The intra-school controversies in Hanafī school are remarkable. These controversies pose a risk for legal safety and stability and creates difficulties for muqallīd Hanafī judges and muftīs. In the historical process, different types of literature such as mukhtaṣar and fatwa (legal opinion) books, and applications such as aṣṣaḥ-ı aqvāl and maʻrūdhāt, emerged to solve this problem. One of the last example of these applications is the codification movement. The subject of this study is the relationship between the Majalla al-Aḥkām al-ʿAdliyyah, (...) which is the first product of codification based on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and the intra-school preference. In order to describe this relationship, it is briefly emphasized that one of the aims of codification of Majalla is to satisfy the need for intra-school preference. The function and content of Majallaʼs necessary reasons, (asbāb al-mūjiba) was analyzed in terms of intra-school preference. The interventions on the preferences of the Majalla Commission are also emphasized. The Majalla is a text of the intra-school preference. The analysis of its content in relation to intra-school preference is very important. Therefore, in order to reveal what kind of method is used in intra-school preferences and to determine different aspects of intra-school preference in the Majalla, the chapter about ‘sale’ (Kitāb al-Buyūʿ) of the Majalla are examined.Summary: The intra-school controversies in Hanafī School, which is quite important in terms of freedom of ijtihād (independent legal judgment) and legal wealth, possible to threaten legal safety and stability. These controversies also make difficult for judges to reach a judgment or fatwa in controversial affairs. For this reason, determination of the rājiḥ (preferred opinion) in controversial issues in the school, is a need that must be eliminated.The intra-school preference can be described as "to determine the superior, preponderant of different opinion or narrations about a specific issue in the school". In the historical process different types of literature such as mukhtaṣar and fatwa books, and different applications such as asaḥḥ-ı aqvāl and maʻrūzāt, emerged to meet this need. One of the applications aimed to meet this need is the codifications in the last period of the Ottoman State.The relationship between the Majalla al-Ahkam al-Adliyyah, which is the first example of codification based on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and the intra-school preference; and in this context, while preparing the Majalla how a method was followed in the intra-school preference; at what rate be obeyed the rājiḥ (preferred) opinion; articles contrary to the rājiḥ (preferred) opinion in Majalla and their reasons; whether legal arrangements have been made in all controversial issues; at what rate be met the need of determination of rājiḥ (preferred) opinion are the issues that need to be examined.One of the main reasons for the need for a law text such as Majalla al-Ahkam al-Adliyyah is the multitude of the intra-school controversies in Hanafī School. Therefore, the goal of Majalla is to prepare a code that contains rājiḥ opinion.When Majallaʼs necessary reasons, i.e. asbāb al-mūjiba, are examined in terms of the intra-school preference, it is seen that there are two basic functions of necessary reasons. The first of them is, emphasizing that the code is prepared substantially in accordance with the râjih opinion in the school. In fact, that this issue in the asbāb al-mūjiba of the first ten books of Majalla is expressly stated. The other function of the asbāb al-mūjiba is to justify that why rājiḥ opinion are not be confirmed in some article. In the necessary reasons it is stated that twelve articles are prepared in the direction of unrâcih (unpreferable) opinion. Considering that Majalla is formed of 1851 article, it will be better understood that how the rājiḥ opinions are effective in Majalla's content. Essentially, the conditions of the period also make it necessary. The preference of the non-preferred opinion of Züfer (d. 158/775) in 692nd article of Kitāb al-Ḥavala, caused the reaction of some circles mainly Şeyhülislam Hasan Fehmi Efendi (d.1298/1881) and for this reason Ahmet Cevdet Pasa (d.1895) was dismissed from the ministry of Divan al-Ahkâm al-Adliyyah and the chairman of the Majalla Commission.When the asbāb al-mūjibas of contrary articles to rājiḥ opinions are examined, it is seen that maṣlaḥa and customs are determinative in these preferences. It is also seen that the preferences of some jurists are also mentioned as a reason of preference. The most widespread preference’s reason in Hanafī sources is in congruity with the texts. On the contrary, it is noteworthy that, besides the interdiction of extravagant (safih), it is not operated as a preference’s reason in