La rencontre entre la philosophie de Lukács et la pensée ontologique de Nicolai Hartmann est un sujet rarement abordé dans l’historiographie philosophique. Le contact avec les grands travaux ontologiques de Hartmann a joué pourtant un rôle décisif dansla genèse de l’Ontologie de l’être social, l’ouvrage qui a couronné le long parcours intellectuel et politique de Lukács. Le texte se propose d’éclaircir l’affinité profonde qui se fait jour entre deux pensées que tout semblait séparer. Hartmann cultivait la philosophia perennis, élevée au-dessus (...) des contingences socio-historiques, Lukács, philosophe engagé dans les batailles du siècle, bâtissait une œuvre saturée de pensée marxienne. Il existe néanmoins de significatifs traits d’union : la critique de la phénoménologie de Husserl, la critique des courants néo-positivistes et surtout de fortes réserves à l’égard de Heidegger. (shrink)

Sur le modèle des représentations et des propositions en soi de Bolzano, Husserl a envisagé les significations comme des unités idéales-objectives qui sont accessibles à plusieurs consciences et qui perdurent au-delà des actes psychiques passagers dans lesquels elles se réalisent. Indépen­dantes des opérations subjectives, les unités sémantiques seraient donc transcendantes, c’est-à-dire extérieures à la conscience. Cependant, en posant la subjectivité transcendantale comme un absolu par rapport auquel tout objet, réel ou idéal, se définit, la phénoménologie transcendantale-constitutive est finalement incapable (...) de rendre compte de cette transcendance dont elle nie le caractère absolu au profit de la conscience : une fois que les unités de sens sont définies comme des formations logiques issues de l’activité catégoriale, leur « transcendance » n’est plus qu’un sens d’être intention­nellement constitué. Dès lors, peut-on expliquer la « transcen­dance » des unités de sens, sans vider ce concept de son contenu essentiel, sans retirer aux significations leur indépendance et leur extériorité vis-à-vis de la conscience ? L’hypothèse la plus simple consisterait à dire qu’avant de traduire la manière dont les objets sont représentés par la conscience, les significations conceptuelles sont liées aux propriétés que la pensée a arra­chées à leurs substrats pour en faire des marques distinctives. Mais cet ancrage ontologique soulève à son tour de multiples difficultés, si bien que Husserl, pour expliquer la transcendance des significations sans contrevenir à ses principes idéalistes, n’a pas d’autre choix que d’invoquer un ancrage linguistique : une fois consignées dans des signes extérieurs, les pensées sortent de la sphère privée, acquièrent une extériorité, une publicité et une solidité en vertu desquelles elles se conservent au-delà des vécus passagers, et sont à tout moment accessibles à toute conscience. Cependant, si le langage commun apparaît, pour les consciences, comme l’ultime condition de possibilité de la transcendance des significations, il n’en demeure pas moins que la transcendance qui leur revient avant qu’elles ne soient exprimées — car pour Husserl les significations, dont l’unité s’oppose à la multiplicité des signes susceptibles de les transcrire, ne sont pas nécessaire­ment exprimées — demeure un postulat métaphysique qui pourrait bien s’effondrer avec l’hypothèse d’une traductibilité translinguistique du sens qui lui sert de corollaire. (shrink)

"Sing, O Goddess, the anger of Achilles son of Peleus, that brought countless ills upon the Achaeans." In these opening lines of the Iliad, Homer invokes the Muse. For Homer the act of creating poetry is a divine gift, one that derives from an otherworldly source and is not ultimately reducible to this world. This conception of human creativity as a divine gift pervaded the ancient world, and was also evident among the Hebrews. In Exodus, for instance, we read that (...) God filled the two artisans Bezaleel and Aholiab with wisdom so that they might complete the work of the tabernacle. (shrink)

Open theists argue that God's relationship to time, as conceived in classical theism, is erroneous. They explain that it is contradictory for an atemporal being to act in a temporal universe, including experiencing its temporal successions. Contrary to the atemporalists, redemptive history has shown that God interacts with humans in time. This relational nature of God nullifies the classical notion of God as timelessly eternal. Therefore, it lacks a philosophical and theological basis. Because God is in time, He does not (...) know all future contingencies and, therefore, changes. This study examines open theism's appropriation of the A and B theories of time to the divine-human relationship. The study argues that divine temporality does not solve the tension of divine-human relationships, especially in relation to the future. Further, historical divine temporality does not negate the fact of divine atemporality. It mainly stems from God's choice to create temporal creatures and His relationship with them. Furthermore, if it is not logically and metaphysically contradictory for an omnipresent being to act in space, then it follows that an atemporal being can act in time. Whether time is understood from the metric or psychological point of view, it does not transcend God, and therefore, the limitation it places on human creatures with respect to the future does not apply to God. Lastly, although a few philosophers reject the notion of eternity as timelessly eternal, the doctrine has a philosophical and theological basis in the Scripture. (shrink)

Les objectifs des Recherches logiques 1 s?inscrivent dans le contexte plus large d?une controverse concernant la possibilité d?une connaissance indépendante du sujet connaissant. Il s?agit de ce qui a été connu par la suite sous le nom de « critique du psychologisme ». Husserl veut montrer dans les Recherches logiques que la façon dont on ordonne les objets dans la connaissance, selon des relations porteuses de valeur de vérité, ne surgit pas de l?expérience particulière que l?on en fait. La connaissance (...) n?est pas la création d?un sujet, ni d?une culture : elle a, au contraire, un caractère absolu. C?est précisément pour soutenir cette position que Husserl introduit un nouveau concept d?intentionnalité qui se distingue des autres concepts présents à l?époque, notamment dans l?école de Franz Brentano, par trois points essentiels. Premièrement, une des conditions essentielles de l?inten­tionnalité husserlienne est que l?objet intentionnel soit transcendant, c?est-à-dire qu?il ne dépende pas de la production effective de l?acte. Deuxième­ment, le contenu (la teneur) de l?acte doit être conçu(e), à la suite de Bolzano, sous la forme d?une signification idéale, toujours identique dans tous les actes du même type, et non pas sous celle d?une image surgissant dans le psychique du sujet individuel, vouée à être chaque fois différente, en fonction de l?expérience personnelle de ce sujet. Et. (shrink)

Two philosophical tools are used in this article, namely that of philosophical-pluralism and transcendent pluralism as a kind of glue to enhance our examining of creative pluralism. There is a diversity implant in positive modus of understanding this pluralistic pristine of creative pluralism within transcendence modus. To help facilitate this pluralistic pristine, the author makes use of three constructivist paradigms that are distinguished and used, namely exogenous constructivism emphasising the reconstruction of structures preformed in the environment; endogenous constructivism emphasising the (...) coordination of previous organismic structures and dialectical constructivism emphasising the construction of new structures out of organism and environmental interaction.Contribution: The aim of this article is to present a coherent metatheory by specifying the boundary conditions in which each root metaphor best applies. These above-mentioned versions of pluralism as tools are a reminiscence and a jubilee of the efforts made by sapiens through diversity onto or into pluralism to enable the religious hamlet to think and share. This pluralistic approach of orientation, I hope, will empower sapiens in their respective hamlets to define, articulate and designate to enhance their own epistemological and ontological vantage points wherefrom their individual, coherent and contextual ways of thinking, acting and projecting their lives in a positive modus by emphasising the reconstructions of their performance in their environment. (shrink)

I. The Seduction of Immanence The vocabulary of humanism—in which concepts such as “man,” “humane,” and “humanity” figure prominently—has always been contentious. The sarcasm of the nineteenth-century Catholic conservative thinker Joseph de Maistre with regard to the abstraction-tainted works of revolutionary thinkers, has become famous: “In my life I have met Frenchmen, Italians, and Russians, but Man, I solemnly declare, I have never met before; perhaps he exists, but not to my personal knowledge.”1These concepts acquire a practical, political, and even (...) polemical meaning when acted upon in the name of man, human rights, and finally humanity against “inhuman” practices…. (shrink)

