Instant messaging is a highly diffused form of communication among younger populations, yet little is known about the emotional experience during IM. The present study aimed to investigate the emotional experience during IM by drawing on the Circumplex Model of Affect and measuring heart rate and electrodermal activity as indicators of arousal in addition to self-reported perceived emotional valence. Using an experimental design, we manipulated message latency and message valence. Based on data collected from 65 young adults, we observed arousal (...) as participants’ electrodermal activity levels increased from the time a fictitious peer started typing a response to the receipt of that response, especially in the delayed condition. Electrodermal activity levels also increased in both the positive and the negative message conditions. No changes were observed for heart rate. Participants’ self-report perceived emotional valence revealed that positive messages were evaluated as more pleasant and the peer as more available, while no difference in the self-report was found for message latency. These findings shed light on the emotional experience during IM by adding valuable insights on the physiological processes underlying the anticipation of social reward, but only during delayed IM exchange that can be observed in Human–Computer-Interaction. (shrink)

Warum existiert uberhaupt etwas, warum existiert gerade unsere Welt? Wofur soll sich der Mensch in ihr engagieren, wie soll er seinen Charakter bilden? Mit begrifflicher Prazision wird gepruft, was Leibnizens Philosophie zur Behandlung dieser unabweisbaren Fragen auch heute noch beitragen kann. Da Leibniz die Antworten letztlich aus einer Theologia Naturalis gewinnt, steht sein Gottesbegriff im Zentrum der Untersuchung. Dieser wird in seinen vielfaltigen Bezugen und Funktionen innerhalb Leibniz' System detailliert erlautert. Ergebnis ist eine kritische integrale Gesamtdarstellung der Leibnizschen Philosophie; sie (...) bietet neben einer originellen und argumentativ dichten, gleichermaaen texttreuen wie sachorientierten Interpretation von Ontologie, Psychologie, Ethik, Logik, Erkenntnis-, Wissenschafts- und Rationalitatstheorie auch eine Wurdigung der Grundzuge von Natur-, Geschichts- und Staatsphilosophie. (Franz Steiner 1996). (shrink)

Einleitung Die Ausbreitung des Massentourismus und die Grundstücksspekulation gefährden frühbyzantinische und byzantinische archäologische Stätten im südwestlichen Kleinasien akut. Wie nun schon in den 1980er Jahren ein Vier-Sterne-Hotel einer spanischen Hotelkette direkt in das weit ausgedehnte spätantike und byzantinische Ruinengebiet von Kauniōn Panormos, das mittelalterliche Prepia (der heutige Name des benachbar ten Örtchens ist Sarigerme), das an der Mündung des Sarisu Çayi – zu deutsch: Gelbwasser-Fluß – im westlichen Lykien gelegen ist, hineingebaut wurde, so sind nun schon vorbereitende Hotelbauarbeiten im Auftrage (...) einer weiteren europäischen Hotelkette mitten im spätantiken Ruinengebiet der Ala-Kilise-Bucht (Anastasioúpolis?) in Karien im vollen Gange, nun soll hier in der Nähe noch eine Appartmenthaussiedlung entstehen. Ein Hilferuf des Verfassers bei der UNESCO Suborganisation ICOMOS verhallte bisher ungehört. Das Ruinengebiet von Sarigerme befindet sich südwestlich von Dalaman und südöstlich der Polis Kaunos. Auf der Kauniōn Panormos (Prepia) unmittelbar vorgelagerten Papas-Insel (Baba Adasi) befindet sich die Ruine eines antiken Mausoleums oder eines Leuchtturms und genauso wie Kaunos verfügte das Bistum (Kaunion) Panormos über ein in der Spätantike allerdings wohl noch intaktes, heute versumpftes, Hafenbecken. Offenbar im Zuge von Bauarbeiten in der Hotelanlage von Sarigerme wurden zwei im Ruinengebiet gefundene Kapitelle vor die Lobby des Hotels verschleppt. Es handelt sich hierbei zum einen um ein größeres korinthisches Normalkapitell aus Marmor mit einer durch ein Profil zweigeteilten Abakusleiste (vgl. Abb. 1), das möglicherweise ursprünglich aus einer der beiden großen Basiliken – von denen eine die Bischofskirche gewesen sein wird – des Ortes stammt und welches dem 5./6. Jh. zugeordnet werden kann, zum anderen um ein byzantinisches Kleinkapitell aus feinkristallinem weißen Marmor (vgl. Abb. 2–4). Das größere korinthische Kapitell gehört zu einem weit verbreiteten Standardtypus und soll deswegen hier nicht weiter besprochen werden. Das Kleinkapitell zeigt jedoch ein einzigartig gestaltetes Dekor, für das dem Verfasser bisher kein direktes Vergleichsbeispiel bekannt ist und das, durch diese kurze Vorlage, sicherlich eine Bereicherung des provinziellen byzantinischen Bauplastik-Katalogs sein wird. (shrink)