Majalla.Some preferences of the Majalla Commission were intervened by other institutions. The chapters prepared by the commission were examined both by Majlis-i Wukalā and Mashihat, and these chapters were subject to some revisions at this time. Here, two articles prepared on the basis of the non-preferred opinion were intervened by Majlis-i Wukalā. The first of these is 216th article that written in the direction of opinion of Mashāyikh Balkh, which argues that it is permissible to sell separately ḥaqq al-murūr (the right of passage) and ḥaqq al-shirb (water right), the second is the 611th article which regulates the liability to damage of ajīr al-mushtarak (joint salaried employee).When the content of Kitāb al-Buyū, the first and the most voluminous book of Majalla, is examined in terms of the intra-school preference, it is seen that the rājiḥ opinions in the school are generally taken as basis. It is stated that in the asbāb al-mūjiba of the Kitāb al-Buyūʿ the four issues are prepared basing on the non-preferred opinion and these preferences are justified with custom and maṣlaḥa. However, the contrary articles to the rājiḥ opinion in the Kitāb al-Buyūʿ are not limited to these. According to our research, in addition to these, three articles were prepared with the preference of non-preferred opinion. These are the 118th article regarding that the bayʻ bi-l-wafā is permissible in chattels, 165th article on the definition of al-ghabn al-faḥiş (lesion), and the 309th article concerning the provision of the khiyār al-sharṭ (right of cancellation). These three articles show that the regulations contrary to the rājiḥ opinion in Majalla are not just those explained in the asbāb al-mūjiba and this situation is contrary to the method that is followed when preparing the Majalla.In some controversial issues in the Hanafi School, authorized jurists to preference (asḥāb al-tarjīh) disagreed over which opinion is rājiḥ. It wasn’t explained that how a method would be followed in Majalla when the legal arrangements were made in these matters. When these issues are examined, it can be said that the preferences of the majority, the providing of convenience and the preference by some jurists are effective.Preferences in Majalla have not been occurred only among the sharʻī (related to Islamic Law) provisions. In addition, the definitions and the inscription in the definitions are also the subject of preference. In this context, the preferences related to the definition of the sales contract, the suspended contract (al-ʻaqd al-maqqūf) and the al-ghabn al-faḥiş in Kitāb al-Buyūʿ can be mentioned as an example.Some controversial issues in the Hanafi School are not regulated in Majalla. When considering the multiplicity of controversial issues and therefore the difficulty of making legal arrangements to cover all of them, this situation is natural. Moreover, some of these issues may not have been regulated in Majalla because they are not frequent and necessary. However, it is not possible to explain all the controversial issues that have not been regulated for these reasons. Because some of the controversial issues that have not been legislated are basic, relatively important issues and they are included in the mukhtaṣars. This indicates that when preparing the Majalla, instead of making preference on some controversial issues, the method of non-regulation of these matters is adopted. It can be said that this method is applied as a way of creating law text which is clear of controversy. Thus, the determining of the rājiḥ opinion in these matters has been left to the judges. This situation is not suitable to meet the need of determining the rājiḥ opinion, which is the goal of Majalla. But it is the result of the difficulty of making a law that encompasses all legal issues. (shrink)

Mezheplerin teşekkül etmeye başladığı ilk dönemlerden itibaren istihsanın bir istidlal yöntemi olup olmadığı tartışılagelmiştir. Bu tartışmaların temelinde kavramsallaşma sürecini henüz tamamlamamış olan istihsan teriminin çağrıştırdığı keyfiliğin/sübjektivitenin etkisi çok fazladır. Bu yüzden istihsanı bir yöntem olarak benimseyenler, ağır ithamlara maruz kalmışlardır. İstihsanı benimseyenlerin başında Hanefî hukukçular gelmektedir. Öyle ki istihsan yöntemi Hanefî mezhebiyle anılır hale gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte mezhebin önde gelen temsilcilerinden biri olan ve kıyas metodunu kullanmasıyla ön plana çıkan Züfer b. Hüzeyl’in istihsana yaklaşımıyla ilgili iki farklı yaklaşım tespitedilmiştir. Yaptığımız (...) araştırma ve inceleme neticesinde her iki tespitinde isabetli olmadığını; Züfer b. Hüzeyl’inkıyas yapmadaki becerisinin yanı sıra istihsana müracaatta sonuna kadar kıyas taraftarı olduğunu; ancak kıyasın meselelere çözüm üretmede yetersiz kaldığı ya da doğru sonuç vermediği durumlarda ise ızdırârın da bir gereği olarak