continent. 2.2 (2012): 155–158 Michel Serres. Biogea . Trans. Randolph Burks. Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing. 2012. 200 pp. | ISBN 9781937561086 | $22.95 Conveying to potential readers the significance of a book puts me at risk of glad handing. It’s not in my interest to laud the undeserving, especially on the pages of this journal. This is not a sales pitch, but rather an affirmation of a necessary work on very troubled terms: human, earth, nature, and the problematic world we made. (...) It is this world that aspirates the silence (so to speak), and therefore the subject which, along with the development of the “made world” exports the excess augmentation of the cosmically missing, this silence of the natural, et cetera. Had we learned from Locke that lesson of “labor,” to consume what we need… but perhaps we need more than what matters? Serres’ Biogea has several functions on this manner, if it is indeed a book to be consumed. First, readers searching for novelistic entertainment have a place to dwell. Biogea deserves a place in your back pocket; biographical generosity and poetic fluidity should satisfy most textual fetishes. For lay philosophers who want to refresh their acumen, Biogea deserves a place on the book shelf, one already reads a sorely needed postmodern tune-up here. Serres’ style is clearly French; he leaves few cheese crumbs on his words, rather preciseness and breathing in the work give way to a sweeping manner that breaks the narrative line of sight. A circular narrative and anachronistic fragmentation of terms allows an abyssal atmosphere to swell, if only to pump into the book the externality of its broader text. Biogea aspires to a higher standard and the book, at times, is thinking this negentropic problem too. Univocal, the publisher, has crafted a book appropriate for the hands to hold and the translations are an achievement of an otherwise difficult writer to translate. Terms are the conditions of a broader text. It is important to note that Serres’ content is as much a thinking of terminal ports. There is a regard for the transportation technology of the written word. For me, this is the mark of genius, a craftiness that tells of a book device that I may trust. Serres is an accomplished thinker and a necessary voice to check the putative trendiness of anti-postmodernist and market-driven theory of endless cultural liquidation. Offering interventions on subjectivity as an open system we are given a chance to affirm the human, not merely to discard it, but to engage its poetic image emotion, the calibratory silent sense of the analogic world; the terms on which we base our efforts. 1 The human is the center of its own negation, constantly mediating it. Something deeper at stake appears in the work then, and it is quite obvious from the onset. Certainly, a book is an intensification of possible text and those who brought this actual book into existence have captured a rarity in regards to the subject matter and artistic accomplishment. I mentioned terms as conditions, so let us understand Biogea as bio-yea, a yes to bios . An affirmation of living and accepting presence for all of its defiance of images, words, and things temporal. Therefore Serres’ existence and its existants plays parts; out of linearity and still like a porous bone pumping blood it manufactures into the fleshy life it becomes. Starting from a man named silence chaos emerges, or the man “Old Taciturn” takes up a journey anticipating a great flood. In other words, a development akin to the one in Genesis. In dealing with this ancestral occupation, fusing Genesis with contemporary philosophical terms, Serres initiates this anachronistic fragmentation under the forming subjectivity of his own autobiography. This mutation in the open system is precisely one of Serres’ terms. There an abyss is at work, stated, but also measured by heels on the ground—the abyss dispatching earthen tensions, that which plays our tunes, that which we abide by and recognize in volcanoes, rivers, oceans, earthquakes and weaponry in the battles of the world. Set in later stages of the book, such tensions are harnessed through scientific principles in an attempt to unify the terms of natural force if only to terminate the world. Thus the elevation of the earth into the world is clearly set forth. Here already, and few pages in, a resonance is set forth under appellations such as the river Garonne, a subjectivity as much as it is inhuman, the river is the inhuman that makes us human. I get the sense that Serres is taking up a challenge issued by Wallace Stevens; namely, that the great poems of heaven and hell have been written, but that only the poem of the earth has resisted composition. 2 On this level we cannot avoid the killing factor of silence, given that our cognition blocks its pure, radical obliteration. Thus a silence of attunement to the earth is in a novel dialectic of the rithmic and rhythm. A technological world, a triumph of termination is set forth. If a text imposes its will given the reader who authorizes it, it is made to convey or convect a presupposition to a reader or its inhabitant(s). Text is therefore both, in-content, contenting, contentedness, and in reading it, a way to navigate self-destruction (dis-content). Here then would one note that the “inhuman” reveals itself, “an aperiodic rhythm of lovers and beloved…the sea as our friend…but as our enemy…maternal vivifying sea.” The sea is an open book, or vaginal birth canal, where the engagement of text comes forth: “…woman sea, open vulva.” One sees like the sea, but only after it, when the uninhabitable truth of inhabiting it switches the polarity of the sailors soul: “I was seeing like the sea” (9-11). In other words, we are invited to embrace the nonsense of the visible. At this point I am taken to Jean-François Lyotard’s work The Inhuman , specifically the first entry on negentropy that would be congruent with Serres’ thematic. 3 The human being exports, deports, or transplants its relation through text, through the system— and this is its sense or relation to silence, to music. Unaware of Serres’ proximity to this work, the concept of gender interrelation as regards a solar catastrophe runs clear. It would be, on this basis, that Serres references his peers, the other texts that, as mentioned above, are discarded in philosophy today. For students of philosophy what we have here is perhaps a gift, a needed project. If silence and death are at work, there is a political valence to deal with, and here, much like the domain of the text and the dominion of the reader, we confront the world of natural, fluid violence. The anti-postmodernist critique is in part based on a weak idea that the loss of ideology, of a world vision, motivates the “correlationist” project. 4 Serres seems to offer another way to view this when he notes that whereas persons “sometimes kill,” it is clearly “the collective” that “always kills” (17). What is the collective today, if not an organizing function we never see yet acts in its favor in the name of truth? One feels a sense of enigma here, if only to link to what Stevens remarked of communism as a “grubby faith,” providing this applies for capitalism as well, namely any ideology of progress overly interested in absolutes. Here we get the sense that the inhuman, silence, this type of killing, always killing, could not be matched by human-made, political dynamos. Or that if it comes to an equilibrium, a catastrophe is never too far from us to read with our heels. We are left to note that the forces of nature presuppose and permeate political systems, the more these systems obtain force, the more the system takes upon itself the proper name of nature that motivates its dissemination, albeit falsely. This note, that in an age of ecocide and technological captivity (sustainability and transparency) political regimes won’t grow our soul-learning ears any larger than our tongues, stands clear to us. The promise of technological desubjectification is here pushed aside. Regarding politics, Serres illustrates this fact: Where did this corpse come from? Who was it? Who killed it? I don’t know. I won’t try to find out. I refuse to get vengeance for it. And I only see Garonne. For our victims, today, are the rivers, too. Their waters have irrigated my life, enchanted my thought, invigorated my body; I’ve known them to be threatening, untamable, as dangerous as the sea when it rages. Yes, murderous. They decided to control their courses; dams, sometimes senseless, destroying sites and valleys, reduced entire populations to servile displacements; programs for the irrigation of thirsty farmland, often beneficial of course, completed their drying up.(22) Serres enters into his idea concerning the captivity of language from the natural into a world system: For thousands of years, we have been licking things with our tongues, covering and daubing them so as to appropriate things for ourselves. If language boils down to a convention, this convention took place between the speakers without consulting the thing named, become as a result the property of those who covered it in this way with their drawn or voiced productions. Malfeasance analyzes these acts of appropriation. Thus every inert object, every living thing as well, sleeps under the covers of signs, a little in the way that, today, a thousand posters shouting messages and ugly riots of color drown, with their filthy flood, the landscapes, or better, exclude them from perception because the meaning, almost nil, of this false language and these base images forms an irresistible source of attraction to our neurons and eyes. This appropriation covers the world’s beauty with ugliness. (38-39) Technological concealment coming to bear, we begin to get a sense of another commentary on the condition of sensing, driving home the necessity of a text dealing with such subject matter to be what its terms insist. Thus toward new openings: The new opening. As low beneath our feet as you like, the Biogea opens us to another space, high enough for us to be able to acquire a wisdom there, that of redeveloping this same place differently from our fathers, this place that’s still politically cut up by old hatreds, beneath the flood of tears and blood that we call history. Without this soft place, spiritually very old, but newly conceived in this way, without the juridical construction of a common good, opposed to our filthy ownership, I don’t see how our planet, hard, will survive. Hardness that depends on a softness, material belonging that depends on this temporary rented location (51). Serres enters into a summit on the content and the structure of his work. Archimedes is brought in with the concept of three volcanoes. Meaning fire, but as well earth, water, air. For it was Archimedes’ war machines that sought to lift the earth, thus bringing in the question of principles of science: “can a principle be invented while controlling its consequences?” (66-7). May the earth be put in a sentence, terminated by terminology, appellations, gone wild? By means of these element-dominating laws, this old physicist began to tear nature away from the ancient myths; by a strange return, today we’re plunging our successes back into the anxieties and terrors from which that ancient physics was born. Yes, our new history of science and technology is plunging, today, as though in a loop, into the fundamental human myths from which Empedocles’ first laws came. A major progression and a regression on the nether side of the origins. Consequently, the contemporary time requires that we try to return to that unity in which the principles of hate and love are at the same time human, living, inert and global. We will never attain a deontology of our knowledge and actions without thinking the subjective, the objective, the collective, and the cognitive all together simultaneously. Here, hate and love are the result of these four components.(71) Working then on the concept of fire-starting mirrors to the atomic annihilation of the Second War, Serres works into the subjectivity in question on the matter of rhythm—say rithmic— precisely at that point: Knowledge is changing today. The all-political is dying; the monarchy of the sciences said to be hard is coming to a close. The science of the things of the world will have to communicate just as much as the things of the world do, which do it much better than humans do, who don’t always want to do it. Let’s celebrate two changes this morning. The first one strikes a new blow to our narcissism. No, knowledge and the world don’t resemble our analytical enjoyments of refined cutting up, of endless debates and of exclusions full of hate. They, on the contrary, form a bloc and a sum, alliance and alloys. Uniting the fields of knowledge among themselves the way the things are connected among themselves, the second newness puts into place sets united by interlacing, webs and simplexes that combine with the things of the world, themselves combined, the combined knowledge that understands them.(130-1) Biogea closes on its opening flood thematic, approaching the initial telos of Genesis. Here the trees are brought into a position with atmosphere, the opaque abyssal reservoir, the tomb of the sun, sea in the polarity of the earthen heaven and hell. The poem of the earth then is silent but deadly, indeed, as funny as that phrase is, mainly a tomb gas. The meaning of the living and the non-meaning of things converge in the muteness of the world; this meaning and non-meaning plunge there and come out, the ultimate eddy. Mundus patet: through a fissure, through an opening, a fault, a cleft come noises, calls as small as these apertures. I’m listening, attentive, I’m translating, I’m advancing in the scaled-down meaning and science. Mundus patet: should the world open greatly, it will launch me into its silence. The totality remains silent. Knowledge expanded in elation. White origin of meaning, fountain of joy. (198) Final Remarks One test of a review is the long term trajectory the referee thinks the book will have. I see Serres’ text lending greatly into the vision of Biogea . In fact, in the vision of the novel inquiries of Stephen Jay Gould’s work there is something to be thought on the level of the individual and the species; namely, that humanity and its uniqueness is in its deferral, its thinking and naming, a thinking surrounded by silence that filters into everything, that pulls us through the world, the kinetic pulse we recognize, and all of that we cleave away in the base philosophical maxim of difference itself. Unique individuals are spatial creatures: we dwell, and we ought to get good at it. Yet this is an imaginative space that, if you are crazy enough to believe it, de-term-ine the conditions of its own terms. That is why we are not merely creating spaces on the acceleration of time, or so this ignoramus thinks, to accidentally transcend. Imagination already has this insatiable silence that we drink up and fail to manifest. Space is timeless. The imagination itself, shared by humans for themselves, their objects, and the species as a whole, is a non-defined space of relation; a whole human trajectory as part of nature, and part of worlds that are the other side of thinking nature, the consequence of it, at least our attempt to do so. Our survival is based on our deliberation, our caution, our natural deconstructive sense toward this silence that is already part of the song, sung, singing of this century without end. Good books will let us inhabit this space and recognize a form of life. Serres’ text moves toward dwelling, as noted, in masterful and accessible ways. The pitched battles are the falling replays of anemic and dead politics. As soon as we realize there is humanity, we may be able to enjoy the end of it, our inhuman capability of listening to silence. NOTES 1. See Michel Serres. The Parasite . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2007. 2. Wallace Stevens, “Imagination as Value” [ca. 1945], in Collected Poetry and Prose . New York: The Library of America. 1997. 724-39. 3. Jean-François Lyotard. The Inhuman: Reflections on Time . Trans. Geoffrey Bennington & Rachel Bowlby. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 1992. 4. See the introduction: Quentin Melliassoux. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency . Trans. Ray Brassier. New York: Continuum. 2008. EDITOR'S NOTE: This review was updated on August 8, 2012. Substantial edits include block quotes from the book under review as well as the inclusion of comments from the author. (shrink)

Contemporary debates on divine action tend to focus on finding a space in nature where there would be no natural causes, where nature offers indeterminacy, openness, and potentiality, to place God’s action. These places are found through the natural sciences, in particular quantum mechanics. God’s action is then located in those ontological ”causal-gaps’ offered by certain interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this view, God would determine what is left underdetermined in nature without disrupting the laws of nature. These contemporary proposals (...) evidence at least two unexamined assumptions, which frame the discussion in such a way that they portray God as acting as a secondary cause or a ”cause among causes’. God is somewhat required to act within these ”gaps’, binding God to the laws of nature, and placing God’s action at the level of secondary causes. I suggest that understanding God’s action, following Thomas Aquinas, in terms of primary and secondary causation could help dissolve this difficulty. Aquinas moves away from this objection by suggesting to speak of an analogical notion of cause, allowing for an analogical understanding of God’s causality in nature. With a radically different understanding of the interplay between secondary causes and God, Aquinas manages to avoid conceiving God as a cause among causes, keeping the distinctive transcendent character of God’s causality safe from objections. (shrink)

Purpose of the article is to reconstruct the legal sources of Christian anthropology. Theoretical basis. The methodological basis of the article is the understanding of the fundamental foundations of Christian anthropology in the context of Roman legal understanding. Originality. From the point of view of the Christian religion, man is a dual being: his body is part of the material world, but his soul is not from this world, he is born directly from God. The transcendent origin of the soul (...) gives it the right to communicate with God, but this right can be realized only with the help of the Church, which is seen as the "bride of the Lamb" and the mystical "body of Christ". Interpretations of the essence of church organization correlate with the principles of organization of the Roman community. The principle of universal priesthood correlates with the idea of "post-Tarquinian democracy", recognizing the people of Rome as the supreme bearer of the empire of Jupiter; catholicity – with the idea of the senate as a meeting of the most deserving leaders of the community; apostolic succession – with the institution of republican magistrates, who even though received their power from the community, but through "consultations with the gods". In essence, Christian dogmatism is Roman law applied to the Middle Eastern religion; the Bible was interpreted as a legal document, and theologians acted as lawyers. Conclusions. In the ancient Churches the ideal of Roman law was realized as the right of impersonal law, standing outside and above the individual. The latter has no ontological value, it is a "servant of God", but the union of men into the mystical "body of Christ" makes the latter empowered to represent God on earth and to act on his behalf. The Renaissance paved the way for the Reformation, in which a powerful "Greek" lobby declared itself. Despite the fact that many leaders of the Reformation had a personal dislike for philosophy, they were spontaneous philosophers, believing themselves entitled to interpret the will of God independently, regardless of the authority of the councils. They were strict rationalists who only changed the object of their reason: if the ancient Greeks tried to comprehend the world rationally, the Protestants set themselves the goal of rationally comprehending the Book. Ultimately, the main question of Christian theology is the question of man’s attitude to God, and the differences between the anthropological systems within Christianity are the options for answering this question. (shrink)