Diese neueste Buchveröffentlichung von Professor Vincenzo RUGGIERI SJ, der am Pontificio Istituto Orientale in Rom byzantinische Archäologie und byzantinische Geschichte lehrt, stellt einige archäologische byzantinische Stätten aus seinem traditionellen Forschungsgebiet in der historischen Kirchenprovinz Karien vor, die im westlichen Kleinasien gelegen war. Hier wartet R. nun zum größten Teil mit von ihm selbst aufgefundenen und erforschten Monumenten auf und das vorgelegte Werk kann als die geographisch nördliche Fortsetzung der im selben Verlag bereits im Jahre 2003 erschienenen stattlichen und sehr umfangreichen (...) Monographie über die frühchristlichen und byzantinischen Denkmäler am Golf von Keramos (V. RUGGIERI, Il golfo di Keramos. Dal tardo-antico al medioevo bizantino. Soveria Mannelli 2003. 441 S.; vgl. dazu nun auch die Rezension von: M. DENNERT, Oriens Christianus 89 (2005), 295–297.) begriffen werden – dieser Meeresarm gehört übrigens auch zu Karien. Zugrunde liegen beiden Buchpublikationen Ergebnisse etlicher in den 1990er Jahren durchgeführter systematischer Geländebegehungen (‚Surveys‘) des Forschungsteams um R., von denen an einigen auch der Verfasser dieser Zeilen mitgewirkt hat; vgl. A. Zäh, OCP 63 (1997) 147 ff. Die hier vorgestellten bisher zum größten Teil neu aufgefundenen und hiermit bekannt gemachten byzantinischen Denkmäler sind auf der Halbinsel von Halikarnassos (heute: Bodrum) und im westlichen Karien (Myndos, Bargylia) gelegen – des Weiteren werden hier einige Binnen-Orte in Zentralkarien (Euromos, Mylasa, Labraunda, Stratonikeia und Lagina) und viele weitere kleinere Fundorte vorgestellt. Die großen historischen Stätten des nördlichen Karien, wie Milet, Aphrodisias (Stauroúpolis) oder Antiocheia ad Meandrum, werden nicht behandelt. Die hier vorgeführten Orte und Regionen verfügen über eine stattliche Anzahl von Denkmälern, die nun nicht minder bedeutender sind als der Denkmälerbestand am Golf von Keramos, und das mag damit die hier vorgelegte zusammenfassende weitere monographische Abhandlung rechtfertigen. Denn das Werk fasst die wesentlichen Ergebnisse der Ruggieri-Forschungen der 1990er Jahre zusammen, die bisher über diverse JÖB- und OCP-Artikel verstreut erschienen sind (im Literaturverzeichnis Bibliografia S. 32 f. teilweise aufgeführt) und aus, einschränkend erst im Untertitel genannten, diversen Poleïs und deren Umland in Karien stammen. Das Buch bringt aber im Gegensatz zu diesen Artikeln auch gute farbige Abb. der hier entdeckten byzantinischen Wandmalereien und führt ebenso diverse Fußbodenmosaike und Bauskulpturfragmente erneut – zum Teil allerdings bisher auch völlig unbekanntes Material – in übersichtlicher Art und Weise vor. Das Werk ist als eine Gesamtschau der Ruggieri-Entdeckungen in diesem Gebiet anzusprechen. R. ist dem Kleinasien-Kenner seit langem als ein detailverliebter Beobachter und Auffinder sowie hartnäckiger Initiator und fortwährend laufender verlässlicher Motor einer planmäßigen christlichen kunstgeographischen Erschließung nicht nur dieser Region bekannt – wie es auch diese Publikation eindringlich veranschaulicht. (shrink)

