This paper responds to the commentaries from Stacy Carter and Alan Cribb. We pick up on two main themes in our response. First, we reflect on how the process of setting standards for empirical bioethics research entails drawing boundaries around what research counts as empirical bioethics research, and we discuss whether the standards agreed in the consensus process draw these boundaries correctly. Second, we expand on the discussion in the original paper of the role and significance of the concept of (...) ‘integrating’ empirical methods and ethical argument as a standard for research practice within empirical bioethics. (shrink)
One of the key ethical requirements for biomedical research is that it have an acceptable risk-benefit profile (Emanuel, Wendler, and Grady 2000). The International Conference of Harmonization guidelines mandate that clinical trials should be initiated and continued only if “the anticipated benefits justify the risks” (1996). Guidelines from the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences state that biomedical research is acceptable only if the “potential benefits and risks are reasonably balanced” (2002). U.S. federal regulations require that the “risks to (...) subjects” be “reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects and the importance of the knowledge” to be gained from the .. (shrink)
Many guidelines and commentators endorse the view that clinical research is ethically acceptable only when it has social value, in the sense of collecting data which might be used to improve health. A version of this social value requirement is included in the Declaration of Helsinki and the Nuremberg Code, and is codified in many national research regulations. At the same time, there have been no systematic analyses of why social value is an ethical requirement for clinical research. Recognizing this (...) gap in the literature, recent articles by Alan Wertheimer and David Resnik argue that the extant justifications for the social value requirement are unpersuasive. Both authors conclude, contrary to almost all current guidelines and regulations, that it can be acceptable across a broad range of cases to conduct clinical research which is known prospectively to have no social value. The present article assesses this conclusion by critically evaluating the ethical and policy considerations relevant to the claim that clinical research must have social value. This analysis supports the standard view that social value is an ethical requirement for the vast majority of clinical research studies and should be mandated by applicable guidelines and policies. (shrink)
orman Daniels’ theory of justice and health faces a serious practical problem: his theory can ground the special moral importance of health and allows distinguishing just from unjust health inequalities, but it provides little practical guidance for allocating resources when they are especially scarce. Daniels’ solution to this problem is a fair process that he specifies as "accountability for reasonableness". Daniels claims that accountability for reasonableness makes limit-setting decisions in healthcare not only legitimate, but also fair. This paper assesses the (...) latter claim. Does accountability for reasonableness result in fair limit-setting decisions? It is argued that the answer to this question is not a clear yes. Daniels is remarkably unclear about the criterion of fairness that accountability for reasonableness satisfies. The paper discusses different options for resolving this lack of clarity and examines how they apply to Daniels’ accountability for reasonableness framework. It is concluded, first, that accountability for reasonableness is not a paradigm case of any of the classic notions of procedural justice; second, that what might be called "constrained pure procedural justice" best reflects how accountability for reasonableness results in fair limit-setting decisions; and third, that the procedural conditions of accountability for reasonableness must be further specified and amended to better achieve a fair process, and hence fair limit-setting decisions. (shrink)
Health systems that provide for universal patient access through a scheme of prepayments—whether through taxes, social insurance, or a combination of the two—need to make decisions on the scope of coverage that they secure. Such decisions are inherently controversial, implying, as they do, that some patients will receive less than comprehensive health care, or less than complete protection from the financial consequences of ill-heath, even when there is a clinically effective therapy to which they might have access.Controversial decisions of this (...) sort call for a public justification for covering or not covering a given treatment. Priority-setting agencies play a key role in providing such a justification. A recent... (shrink)
It has recently been proposed to incorporate the use of a “Patient Preference Predictor” (PPP) into the process of making treatment decisions for incapacitated patients. A PPP would predict which treatment option a given incapacitated patient would most likely prefer, based on the individual’s characteristics and information on what treatment preferences are correlated with these characteristics. Including a PPP in the shared decision-making process between clinicians and surrogates has the potential to better realize important ethical goals for making treatment decisions (...) for incapacitated patients. However, developing and implementing a PPP poses significant practical challenges. The present paper discusses these practical challenges and considers ways to address them. (shrink)
