Conceptual primitives and semantic universals are the cornerstones of a semantic theory which Anna Wierzbicka has been developing for many years. Semantics: Primes and Universals is a major synthesis of her work, presenting a full and systematic exposition of that theory in a non-technical and readable way. It delineates a full set of universal concepts, as they have emerged from large-scale investigations across a wide range of languages undertaken by the author and her colleagues. On the basis of empirical (...) cross-linguistic studies it vindicates the old notion of the "psychic unity of mankind", while at the same time offering a framework for the rigorous description of different languages and cultures. (shrink)

Introduction 1. Language and meaning Nothing is as easily overlooked, or as easily forgotten, as the most obvious truths. The tenet that language is a tool ...

Making decisions can be tough, but how do you know it s the right one and how can you be sure that unconscious biases aren t distorting your thinking? In Risky Business, Anna Withers and Mark Withers draw on decades of research in the fields of psychology, behavioral economics and neuroscience to explain why are so-called rational brains are frequently fooled by over 100 powerful unconscious biases. At the same time they provide a straightforward framework everyone can use, where (...) these biases are embodied into eight memorable characters that help us to avoid these pitfalls and make better decisions.". (shrink)

This article investigates the challenges posed by the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology and its connection to reality. Neurophenomenological research seeks to understand the intricate relationship between human consciousness, cognition, and the underlying neural processes. However, the subjective nature of conscious experiences presents unique epistemic challenges in determining the reliability of the knowledge generated in this research. Personal factors such as beliefs, emotions, and cultural backgrounds influence subjective experiences, which vary from individual to individual. On the other hand, scientific knowledge (...) aims to uncover universal truths based on empirical observations and objective principles. Reconciling the subjective and objective realms presents a significant challenge in determining the reliability of knowledge generated through neurophenomenological research. This article aims to examine the inherent limitations and challenges of neurophenomenological research to shed light on the complexities involved in understanding the nature of knowledge itself. This article highlights that the ontological implications of the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology arise from the question of how subjective experiences relate to objective reality. Understanding the neural correlates and mechanisms behind subjective experiences can provide insight into the underlying ontological nature of consciousness. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to portray the ethics of suffering based on the published literature. Narrative use has become common in the fields of nursing education and curriculum development and in the determination of practice competencies. Understanding the ethics of suffering implies a hermeneutic movement between alienation and dedication. To understand the ethical significance of human suffering, the scene of suffering is described through the concepts of: to endure, to struggle, to sacrifice life and health, and to become. (...) To respond, to discover, to approach, to touch and to shape patients' different patterns of life implies responsibility: to see, to affirm their dignity by being, and to express this in ethical words. Narration plays a crucial role in transforming suffering, that is, reformulating patients' stories. It is vital that educators should create a learning environment where students can find the courage and intention to be present and listen to patients' narratives. (shrink)

Ethics in caring is what we actually make explicit through our approach and how we invite the suffering patient into a caring relationship. This phenomenological study investigates suffering and health and how this presupposes a deeper reflection on ethics in caring. The aim was to try to discover, describe and understand how patients experience their life situation three years after undergoing surgery. The theoretical approach is based on central aspects of Eriksson’s caritative theory (i.e. the view of the person as (...) body, soul and spirit). The informants were four women and four men aged between 55 and 77 years. The empirical material revealed suffering that was connected with both illness and life. Suffering involves experiences of grief, loneliness and struggling. Health implies a yearning for something beyond the current life situation, a yearning to experience some meaning in life. This leads to an awareness of unplumbed possibilities. Understanding the experiences of individual patients demands of us, as both researchers and nurses, to act, seeking after the scientific truth (i.e. a deeper reflection of the ontological, epistemological and methodological questions). The idea of responsibility helps us to interpret and meet the innermost desires of suffering patients in their true presence. Caritative caring ethics means ‘being there’, confirming patients’ absolute dignity; it is a manifestation of the love that ‘just exists’. Compassion requires an inner disposition to go with others to the places where they are weak, vulnerable, lonely and broken. An ontology of caring provides both a starting point and a context for reflection about ethics and the ethical life. (shrink)

Habilitation thesis, book proposal in preparation.

