The question, "Why has Harriet Taylor Mill appeared in the history of philosophy as she has?" has several answers. The answers intertwine the personality and politics of Harriet, the sexism of those who wrote of her (which was a reflection of the overall status of women during the period the commentator wrote), misunderstandings of the means and meaning of her collaboration with John Stuart Mill, and the disturbing challenge of her questioning.

John Stuart Mill commented on the relationship between equality and liberty in general terms, and he also discussed the relationships between equality and four more concrete social goals: equality vs. diversity and individual spontaneity, equality vs. freedom of trade and entrepreneurial activity, equality vs. economic incentives for workpeople, and equality vs. welfare. In his more general statements he wrote off potential conflicts between equality and liberty, claiming that only those liberties that can be enjoyed by all are real liberties—or at (...) least they are the only ones worth defending. However, in several of his more concrete discussions he gave higher priority to various liberty-related goals than to equality. This seeming contradiction can be resolved if we assume that he distinguished between valuing a liberty per se and valuing it as a means to achieve something else. (shrink)

ABSTRACT John Stuart Mill’s posthumously published Three Essays on Religion have been seen as standing in a problematical relationship with his better‐known works, especially On Liberty, which emphasize the negative sides of Mill’s approach to religion. The Three Essays are less easy to characterize. A careful reading shows Mill’s concern to subject religious views to rational scrutiny, but also to acknowledge the important and largely beneficent role religion has played, and presumably will continue to play, in human affairs. This role (...) will not, Mill predicts, continue to be that of keeping selfish impulses in check. Rather, it will be to inspire people to assist a benevolent but, plainly, less‐than‐omniscient deity; and, as well, to spark an imaginative identification with an ongoing process of intellectual and moral perfection that transcends our mortal lives. (shrink)

This article examines John Stuart Mill’s influential proposal of how to tax wealth transfers. According to Mill, every person should be free to bequeath but not to receive bequest. Mill proposed an upper limit on how much each person could receive from wealth transfers. We discuss three objections against this proposal. The nonseparability objection holds that it is not possible to separate the freedom to give from the freedom to receive. The objection from private property holds that private property includes (...) an unlimited right to dispose of one’s assets and that this right is violated under Mill’s scheme. The objection from incentives holds that Mill’s scheme would have negative effects on people’s willingness to work and save. We argue that these objections can be met and that taxing bequeathed wealth according to Mill’s scheme is more just and more efficient compared to systems that rely less on wealth transfer taxation. (shrink)

According to G. E. Moore, moral expertise requires abilities of several kinds: the ability to factor judgments of right and wrong into (a) judgments of good and bad and (b) judgments of cause and effect, (2) the ability to use intuition to make the requisite judgments of good and bad, and (3) the ability to use empirical investigation to make the requisite judgments of cause and effect. Moore’s conception of moral expertise is thus extremely demanding, but he supplements it with (...) some very simple practical guidance. (shrink)

This article reviews the basic elements in John Stuart thought on freedom of expression, public opinion and the role of journalism in a democratic society, ideas bringing together and consolidating a tradition which began in the seventeenth century and continues through to the present day. It also considers Mill’s thought in relation with the views of thinkers who came before him, Milton and Jefferson, for example, and his contemporary, Tocqueville. Among the core ideas in Mill’s writings are the “harm principle”, (...) his approximation to the idea of truth, and his account of how political debate should be carried out. His extensive body of work has given rise to intense debate which is still lively today. As Isaiah Berlin emphasised, “[...] the critics of Mill have, on the whole, exceeded the number of his defenders. Nevertheless, the inner citadel – the central thesis – has stood the test”. (shrink)

There is a dominant perception of liberty among most contemporary liberals. It is one close to empiricism’s portrayal of freedom as a natural right of every person to advance her interests. According to this view, there are no demanding conditions under which people can be regarded as free agents but their unfettered behaviour from external inhibitions. It is widely thought that Mill’s liberalism does not deviate considerably from this tradition. The present text suggests a different reading of the gist of (...) Mill’s political rationale. Highlighting the positive – in Berlin’s sense – aspects of his politically demanding concept of liberty which successfully combines facets of different traditions serves the purpose to stress the alternative features of his approach. Underlining the active political intervention Mill is instructing by implicating the state to preserve the essence of freedom and induce it in society, manifests how his position diverges from that of mainstream neutralist liberals. (shrink)