Zum I. Kapitel 1 Diesen hier nur skizzierten Strukturzusammenhang von Fragehinsichten und Sachbezügen, innerhalb dessen die Politische Philosophie ihren Ort gewinnt, hat der Verf des näheren darzulegen versucht in einem Aufsatz Die Staatsphilosophie im Verhältnis zur Politik als Wissenschaft, in: Dieter Oberndörfer (Hrsg.), Wissenschaftliche Politik. Eine Einführung in Grundfragen ihrer Tradition und Theorie. Freiburg i. Br. 1962, S. 153-195. Vgl. dazu insbesondere auch Arnold Bergslraesser, Politik in Wissenschaft und Bildung. Schriften und Reden. Freiburg i. Br. 1961, S. 17-29 (Die Stellung (...) der Politik unter den Wissen schaften); Dieter Oberndärfer, Politik als praktische Wissenschaft, in dem oben angeführten Band, S. 9-58, bes. S. 37ff. ; Olto Heinrich von der GablenlZ, Politische Wissenschaft und Philosophie, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 1, 1960/61, S. 4-11; H.R.G. Greaves, Grundlagen der Politischen Theorie. Neuwied-Berlin 1960 sowie die Arbeiten von Hans Barlh, Helmut Kuhn, Max Müller (vgl. Anm. 6, Nr. 7), Joachim Ritter (zu Aristoteles) und Leo Slrauss, die zu den wenigen gehören, die heute noch von der Philosophie selbst aus den Problembereich der Praktischen und Politischen Philosophie in einem unserem Ver ständnis verwandten Sinne zu erörtern und grundzulegen suchen (s. Lit.-Verz.). Es sei auch auf die unter diesem Betracht in Frage kommenden Publikationen Hannah Arendts hingewiesen. Siehe außerdem unsere Angaben unter Anm. 4 und 5.-In ein analoges Ver hältnis setzt Helmut Schelsky (Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie. Düsseldorf Köln 1959) Soziologie, philosophische Theorie der Gesellschaft und allgemeine Philosophie zueinander. (shrink)

Im Zentrum des Bandes steht die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang von Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie im Kontext der mittelalterlichen Rezeption der Texte des Aristoteles an Hof und Universitäten, und dabei insbesondere der für die Epistemologie einschlägigen Passagen in De anima und in den Zweiten Analytiken sowie ihre spätantike und arabische Vermittlung. In diesem komplexen Rezeptions- und vor allem Transformationsprozeß werden zugleich die wissenschaftlichen und gesellschaftlich-institutionellen Grundlagen für den okzidentalen Prozeß der Rationalisierung und der Aufklärung gelegt, deren "Dialektik" nicht nur die Geschichte (...) Europas bis zum heutigen Tag bestimmt. Die Beiträge des Bandes vermitteln damit nicht nur einen umfassenden und bisher in der Forschung in dieser Form nicht geleisteten Überblick über Reichweite und Grenzen der epistemologischen Debatten im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert sowie ihren jeweiligen historischen Ort in der Wissenskultur des Mittelalters, sondern stellen darüber hinaus in ihrer Gesamtheit auch einen Beitrag dar zu Fragen der Epistemologie der Gegenwart, etwa zum Problem der Axiomatik der Wissenschaften. Die Publikation schließt damit nicht nur ein Desiderat in der Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, sondern bildet zugleich einen genuinen Beitrag zu gegenwärtigen Fragestellungen der Epistemologie. (shrink)