A program for the simulation of rational social normative trust, predictive `trust,' and predictive reliance between agents will be introduced. It offers a tool for social scientists or a trust component for multi-agent simulations/multi-agent systems, which need to include trust between agents to guide the decisions about the course of action. It is based on an analysis of rational social normative trust (RSNTR) (revised version of M. Tuomela 2002), which is presented and briefly argued. For collective agents, belief conditions for (...) collective agency should be added. For the various forms of trust agents must have (at least) subjectively rational reasons to believe that the conditions of the trust account are fulfilled. A list of such reasons (of varied weights), e.g., given by empirical research, can manually be built into a parameter file or be generated by a calling program in a fixed format. From this list of reasons the program randomly generates a belief base for the agents of the artificial society. Reasons can be chained together so that one set of reasons satisfies several belief conditions. The program checks if the conditions are fulfilled for the artificial agents' social normative trust/predictive `trust'/`predictive reliance' in another agent that he will perform an action X. Each outcome is logged to a result file. In conclusion we discuss various aspects of the application of a trust component of the suggested kind in empirical research, social simulation, and multi-agent systems. (shrink)

Nothing seems as certain as death. However, what if life continues digitally after death? Companies and initiatives such as Amazon, Storyfile, Here After AI, Forever Identity and LifeNaut are dedicated to precisely this objective: using avatars, records, and other digital content of the deceased, they strive to enable a digital continuation of life. The deceased live on digitally, and at times, these can even appear very much alive-perhaps too alive? This article explores the ethical implications of these technologies, commonly known (...) as Death Tech. With the advancement of artificial intelligence, Death Tech will inevitably transform mourning practices, our perception of death, and how we cope with its reality in the coming years. In this article, it is demonstrated that Death Tech can contribute to individual grief support, education, and a vibrant culture of remembrance. However, it is crucial to recognise that the Digital Afterlife is not a paradise but necessitates active designing and ethical deliberation. DOI 10.5771/0010-3497-2023-3-427. (shrink)

Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...) agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism. (shrink)

XENOLOGY AND XENOTOPOGRAPHY OF BERNHARD WALDENFELS The paper strives to adapt Bernhard Waldenfels’ xenology and so called ‘xenotopography’ for the philosophico-literary studies in fantastic world-building with a special concern of the ‘portal-quest’ model of fantasy and SF. Following Waldenfel’s remarks on the nature of post- Husserlian diastasis of our world [Heimwelt] and otherworld [Fremdwelt] and acknowledging the consequences of allocating one’s attitude towards the otherness in the symbolical borderland [‘sphere of intermonde’] in between, it is examined whether such a model (...) can occur in the fantastic literature and what may be the consequence of xenotopographic reconsideration of its basic ontological premises. Additionally, the article offers an original xenotopograpfic model of worldbuilding which addresses three carefully chosen case studies of fantastic worlds from Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s Game tetralogy, Neil Gaiman’s Stardust and George R. R. Martin’s The Song of Ice and Fire. In the end, it is suggested that hitherto presented xenotopography gravely inspired a postmodern shift in the genres of fantasy and SF which results in more ethically conscious representations of the otherness and even more concise and alien comprehensive world-building. (shrink)