Le débat engagé dans le Phèdre à la suite des trois discours, constitue une enquête dialectique qui ne se limite pas, comme dans le Gorgias, aux seuls genres étudiés par les rhéteurs et sophistes, à savoir l'éloquence du barreau et de la tribune politique. Il examine toute la rhétorique en tant qu'art de conduire ou de provoquer l'âme. Tout discours, à quelque genre qu'il appartienne, est sujet à contradiction : en rhétorique comme en dialectique celui-là est le meilleur qui voit (...) la vérité, parce que, connaissant le pour et le contre, le vrai et le semblant de vérité, il saura défendre l'une et l'autre thèse. C'est là une doctrine reçue dans l'Académie. Pour la mettre en évidence Platon a recours à l'exemple des trois discours. Celui de Lysias, faute d'avoir établi une définition qui en soit le principe ou commencement, manque de suite et „nage à rebours". Les deux discours de Socrate posent un principe. Dans le premier une définition conventionnelle de l'amour le conduit à blâmer celui-ci, à juste titre. Vrai en lui-même, ce discours devient faux du moment qu'on lève la convention : or, dans le cas présent, il faut la lever, parce qu'elle méconnaît le divin. Sur l'intervention du „ signe" avertisseur, Socrate le corrige et le complète par le second discours, dont le principe n'est plus conventionnel et hypothétique, mais absolu : l'âme, principe moteur de tout. Nous avons ici l'antilogie parfaite qui repose sur l'unité de formes opposées, „l'un qui s'épand en multiplicité". Platon a choisi comme sujet l'amour parce que c'est lui qui, en tant qu'intermédiaire, unissant l'humain et le divin, réalise éminemment cette unité-multiplicité. L'exposé de la méthode diérétique contient bien des éléments que nous retrouverons dans les dialogues métaphysiques, mais nous aurions tort de la confondre avec celle du Sophiste, qui opère sur des notions „humaines" et a comme but de définir la forme indivisible en la cernant par une chaîne de divisions dichotomiques. Ici, grâce au mythe, il opère la jonction avec le trancendant, et il prouve que, par son caractère antilogique, le discours complet correspond à la structure de l'être un et multiple en affirmant l'unité et la contrariété des formes non-homonymes qui la constituent. Ce ne sont donc pas des exercices de dialectique formelle opérant sur de purs concepts. L'unité en question est réalisée dans l'ordre transcendant des Idées et c'est la réminiscence qui nous permet de la saisir et de reconnaître ainsi les rapports logiques et ontologiques à la fois entre les choses perçues. Cette méthode, nous devons la suivre „ pour être à même de parler et de penser". En fondant la rhétorique sur la dialectique, Platon entend reléguer au second plan les facteurs émotionnels que, sous l'influence du théâtre, la rhétorique attique d'inspiration Gorgienne avait mis en évidence comme constituant l'essence de la rhétorique. Après avoir, ici, revendiqué pour la dialectique la place qui lui revient, Socrate nous dira dans la suite ce que valent ces moyens et quel parti on peut en tirer. Il importe de bien distinguer ces deux thèses, comme Platon a eu soin de le faire. La première nous renvoie à la dialectique, la seconde à la philosophie de la nature. (shrink)

What can literary education contribute to moral education? In this article the inherent practical, moral or political, relevance of literature and literary education is defended, which is opposed to a moralist approach to (children's) literature. A much debated danger in literature and the arts, viz. that it gives rise to a flight into a "promised land" instead of having relevance for real life and the real world, can be overcome by bringing to the fore the active part the reader plays (...) in realizing the "world of the work." The classical idea of mimesis (i.e. of art mirroring reality) then makes room for a historicity of reading with an ongoing interplay of the (real) worlds of readers and the (fictive) world of the text. This idea is elaborated on from the point of view of Ricoeur's hermeneutics and from that of Iser's reception aesthetics, respectively. In realizing the world of the work the world of the reader is transcended and opened up towards the possible. In this reconfiguration lies the practical relevance of literature. Books, therefore, do not have to mirror the actual world in order to be morally or politically relevant. It is in the act of reading that the lasting significance of so-called classics is renewed time and time again. (shrink)

A fruitful way to approach The Idea of Phenomenology is through Husserl’s claim that consciousness is not a bag, box, or any other kind of container. The bag conception, which dominated much of modern philosophy, is rooted in the idea that philosophy is restricted to investigating only what is really immanent to consciousness, such as acts and sensory contents. On this view, what Husserl called “the riddle of transcendence” can never be solved. The phenomenological reduction, as Husserl develops it in (...) The Idea of Phenomenology, opened up a new and broader sense of immanence that embraces the transcendent, making it possible both to solve the riddle and to escape the bag conception once and for all. The essay will discuss ways in which this new conception of immanence is tied to the key Husserlian themes of appearance, phenomenon, essence, seeing or intuiting, and constitution. (shrink)

First principles and the challenge of Parmenidean monism -- St. Thomas on analogia entis in the Scriptum super sententiis and in De veritate -- Consideration of objections to the view that the analogia entis is the analogy of proper proportionality -- The analogy of being and the transcendence and analogical intelligibility of the act of faith.

Do basic human values facilitate prosocial behaviour on a global scale? This study, for the first time, analyzes the effect of values on prosocial behaviour in the context of public support for foreign development assistance. Support for foreign development assistance is a prosocial act intended to benefit the less fortunate in developing nations. Despite a plethora of evidence showing the effect of personal values on prosocial behaviour, the literature has neglected the value origins of support for development assistance. I argue (...) that personal values play a crucial role in shaping individuals’ support for foreign development assistance. Using data from nationally representative samples covering 11 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, I show that self-transcendence and openness to change values, as defined by Schwartz’ theory of values, are reliable predictors of support for foreign development assistance. By linking human values to foreign development aid, this study expands the purview of values research to the domain of global governance and opens up new avenues of interdisciplinary inquiry that apply theories of values to different dimensions of world affairs. (shrink)

In this book, I will discuss three main topics: the roots and aims of scientific knowledge, scientific knowledge in society, and science and values I understand scientific knowledge as being a planned and continuous production of the general and common knowledge of scientific communities. I begin my discussion with a brief analysis of the main differences between sciences, on the one hand, and everyday experience, philosophies, religions, and ideologies, on the other. I define the concept of science as a set (...) of family resemblances (in Wittgenstein's sense). The sciences can be distinguished along three lines, in terms of the difference between empirical and non-empirical sciences, differences in degrees of theoretical and methodological structure among individual sciences and scientific disciplines. Scientific knowledge is based upon some grounds, paradigmatic knowledge bases. Scientific knowledge is founded on a unified paradigmatic knowledge base. The latter includes fundamental theories, basic facts, generally accepted empirical regularities (laws), scientific research methods, scientific explanations, and established relations to other sciences. Scientific knowledge in general is defined well in classical terms by the definition that knowledge is a true and rationally-justified belief. In this connection, scientific truth is relative, depending on the given paradigmatic knowledge base and on the precision and accessibility of the measurements and observations involved. In the book's first part, I consider the production and testing of scientific hypotheses, scientific explanations, the structure of scientific theories, and the problem of scientific realism. I consider explanation an integral part of a wider nexus of heuristic and theoretical activities in science like giving reasons, understanding, clarification, and founding. Continuous production of scientific explanations is a necessary condition for the systematic reproduction of scientific knowledge. Accordingly, it does not suffice to describe them in terms of the logical structure of the arguments on which they are based, but rather, scientific explanations ought to be given complete with an epistemic and pragmatic context of the explanation. I consider especially deductive-nomological, inductive-statistical, dispositional, teleological-functional, and genetic explanations. I emphasize the ever-increasing importance of explanations by analogy and by model. Orthogonal to these distinctions lies the distinction between causal and epistemic explanation. Epistemic explanations relate scientific discoveries to epistemic progress, and causal explanations are these epistemic explanations that relate scientific discoveries to reality too. Causal explanations inform us that certain changes occur in the world as agents of other changes, or rather, that certain changes are real consequences of other changes. Thus, by having explanations of causes, we can intervene in the world to induce by design certain changes in some course of phenomena. I consider scientific theories as logically and epistemically ordered wholeness of scientific knowledge in a realm of research that enables us to construct useful models of reality. After the discussion of different 'statement' views on theories and different interpretations of the theory-experience relation, I introduce the 'model' theoretical (non-statement) views on theories, especially the structural theory of science. The model views on theories transcend the realism-antirealism dualism by introducing models between theory and reality. Therefore, the question of scientific realism is not merely whether and, if so, which element(s), of scientific theories represent reality, but rather which conditions suffice to infer from a theory that one of its models truly expresses reality. In other words, under which conditions do models of a theory represent models of reality? Generally, models are just as much images of reality in a theory as they are images of a theory in reality. The actual problem of scientific realism doesn't originate in the observable-unobservable distinction (even if this distinction is otherwise theoretically loaded), but rather in ontological quandaries, of the sort especially encountered in modern physical theories such as quantum mechanics, relativity theory, and cosmological theories, although they are known to arise in other sciences as well. Scientific theories may be real, even if they describe nothing about the world. However, such theories can be given this status only if their formal, mathematical postulates exhibit some formal homology between reality and mathematical forms. The very fact that it is possible to describe reality with the help of mathematics even in cases, where every (representational, conceptual) language and thought fall short, would indicate that even mathematics itself is, in some sense, a part of reality, although 'outside' of the empirical world. It follows we have to distinguish the non-empirical reality and the empirical world. Formal objectivity and non-arbitrariness of theories do not emerge from either our language or thoughts, or from the world of facts, causes, and effects, but rather from non-empirical reality, which frames the world as some kind of objective transcendental condition for the possibility of the existence of the world, thoughts, and language. In the second part of the book, I consider the incorporation of scientific work and scientific knowledge into modern society and its relations to values and ethics. Production of scientific knowledge goes on as a parallel distributed process of a special kind of social (shared) cognition. The central part of this cognition is the presentation of parts of the world by scientific (theoretical) models which are warranted by the shared and public practice of justification, and in reflective acting in the world as it would. I consider various formal concepts of collective propositional knowledge (distributed, mutual, common knowledge). Scientific knowledge is an achievement to be ascribed to a scientific community or, indirectly, to all those who apply or expand it, rather than to individuals per se. It presents the continuous and partially planned production of non-trivial common knowledge of the research communities in modern societies. However, besides common knowledge, shared dispositional knowledge (knowledge how of scientific teams) and shared knowledge by acquiring (knowledge of fundamental similarities and differences in scientific teams) are parts of the real body of scientific knowledge. Scientific common knowledge implies the projection into idealized universal knowledge of all real or potentially rational and well-informed individuals. The respect of scientific knowledge thus presents the norm of rationality. Science as the intensively shared and socially distributed kind of cognition enters into modern society as a special kind of work (general work), as a productive force (social invention drive), and as a form of capital (human, social, cultural, informational, etc.). However any of these categories can adequately represent the socio-economical role of science in modern societies, and we are still waiting for a more adequate general concept that would theoretically cover the 'scientification' of modern societies. My thesis is that the most important general effect of scientification is (and will be) the growth of social processes that structurally resemble parallel distributed shared social cognition of science, and not so much the rise of the use of scientific knowledge and scientifically based information in all kinds of production. Scientification of modern societies inevitably includes a much stronger need for moral and social responsibility of scientists for their work and its effects in their local society and the global world. This need comes in contradiction with the quite large accepted idea (and even the 'norm') on value-free research. I discuss to some degree different arguments for the absence of non-epistemic values and ethical reasoning from science and find them non-convincing. The sound idea of value-free research lies in the need for the absence of categorical value statements from scientific explanations and theoretical deductions. Values and ethical judgment have, and sometimes they even have to play an important role in another part of research and its application in science or outside it. Not the value-loudness of research is a danger for science but its blind, non-reflective use. It leads to the ideologization and politicization of science. A similar danger lies in the purely value-neutrality of research. It leads to the instrumentalization of science to the technical or bureaucratic means for 'any' aims. (shrink)

