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Alexander Greenberg
University of Southampton
Alexander Greenberg
Cambridge University
  1.  57
    Should I believe all the truths?Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3279-3303.
    Should I believe something if and only if it’s true? Many philosophers have objected to this kind of truth norm, on the grounds that it’s not the case that one ought to believe all the truths. For example, some truths are too complex to believe; others are too trivial to be worth believing. Philosophers who defend truth norms often respond to this problem by reformulating truth norms in ways that do not entail that one ought to believe all the truths. (...)
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  2.  14
    There is No (Sui Generis) Norm of Assertion.Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (3):337 - 362.
    There are norms on action and norms on assertion. That is, there are things we should and shouldn't do, and things we should and shouldn't say. How do these two kinds of norm relate? Are norms on assertion reducible to norms on action? Many philosophers think they are not. These philosophers claim there is a sui generis norm specific to assertion, a norm which is also often claimed to be constitutive of assertion. Both claims, I argue, should be rejected. The (...)
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  3.  30
    Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence.Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):91-111.
    We seem to be responsible for our beliefs in a distinctively epistemic way. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. We do this by criticising other believers as ‘gullible’ or ‘biased’, and by trying to persuade others to revise their beliefs. But responsibility for belief looks hard to understand because we seem to lack control over our beliefs. In this paper, I argue that we can make progress in our understanding of responsibility for belief (...)
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  4.  43
    Why Criminal Responsibility for Negligence Cannot Be Indirect.Alexander Greenberg - forthcoming - Cambridge Law Journal.
    A popular way to try to justify holding defendants criminally responsible for inadvertent negligence is via an indirect or ‘tracing’ approach, i.e. an approach which traces the inadvertence back to prior culpable action. I argue that this indirect approach to criminal negligence fails because it can’t account for a key feature of how criminal negligence should be (and sometimes is) assessed. Specifically, it can’t account for why, when considering whether a defendant is negligent, what counts as a risk should be (...)
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  5.  71
    Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh.Alexander Greenberg & Christopher Cowie - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:128-145.
    We respond to Conor McHugh's claim that an evaluative account of the normative relation between belief and truth is preferable to a prescriptive account. We claim that his arguments fail to establish this. We then draw a more general sceptical conclusion: we take our arguments to put pressure on any attempt to show that an evaluative account will fare better than a prescriptive account. We briefly express scepticism about whether McHugh's more recent ‘fitting attitude’ account fares better.
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  6.  23
    Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity.C. Cowie & Alexander Greenberg - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & R. McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 173-196.
    According to constitutivists about epistemic normativity, epistemic normativity is explained by the nature of belief. Specifically, it is explained by the fact that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a normative relation to truth. We ask whether there are persuasive arguments for the claim that belief stands in such a relation to truth. We examine and critique two arguments for this claim. The first is based on the transparency of belief. The second is based on Moore-paradoxical sentences. (...)
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