—the ones who seem like Michael Jordan used to seem on the basketball court, able to somehow make even... (shrink)

This narrative symposium examines the relationship of bioethics practice to personal experiences of illness. A call for stories was developed by Tod Chambers, the symposium editor, and editorial staff and was sent to several commonly used bioethics listservs and posted on the Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics website. The call asked authors to relate a personal story of being ill or caring for a person who is ill, and to describe how this affected how they think about bioethical questions and the (...) practice of medicine. Eighteen individuals were invited to submit full stories based on review of their proposals. Twelve stories are published in this symposium, and six supplemental stories are published online only through Project MUSE. Authors explore themes of vulnerability, suffering, communication, voluntariness, cultural barriers, and flaws in local healthcare systems through stories about their own illnesses or about caring for children, partners, parents and grandparents. Commentary articles by Arthur Frank, Bradley Lewis, and Carol Taylor follow the collection of personal narratives. (shrink)

Critics of theological accounts of the nature of morality have argued that such accounts must be rejected, even by theists, because such accounts (i) have the unacceptable implication that nothing is morally wrong in possible worlds in which atheism is true, (ii) render the substantive content of morality arbitrary, and (iii) make it impossible or redundant to attribute moral properties to God or God’s actions. I argue that none of these criticisms constitute good reason for theists to abandon theological accounts (...) of the nature of morality. (shrink)

We argue that limiting the theory of extreme self-sacrifice to two determinants, namely, identity fusion and group threats, results in logical and conceptual difficulties. To strengthen Whitehouse's theory, we encourage a more holistic approach. In particular, we suggest that the theory include exogenous sociopolitical factors and constituents of the religious system as additional predictors of extreme self-sacrifice.

Political theorists converge in identifying modern techniques of domination as habit-formative and psychologically invasive, in contrast to earlier, more blatantly coercive forms of repression. Putting Aristotle on tyranny in conversation with Michel Foucault on subject formation, this article argues for continuity across the pre- and postmodern divide. Through a close reading of the “three heads of tyranny” in Politics 5.11 —those being the tyrant’s efforts to form subjects who have small thoughts are distrustful of one another, and are incapable of (...) action—I argue that central to Aristotle’s account of tyrannical domination is how tyrants cultivate the ethical vice of “small-souledness”, thus producing subjects with humbled desires for a proportionate distribution of political power. This article deepens our appreciation of the social and psychological registers of Aristotle’s theorization of domination and gives reasons for continuing to take Aristotle’s insights into tyranny seriously today. (shrink)

ABSTRACT William Cooney has recently argued (The Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 6, pp. 201–204) that the social programme of affirmative action, though controversial, can be supported by the doctrine of double effect in that, according to the doctrine, responsibility falls on the side of intended consequences and not on that of unintended consequences. The point of affirmative action is to include certain disadvantaged groups; it is not to exclude other groups, though this is an inevitable and foreseeable by‐product. In (...) this article I contend that Cooney's argument ignores two important conditions of the doctrine of double effect; namely, that the good which results from the intended effect must be at least commensurate with the harm that results from the unintended effect; and, that the intended good effect is causally separate from the unintended harmful effect. Any use of the doctrine which neglects these conditions leads to morally problematic cases. Further, once we take the conditions into account, we have good reason to think that the doctrine of double effect has no relevance to the affirmative action debate. (shrink)

Affective geographies examine the emotional dimensions of space and spatial relationships; geopolitics seeks to understand the role of space and geography in international relations. In this paper, we consider a hybridization of these concepts in the context of the Nordic countries, and in particular Denmark. Nordic countries have shifted attention to the wielding of “soft power” as a tool in seeking to achieve international relations and economic goals. We argue that in the case of Denmark, these soft power tools bear (...) an interesting affective dimension through an emphasis on “hygge,” or, “coziness.” Through media analysis, we illuminate the components of soft power in the Danish case and highlight the role of affect as a key element of these soft power tools. (shrink)

The risk of tort liability for health maintenance organizations and other managed care plans has dramatically increased in recent years. This is due in part to the growing percentage of health care rendered through managed care plans. The cost-containment mechanisms commonly used by managed care plans, such as limiting access to services and/or choice of providers, creates a climate ripe for disputes that may end up in court. As dissatisfied patients and providers seek recourse in the courts, tort doctrines are (...) extended and new legal theories emerge as needed. For example, the concepts of direct and vicarious tort liability developed in the hospital context have been extended by courts to encompass HMOs. vicarious liability claims, based on ostensible agency or respondeat superior doctrines, have been brought against HMOs and managed care plans for negligent treatment by physicians selected to provide care to members. (shrink)

The risk of tort liability for health maintenance organizations and other managed care plans has dramatically increased in recent years. This is due in part to the growing percentage of health care rendered through managed care plans. The cost-containment mechanisms commonly used by managed care plans, such as limiting access to services and/or choice of providers, creates a climate ripe for disputes that may end up in court. As dissatisfied patients and providers seek recourse in the courts, tort doctrines are (...) extended and new legal theories emerge as needed. For example, the concepts of direct and vicarious tort liability developed in the hospital context have been extended by courts to encompass HMOs. vicarious liability claims, based on ostensible agency or respondeat superior doctrines, have been brought against HMOs and managed care plans for negligent treatment by physicians selected to provide care to members. (shrink)