In this paper, an account of rational social normative trust (RSNTR) and a context for rational trust (Y) will be offered and briefly argued. The account concerns a person’s trust in another person that he will perform a specific action. Rational social normative trust is conceived as the trustor’s accepting attitude vis-à-vis his dependence on the trustee. This is an attitude that the trustor acquires non-intentionally, because of his belief, due to their relationship of mutual respect, that he is entitled (...) to expect of the trustee, on social or (quasi-) moral normative grounds, that the trustee will intentionally gratify him by his action, and because of his belief that he will indeed do so at least in part in deference to his rights. The “trust context Y” involves the conditions for a situation where the trustor can rationally consider whether intentional gratification may be expected. Rational trust is distinguished from the more general technical concept of rational reliance by the presence of context Y and the trustor’s expectation of the trustee’s intentional gratification of the trustor. The trustor’s social normative expectation of the trustee’s intentional “acting with goodwill” towards him is the central belief of the trustor involved in rational social normative trust. This belief does not require the trustor’s belief of the trustee’s genuine attitude of goodwill towards the trustor. The account distinguishes social normative trust from predictive “trust” by the trustor’s socially grounded normative, as opposed to only predictive, expectation of the trustee’s intentional gratification of the trustor. Normative trust, and also predictive “trust,” are more than an evaluation of a person’s trustworthiness. In addition to expecting of the trustee and/or expecting that the trustee will intentionally gratify him, the trustor feels comfortable about being dependent on the trustee, and has an accepting attitude regarding his dependent position. Both in normative and predictive trust, the trustor may decide to depend, or to refrain from depending, on the trustee for an action. In the case of normative trust, the trustor genuinely trusts the person he decides to depend on, but in the case of predictive “trust,” his “trusting” is comparable to relying on some features of the trustee or the situation. “Deciding to trust” is to make a bet on someone – to act as if one trusted. The account of rational trust (RSNTR) will be applied to a case where the trustee is a collective agent. Criteria for collective agency is then added. Collective agency is discussed, mainly, in the light of Raimo Tuomela’s work. When the trustor is a collective, the criteria for collective agency should be satisfied for the trustor as well. (shrink)

The Anschluss of Austria in 1938 was a major moment for Nazi expansion in Europe. This German annexation has often been framed to portray Austria as the “first victim” in Nazi aggression, placing blame for crimes agaisnt humanity on the Nazi ideology, rather than Austrian individuals or groups complicit with colaboration. This paper seeks to deconstruct this historiographical understanding based on ideology and analyze the impact of agency in examining Austria’s history with Nazism, the Holocaust, and coming to terms with (...) problematic history. (shrink)

Henryk Elzenberg (1887–1967)—a Polish philosopher, axiologist and existentialist claimed that creativity concealed the secret of life and death. Creativity connects many extremities and contradictions, it requires sacrifices, asceticism, perfectionism, but also yearning, liberty, sensuality and desire.

Artur Blaim’s Gazing in Useless Wonder. English Utopian Fictions 1516–1800, the thirteenth volume of the esteemed Ralahine Utopian Studies series, has already received praises as a must-read monograph from such renowned utopian scholars as Lyman Tower Sargent and Gregory Claeys—and indeed it challenges anyone who would dare state otherwise. And even though such flawless pieces of research are not that common, Blaim’s book definitely has the potential to set a precedent in that regard, being a thorough and cohesive analysis of (...) rather sporadically interpreted utopian texts and novels from even less often studied historical periods.Already the book’s composition reveals a direct association between the emergence of... (shrink)

W artykule analizowane są uwagi Henryka Elzenberga dotyczące znaczenia i funkcji muzyki dla człowieka. Muzyka ma zdolność antycypowania, wywołania, przekazywania i przekierowywania treści emocjonalnych, ale jaka jest jej rola w poznaniu i myśleniu? Problem jest omawiany w kontekście relacji muzyki z mistyką, z życiem, z niemoralnością, w odwołaniu do Beethovena i Wagnera oraz myśli Wittgensteina o muzyce.

