Theistic Ethics: Not as Bad as You Think

Philo 12 (1):31-45 (2009)
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Abstract

Critics of theological accounts of the nature of morality have argued that such accounts must be rejected, even by theists, because such accounts (i) have the unacceptable implication that nothing is morally wrong in possible worlds in which atheism is true, (ii) render the substantive content of morality arbitrary, and (iii) make it impossible or redundant to attribute moral properties to God or God’s actions. I argue that none of these criticisms constitute good reason for theists to abandon theological accounts of the nature of morality.

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Matt Jordan
Ohio State University

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