Kalam Cosmological Argument

Cosmological arguments pick out some general feature of the universe––e.g., its contingency––and argue that this feature lends credence to the existence of God. The Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA), developed originally by Muslim theologians, focuses on the universe’s seeming finitude, arguing that this suggests the existence of a first cause. There are two main variants of the Kalam: one variant, espoused by William Lane Craig, contends that the universe is temporally finite. Another variant, espoused by Alexander Pruss, argues for causal finitism (the thesis that any causal chain must be finite). The Craigian Kalam proceeds by using some causal principle––e.g., “everything which begins to exist has a cause”––to deduce the existence of a cause of the universe from its temporal finitude. Comparatively, the Prussian Kalam has quicker arguments to the existence of a first cause: however, to show that this first cause has divine attributes, this Kalam often also ends up relying on various causal or linking principles. In any variant of the Kalam, there are three main areas of contention: (i) whether the universe really is finite in the way so claimed, (ii) whether the relevant causal or linking principle is cogent, and (iii) whether the first cause which has been deduced exemplifies any of the traditional divine attributes. 

The original Craigian Kalam is explicated most notably in Craig 1979, and a contemporary defense is found in Craig & Sinclair 2009. The Craigian Kalam uses philosophical and scientific arguments for temporal finitude: Copan & Craig 2017 is a wonderful anthology of essays criticizing and defending the philosophical arguments for temporal finitude, and Craig & Copan 2017 is an anthology on the scientific arguments for temporal finitude. The Prussian Kalam is developed most extensively in Pruss 2018, as well as Koons 2014. Most objections to, and discussions of, the Prussian Kalam build on, or center around, an objection developed in §3 of Shackel 2005. Another source of objection to the Kalam more generally has been that its arguments for finitude can be parodied as (implausible) arguments for a finite future; see Cohen 2015 for Kalam parodies generally, and Schmid forthcoming for parodies of the Prussian Kalam.

For a good overview of the Craigian Kalam, see Reichenbach 2004, particularly §7. For a survey on recent work on the Kalam, and certain sub-variants not mentioned herein, see McIntosh 2022, especially §2.