Scheler, dans sa période dite intermédiaire, critique le caractère logique de la réduction husserlienne dont la méthode serait sous le joug d’un paradigme intellectualiste. Cette critique constructive prend la forme d’une inclusion des actes intentionnels alogiques ou émotionnels obéissant à une « logique du cœur », ce qui implique une opération d’inversion du primat, supposé traditionnel et dominant jusqu’à Husserl compris, de la connaissance sur l’affectivité, et singulièrement sur l’« amour ». Dans les derniers travaux de Scheler, (...) la « logique du cœur » continue de commander la méthode et la pratique de la réduction, car la fonction du « cœur » se trouve amplifiée dans le mouvement de conversion propre à la réduction phénoménologique réintérprétée en « réduction ascétique ». (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews St. Auc~stine and Being: A Me$aphyM,cal Essay. By James F. Anderson. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.Pp. viii [i] + 76. Guilders 9.90.) Contemporary students of medieval philosophy, especially those influenced by the writings of Gilson, usually view Augustine as primarily an essentialist in metaphysics, while Aquinas is viewed as some sort of existentialist. This is taken to mean that, whereas Augustine seems to identify being with essence (...) or wha~ a thing is, Aquinas distinguishes between what a thing is and its act of existence. The major contribution of Aquinas to later philosophy is often depicted as this distinction between essence and existence. Perhaps the major interest and value of Professor Anderson's essay is that it contests this currently predominant opinion of the essentialist character of Augustinian metaphysics and calls for a re-evaluation of the supposedly revohi~ionary character of the Thomistic concentration upon the act of existence. It is quite evident that Augustine broke with Plotinus when he asserted that the first principle of all things was God, being itself (ipsum esse), rather than the One, which transcends being. The controversy arises over Augustine's view of the nature of being (esse). For Gilson the notion of being remained for Augustine Neoplatonic, while for Anderson Augustine introduced an existential aspect to the notion of being lacking in Neoplatonic thought. Citing the same texts for support Gilson maintains that Augustine interprets the name of God given in Exodus as "I am he who never changes," while Anderson maintains that Augustine interprets Exodus as asserting that God is being, in the sense of existence, itself. The major point of disagreement between Gilson and Anderson is not whether Augustine regarded being as pre~ dominant, but how Augustine interpreted the notion of being. In some texts Augustine maintsSns that being and immutability mean the same thing, in others he argues that a thing truly is 'because it is immutable, and in yet others he argues that a thing is immutable because it truly is. The first opinion seems to be the one frequently favored as an interpretation of Augustine by Gilson. The second is usually regarded as Neoplatonic. The third is the opinion which Professor Anderson argues was most accurately Augustine's. According to Professor Anderson the first two opinions reflect for Augustine a merely factual connection between being and immutability, whereas the third reflects a metaphysical entailment. I should like to mention three points in Professor Anderson's discussion which seem to me weak. Firstly, as Augustine remarks that being is the name for unchangeableness we cannot take this as asserting a merely factual relationship. Secondly, to say that 'being' and 'immutability ~mean the same thing to Augustine or that being and immutability are identical to him does not necessitate, as Professor Andersen claims, denying the primacy of being. If 'being' and 'immutability' mean the same thing, then it is very peculiar to ask which is primary. If it is remarked that 'triangleI means the same thing as 'three sided figure', what sense does it make to ask which notion is primary? I suspect that Professor Anderson's contention makes sense only if one believes that there is a difference in the meanings of 'being' and 'immutability ', but whether or not there was such a difference for Augustine is precisely the point at issue. Professor Anderson asserts that it would be a "metaphysical inconsistency" to claim that God is both being and immutability, but it is not clear why such a claim would be inconsistent if the two terms in fact mean the same thing (p. 30). Thirdly, if, as is in fact the case, Augustine's remarks on the relationship between immutability and being are inconsistent perhaps we should accept the possibility that Augustine himself never came to a clear view on this matter rather than attempt to surmise what Augustine "must have meant." Of course, such inconsistency in Augustine's writings would tend to support the thesis of Gilson that Augustine has difficulties reconciling his theology and metaphysics. Moreover, the analogy Professor Anderson suggests between the Augustinian mutability-immutability contrast and the Thomistic potency-act contrast could only be a very rough one... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews St. Auc~stine and Being: A Me$aphyM,cal Essay. By James F. Anderson. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.Pp. viii [i] + 76. Guilders 9.90.) Contemporary students of medieval philosophy, especially those influenced by the writings of Gilson, usually view Augustine as primarily an essentialist in metaphysics, while Aquinas is viewed as some sort of existentialist. This is taken to mean that, whereas Augustine seems to identify being with essence (...) or wha~ a thing is, Aquinas distinguishes between what a thing is and its act of existence. The major contribution of Aquinas to later philosophy is often depicted as this distinction between essence and existence. Perhaps the major interest and value of Professor Anderson's essay is that it contests this currently predominant opinion of the essentialist character of Augustinian metaphysics and calls for a re-evaluation of the supposedly revohi~ionary character of the Thomistic concentration upon the act of existence. It is quite evident that Augustine broke with Plotinus when he asserted that the first principle of all things was God, being itself (ipsum esse), rather than the One, which transcends being. The controversy arises over Augustine's view of the nature of being (esse). For Gilson the notion of being remained for Augustine Neoplatonic, while for Anderson Augustine introduced an existential aspect to the notion of being lacking in Neoplatonic thought. Citing the same texts for support Gilson maintains that Augustine interprets the name of God given in Exodus as "I am he who never changes," while Anderson maintains that Augustine interprets Exodus as asserting that God is being, in the sense of existence, itself. The major point of disagreement between Gilson and Anderson is not whether Augustine regarded being as pre~ dominant, but how Augustine interpreted the notion of being. In some texts Augustine maintsSns that being and immutability mean the same thing, in others he argues that a thing truly is 'because it is immutable, and in yet others he argues that a thing is immutable because it truly is. The first opinion seems to be the one frequently favored as an interpretation of Augustine by Gilson. The second is usually regarded as Neoplatonic. The third is the opinion which Professor Anderson argues was most accurately Augustine's. According to Professor Anderson the first two opinions reflect for Augustine a merely factual connection between being and immutability, whereas the third reflects a metaphysical entailment. I should like to mention three points in Professor Anderson's discussion which seem to me weak. Firstly, as Augustine remarks that being is the name for unchangeableness we cannot take this as asserting a merely factual relationship. Secondly, to say that 'being' and 'immutability ~mean the same thing to Augustine or that being and immutability are identical to him does not necessitate, as Professor Andersen claims, denying the primacy of being. If 'being' and 'immutability' mean the same thing, then it is very peculiar to ask which is primary. If it is remarked that 'triangleI means the same thing as 'three sided figure', what sense does it make to ask which notion is primary? I suspect that Professor Anderson's contention makes sense only if one believes that there is a difference in the meanings of 'being' and 'immutability ', but whether or not there was such a difference for Augustine is precisely the point at issue. Professor Anderson asserts that it would be a "metaphysical inconsistency" to claim that God is both being and immutability, but it is not clear why such a claim would be inconsistent if the two terms in fact mean the same thing (p. 30). Thirdly, if, as is in fact the case, Augustine's remarks on the relationship between immutability and being are inconsistent perhaps we should accept the possibility that Augustine himself never came to a clear view on this matter rather than attempt to surmise what Augustine "must have meant." Of course, such inconsistency in Augustine's writings would tend to support the thesis of Gilson that Augustine has difficulties reconciling his theology and metaphysics. Moreover, the analogy Professor Anderson suggests between the Augustinian mutability-immutability contrast and the Thomistic potency-act contrast could only be a very rough one... (shrink)

La presse italienne a suivi de très près l'agonie et la mort du pape Jean-Paul II. Il s'agit certainement de l'événement le plus médiatisé depuis les attentats terroristes du 11 septembre 2001. Les quatre titres italiens, malgré leur positionnement politique différent, analysent l'événement avec le même degré de dramatisation et d'intensité. Ils proposent un récit fortement sentimental à travers le recours à un langage émotionnel, à des images touchantes ou, encore, à une mise en page spécifique. Les thèmes qui reviennent (...) le plus souvent font appel au caractère et au charisme de Jean-Paul II, à son recours aux médias dans le but de véhiculer le message chrétien. Son rapport avec les jeunes est également un des sujets privilégiés par la presse italienne, pour cela son Pontificat est qualifié de révolutionnaire. Si les quatre quotidiens italiens étudiés proposent une analyse similaire, à travers leur récit d'un « événement d'émotion planétaire », des différences persistent. S'adressant à un public spécifique, chaque titre emploie son propre langage, il renvoie à des références précises et touche des sensibilités diverses. Malgré une uniformisation substantielle, le clivage droite-gauche semble persister.The Italian press has closely followed the agony and death of Pope John Paul II. It is certainly the most publicized event since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The four Italian titles, despite their different political positions, analyze the event with the same degree of intensity and drama. They offer a highly sentimental story through the use of emotional language, images or touching, even to a specific layout. The themes that recur most often involve the character and charisma of John Paul II, in his use of the media in order to convey the Christian message. His relationship with young people is also one of the subjects favored by the Italian press for his pontificate that is called revolutionary. If the four studied Italian newspapers offer a similar analysis, through their narrative of a "global event emotion", differences persist. Addressing a specific audience, each title uses its own language, it refers to specific references and touches different sensibilities. Despite a substantial uniformity, the left-right divide seems to persist. (shrink)

These studies touch in various ways the compatibility and, moreover, the complementary significance of the twofold character of demythologizing, viz. elimination of myth as a basis for the transcendence of moral obligation, and liberation of the symbolic potential of the kerygma. With some exceptions the topics dealt with in this series are better known than those in previous ones, having acquired ample diffusion with the increased interest in and acceptance of the seminal works of Buber, Bonhoffer and Nabert. What is (...) missing here is a clear understanding of the relations between myth and transcendental consciousness, a clear sense of why does myth, with all its moral wrappings, come to have such a strong sway—the myth of the return = the return of the myth—on human history. Once this is clear, two forms of moral conscience can be distinguished. One form results, generically and in its acts, from creative projects whereby values can become reality. Another form, a crisis-constituted conscience, is irretrievably lost in "substitute action" whereby all categories flounder, and the impossible suddenly acquires an overwhelming fascination. The first form develops from a principle limiting "le désir d'être" to work, institutions and other involvement in economic, political and cultural life. Conversely, the second form has its roots in a principle of illimitation—pleonaxia—which makes man a stranger on earth, inescapably open both to myth and to kerygma.—A. M. (shrink)