Although thick ethical concepts have been neglected in Murdochian scholarship, this article argues that they were central to the thought of Iris Murdoch. In the first section, the article provides a sustained account of thick ethical concepts in Murdoch's philosophy, demonstrating how these concepts align with and illuminate familiar aspects of her philosophical essays. The first section also explores the ways in which Murdoch's alternative account of moral concepts was at the heart of her overall attack on the noncognitivism of (...) her day. In the second section, the article provides a reading of The Black Prince and considers the ways that thick ethical concepts offer new insight into Murdoch's literary activity. It concludes by suggesting that studying Murdoch's philosophy and literature in light of thick ethical concepts reveals a deep unity between her two intellectual projects. (shrink)

Can humans truly be the measure of all things? Is relativism a corrosive concept, undermining any chance we have of getting clear about things? Should we seek foundations for our values, or is such an effort a waste of time? With David Gallagher, Shannon Jordan, and Joshua Halberstam.

Can humans truly be the measure of all things? Is relativism a corrosive concept, undermining any chance we have of getting clear about things? Should we seek foundations for our values, or is such an effort a waste of time? With David Gallagher, Shannon Jordan, and Joshua Halberstam.

Toward a neurobiologically grounded approach to explaining self-control we discuss the case of a patient with a bilateral lesion in frontal ventromedial cortex. Patients with such lesions display a marked deficit in social decision making. Compared with an account that examines the causal antecedents of self-control, Rachlin's behaviorist approach seems lacking in explanatory strength.

China is rising. As China ascends in power, it is likely that ?Western? administrators ? American and European, in particular ? will find that they must interact with Chinese administrators more and more. In this article, I offer readers a brief glimpse into Chinese administrative ethics through an investigation of two forms of Chinese philosophy ? Confucianism and Taoism. In addition to reviewing these philosophies, I derive some consequences for a public service ethic that lies between the East and the (...) West. In particular, this article includes some recommendations for the managerial implications of these two philosophies in the context of increased political and administrative connections between the West and China. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that narratives concerning Periclean Athens have mistakenly imposed modern conceptions of enlightenment onto the Greek world,and have therefore been blinded to crucial aspects of Socrates’s practice of moral reason giving. In contrast to the Kantian conception of enlightenment, which puts forth an image of the ideally enlightened person as an autonomous reasoner, one who refuses to be guided by another and who has the courage to throw off the chains of tradition and “think for oneself,” (...) I argue that Socrates provides us with a much different picture of the enlightened individual. Socrates’s practice of moral reasoning does not take the form of autonomous rationality that is antithetical to tradition, but rather his practice recognizes the rightful authority of tradition and custom in moral reason giving. Thus, rather than characterizing Socrates through a Kantian enlightenment reading, this paper argues that we should study Socrates through the lens of the sensus communis, a humanist concept articulated well by Giambattista Vico and Hans Georg-Gadamer. (shrink)

The #MeToo movement generated a feminist insistence that we “believe women.” But the men accused of assault, harassment, and other violations frequently defended themselves with the insistence that they had always “respected women” – sometimes, going so far as to get numerous women to sign letters swearing that these men had always respected them. This common MeToo defense reveals the core inconsistency – and the core entitlement – at the heart of misogyny and sexual injustice: some women deserve respect. But (...) the duty to respect those women relies on an invisible entitlement to disrespect – indeed, to assault, harass, dominate, or exploit – others. This chapter explores consent’s role within the superstructure of misogyny and sexual injustice, arguing what consent is a key apparatus of white supremacy. It argues that consent has been constructed through dynamics of colonial and racist sexual entitlement, mapping some (white) women as deserving of respect and the right to consent, while marking other women as expendable or disposable within the sexual economy. This means not only that consent is historically constructed as white, but also that whiteness, and in particular, white womanhood, is constructed through consent. Thus, white women’s right to consent – or to refuse – is premised upon the inability of other women to do so. In this way, the right to sexual consent does not disrupt the norm of male sexual entitlement. Consent has always been premised on non-consent, from coloniality and slavery to contemporary porn, which offers a vision of the world without proper consent, so that granting consent to actual women is an exceptional practice, an “act of respect.” By including race and class alongside gender in my analysis of consent, I argue that contemporary feminist visions of sexual justice must do more than defend or ameliorate consent, but develop intersectional interrogations of sexual justice that reckon with the complicities of consent. (shrink)