W artykule analizowane są reguły „dezintegracji” i „dekonstrukcji” w pracach Kazimierza Dąbrowskiego i Michela Foucaulta. Teoria dezintegracji pozytywnej Dąbrowskiego bada niszczące i budujące procesy w osobowości człowieka. Teoria dyskursu Foucaulta wskazuje na różne dekonstrukcje, którym człowiek jest poddawany na skutek procesów kulturowych i psychologicznych. Obie reguły ukazane są na przykładzie opisów „zdrowia” i „choroby”.

W tekście podjęty zotał problem twórczości i osobowości artysty z perspektywy niektórych XX-wiecznych teorii, m.in. psychoanalizy, psychologii analitycznej i egzystencjalnej. Twórczość może być formą rozwiązania konfliktu i przemiany energii seksualnej, formą obrony psychologicznej i odbudowy swojego,,ja”, czynnością harmonizowania swojego,,cienia” ze sobą i wyrazem archetypu, sposobem przekroczenia swojego typu psychologicznego i rozwoju osobowości, a także mistycznym połączeniem przedmiotu i podmiotu oraz egzystencjalną psychosyntezą.

Tekst omawia myśl Henryka Bergsona na temat twórczości artystycznej jako efekt „ewolucji twórczej”. Wyłanianiu się dzieła twórczego towarzysza dwa główne procesy, które utrwalaja relacje świata duchowego i materialnego: sympatia i asymilacja. Tworzenie można opisać za pomocą różnych technik, np. skupianie, mentalizacja, wykraczanie poza plan, selekcjonowanie, odwracanie przebiegów fizycznych w stronę przeciwna, obramowanie dzieła itd. Na poziomie analizy metafizycznej Bergson opisuje twórczość nie tyle jako relacje artysta–człowiek, ale jako relacje duszy artysty i świata natury, które wymykają się regułom logicznym.

Grounding theorists insist that grounding and explanation are intimately related. This claim could be understood as saying either that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation or it could be interpreted as saying that grounding plays an important—possibly an indispensable—role in metaphysical explanation. Or both. I argue that saying that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation can only be justified if grounding is explanatory by nature, but that this view is untenable. We ought therefore to be ‘separatists’ and view grounding and (...) explanation as distinct. As it turns out, though, once grounding has been in this sense distinguished from the explanation it backs, the view that the role grounding plays in explanation justifies its introduction ends up in serious trouble. I conclude that the role grounding plays in explanation does not justify attributing to grounding whatever nature we think it has, and it most likely does not give us any special reason to think grounding exists. (shrink)

In everyday life and in science we acquire evidence of evidence and based on this new evidence we often change our epistemic states. An assumption underlying such practice is that the following EEE Slogan is correct: 'evidence of evidence is evidence' (Feldman 2007, p. 208). We suggest that evidence of evidence is best understood as higher-order evidence about the epistemic state of agents. In order to model evidence of evidence we introduce a new powerful framework for modelling epistemic states, Dyadic (...) Bayesianism. Based on this framework, we then discuss characterizations of evidence of evidence and argue for one of them. Finally, we show that whether the EEE Slogan holds, depends on the specific kind of evidence of evidence. (shrink)

The use of prisoners as research participants is controversial. Efforts to protect them in response to past exploitation and abuse have led to strict regulations and reluctance to involve them as participants. Hence, prisoners are routinely denied the opportunity to participate in research. In the absence of comprehensive information regarding prisoners’ current involvement in research, we examined UK prisoners’ involvement through review of research applications to the UK National Research Ethics Service. We found that prisoners have extremely limited access to (...) research participation. This analysis was augmented by a survey of those involved in research and research governance (UK researchers and Research Ethics Committee members). Our results suggest that pragmatic concerns regarding the perceived burden of including prisoners are far more prominent in motivating their exclusion than ethical concerns or knowledge of regulations. While prisoners may remain a vulnerable research population due to constraints upon their liberty and autonomy and the coercive nature of the prison environment, routine exclusion from participation may be disadvantageous. Rigorous ethical oversight and the shift in the prevailing attitude towards the risks and benefits of participation suggest that it may be time for research to be more accessible to prisoners in line with the principle of equivalence in prison healthcare. We suggest the necessary first step in this process is a re-examination of current guidance in the UK and other countries with exclusions. (shrink)