Die folgende Untersuchung ist eine Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Ort des 'Irrationalisten' Johann Gottfried Herder innerhalb des Kontinuums der Aufklärung. Aus dem Inhalt: I. Ästhetik als Desiderat der Gnoseologie A. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz B. Christian Wolff C. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten II. Herders Ästhetik-Kritik A. Herders Kritik der Philosophie der "Wortwelten" B. Herders Auseinandersetzung mit Baumgarten III. Herders Ästhetik-Entwurf A. Zum Konzept der Prägnanz B. Haptik und Skulptur, Optik und Malerei C. Poesie - Phantasie und Dichtungsvermögen IV. Herders (...) Entwurf einer Geschichtsphilosophie A. Der Status der Geschichtsphilosophie B. Aisthesis und Geschichte. (shrink)

Front cover -- Copyright -- Inhalt -- Vorwort -- Einleitung -- 1. Hagiographen und Historiker, Musiker und Dichter -- 1.1 Eadmer von Canterbury -- 1.2 Osbern von Canterbury -- 1.3 Goscelin von Canterbury -- 1.4 Reginald von Canterbury -- 2. Mitarbeiter und Herausgeber -- 2.1 Alexander von Canterbury -- 2.2 Boso von Le Bec -- 3. Theologen und Philosophen -- 3.1 Ralph von Battle -- 3.2 Gilbert Crispin -- 3.3 Elmer von Canterbury -- Verzeichnis der Orte -- Verzeichnis antiker (...) und mittelalterlicher Personen -- Verzeichnis neuzeitlicher und moderner Personen -- Reihe Fuldaer Hochschulschriften -- Reihe Fuldaer Studien -- Weitere Publikationen der Theologischen Fakultät Fulda -- Back cover. (shrink)

Parkinson schreibt, es sei nicht klar, daß Alexander selbst von Geburt an Merkmale oder Zeichen des Ortes seines zukünftigen Todes in sich getragen haben müsse, weil der vollständige Begriff von Alexander den Begriff des in Babylon Sterbens enthält. Die vorliegende Interpretation des Prinzips der Vorherbestimmtheit der Geschichte verdeutlicht dies mit Hilfe der bildlichen Ausdrücke, Pläne und Dispositionen und mit Hilfe einer aristotelischen Unterscheidung zwischen "going to be" und "will be" , fur welche ein formaler chronologischer Apparat ausgearbeitet ist. (...) Die Arbeit gibt ebenfalls Einblick in den Gedanken, daB die Gegenwart schwanger mit der Zukunft ist, und antwortet auf Reschers Kritik, daß Leibniz' Metaphysik von Grund auf statisch sei. (shrink)

' But, although such a being (a purely intellectual being) might perhaps be conceived to exist, and although, in studying our internal frame, ...

Alexander R. Pruss examines a large family of paradoxes to do with infinity - ranging from deterministic supertasks to infinite lotteries and decision theory. Having identified their common structure, Pruss considers at length how these paradoxes can be resolved by embracing causal finitism.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discussing various forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes, from Parmenides, Leibnez, and Hume, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument (...) and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, including meta-ethics and the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Hate speech law can be found throughout the world. But it is also the subject of numerous principled arguments, both for and against. These principles invoke a host of morally relevant features and practical considerations . The book develops and then critically examines these various principled arguments. It also attempts to de-homogenize hate speech law into different clusters of laws/regulations/codes that constrain uses of hate speech, so as to facilitate a more nuanced examination of the principled arguments. Finally, it argues (...) that it is morally fitting for judicial and legislative judgments about the overall warrant of hate speech law to reflect principled compromise. Principled compromise is characterized not merely by compromise over matters of principled concern but also by compromise which is itself governed by ideals of moral duty or civic virtue. (shrink)

Should I believe something if and only if it’s true? Many philosophers have objected to this kind of truth norm, on the grounds that it’s not the case that one ought to believe all the truths. For example, some truths are too complex to believe; others are too trivial to be worth believing. Philosophers who defend truth norms often respond to this problem by reformulating truth norms in ways that do not entail that one ought to believe all the truths. (...) Many of these attempts at reformulation, I’ll argue, have been missteps. A number of these different reformulations are incapable of carrying out a central role a truth norm is meant to play, that of explaining justification. The truth norm I’ll defend, however, avoids the implausible results of a prescription to believe all the truths, but doesn’t thereby fail to explain justification. This norm, introduced by Conor McHugh, states that if one has some doxastic attitude about p—i.e. if one believes, disbelieves, or suspends judgement about whether p—then one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true. (shrink)