What is a just way of spending public resources for health and health care? Several significant answers to this question are under debate. Public spending could aim to promote greater equality in health, for example, or maximize the health of the population, or provide the worst off with the best possible health. Another approach is to aim for each person to have "enough" so that her health or access to health care does not fall under a critical level. This latter (...) approach is called sufficientarian. Sufficientarian approaches to distributive justice are intuitively appealing, but require further analysis and assessment. What exactly is sufficiency? Why do we need it? What does it imply for the just distribution of health or healthcare? This volume offers fresh perspectives on these critical questions. Philosophers, bioethicists, health policy-makers, and health economists investigate sufficiency and its application to health and health care in fifteen original contributions. (shrink)
The current ethical and regulatory framework for research is often charged with burdening investigators and impeding socially valuable research. To address these concerns, a growing number of research ethicists argue that informed consent should be adapted to the risks of research participation. This would require less rigorous consent standards in low-risk research than in high-risk research. However, the current discussion is restricted to cases of research in which the risks of research participation are outweighed by the potential clinical benefits for (...) the individual research participant. Furthermore, current proposals do not address the worry that risk-adapted informed consent may result in enrolling participants into research without their autonomous authorization. In this paper, we show how the standard view of informed consent – consent as autonomous authorization – can be adapted to risk even when the research does not have a favourable risk-benefit profile for the participant. Our argument has two important implications: first, it implies that current and proposed consent standards are not adequately calibrated to risk and, second, that consent standards also need to be adapted to factors other than risk. (shrink)
What is a just way of spending public resources for health and health care? Several significant answers to this question are under debate. Public spending could aim to promote greater equality in health, for example, or maximize the health of the population, or provide the worst off with the best possible health. Another approach is to aim for each person to have "enough" so that her health or access to health care does not fall under a critical level. This latter (...) approach is called sufficientarian. Sufficientarian approaches to distributive justice are intuitively appealing, but require further analysis and assessment. What exactly is sufficiency? Why do we need it? What does it imply for the just distribution of health or healthcare? This volume offers fresh perspectives on these critical questions. Philosophers, bioethicists, health policy-makers, and health economists investigate sufficiency and its application to health and health care in fifteen original contributions. (shrink)
Background: It is often claimed that a regulated kidney market would significantly reduce the kidney shortage, thus saving or improving many lives. Data are lacking, however, on how many people would consider selling a kidney in such a market. Methods: A survey instrument, developed to assess behavioural dispositions to and attitudes about a hypothetical regulated kidney market, was given to Swiss third-year medical students. Results: Respondents’ median age was 23 years. Their socioeconomic status was high or middle. 48 considered selling (...) a kidney in a regulated kidney market, of whom 31 would sell only to overcome a particularly difficult financial situation. High social status and male gender was the strongest predictor of a disposition to sell. 32 of all respondents supported legalising a regulated kidney market. This attitude was not associated with a disposition to sell a kidney. 5 respondents endorsed a market and considered providing a kidney to a stranger if and only if paid. 4 of those 5 would sell only under financial duress. Conclusions: Current understanding of a regulated kidney market is insufficient. It is unclear whether a regulated market would result in a net gain of kidneys. Most possible kidney vendors would only sell in a particularly difficult financial situation, raising concerns about the validity of consent and inequities in the provision of organs. Further empirical and normative analysis of these issues is required. Any calls to implement and evaluate a regulated kidney market in pilot studies are therefore premature. (shrink)
As health policy-makers around the world seek to make progress towards universal health coverage, they must navigate between two important ethical imperatives: to set national spending priorities fairly and efficiently; and to safeguard the right to health. These imperatives can conflict, leading some to conclude that rights-based approaches present a disruptive influence on health policy, hindering states’ efforts to set priorities fairly and efficiently. Here, we challenge this perception. We argue first that these points of tension stem largely from inadequate (...) interpretations of the aims of priority setting as well as the right to health. We then discuss various ways in which the right to health complements traditional concerns of priority setting and vice versa. Finally, we set out a three-step process by which policy-makers may navigate the ethical and legal considerations at play. (shrink)
One of the fundamental ethical concerns about biomedical research is that it frequently exposes participants to risks for the benefit of others. To protect participants’ rights and interests in this context, research regulations and guidelines set out a mix of substantive and procedural requirements for research involving humans. Risk thresholds play an important role in formulating both types of requirements. First, risk thresholds serve to set upper risk limits in certain types of research. Second, risk thresholds serve to demarcate risk (...) categories that streamline risk-adapted systems of ethical oversight. But although risk thresholds play such an important role in research governance, there is a need both to better define the existing risk thresholds and to delineate new thresholds in order to develop more risk-adapted systems of research oversight. The present paper examines the existing minimal risk threshold and the surrounding debates with the goal of deriving a systematic approach to setting thresholds of research risk. (shrink)