Thus Pascal sets forth the romanticist thesis that reason has nothing to do with the deep intimations of the worshipping soul. Religion is an affair of the heart, and the productive Source of all things cannot be comprehended by the exercise of the finite intellect. This doctrine foreshadows the Kantian dichotomy between phenomena and noumena: the understanding can legitimately operate only within the sphere of space, time and natural causality, as it knows nothing of the transcendental postulates of the moral (...) life. In Kant's case, however, the opposition is worked out by means of a sustained and systematic analysis of man's faculties of cognition, and the intuitions of moral feeling are not without a rationality of their own. One might say that in Kant's view there is a logic of ethical sentiment as well as a logic of the scientific understanding, the former being practical, the latter theoretical. In the practical domain of morality the categories of the scientific understanding do not apply: the individual who acts from a sense of duty is free and immortal, besides being destined to receive rewards from the hand of God according to his deserts. The practice of the moral life therefore creates a sort of categoreal vacuum, the individual becoming a noumenon, emancipated from the shackles of the sensible world; from an empirical point of view, morality means self-transcendence. (shrink)

Buddhism teaches that the diversity of living beings in the world is caused and upheld by intentional acts performed in this and previous lives by karmic trajectories, beings whose continuity through rebirths is not dependent on a transcendent substratum such as a self (ātman), and that the order of beings in the world exactly correlates with the consequences of acts (karrnan) operative for their present life. The central Buddhist doctrine of dependent co‐arising (pratītya‐samutpāda) shows how these karmic trajectories are sustained (...) by twelve conditions, the primary of which is ignorance. The goal of Buddhists is ultimately to transcend rebirth and attain nirvāṇa. This is possible because the world is both a rebirth realm and a realm in which awakening from ignorance can be attained. The natural world of living beings is a moral order and this moral order functions in a physical setting. The physical setting of the rebirth system is the cosmos as the abode of beings, and the beings participating in the rebirth system constitute the world of living beings. These together constitute the world of rebirth (saṃsāra). By nature in this article is understood that part of the cosmos that constitutes the physical setting of humans and the world of non‐human beings also living there – that is, animals and plants. This is, one should note, only a very small part of the Buddhist cosmos, which consists of a huge number of world systems, and which is immense in time and space and eternally manifests and dissolves. (shrink)

A fruitful way to approach The Idea of Phenomenology is through Husserl’s claim that consciousness is not a bag, box, or any other kind of container. The bag conception, which dominated much of modern philosophy, is rooted in the idea that philosophy is restricted to investigating only what is really immanent to consciousness, such as acts and sensory contents. On this view, what Husserl called the riddle of transcendence can never be solved. The phenomenological reduction, as Husserl develops it in (...) The Idea of Phenomenology, opened up a new and broader sense of immanence that embraces the transcendent, making it possible both to solve the riddle and to escape the bag conception once and for all. The essay will discuss ways in which this new conception of immanence is tied to the key Husserlian themes of appearance, phenomenon, essence, seeing or intuiting, and constitution. (shrink)

Despite the declarations about the possibility of rationalities that are alternative to Western European, despite the reasoning about philosophical multipolarity, the multiplicity of ways of thinking, etc., nowadays, the Western European paradigm of rationality (and concepts that corresponds to it), which is derived from Hellenic thought, continues to claim the status of ideological neutrality and transcend any intercivilizational differences. The Western European rationality in all its diversity is now acting as rationality as such. The indispensability of the reference to the (...) Greek conceptual apparatus in contemporary philosophizing manifests itself most openly in the form of comparativism. Thus, there is the focus on carrying out explicit parallels between, on the one hand, the studied non-European intellectual phenomena and, on the other hand, their supposed European counterparts. An example of the cross-cultural and methodologically sound research of the problems of rationality is an analysis of the Dao through the prism of the Logos. The statement of the uniqueness of the Greek Logos does not imply the prohibition of the existence of its original counterparts in the so-called “non-Western” civilizations with an ancient and distinctive culture. The assumption of the existence of their own analogues of the Logos and rationality in various non-European civilizations presumes the most interesting question about the pluralism of rationalities – the question about the existence of rationalities in the past that could be considered as an alternative to the now prevailing Western European standard of rationality. (shrink)

Dès l'aube de la pensée philosophique en occident, l'Ecole d'Elèe souligne le caractère absolu de l'être. Découverte des plus importante, qui ne cessera d'exercer une profonde influence sur tout le cours de la réflexion philosophique. Platon s'attache à réhabiliter l'intelligibilité du multiple : il y a « des idées » subsistantes; et Aristote dégage l'intelligibilité du multiple matériel : il y a « des catégories » obtenues au moyen de l'abstraction. L'un et l'autre s'efforce d'y découvrir un ordre : (...) rapports de participation, selon Platon ; rapports de causalité, selon Aristote. Platon se dégage de la tenaille de Parménide, — ou l'être, ou l'absurde néant, — en distinguant deux néants : l'un, qui est le contraire de l'être, est absurde ; mais l'autre, qui est l'altérité, est parfaitement intelligible, une idée, un être véritable. Ce non-être relatif, à savoir l'altéritê, est aussi universel que l'être correspondant, à savoir ceci, cela, êtres corrélatifs. Pour autant, l'unité fondamentale du monde des idées est une unité d'ordre, une multiplicité, et non plus l'unicité à la manière de Parménide. Il est vrai que de toute son âme Platon aspire à une unité suprême et unique, mais il ne réussit pas à l'intégrer techniquement dans son système. Aristote, qui pose carrément en principe que l'être a des sens multiples et irréductibles, notamment les catégories, découvre, lui aussi, un ordre qui unit les catégories entre elles, de même qu'un ordre qui unit toutes les réalités substantielles en les reliant à un Premier Moteur : il est vrai que cette dernière influence ne peut pénétrer jusqu'au fond de la réalité, puisque celle-ci est autre chose que du mouvement, et que par conséquent cette réalité, fondamentalement non unifiée, demeure fondamentalement inintelligible. Il est intéressant de rapprocher de ces deux systèmes « essentialistes » celui de Hegel, dont le mouvement dialectique part de l'être et se porte immédiatement vers le non-être correspondant, considéré comme intelligible : l'être s'en trouve radicalement « relative » . Aussi bien, c'est dans l'élaboration ultérieure de l'être qualifié, quidditatif, que Hegel cherche, mais en vain, l'idée absolue. Plotin réussit à formuler nettement le problème du relatif et de l'absolu et à s'orienter vers une solution : il souligne le caractère radicalement relatif de la réalité relative, ce qui implique le caractère radicalement indépendant de la réalité absolue. Comme il continue à entendre l'être à la manière essentialiste de Platon et d'Aristote, il va de soi qu'il ne lui est pas possible d'identifier l'être et l'absolu : la réalité suprême, l'Un, est donc au delà de l'être, de même qu'il est au delà de l'intelligence, dont l'objet propre est l'être. En distinguant la quiddité et l'existence, Avicenne introduit, à côté de la quiddité, une nouvelle dimension où pourra se mouvoir l'intelligence. Néanmoins c'est sur la quiddité qu'il met l'accent : considérée en elle-même et indépendamment de toute rapport virtuel ou actuel avec l'existence, la quiddité à un sens complet ; au contraire, l'existence ne se conçoit que se rapportant à la quiddité. C'est du côté de la quiddité que se trouve l'absolu. S. Thomas reprend la distinction avicennienne, mais en la retournant : car c'est à l'esse qu'il accorde la primauté : l'esse est acte, la quiddité est puissance ; l'esse est la perfection fondamentale de tout, à laquelle toute réalité participe. C'est dans la ligne de l'esse que se trouve l'absolu. Heidegger fait observer que depuis Platon la philosophie se trouve sur une mauvaise voie : c'est toujours de l « étant » qu'elle s'est occupée, c'est-à-dire, de l'être qualifié, tandis qu'elle a négligé l'étude de l'être lui-même. Sans doute a-t-il raison pour une bonne part, mais il ignore que S. Thomas a élaboré une philosophie authentique de Yesse, que beaucoup sont trop enclins à ne pas considérer. Comment justifier le point de départ et le point de vue d'une philosophie de l'être ? Où les trouver ? Non pas dans quelque secteur particulier où Ion rencontrerait l'être pur, mais dans tout secteur, dans toute expérience. C'est sur le fait qu'il faut s'appuyer, sur le fait dont l'homme de science déclare qu'il est plus fort que le Lord Maire de Londres. L'homme de science se borne à noter les faits et à en chercher la régularité ; le philosophe s'attache à découvrir la raison de la solidité absolue des faits et à dégager ce que cela implique. Lorsqu'on a exposé tout ce qu'est une réalité donnée, tout ce que sa quiddité comporte, on n'a nullement fini de dire ce que cette réalité contient d'intelligible, puisqu'on n'a pas encore déclaré que cette réalité est, qu'elle existe. Sans doute, Kant est-il d'avis que l'intelligibilité de cent thalers existants ne dépasse en rien celle de cent thalers possibles, mais il est pourtant certain que le jugement d'existence, qui est un jugement, est affaire d'intelligence, d'intelligibilité : il manifeste d'emblée la solidité irréfragable de l'être ; rien ne pourra plus jamais effacer ce qui a été et, désormais, absolument tout doit en tenir compte. C'est cela même qui est à la base de la connaissance vraie, à savoir de celle qui saisit « ce qui est ». Ceci ne contredit en rien la relativité des faits : c'est précisément le fait qui nous révèle l'absolu, c'est le relatif qui se montre comme étant absolument relatif. Tout comme c'est de la situation dans laquelle je me trouve que j'ai conscience et que c'est donc en elle que je domine et transcende la relativité qui est propre à cette situation. L'absolu que je saisis est celui qui me révèle le relatif. Mon point de vue, qui n'est qu'humain, n'est jamais celui de Dieu : cependant il contient une valeur d'absolu. Et la donnée qui m'est présentée n'est pas l'être divin : cependant elle manifeste une signification d'absolu, à savoir la signification d'être. Dans cette signification, tout coïncide, car ce qui ne s'y trouverait pas, serait pur néant. Tout se rencontre dans une identité fondamentale. C'est à raison de l'être qu'il contient que la réalité parle à l'intelligence, comme aussi à la vie appetitive : c'est grâce à sa signification d'être, que la réalité peut m'être « présente ». Aussi bien, pour y répondre, pour résoudre les problèmes qu'elle pose, il n'est que de s'en approcher et de se laisser guider par elle. On peut montrer que la signification absolue d'être que manifeste toute donnée exige un principe réel unique qui fonde toute réalité. Ce principe ne peut se concevoir, ni sur le mode d'une substance, ni sur celui d'une cause particulière, car l'une et l'autre sont essentiellement relatives. Il ne peut s'entendre que comme l'Absolu, dégagé de tout rapport : si toutes choses sont intégralement dépendantes de cet Absolu, lui-même ne peut dépendre de rien et il garde nécessairement son indépendance totale. Il apparaît clairement qu'il ne sert à rien de se mouvoir, « horizontalement », le long d'une série de causes dans l'espoir d'en découvrir une, par exemple la première de la série, qui permettrait davantage de se porter, « verticalement », vers l'Absolu ; car du fini à l'Infini la distance demeure partout la même et la difficulté est toujours égale : le passage du fini à l'Infini est unique et il exige d'être examiné et justifié avec soin. L'argument en question est d'une nature spéciale : il s'agit d'atteindre l'Infini à partir du fini et, de plus, au moyen d'une intelligence finie. Aussi bien, n'atteignons-nous jamais immédiatement l'Infini en lui-même, mais uniquement dans le fini et tel que le fini nous le révèle. Donc c'est tout en pensant le fini qu'il nous faut penser l'Infini, à savoir comme exigence fondamentale de ce fini. C'est en ce sens qu'on dit que de l'Infini au fini il y a relation logique. Cependant, par là-même nous comprenons que nulle relation réelle ne peut lier l'Infini au fini. Ceci ne signifie nullement que l'Absolu divin serait entièrement isolé et loin de toute réalité finie ; mais tout au contraire, que Dieu est plus près de la créature qu'aucun terme relatif ne peut jamais l'être du terme qui lui correspond : l'Absolu créateur, souverainement indépendant et transcendant, est tout aussi parfaitement immanent, c'est-à-dire toujours intimement et activement présent à ce qu'il pose dans le réel. (shrink)