Are demands for equality motivated by envy? Nietzsche, Freud, Hayek, and Nozick all thought so. Call this the Envy Objection. For egalitarians, the Envy Objection is meant to sting. Many egalitarians have tried to evade the Envy Objection.. But should egalitarians be worried about envy? In this paper, I argue that egalitarians should stop worrying and learn to love envy. I argue that the persistent unwillingness to embrace the Envy Objection is rooted in a common misunderstanding of the nature of (...) the charge, what it reveals, and what can be said in response to it. I develop what Bernard Williams might call a vindicatory genealogy of envy, thereby allowing us to see that envy, rather than undermining egalitarian intuitions, can in fact play a distinct justificatory role (when it is fitting), which undermines the Envy Objection. (shrink)

One might well wonder—is there a category under which every thing falls? Offering an informative account of such a category is no easy task. For nothing would distinguish things that fall under it from those that don’t—there being, after all, none of the latter. It seems hard, then, to say much about any fully general category; and it would appear to do no carving or categorizing or dividing at all. Nonetheless there are candidates for such a fully general office, including (...) thing, being, entity, item, existent, and—especially—object.[ It is not obvious that there is any fully general category (whether object or otherwise). Accordingly, not all accounts of object assign it to a fully general category, instead allowing that there are non-objects. On those views, object does indeed divide. Accounts of object, then, differ with respect to whether there are non-objects. And this is not the only fault line. Other dimensions of difference include what objects there are and what objects are. Accordingly, this entry will survey three broad questions about the category object: What, if any, is its contrast or complement? What is its extension? What is its nature? (shrink)

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has developed a novel framework for assessing and communicating uncertainty in the findings published in their periodic assessment reports. But how should these uncertainty assessments inform decisions? We take a formal decision-making perspective to investigate how scientific input formulated in the IPCC’s novel framework might inform decisions in a principled way through a normative decision model.

We discuss four interconnected issues that we believe have hindered investigations into how language may affect thinking. These have had a tendency to reappear in the debate concerning linguistic relativity over the past decades, despite numerous empirical findings. The first is the claim that it is impossible to disentangle language from thought, making the question concerning “influence” pointless. The second is the argument that it is impossible to disentangle language from culture in general, and from social interaction in particular, so (...) it is impossible to attribute any differences in the thought patterns of the members of different cultures to language per se. The third issue is the objection that methodological and empirical problems defeat all but the most trivial version of the thesis of linguistic influence: that language gives new factual information. The fourth is the assumption that since language can potentially influence thought from “not at all” to “completely,” the possible forms of linguistic influence can be placed on a cline, and competing theories can be seen as debating the actual position on this cline. We analyze these claims and show that the first three do not constitute in-principle objections against the validity of the project of investigating linguistic influence on thought, and that the last one is not the best way to frame the empirical challenges at hand. While we do not argue for any specific theory or mechanism for linguistic influence on thought, our discussion and the reviewed literature show that such influence is clearly possible, and hence in need of further investigations. (shrink)

According to universalists, everyone will eventually enjoy eternal union with God. Many hope that universalism is true. But to their dismay, it faces a seemingly decisive objection: some people reject God. In this article, we show that this fact is not a decisive problem for universalism after all. We situate our argument within a framework of hope, and contend that the good news of universalism furnishes special reason to take a kindly view towards otherwise murky or speculative metaphysical hypotheses — (...) hypotheses that not only remove a problem for universalism but also uncover novel defenses of the view. (shrink)

F. H. Bradley was the foremost philosopher of the British Idealist school, which came to prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century. Bradley, who was a life fellow of Merton College, Oxford, was influenced by Hegel, and also reacted against utilitarianism. He was recognised during his lifetime as one of the greatest intellectuals of his generation and was the first philosopher to receive the Order of Merit, in 1924. His work is considered to have been important (...) to the formation of analytic philosophy. In metaphysics, he rejected pluralism and realism, and believed that English philosophy needed to deal systematically with first principles. This work, first published in 1893, is divided into two parts: 'Appearance' deals with exposing the contradictions that Bradley believed are hidden in our everyday conceptions of the world; and in 'Reality', he builds his positive account of reality and considers possible objections to it. (shrink)

Mindfulness based interventions (MBIs) are rapidly emerging in health care settings for their role in reducing stress and improving physical and mental health. In such settings, the religious roots and affiliations of MBIs are downplayed, and the possibilities for developing spiritual, even mystical, states of consciousness are minimized. This article helps rebalance this trend by using the tools of medical humanities and narrative medicine to explore MBI as a bridge between medical and spiritual approaches to health related suffering. My narrative (...) medicine method draws insights from the arts and humanities that are rarely used in standard clinical research but are increasingly common among medical humanities and narrative medicine scholars. The specific path I take will be to work through historical, linguistic, and philosophic dimensions of mindfulness and mysticism as relevant to illness, suffering, death, and dying. I close with two case examples in which mindfulness is used as an intentionally spiritual practice for health concerns. (shrink)

1. Sexual Brains and Body Politics 2. Hormones and Hardwiring 3. Making Sense of Brain Organization Studies 4. Thirteen Ways of Looking at Brain Organization 5. Working Backward from “Distinct‘ Groups 6. Masculine and Feminine Sexuality 7. Sexual Orienteering 8. Sex-Typed Interests 9. Taking Context Seriously 10. Trading Essence for Potential.