I show that Armstrong’s view of laws as second-order contingent relations of ‘necessitation’ among categorical properties faces a dilemma. The necessitation relation confers a relation of extensional inclusion (‘constant conjunction’) on its relata. It does so either necessarily or contingently. If necessarily, it is not a categorical relation (in the relevant sense). If contingently, then an explanation is required of how it confers extensional inclusion. That explanation will need to appeal to a third-order relation between necessitation and extensional inclusion. The (...) same dilemma reappears at this level. Either Armstrong must concede that some properties are not categorical but have essential powers – or he is faced with a regress. (shrink)

Alexander's views on universals are, it seems, quite important in the history of western philosophy. When Boethius gives in his second commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge his solution to the problem of universals as he conceived it, he claims to be adopting Alexander's approach. If true, this means that the locus classicus for all western medieval thinkers on this topic is really a rendering of Alexander's teaching. Alexander commented Aristotle’s statement in his On the Soul “The universal (...) animal either is nothing at all or is posterior if it exists”, and this commentary has been translated into Arabic several times in the classical period. In this study the anonymous Arabic translations of Alexander’s commentary has been translated into English. (shrink)

This important philosophical reflection on love and sexuality from a broadly Christian perspective is aimed at philosophers, theologians, and educated Christian readers. Alexander R. Pruss focuses on foundational questions on the nature of romantic love and on controversial questions in sexual ethics on the basis of the fundamental idea that romantic love pursues union of two persons as one body. _One Body_ begins with an account, inspired by St. Thomas Aquinas, of the general nature of love as constituted by (...) components of goodwill, appreciation, and unitiveness. Different forms of love, such as parental, collegial, filial, friendly, fraternal, or romantic, Pruss argues, differ primarily not in terms of goodwill or appreciation but in terms of the kind of union that is sought. Pruss examines romantic love as distinguished from other kinds of love by a focus on a particular kind of union, a deep union as one body achieved through the joint biological striving of the sort involved in reproduction. Taking the account of the union that romantic love seeks as a foundation, the book considers the nature of marriage and applies its account to controversial ethical questions, such as the connection between love, sex, and commitment and the moral issues involving contraception, same-sex activity, and reproductive technology. With philosophical rigor and sophistication, Pruss provides carefully argued answers to controversial questions in Christian sexual ethics. "This is a terrific—really quite extraordinary—work of scholarship. It is quite simply the best work on Christian sexual ethics that I have seen. It will become the text that anyone who ventures into the field will have to grapple with—a kind of touchstone. Moreover, it is filled with arguments with which even secular writers on sexual morality will have to engage and come to terms." —_Robert P. George, Princeton University __ "_One Body_ is an excellent piece of philosophical-theological reflection on the nature of sexuality and marriage. This book has the potential to become a standard go-to text for professors and students working on sex ethics issues, whether in philosophy or theology, both for the richness of its arguments, and the scope of its coverage of cases. " — Christopher Tollefsen, University of South Carolina_ "Alexander Pruss here develops sound and humane answers to the whole range of main questions about human sexual and reproductive choices. His principal argument for the key answers is very different from the one I have articulated over the past fifteen years. But his argumentation is at every point attractively direct, careful, energetic in framing and responding to objections, and admirably attentive to realities and the human goods at stake." —_John Finnis, University of Oxford _. (shrink)

I argue that the naturalism of Thomas Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions," which he himself later ignored, is worthy of rehabilitation. A naturalistic conception of paradigms is ripe for development with the tools of cognitive science. As a consequence a naturalistic understanding of world-change and incommensurability is also viable.