Est-il vrai que la notion chrétienne de création soit une notion complètement nouvelle par rapport à la philosophie grecque ? Telle est la question qu'on se pose dans l'article ci-dessus. Si d'habitude on est incliné à répondre à cette question par l'affirmative, c'est en admettant que, assez généralement, la philosophie grecque connaît l'idée d'une matière préexistante. C'est ainsi que les apologètes grecs du deuxième siècle, tels qu'Aristide et Théophile d'Antioche, se sont opposés à la philosophie grecque et spécialement à la (...) doctrine de Platon telle qu'ils l'ont comprise. L'auteur essaie de démontrer que, en fait, Platon n'a pas admis une matière préexistante dans le sens voulu par ses adversaires. Il n'a ni enseigné que les éléments préexistassent à l'œuvre créatrice du Démiurge , ni introduit sa notion d' espace dans le sens de matière, telle qu'Aristote, suivant sa propre terminologie, a voulu l'expliquer. C'est donc une erreur de dire que Platon ait admis une matière qui soit « coéternelle » et « du même âge », donc du même ordre que Dieu. Pour Platon, et pour Aristote également, le principe non déterminé ne saurait, comme tel, être du même orde que le premier Principe de l'être qui est comme tel un principe déterminant et déterminé. C'e'st une erreur, encore, de dire que, sur ce point comme sur beaucoup d'autres, Aristote était plus près de la vérité, donc du Christianisme, que Platon, le « Démiurge » du dernier n'étant pas une cause totale, tandis que le Premier Moteur d'Aristote était, dans un sens, vraiment une cause totale. Ce qui se voit clairement chez Platon, non seulement dans le Timée, mais aussi dans la République et dans le Philète , c'est qu'il est constamment et profondément préoccupé de fonder l'existence relative dans l'Existence absolue. Il a reconnu le rapport entre le monde visible et le Monde transcendant comme une relation de dépendance totale et essentielle. Or, si, dans son essence, la notion chrétienne de création n'est autre chose qu'une telle relation de dépendance, Platon, qui a fait de cette notion la base de toute sa philosophie, était par là-même près de la foi chrétienne. Aristote, d'autre part, bien qu'il ait dit une fois au moins que de son premier Principe tout l'univers dépend, a minimisé en fait le rapport entre le premier Principe et notre monde. Dans la notion chrétienne de création deux éléments se dissinguent : L'Etre Absolu, dont sort tout ce qui est relatif, se distingue dans son essence de tout ce qui n'est pas Lui. Le mode selon lequel l'être relatif sort de l'Absolu n'est pas celui d'une nécessité de nature, mais d'un acte de volonté. En partant de cette analyse, on peut déterminer exactement les degrés de différence ou d'affinité entre la notion chrétienne de création et les différents systèmes de philosophie grecque. En rapport avec la Stoa, la différence est dans la notion de Dieu : ne reconnaissant pas sa transcendance, on méconnaît l'opposition entre l'Absolu et l'être relatif. Quant à Aristote, il n'explique aucunement comment l'être relatif provient de l'Absolu : son premier Moteur n'est pas la cause de l'être, et les « formes » immanentes des objets naturels restent chez lui sans aucune explication. Sans doute, Platon explique davantage. Il est suivi par les Néoplatoniciens qui font provenir l'être relatif de l'Absolu, tout en connaissant une différence essentielle entre l'un et l'autre, mais n'admettant point d'acte de volonté de la part de l'Absolu. Platon qui, probablement, admettait un acte de volonté, se trouvait par là-même le plus près de la notion chrétienne de création. Il en différait, cependant, sur quelques points importants. Il n'enseigne qu'en partie une création directe : c'est que le Nous transcendant qui est le Démiurge, constitue des éléments le monde visible ; ces éléments, il ne les a pas trouvés comme tels, mais il les a faits de — « quelque chose » qu'on n'a pas le droit de nommre une chose. Il « fait » donc le monde dans son aspect intelligible. Mais il reste un aspect qui échappe à la pensée et qui, comme tel, ne saurait provenir du Principe Suprême qui domine la hiérarchie platonicienne de l'être. Ensuite, le Nous transcendant fait les âmes : l'âme du monde, les astres , les âmes humaines. Il ne fait ni les corps humains ni les êtres vivants d'un ordre inférieur à l'homme. Ceux-là, ils sont tous créés par les « dieux créés » et secondaires qui sont les Astres. Pour Platon, l'Esprit transcendant qui crée le monde n'est pas le Principe suprême. Il se trouve d'après ce qu'il paraît, à un degré plus bas dans la hiérarchie de l'être. Ce seront les penseurs chrétiens, ce sera tout d'abord Saint Athanase qui, en unifiant essentiellement le Père et son Logos, a réuni l'Un et le Nous transcendant qui est le Démiurge de Platon. Au lieu d'opposer au Platonisme la doctrine qu'il n'y a pas de matière préexistante, Dieu ayant « concréé » la matière, nous préférons de dire : Platon a éloigné la notion d'infini et d'indétermination de son principe suprême ; donc, il en a fait un autre principe, jamais du même ordre que l'Un, mais tout de même un principe fondamental. La notion chrétienne de Dieu, d'autre part, renferme et le caractère de l'Un et celui de l'Infini. (shrink)

In his clear-sighted, humane, and provocative way, Richard Falk calls for a revolution in thinking about the future of world order. Explorations at the Edge of Time develops the idea that a major cultural shift from modernism to postmodernism is under way, creating both new difficulties and new opportunities in the domain of global public policy. The author observes, "A postmodem possibility implies the human capacity to transcend the violence, poverty, ecological decay, oppression, injustice, and secularism of the modern world." (...) Recognizing that the concepts of "progress" and "development" have changed due to the breakdown of the modernist consensus, Falk contends that most problems have transnational dimensions. He proposes a commitment to grassroots globalism, and he challenges aspiring "citizen pilgrims" to think and act in ways that will enhance their feeling of identity with the rest of creation. Falk's "rooted utopianism" challenges our political imagination in relation to pressing global problems and helps forge an overall vision of the future. What is at stake is the building of political understanding amidst the appreciation of unity and diversity for a hopeful entry upon the 21st Century. Author note: Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University. He has published more than twenty books, including The Promise of World Order (Temple). (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to clash the problem of forgiveness as formulated in contemporary secular and Christian ethics with Kierkegaard’s considerations concerning this issue. Kierkegaard’s thought is increasingly used in the modern debate on forgiveness. It is therefore worth investigating whether Kierkegaard’s considerations are really able to overcome in any way contemporary disputes concerning this problem or enrich our thinking in this area. The main thesis of this paper states that there is a fundamental, ontological difference between Kierkegaard’s understanding (...) of forgiveness and that of modern thinkers. While the Danish philosopher refers to the transcendent reality of spirit, where the act of forgiveness is always performed by God, in contemporary ethical and Christian thought, forgiveness is first and foremost formulated from an immanent point of view that appeals to the world of human values. This difference is demonstrated by analyzing the four main themes corresponding to the most important issues taken up in the contemporary debate on forgiveness. These are: the victim-offender relation, the conditionality and unconditionality of forgiveness, the issue of condonation, and the problem of the unforgivable. As a result of the analyses presented herein, the impossibility of directly applying Kierkegaard’s transcendent theses to ethical thought of the immanent variety will be shown. (shrink)

L'objet de l'article est de considérer le document du magistère «Ordinatio sacerdotalis» dans le cadre de la gnoséologie théologique. Vatican II a légué, au sujet de l'objet et de l'étendue du magistère pontifical ordinaire trois critères-clé que l'ecclésiologiste doit appliquer pour l'interprétation des textes du magistère. a) La nature du document ; b) La proposition fréquente du thème en d'autres documents du magistère et sa transmission dans la tradition vivante de l'Eglise; c) Les formules employées pour déterminer le caractère (...) de l'acte magistériel et l'étendue de l'adhésion requise des destinataires. Il est de la compétence de l'ecclésiologiste, en accueillant en principe le document en la forme requise par sa présentation, d'approfondir la connexion véritable de la doctrine proposée avec le dépôt révélé et l'analogie de cette doctrine avec les autres vérités du message chrétien. Ainsi seulement pourra-t-on situer le document en raison de son contenu et de l'acte formel du magistère qui s'y exprime, dans le contexte qui lui correspond par rapport à l'entièreté du dépôt de la foi. (shrink)

Nussbaum argues for a (limited) transcendence through contemplation which is compatible with practical reasoning and aspiration towards other human goods. This paper raises difficulties for this account based on a) the relation of thinking to human freedom, and b) the self‐constitutive nature of human thinking. It explores connections Thomas Aquinas makes between contemplation, transcendence and happiness, and explains the relation between (unlimited) transcendent experience and rationality by considering individuals who lack rational judgement but do seem capable of contemplation (young children, (...) certain mentally disordered persons). What contemplation by these individuals and by rational, mature adults have in common is awareness (by the less than perfectly rational) of the possibility of a life of unlimited rationality. I claim this awareness does not come naturally to us but is made possible by some super‐natural cause acting in a way that does not violate human nature but rather perfects our contemplative faculty and enables our happiness. (shrink)

Was Swift correct that “reasoning will never make a man correct an ill opinion, which by reasoning he never acquired” (Letter to a Young Gentleman)? If so, what recourse is there to change attitudes especially among those who continue to fervently believe unjustified claims and act upon them in a way that affects other people? I will answer the first question with a qualified yes, and the second I will follow Swift’s implicit proposal to rely upon humor, satire, playful ridicule, (...) and especially irony to unsettle the certainties of those who have not appealed to reason or epistemic justification to maintain their cherished opinions. In the bulk of the chapter, I will then assess what sort of irony Swift employs: is his irony primarily a trope in the service of a particular idea? Or is he truly Socratic in his irony, the sort Kierkegaard admired that transcends the mere rhetorical device and can be viewed as a stance on life in general? The answer to the latter question, in typical Aristotelian fashion, will be yes and no. My account of Socratic Irony will be informed primarily by the works of Alexander Nehemas, Jorge Portilla, and Jonathan Lear’s interpretation of Kierkegaard on Socrates’ irony. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de discuter la façon dont Jean-Luc Marion décrit, dans Au lieu de soi, la formation et la déformation du « modèle augustinien de confession » chez Montaigne et Rousseau. Contrairement au « moi » moderne « encapsulé » en lui-même – tout tiers étant exclu –, la confession telle que la pratique saint Augustin expulse nécessairement l’ego de sa sphère intérieure pour confronter celui-ci à un au-delà qui rend possible la vérité de soi-même. L’écriture de soi (...) chez Augustin est éminemment performative et sa vérité réside avant tout dans l’acte et non dans une adéquation entre la chose et le récit. C’est ce caractère d’expérimentation qui pousse immanquablement le moi en direction d’une transcendance propre à l’attester et qui est au contraire perdu dans l’autobiographie moderne. Pourtant, la naissance de la psychologie expérimentale au siècle de l’Aufklärung et la prolifération des récits de vie à la première personne, notamment de philosophes, nous confrontent, certes dans un contexte désormais plus littéraire et médical, à une démarche d’accès à la vérité de soi-même encore effectuée comme acte d’écriture de soi. À partir de deux démarches autobiographiques, celle de Karl Philipp Moritz dans Anton Reiser et de Salomon Maimon dans la Lebensgeschichte, il sera montré comment, même renversés, certains traits du « modèle augustinien » semblent tenir bon au-delà de l’affaissement rousseauiste. (shrink)