Several influential ethical guidelines and frameworks endorse the view that research with human participants is ethically acceptable only when it has “social value,” meaning that it generates knowledge which can be used to benefit society. For example, the Nuremberg Code requires that medical experiments on human beings “yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study”. The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences guidelines hold that “health-related research with humans... must have social (...) value” or the “prospect of generating the knowledge and the means necessary to protect and promote people’s health” (CIOMS... (shrink)
The World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki is one of the most important and influential international research ethics documents. Launched in 1964, when ethical guidance for research was scarce, the Declaration comprised eleven basic principles and provisions on clinical research. The document has since evolved to a complex set of principles, norms, and directions for action of varying degrees of specificity, ranging from specific rules to broad aspirational statements. It has been revised six times in an effort to maintain its (...) influence. While all revisions were the result of vigorous debate, the 2000 revision and two subsequent notes of clarification spurred particular controversy surrounding the use of placebo in clinical research and the standard of care and post-trial obligations in research in developing countries. Several institutions opted to cite earlier versions of the Declaration, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration recently removed all reference to the Declaration in its approval requirements for drugs and biological products that are studied outside the United States. (shrink)
One rationale policy-makers sometimes give for declining to fund a service or intervention is on the grounds that it would be ‘unaffordable’, which is to say, that the total cost of providing the service or intervention for all eligible recipients would exceed the budget limit. But does the mere fact that a service or intervention is unaffordable present a reason not to fund it? Thus far, the philosophical literature has remained largely silent on this issue. However, in this article, we (...) consider this kind of thinking in depth. Albeit with certain important caveats, we argue that the use of affordability criteria in matters of public financing commits what Parfit might have called a ‘mistake in moral mathematics’. First, it fails to abide by what we term a principle of ‘non-perfectionism’ in moral action: the mere fact that it is practically impossible for you to do all the good that you have reason to do does not present a reason not to do whatever good you can do. And second, when used as a means of arbitrating between which services to fund, affordability criteria can lead to a kind of ‘numerical discrimination’. Various attendant issues around fairness and lotteries are also discussed. (shrink)
In his stimulating target article,1 Philippe Calain discusses how the traditional ethical framework for clinical research was challenged during the 2013–2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa. One of his key claims is that conventional research ethics did not have the resources to address the ‘profound tension’1, between individual and public interests in clinical research during this epidemic. I agree with this claim, but would like to provide a modified argument in its support. As Calain points out, although a tension between (...) individual and public interests in clinical research always exists, this tension was heightened during the Ebola epidemic. Ebola had an average fatality rate of 40%–60% in this outbreak and reached up to 90% in some locations. Appropriate personal protective equipment was not always available; the level of benefit from supportive care was contested; and there were no targeted treatments and vaccines for the disease. Given this situation, patients with Ebola had a strong interest in accessing potential treatments even if they were unproven. This was especially true in the early phases of the epidemic when fatality rates were very high and seemingly safe ‘repurposed’ treatments were proposed for study. Individuals at high risk of contracting Ebola—for example, frontline workers or informal carers in the community—equally had a strong interest in accessing experimental vaccines, once their safety and ability to induce an immune response had been established in phase 1/2 testing. At the same time, the exponential spread of Ebola in the second half of 2014 created a strong public interest in rigorous research results that could support the rapid marketing authorization, mass production and widespread implementation of any proven effective treatments or vaccines, as well …. (shrink)
In his stimulating target article, 1 Philippe Calain discusses how the traditional ethical framework for clinical research was challenged during the 2013–2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa. One of his key claims is that conventional research ethics did not have the resources to address the ‘profound tension’ 1, between individual and public interests in clinical research during this epidemic. I agree with this claim, but would like to provide a modified argument in its support. As Calain points out, although a (...) tension between individual and public interests in clinical research always exists, this tension was heightened during the Ebola epidemic. Ebola had an average fatality rate of 40%–60% in this outbreak and reached up to 90% in some locations. Appropriate personal protective equipment was not always available; the level of benefit from supportive care was contested; and there were no targeted treatments and vaccines for the... (shrink)