We routinely take diminished capacity as diminishing moral responsibility (as in the case of immaturity, senility, or particular mental impairments). The prospect of enhanced capacity therefore poses immediate questions with regard to moral responsibility. Of particular interest are those capacities that might allow us to better avoid serious harms or wrongdoing. We can consider questions of responsibility with regards to enhancement at various removes. In the first instance: where such (safe and effective) interventions exist, do we have an obligation to (...) undergo such enhancement? Secondly: once enhanced, would the ambit of our responsibility therefore increase? Some philosophers have argued that enhanced capacities potentially generate “hyperresponsibility.” Hyperresponsible people would be held to a different and higher moral standard than those of us with more ordinary human capacities, and are liable to be more blameworthy for wrongdoing than ordinary agents. This chapter discusses the implications of enhancement for three central views of responsibility, namely: capacity-based, control-based and revelation-based views. Debates around moral responsibility have primarily concerned diminished capacities; as such the prospect of enhancement introduces new terrain—and potentially new fault-lines and complexities—in which to interrogate our theoretical conceptions of the foundations (and limits) of moral responsibility. (shrink)

The author would like to make the following corrections to the published paper [...].

In ‘The autonomy of the affect’ Brian Massumi wrote of the gap between affective and cognitive registering of the traumatic experience. Affect theorists and neuroscientists have long shared the notion of a gap between the somatic response to a traumatic event and the appraisal of the affective situation. This article develops theories on dissociation or nothingness, where nothingness is a measurement of the space between the affective and the cognitive registering of a traumatic event. It explores the concept of two (...) different systems, one a ‘conscious automatic’ system and the other an ‘intensity system’ that exists outside of normal physiological sequencing, beyond narration, and therefore incapable of integrating into memory systems. (shrink)

Julia Annas here offers a fundamental reexamination of Plato's ethical thought by investigating the Middle Platonist perspective, which emerged at the end of Plato's own school, the Academy. She highlights the differences between ancient and modern assumptions about Plato's ethics--and stresses the need to be more critical about our own. One of these modern assumptions is the notion that the dialogues record the development of Plato's thought. Annas shows how the Middle Platonists, by contrast, viewed the dialogues as multiple presentations (...) of a single Platonic ethical philosophy, differing in form and purpose but ultimately coherent. They also read Plato's ethics as consistently defending the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness, and see it as converging in its main points with the ethics of the Stoics. Annas goes on to explore the Platonic idea that humankind's final end is "becoming like God"--an idea that is well known among the ancients but virtually ignored in modern interpretations. She also maintains that modern interpretations, beginning in the nineteenth century, have placed undue emphasis on the Republic, and have treated it too much as a political work, whereas the ancients rightly saw it as a continuation of Plato's ethical writings. (shrink)

In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences ever justify evaluative (...) judgments? Are experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgments? (3) Questions about Value Theory and Evaluative Perception: Is the existence of evaluative experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of value experience? (shrink)

I investigate patterns of usage of thanking formulae in the closing section of a corpus of 94 telephone calls made by tenants to a UK housing association. The data suggest that unilateral thanking is the norm when calls are institutionally and interactionally unmarked. In contrast, mutual thanking correlates mainly with the presence of interactional problems of various kinds, or, in a few cases, with features that are not problematic as such, but simply interactionally marked given the nature of the activity. (...) When initiated by agents rather than by callers, thanking is frequently hearable as conveying an apologetic stance. Participants thus seem to orient to different thanking patterns as devices which may be used either to mark the preceding interaction as an instance of ‘business-as-usual’ or, if such is not the case, to restore interpersonal harmony or index awareness that aspects of the preceding interaction have otherwise deviated from situational expectations. (shrink)