_The purpose _of the article is to introduce into scientific circulation works by Ukrainian scholar Taras Zakydalsky on the philosophy of Hryhorii Skovoroda. Taras Zakydalsky is a representative of the Ukrainian diaspora, philosopher, and member of Canadian NTSh (Shevchenko Scientific Society of Canada). _Theoretical basis._ We consider the uniqueness of H. Skovoroda’s philosophy, which stimulates not only intellectually but also spiritually enlightens the reader. The reasons for the complex perception and interpretation of Hryhorii Skovoroda’s philosophy are highlighted. We have verified (...) the main methods of its interpretation given in the works by Dmytro Chyzhevskyi. The influence of philosophical thought of thinkers of Antiquity and the Middle Ages: Aristotle, Epicurus, the Church Fathers, and Tertullian has been studied. We have comprehended H. Skovoroda’s interpretation of the Bible as a two-layer existence, the symbolic world that makes the foundation of his philosophy. The peculiarity of the thinker’s division of the heart into "internal" and "external" is analyzed. Hryhorii Skovoroda’s position on the Good and the evil is stated. The Good is identified with God, and the evil – with the real world, the man can choose between the two. Much attention is paid to the understanding of man as a microcosm – rational thinking, and thought is the fundamental cause of human activity, which generates all existence. Hryhorii Skovoroda’s philosophy of metaphysics as the existence of three worlds is highlighted: the first is the macrocosm (the whole surrounding world), the second is the microcosm (the man), and the third is the symbolic world (the Bible). "Monodualism" as a characteristic feature of H. Skovoroda’s work is analyzed. We have highlighted H. Skovoroda’s attitude to the transcendence of God, which is not separated from the world but is present in it directly. The understanding of faith as a forced act of self-love is analyzed because by loving ourselves we love God. The criteria for true and false faith have been clarified. The significance of H. Skovoroda’s aphorism that _what is necessary is useful, and not useful is unnecessary_ is considered. Examples of ethical principles in H. Skovoroda’s philosophy are considered. Peculiarities of the concept HAPPINESS are revealed. This concept is a universal means of existence of the Good, its source is gratitude to God. _Originality_ of the article is in the systematic presentation of the philosophy of the heart by Hryhorii Skovoroda and the analysis of the integrity of the "inner man", the true meaning of life as interpreted by Taras Zakydalsky. _Conclusions_ summarize the "anthropological pragmatism" of the philosopher, whose main idea is to apply practical skills for the benefit of society. (shrink)

Cet article propose une caractérisation de la sensibilité et de la conscience émotionnelle des personnes autistes grâce à des précisions terminologiques des concepts d’émotions et de conscience. Il met en évidence le caractère contradictoire qui semble caractériser la sensibilité des personnes autistes : alors que leurs états internes du corps parviennent à la conscience beaucoup plus fréquemment que pour les personnes neurotypiques, leurs émotions sont appréhendées de manière descriptive et non par le biais de ces ressentis corporels, comme c’est (...) pourtant le cas pour les personnes neurotypiques. Chez les personnes autistes, la compréhension émotionnelle semble donc être détachée du ressenti émotionnel, pourtant très présent. La mise en commun des résultats d’études mettant en évidence ces particularités permet de proposer une hypothèse explicative de cette apparente contradiction ; hypothèse selon laquelle pour les personnes autistes, le caractère accablant des ressentis du corps est évité grâce à une stratégie compensatoire d’accès explicite aux émotions, détaché du ressenti émotionnel. (shrink)

An important milestone of 20th Century philosophy was the rise of personalism. After the crimes and atrocities against millions of human beings in two World Wars, especially the Second, some philosophers and other thinkers began to seek arguments showing the value of each human being, to expose and denounce the folly of political structures that violate the inalienable rights of the individual person. -/- Karol Wojtyla appeals to the ancient concept of 'person' to emphasize the particular value of each human (...) being. The person is unique because of their subjectivity by which they possesses an unrepeatable interior world in the history of humanity. Their rational nature grants them a special character among living beings, among which is the transcendence to the infinite. Wojtyla magisterially shows how each human being's personhood is rooted in a conscious and free subjectivity, which is marked also by personal and social responsibility. Wojtyla's original philosophical analysis takes for its starting point the human act, in which consciousness and experience consolidate voluntary choices, which are objectively efficacious. By their acts, the person determines their own personhood. This self-dominion manifests the person and enables them to live together in a community in which one's neighbor can be a companion on the voyage of life. -/- This work provides a clear guide to Karol Wojtyla's principal philosophical work, Person and Act, rigorously analyzing the meaning that the author intended in his exposition. An important feature of the work is that the authors rely on the original Polish text, Osoba i czyn, as well as the best translations into Italian and Spanish, rather than on a flawed and sometimes misleading English edition of the work. -/- Besides the analysis of Wojtyla's masterwork, this volume offers three chapters examining the impact of Wojtyla's anthropology on the relationship between faith and reason. (shrink)

The doctrine of the image of God is often regarded as grounding human dignity in something permanent and unchanging that transcends our attitudes and behaviors. Yet we persistently encounter the argument that particular human individuals or groups have acted so as to forfeit their moral standing as fellow humans. They are bestialized, categorized as non-human animals, lifting ordinary restraints on punishment. I examine the logic of this argument in John Locke, Thomas Aquinas, and contemporary felony disenfranchisement, showing how it involves (...) slippage between the unobjectionable notion that specific rights may in particular circumstances be forfeited, and the deeply troubling claim that one’s moral standing as human can as such be forfeited. I argue that an apparently similar rhetoric of dehumanization employed by Frederick Douglass, in contrast, refrains from stripping the opponent of moral considerability. (shrink)

L'étude aborde la question de la méthode théologique, en considérant sa nature et sa typologie, ses possibilités et ses limites, ainsi que les conditions de sa légitimité devant les instances du «depositum fidei». On attribue une importance spéciale à la tension de fond entre l'usage de la méthode kérygmatique et de la méthode dialogale dans la théologie du passé, mais surtout dans le débat actuel, spécialement entre divers courants de la théologie de la transcendance, telles les «théologies de la parole» (...) et la «méthode de corrélation», ou encore entre les «théologies du mystère» et la «méthode transcendantale». Pareille tension s'aggrave dans les «théologies de l'immanence», telles les théologies de la «mort de Dieu» ou les «théologies de l'histoire», ou entre les «théologies de la modernité» et certaines «théologies de la praxis». A la fin de ce panorama du pluralisme méthodologique actuel, on formule certains principes fondamentaux sur le problème débattu. Finalement, on considère le caractère obligatoire du «depositum fidei» comme instance théologique définitive. (shrink)

Analysis of the social-cognitive substrate of scientific activity reveals that much of science functions in an inauthentic mode whereby a materialist world view constrains the authentic practice of science. But materialism cannot explain matter, as evidenced by empirical data concerning the nature of physical manifestation. Nor, then, should materialism be the basis for our interpretation of consciousness. It is time to move beyond scientific materialism and develop transcendent theories of consciousness. Such theories should minimally meet the following criteria: they should (...) be based on all of the usual empirical data concerning consciousness, including altered states of consciousness; they should take into account data about anomalous phenomena and transcendent states of consciousness; they should address the issue of existential meaning and provide soteriological guidance; and they should be consistent with the most accurate theories of physical manifestation, such as relativistic quantum field theories. Speculating within a quantum-theoretic context, consciousness could be inserted as a primitive element into reality by providing a role for intention in the selection process of observables, the collapse of the state vector, or the ordering of quantum fluctuations. But consciousness could be more fundamental, in the sense of a deep consciousness coinciding with a pre-physical substrate, from which intention shapes both mental experience and physical manifestation. If any significance can be attached to the mathematical formalism of relativistic quantum field theories, perhaps creation and annihilation operators, which determine the fluctuations of a quantum field, can metaphorically be regarded as the avenue through which intention acts. Morphic fields within the pre-physical substrate could hold in place patterns that shape the reality that we experience. Among such morphic fields could be ones that correspond to the world view of scientism. By becoming authentic, one could break from such constraints and consider alternative possibilities that can include various forms of radical transformation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 135-137 [Access article in PDF] The 2002 Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies Alice Keefe University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point "Religious Responses to Violence" was the theme for the program at the SBCS Annual Meeting in Toronto, Canada, on November 22-23, 2002. Speaking from Christian and Jewish perspectives, the presenters in Session I were Harold Kasimow, Professor Emeritus of Grinnell College; Elaine MacInnes, O.L.M.; Sarah (...) Pinnock of Trinity University; and Rebekah Miles from the Perkins School of Theology. Responding from a Buddhist perspective was Virginia Strauss of the Boston Research Center. Session II offered reflections on Buddhist responses to violence from Gene Reeves of the International Buddhist Congregation; Christopher Ives of Stonehill College; and John Makransky, professor of Religious Studies at Boston College and a Buddhist teacher, with a Christian response from Theodore Walker of Perkins School of Theology, noted for his work in Black theology.Opening Session I, Harold Kasimow explored Jewish responses to violence, which he finds similar in many ways to responses to violence in Mahayana Buddhism. Both traditions unequivocally condemn violence. Basic to Jewish reflection on violence is the great commandment that one shall love one's neighbor as oneself, along with the principle that all humans are created in the image of God; therefore, as Rabbi Akiva taught, whoever sheds blood diminishes God's presence in the world. But like Mahayana Buddhism, the Jewish tradition admits to rare cases where violence may be legitimately used in a spirit of compassion when the lives of others are at stake. On this point, Kasimow, himself a Holocaust survivor, cited Abraham Heschel, who said that "indifference to evil is more insidious than evil itself." Heschel dreamed of a world rid of evil by human effort, and he suggested that interfaith dialogue serves as a step toward this goal as it works against the evil of demonizing the "other."Sarah Pinnock, who has written on the religious journeys of Holocaust survivors, explored the themes of memory, solidarity, hope, and mystical faith as compelling Christian modes of survival and resistance in the face of evil. Logic cannot solve the problem of evil, but through memory, suffering is not forgotten; through solidarity, we identify and join with the victimized in resistance to evil; and through hope, we find the energy for resistance. Mystical faith discovers divine transcendence in all things, while abandoning egotistical demands that God be the world's puppet master; [End Page 135] in mystical faith, Christians do not look for divine intervention, but for human beings to act for God against evil.Rebekah Miles, a Christian ethicist, offered a lucid outline of three distinct Christian approaches to violence: (1) absolute pacificism, which rejects the use of violence for any reason; (2) the "crusade" perspective, which justifies war when it can be construed as a conflict between good and evil and which calls for the total eradication of evil in the form of the enemy; and (3) the "just war" perspective, which stipulates precise criteria for instances when the use of violence may be justified and places restraints on any exercise of violence. In addition to this helpful overview, she engaged arguments (put forth by Rosemary Ruether, SharonWelch, and ReginaSchwartz) that there is something inherent in the nature of Western monotheism that serves to legitimate and encourage violence, and argued for divine transcendence as undergirding the effective power of the prophetic critique against all forms of idolatry and tyranny.The final Christian presenter was Elaine MacInnes, O.L.M., a Catholic nun and Zen master who is noted for her activist work in prison ministry in the Philippines and in Canada. She reminded us that even as violence brings suffering, it is at the same time a mystery in that it carries a redeeming potential to rid us of all that is false. It is the cultivation of silence that allows the sacred inner life to do its work.Responding from a Buddhist perspective, Virginia Strauss returned to the problem of the human desire for retributory justice and looked to Buddhism... (shrink)