In this paper I ask how educational researchers can believe the subjective perceptions of qualitative participant-observers given the concern for objectivity and generalisability of experimental research in the behavioural and social sciences. I critique the most common answer to this question within the educational research community, which posits the existence of two (or more) equally legitimate epistemological paradigms—positivism and constructivism—and offer an alternative that places a priority in educational research on understanding the purposes and meanings humans attribute to educational practices. (...) Only within the context of what I call a transcendent view from somewhere—higher ideals that govern human activities—can we make sense of quantitative as well as qualitative research findings. (shrink)

This book presents new findings that deal with different facets of the well-being of children and their relevance to the proper treatment of children. The well-being of children is considered against the background of a wide variety of legal, political, medical, educational and familial perspectives. The book addresses diverse issues from a range of disciplinary perspectives using a variety of methods. It has three major sections with the essays in each section loosely organized about a common general theme. The first (...) section focuses on issues concerning the relation between children’s well-being and autonomy or agency. The second section deals with child well-being insofar as the limits of parental authority are concerned. The third section has a more applied orientation and addresses a variety of public policy controversies involving the interpretation of children’s well-being. (shrink)

Despite its centrality and its familiarity, W. V. Quine's dispute with Rudolf Carnap over the analytic/synthetic distinction has lacked a satisfactory analysis. The impasse is usually explained either by judging that Quine's arguments are in reality quite weak, or by concluding instead that Carnap was incapable of appreciating their strength. This is unsatisfactory, as is the fact that on these readings it is usually unclear why Quine's own position is not subject to some of the very same arguments. A satisfying (...) and surprising account is here presented that stiches together the puzzling pieces of this important philosophical exchange and that in turn leads to an explanation of why it is so difficult to say whether anything of substance is at stake. (shrink)

Beauty, or at least natural beauty, is famously a symbol of the morally good in Kant's theory of taste. Natural beauty is also, we argue, a symbol of the systematicity of nature. This symbolic connection of beauty and systematicity in nature sheds light on the relation between the principles underlying the use of reflecting judgement. The connection also motivates a more general interpretive proposal: the fact that the imagination can symbolize ideas plays a crucial role in the theory of taste; (...) it is the mechanism that underlies pure judgements of taste, the operation by which the imagination ‘schematizes without a concept’. (shrink)

There are norms on action and norms on assertion. That is, there are things we should and shouldn't do, and things we should and shouldn't say. How do these two kinds of norm relate? Are norms on assertion reducible to norms on action? Many philosophers think they are not. These philosophers claim there is a sui generis norm specific to assertion, a norm which is also often claimed to be constitutive of assertion. Both claims, I argue, should be rejected. The (...) phenomenon claimed to support them – the intuitive wrongness of certain assertions – does not in fact support them. Because assertion is an action, the wrongness of assertions can be explained purely by norms on action. And the specifically epistemic wrongness an assertion norm is typically supposed to explain can be explained by an uncontroversial norm on action: one shouldn't act on epistemically faulty beliefs. No additional sui generis norm on assertion is needed. (shrink)

A traditional interpretation holds that Kant's political theory simply constitutes an account of the constraints which reason places on the state's authority to regulate external action. Alexander Kaufman argues that this traditional interpretation succeeds neither as a faithful reading of Kant's texts nor as a plausible, philosophically sound reconstruction of a `Kantian' political theory. Rather, he argues that Kant's political theory articulates a positive conception of the state's role.

In this volume his object is to fully examine his friend's writings and characters and draws upon his own personal recollections to do so.

We seem to be responsible for our beliefs in a distinctively epistemic way. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. We do this by criticising other believers as ‘gullible’ or ‘biased’, and by trying to persuade others to revise their beliefs. But responsibility for belief looks hard to understand because we seem to lack control over our beliefs. In this paper, I argue that we can make progress in our understanding of responsibility for belief (...) by thinking about it in parallel with another kind of responsibility: legal responsibility for criminal negligence. Specifically, I argue that that a popular account of responsibility for belief, which grounds it in belief’s reasons-responsiveness, faces a problem analogous to one faced by H.L.A. Hart’s influential capacity-based account of culpability. This points towards a more promising account of responsibility of belief, though, if we draw on accounts of negligence that improve on Hart’s. Broadly speaking, the account of negligence that improves on Hart’s account grounds culpability in a concern for others’ interests, whereas my account of epistemic responsibility grounds responsibility for belief in a concern for the truth. (shrink)

I argue that the naturalism of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which he himself later ignored, is worthy of rehabilitation. A naturalistic conception of paradigms is ripe for development with the tools of cognitive science. As a consequence a naturalistic understanding of world-change and incommensurability is also viable.

