Mind 109 (433):1-24 (2000)

Alexander George
Amherst College
Despite its centrality and its familiarity, W. V. Quine's dispute with Rudolf Carnap over the analytic/synthetic distinction has lacked a satisfactory analysis. The impasse is usually explained either by judging that Quine's arguments are in reality quite weak, or by concluding instead that Carnap was incapable of appreciating their strength. This is unsatisfactory, as is the fact that on these readings it is usually unclear why Quine's own position is not subject to some of the very same arguments. A satisfying and surprising account is here presented that stiches together the puzzling pieces of this important philosophical exchange and that in turn leads to an explanation of why it is so difficult to say whether anything of substance is at stake.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/109.433.1
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References found in this work BETA

Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
Truth by Convention.W. V. Quine - 1936 - In Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead. London: Longmans, Green & Co.. pp. 90–124.
Philosophical Naturalism.Michael Friedman - 1997 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 71 (2):5 - 21.
Carnap, Quine, and Logical Truth.Daniel Isaacson - 2000 - In Dagfinn Føllesdal (ed.), Philosophy of Quine. Garland. pp. 360--391.

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Citations of this work BETA

Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention.Gary Ebbs - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):193-237.
Quine Against Lewis (and Carnap) on Truth by Convention.Sean Morris - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):366-391.
Disquotational Truth and Analyticity.Volker Halbach - 2001 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (4):1959-1973.
Artificial Language Philosophy of Science.Sebastian Lutz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):181–203.

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