RésuméLe saint — phénomène religieux universel — est compris comme un personnage à travers lequel un Absolu se manifeste au sein du relatif: le saint représente le fondement transcendant d'une société. Ce fait détermine ses relations avec la dernière: libéré des contraintes habituelles d'ordre transactionnel qui régissent la société, le saint en assure l'équilibre en intervenant comme arbitre lors de conflits graves — en particulier en période de crise —, ou comme directeur des consciences. En faisant de lui un (...) objet de vénération et en l'utilisant comme référence et justification ultimes de sa propre existence, la société essaie de l'intégrer dans ses structures. Toutefois, la dimension d'Absolu demeurent irréductible au relatif, la présence du saint conduit immanquablement à l'élaboration de diverses théories concernant l'existence de deux niveaux de vérité.SummaryThe saint is understood as a universal phenomenon in religion and defined as a person through which absolute Reality manifests itself in the midst of relative reality: the saint represents the transcendental foundation of society. Standing outside and above the constraints deriving from the transactional pattern of social life, the saint acts as an arbiter in cases of major conflicts and as a spiritual guide, and thus assures harmony and peace among the members of society. Society tries to get possession of the saint by making him an object of veneration and by considering him as the ultimate reference and justification of its existence. However, absolute Reality being forever irreducible to relative reality, the saint's presence leads inevitably to the elaboration of theories concerning two levels of truth.ZusammenfassungDer “Heilige” ist ein universelles religiöses Phänomen; er kann definiert werden als ein Mensch, in welchem sich das Absolute innerhalb des Relativen manifestiert: der Heilige repräsentiert die transzendente Grundlage einer Gesellschaft. Diese Tat‐sache bestimmt seine Beziehungen zu der letzteren: der Heilige ist befreit von den transaktionellen Zwängen, die das Gesellschaftsleben beherrschen und ist dadurch befähigt, in schwierigen Konfliktsfällen als Schiedsrichter zu wirken , sowie als geistlicher Führer zu amten. Indem die Gesellschaft ihm ihre Verehrung darbringt und ihn als letzte Begründung und Rechtfertigung ihrer Existenz betrachtet, versucht sie, ihn in ihre Strukturen hereinzuholen. Da indessen das Absolute nie im Relativen aufgeht, führt das Dasein des Heiligen unweigerlich zur Aus‐bildung verschiedener Theorien hinsichtlich der Existenz einer doppelten Wahrheit. (shrink)

W. Norris Clarke's metaphysics of the universe as a journey rests on six major positions: the unrestricted dynamism of the mind, the primacy of the act of existence, the participation structure of reality, and the person, considered as both the starting point of philosophy and the source of the categories needed for a flexible contemporary metaphysics. Reflecting on his conscious life and the universe around him, the finite person mounts by a two-fold path to its Infinite source, who, though immutable (...) in His natural being, is mutable in the intentional being of His personal knowledge and love. The personal God is the efficient cause from whom the universe comes and the final cause to whom it returns.Less optimistic than Norris Clarke, John Caputo wonders about his metaphysics of the person. In a hermeneutical interpretation of the human face, the person through whom Being "sounds" discloses an ambiguous Being that both reveals and conceals itself. Far from grounding a casual ascent to God, hermeneutical phenomenology allows us no more than the right to interpret the world and its transcendent source through our own free decision.Although impressed by Norris Clarke's attempt to introduce mutability into God, Lewis Ford still finds Clarke's Thomistic God unacceptable. As a Whiteheadian, he proposes in place of Thomas' God, whose perfection consists in static unity, a God whose perfection consists in a never-ending process of unification. John Smith argues against the traditional dichotomy made between the ontological and cosmological arguments. Rather than opposed methods of proving God's existence, they should be taken as complementary journeys to the divine presence which discloses itself, although diversely, in the soul and in the world. There are parallels between Smith's historical study of two arguments and Clarke's two-fold path to God. Yet Smith is critical of Thomas' cosmological journey to God and does not share Clarke's confidence in its validity. Significant studies in their own right, the three essays as a group challenge Clarke's whole metaphysics of the universe as a journey. Meeting the challenge, Clarke clarifies and refines his own thought.An account of Clarke's philosophy by Gerald A. McCool, S.J. preceds this unified and stimulating philosophical discussion. (shrink)

I argue that hanink's account of the principle of double effect ("some light on double effect," "analysis", volume 35, number 5) is inadequate, and rests on the mistaken assumption that the criteria for distinguishing acts from each other, intention from foresight, acting from refraining, can be specified independently of any moral perspective. i try to indicate the way to a better understanding of these distinctions, and the essential features of the kind of absolutist morality which invokes them--its concern with "agency", (...) with "transcendent values", and with "limits" on human action. i illustrate these points by a brief discussion of suicide. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MARITAIN ON RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW THOMAS A. FAY St. John's University Jamaica, New York T:HE WAY RIGHTS a11e viewed in our time creates urmoil in our society. But this one-sided view of rights ad ]ts origin in the philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseaiu, in which the" Rights of Man" were divinized and hence made unlimited. In contrast, Maritain based his notion of rights on the natu:rail law, and (...) this phifosophic base can ground a more balanced view of rights, one which can protoot both against those who would assert arbitmry rights without any restraints whatever and against an authoritarian State which would subordinate an individual rights to its requirements. I. Maritain's Notion of the Natural Law For Marita:in, the ultimate groundiing of human rights is in the natural law.1 But just what does he mean by the term "natural law? " It is by no means obvious. Certa:inly from antiquity man has had some gmsp of a narturaJ faw, rthat is, of a law which transcends merely positive law, the law fashioned by men. In!J1an and the State, Maritain cites the case of Antigone, the heroine in Sophocles' pJ.ay of the same name. She breaks a positive faw in giving buriaJl to her brother 'and justifies her act by making an appeal to a law higher than any merely human law. And so she says " Nor did I deem Your ordinance of so much binding force, As that a mortal man could overbear The unchangeable unwritten code of heaven; 1 Les droits de l'homme et la, loi naturclle (New York: Editions de la Maison Frnncaise, Hl42), p. 84. 439 440 THOMAS A. FAY This is not of today and yesterday, But lives forever, having origin Whence no man knows...2 The Stoic philosophers spol{'e of a natural law; so did tnpian in the ancient Roman period, and St. Augus:tine in the early Middle Ages. The se-y;enteenth and eighteenth century saw the classical Law of Nature philosophers, such as Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Benedict Spinoza, and John Locke. And of course, by no means least on our list, there was Thomas Aquinas. Mal11'tain takes Thomas's to be the most perfect statement of natural law. But even here there are certain ambiguities and problems. For example, with 11egard to the "primary " and " seconda,ry" precepts of natural law, the statements of St. Thomas in early work The Commentary On The Sentences are at variance with the vocabulary and the teaiching of the Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94. Maritain attempts to clarify these obscurities by introducing what he rtakes to he the key to Thomas's 1 doctrine of natUl"al law-the notion of knowledge through inclination.3 As Maritain sees it, there are two aspects of natural law, one ontological and the other gnoseologicaL4 The ontological.aspect of natural law means that man has a being-structure which is the locus of inrtelligible necessities, that he possesses ends which necessarily correspond to his essential constitution and which are common to all men. This means that there is, by virtue of human nature itself, an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and accol'lding to which the human will should act if lit is to attain the necessary and essential ends of being human. This order or disposition is what he means by nrutural law. From this it follows that 001y being in nature, be it a tree or a dog or whatevier, has its own na.tural law, which is the normality of its funotioning, the proper way in which, by reason 2 Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 85. s Ibid., p. 91. 4!bill., pp. 85-94. MARITAIN ON RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW 441 of its specific structure and specific ends, it " should " achieve the fullness of its being, The " shou1d " here is not a moral imperative but rather an ontological one, just as we say that a "good" eye" shou1d" be :able to perceive certain objects with clarity at a certain disrtance. But as soon as we enter the realm of free... (shrink)

How one transcends the self depends on the self that experiences it. Is it instigated or sought, does it happen by accident, or by an act of Grace? Is it common or rare? Is it brought on by the ingestion of psychedelic agents or by meditation or by being overcome by fear or merely by caring more about the welfare of others than oneself? Is it transcendence to experience a shift of perspective or dissolution of the self? In the pages (...) that follow, each of these paths is explored in nine ways, each unique unto itself. None of them deal with absolute self-transcendence, which should be no surprise, for, as I’ve indicated, there would no longer a self or person to record or communicate the event. Many of them deal the transcendence of self-consciousness, my own included, but only two describe the ingestion of mind-altering psychedelics to catalyze the event. One sees self-construction from the ground-up, as it were, as a form of transcending a previous self that has disintegrated. One looks to acts of kindness to sidestep the illusion of self-consciousness. Two, at least, look to creative experience in the arts as a way to connect with universal spontaneity, but in very different ways. The others refer to what might be called spiritual experiences that, though thirsted for or sought, arrive unexpectedly, almost like a gift. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the incompatibility of three claims, each of them quite attractive to a theist. First, the doctrine of deep dependence: the universe depends for its existence, in a non-causal way, on God. Second, the doctrine of true transcendence: the universe is wholly distinct from God; God is separate and apart from the universe in respect of mereology, modes, and mentality. Third, the doctrine of robust creaturely freedom: some creature performs some act such that he could (...) have done other than he in fact did. After laying out the claims, I show that their conjunction has its adherents—most clearly, the medieval Jewish philosopher, Maimonides. I then argue in detail that the claims are in fact incompatible. I conclude with a discussion of which of the claims is best jettisoned, drawing in part on the work of the Absolute Idealist, Mary Calkins. (shrink)

The latest news from our planet is threatening: climate change, pollution, forest loss, species extinctions. All these words are frightening and there is no sign of improvement. Simple logic leads to the conclusion that humanity has to react, for its own survival. But at the scale of a human being, it is less obvious. Organizing one’s daily life in order to preserve the environment implies self-questioning, changing habits, sacrificing some comfort. In one word, it is an effort. Then, what justifies (...) such an effort? The personal choice to act in order to preserve our environment is often made by simple altruism. This choice is based on our love for other human beings: our love for the others grounds our effort. Our moral values, our ethical reflections and our religious beliefs are the deep core of these choices. “This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.” (John 15.12 NRSV). This Charter shows the moral and religious values that can help us react regarding the current environmental crisis and it should empower us to transcend the ideas of effort and sacrifice in order to consider the respect of the shared house, in a prophetic fulfillment of the being. (shrink)

Emotional MagicSketch of a phenomenology of emotions in Merleau-PontyHaving more phenomenological and anthropological contours than ontological, this article tries to draw the guidelines of a phenomenology of emotions based on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. In a perspective sometimes very close to Sartre, we wish to stress, in the emotional experience, the conditions of facticity and transcendence in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. If the subject lets itself be seduced by the affective category of the environment, it is only the subject as a phenomenal (...) body that possesses the conditions through which it is able to retrieve itself.La magia emozionaleAbbozzo di una fenomenologia delle emozioni in Merleau-PontyCon contorni più fenomenologici e antropologici che propriamente ontologici, questo articolo intende tracciare le linee principali di una fenomenologia delle emozioni nell’ambito della Fenomenologia della percezione di Merleau-Ponty. Seguendo una linea di riflessione a tratti molto prossima al Sartre di Idee per una teoria delle emozioni, è nostra intenzione porre in rilievo, a partire dall’analisi dell’esperienza emozionale, il pensiero merleau-pontiano riguardo alle condizioni di fatticità e trascendenza. Se, da un lato, il soggetto si lascia affascinare dalle categorie affettive dell’ambiente circostante, dall’altro, soltanto il soggetto stesso, in quanto corpo fenomenico, è in grado di recuperare se stesso. (shrink)