In my 'Dispositions and Antidotes', The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), I raise an objection to the conditional analysis of dispositions, both in its simple formulation and in a more sophisticated version due to David Lewis, The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997). The objection suggests that a disposition may be continuously present and the appropriate stimulus occur without the manifestation occurring, because some outside influence, an antidote, interferes. Gundersen in The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000), argues that my objection rests on an equivocation (...) about which object possesses the disposition and more particularly on an equivocation about the context in which the events referred to take place, and that when the equivocation is resolved the counter-example disappears. I respond by showing that the counter-example does remain if we take contextual and mereological issues into account, and I conclude by remarking that the difference with Lewisdepends on whether certain features are seen as significant for the semanticsand metaphysics of dispositions or as merely characteristic of the pragmaticsof common usage. (shrink)

Scotland has played an immense role in European high culture through the centuries, and among its cultural links none have been greater than those with France. This book shows that the links with France stretch back deep into the Middle Ages, and continue without a break into the 18th century, the Age of Enlightenment.

Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical (...) challenge. (publisher). (shrink)

Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical (...) challenge. (publisher). (shrink)

The claim that workers are subject to structural domination in the labor market is a central contention of the recent radical turn in republican political theory, but it remains undertheorized. Two core components—the claim that workers have “no reasonable alternative” to selling their labor to capitalists and the relevance of exposure to potential interference in such cases—remain unclear. Without a more precise specification of the conditions of structural domination, it is difficult to assess how well republican prescriptions minimize it. I (...) develop a revised defense of the central claim through an analysis of these components. I clarify what it is to have reasonable alternatives in the labor market but show that holding such options is insufficient to avoid structural domination. I argue that the dependence at the heart of structural domination can be constituted multifariously and develop an additional criterion directed at capturing such dependence in production. (shrink)

Paul Boghossian has recently argued against reductive dispositionalism concerning mental content. However, there is a powerful version of reductive dispositionalism—based on work by Ramsey and Lewis—that Boghossian does not consider. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's arguments can be adapted to apply even to this stronger version of reductionism.

The article responds to an overlooked objection put by Allen Buchanan to John Rawls’s theory of justice: that implementing the Difference Principle over time may require gross and frequent disruptions of people’s framing and execution of long-term plans. Having strengthened Buchanan’s objection to resolve significant weaknesses in his main counterexample, I argue that the best response to this objection draws on the concept of the rule of law, specifically, the legal doctrine of legitimate expectations, which can be found in English, (...) French, and European Union administrative law. I also explore the suitability of incorporating this doctrine into Justice as Fairness given its absence in United States constitutional and administrative law. Finally, I turn to consider the question of what the government owes to agents in whom legitimate expectations are induced and then frustrated. Here I introduce the Precept of Administrative Liability. (shrink)

The subtraction argument aims to show that there is an empty world, in the sense of a possible world with no concrete objects. The argument has been endorsed by several philosophers. I show that there are currently two versions of the argument around, and that only one of them is valid. I then sketch the main problem for the valid version of the argument.

Introduction -- What is personal responsibility? -- Ordinary language -- Common conceptions -- What do philosophers mean by responsibility? -- Personally responsible for what? -- What do philosophers think? part I -- Causes -- Capacity -- Control -- Choice versus brute luck -- Second-order attitudes -- Equality of opportunity -- Deservingness -- Reasonableness -- Reciprocity -- Equal shares -- Combining criteria -- What do philosophers think? part II -- Utility -- Self-respect -- Autonomy -- Human flourishing -- Natural duties and (...) special obligations -- A matter of perspectives -- Combining values -- What do politicians think? -- A brief typology -- International comparisons -- Welfare reform -- Healthcare reform -- Rights and responsibilities -- On the responsibilities of politicians -- What do ordinary people think? -- Why ask? -- Attitudes to welfare claimants -- When push comes to shove -- Perceptions and reality -- Further international comparisons -- The trouble with opinion surveys -- Four contemporary issues in focus -- Unemployment -- Health -- Drug abuse -- Personal debt and financial rewards -- So how do we decide? -- Getting the public involved -- Citizens juries -- Answering some potential criticisms. (shrink)

SENSATIONALISM 1 1. Introductory 1 2. Mach's Sensationalism 4 3. Developments of Sensationalism 22 II. THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF SEN- SATIONALISM 25 1. The Point of Sensationalism 25 2. The Ambiguity of 'Sensation' 27 3. The Fundamental Conflict 35 4. Mistakes, Incorrigibility and Simplicity 40 III. DESCRIPTION 51 1. Describing and Descriptions 51 2. Describing in Terms of Sensations 67 IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF 'PURE' DES- CRIPTIONS 79 V. SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS 99 VI. DESCRIPTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 111 BIBLIOGRAPHY 142 INDEX 145 (...) -/- -v- . (shrink)

In my ‘Dispositions and Antidotes’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, I raise an objection to the conditional analysis of dispositions, both in its simple formulation and in a more sophisticated version due to David Lewis, The Philosophical Quarterly, 47. The objection suggests that a disposition may be continuously present and the appropriate stimulus occur without the manifestation occurring, because some outside influence, an antidote, interferes. Gundersen in The Philosophical Quarterly, 50, argues that my objection rests on an equivocation about which object (...) possesses the disposition and more particularly on an equivocation about the context in which the events referred to take place, and that when the equivocation is resolved the counter‐example disappears. I respond by showing that the counter‐example does remain if we take contextual and mereological issues into account, and I conclude by remarking that the difference with Lewisdepends on whether certain features are seen as significant for the semanticsand metaphysics of dispositions or as merely characteristic of the pragmaticsof common usage. (shrink)

Alexander Altmann's acclaimed, wide-ranging biography of Moses Mendelssohn (1729-96) was first published in 1973, but its stature as the definitive biography remains unquestioned. In fact, there has been no subsequent attempt at an intellectual biography of this towering and unusual figure: no other Jew so deeply rooted in the Jewish tradition was at the same time so much a part of the intellectual life of the German Enlightenment in the second half of the eighteenth century. As such, Moses Mendelssohn (...) came to be recognized as the inaugurator of a new phase in Jewish history; all modern Jews today are in his debt. Altmann presents Moses Mendelssohn in strictly biographical terms. He does not attempt to assess his significance with the hindsight of historical perspective nor to trace his image in subsequent generations, but rather to observe his life from the period within which it was set. Altmann has written an absorbing and compelling narrative that makes a whole epoch come alive with great drama, for Mendelssohn's life was a kaleidoscope of the European intellectual scene, Jewish and non-Jewish. As both a prominent philosopher and a believing Jew, Mendelssohn became a spokesman for the Jews and Judaism; he was one of the rare figures who become the symbol of an era. Through Altmann's skilful use of hitherto unpublished archival material, the reader is introduced to the vast array of people-men of letters, artists, politicians, scientists, philosophers, and theologians-with whom Mendelssohn was in contact, and sometimes in conflict. What was Mendelssohn's Judaism like? To what extent did the disparate worlds of Judaism and modern Enlightenment jostle each other in his mind and to what degree could he harmonize them? These questions are not easily answered, and it is only in the aggregate of a multitude of accounts of experiences, reaction, and statements on his part that the answer is to be found. Alexander Altmann's analysis of this wealth of material is extraordinary in its discernment, subtlety, and clarity of expression. This masterly work will be of interest not only to those who are concerned with Jewish intellectual history but also to those interested in eighteenth-century cultural and social history, philosophy and theology, literary criticism, aesthetics, and the other areas of intellectual activity in ferment at that time. The general reader will also find much of contemporary relevance in Mendelssohn's life, not only because of his exemplary devotion to reason and tolerance, but also because of his lifelong struggle with the basic dilemma of the Jew in the modern world: the attraction of assimilation versus the singularity of Jewish life, and the preservation of Jewish identity versus integration in the wider society. (shrink)

Introduction The chief aim of this book is to give an account of two great periods in the history of Scottish culture. One is, inevitably, that of the ...