meseleyi hükümsüz bırakmama adına istihsana müracaat ettiği görülmektedir. Sonuç olarak Züfer b. Hüzeyl’in genel hatlarıyla Hanefî usulüne bağlı kalmakla birlikte istihsanı bir istidlâl yöntemi olarak kullanma hususunda çerçeveyi oldukça daralttığını; kıyasa başvurma konusunda ise sınırları mümkün olduğunca geniş tuttuğunu söylemek mümkündür. İctihad hürriyeti ve hukûkî zenginlik açısından oldukça önemli olan Hanefi mezhebindeki mezhep içi ihtilaflar, hukûkî istikrar ve emniyeti tehdit etme potansiyeli taşımakta ve ayrıca ihtilaflı meselelerde hüküm veya fetva verecek fakihlerin işini zorlaştırmaktadır. Bu nedenle mezhep içerisindeki ihtilaflı meselelerde râcih görüşü tespit etmek, diğer bir ifadeyle mezhep içi tercih, zorunlu bir ihtiyaçtır. Mezhep içi tercih, “muayyen bir mesele ile ilgili mezhepteki muhtelif kavil veya rivayetlerden daha ağır basanı, üstün olanı belirlemek” şeklinde tarif edilebilir. Tarihi süreçte bu ihtiyacı karşılamak için muhtasar ve fetva kitapları gibi farklı telif türleri; esahh-ı akvâl ve maʻrûzât gibi farklı uygulamalar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu ihtiyacı gidermeyi hedefleyen uygulamalardan biri de Osmanlı Devleti’nin son dönemindeki kanunlaştırmalardır. Fıkha dayalı kanunlaştırmanın ilk örneği olan Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye ile mezhep içi tercih arasındaki ilişki ve bu bağlamda Mecelle hazırlanırken, mezhep içi tercihte nasıl bir usûl izlendiği; râcih görüşe ne oranda uyulduğu; Mecelleʼde yer alan râcih görüşe aykırı kanun maddeleri ve bunların gerekçeleri; ihtilaflı bütün konularda düzenleneme yapılıp yapılmadığı ve râcih görüşleri belirleme ihtiyacının ne kadar giderildiği, incelenmesi gereken konulardır. Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye gibi bir kanun metnine ihtiyaç duyulmasının temel nedenlerinden birisi, Hanefî mezhebinde mezhep içi ihtilafların çokluğudur. Buna bağlı olarak Mecelleʼnin hedefi râcih görüşler içeren oluşan bir kanun hazırlamaktır. Mecelle’nin esbâb-ı mûcibeleri mezhep içi tercih açısından incelendiğinde, esbâb-ı mûcibelerin iki temel işlevi olduğu görülür. Bunlardan ilki, kanunun büyük oranda mezhepteki râcih görüşlere uygun olarak hazırlandığını vurgulamaktır. Öyle ki, Mecelle’nin ilk on kitabının esbâb-ı mûcibelerinde bu husus mutlaka ifade edilmektedir. Esbâb-ı mûcibelerin diğer işlevi ise niçin bazı maddelerde râcih görüşe riayet edilmediğini gerekçelendirmektir. Esbâb-ı mûcibelerde on iki maddenin râcih olmayan görüş doğrultusunda hazırlandığı belirtilmektedir. Mecelleʼnin 1851 maddeden oluştuğu göz önünde tutulduğunda Mecelleʼnin muhtevasında râcih görüşlerin ne kadar etkili olduğu daha iyi anlaşılacaktır. Esasen devrin özelliği de bunu zorunlu kılmaktadır. Zira Kitâbüʼl-Havâlenin 692. maddesinde Züferʼin râcih olmayan görüşünün tercih edilmesi, başta Şeyhülislam Hasan Fehmi Efendi olmak üzere bazı çevrelerin tepkisine neden olmuş ve bu sebeple Ahmet Cevdet Paşa Divân-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliyye nâzırlığından ve Mecelle Komisyonu başkanlığından azledilmiştir. Râcih görüşe aykırı maddelerin esbâb-ı mûcibeleri incelendiğinde, bu yöndeki tercihlerde maslahat ve örfün belirleyici olduğu görülmektedir. Ayrıca bazı fakihlerin tercihlerinin de bir tercih sebebi olarak zikredildiği görülmektedir. Hanefi kaynaklarda en sık karşılaşılan tercih sebebi naslara uygunluktur. Buna karşın Mecelleʼde sefîhin hacri konusu dışında, naslara uygunluğun bir tercih sebebi olarak işletilmemesi dikkat çekicidir. Mecelle Komisyonunun bazı tercihlerine diğer kurumlarca müdahale edilmiştir. Komisyonca hazırlanan kitaplar hem Meclis-i Vükelâ hem de Meşîhat tarafından incelenmiş ve bu esnada bazı tashihlere konu olmuştur. İşte râcih olmayan görüş esas alınarak hazırlanan iki maddeye Meclis-i Vükelâ tarafından müdahale edilmiştir. Bunların birincisi hakk-ı mürur ve hakk-ı şirbin müstakil olarak satımının cevazını savunan Belh Meşâyihinin görüşü doğrultusunda yazılan 216. madde, ikincisi ise ecîr-i müşterekin tazmin sorumluluğunu düzenleyen 611. maddedir. Mecelle’nin ilk ve en hacimli kitabı olan Kitâbüʼl-Büyûʻun muhtevası mezhep içi tercih açısından incelendiğinde, ihtilaflı konularda genelde mezhepteki râcih görüşün esas alındığı görülmektedir. Kitâbüʼl-Büyûʻun esbâb-ı mûcibesinde, dört meselenin râcih olmayan görüş esas alınarak hazırlandığı ifade edilmekte ve bu tercihler örf ve maslahatla gerekçelendirilmektedir. Ancak Kitâbüʼl-Büyûʻdaki râcih görüşe aykırı maddeler bunlarla sınırlı değildir. Bizim araştırmamıza göre bunlara ilaveten üç madde daha râcih olmayan görüş tercih edilerek hazırlanmıştır. Bunlar beyʻ biʼl-vefânın menkullerde cevazına dair 118. madde, gabn-i fâhişin tanımı hakkındaki 165. madde ve şart muhayyerliğinin hükmü ile ilgili 309. maddedir. Bu üç madde, Mecelleʼdeki râcih görüşe aykırı düzenlemelerin sadece esbâb-ı mûcibelerde açıklananlardan ibaret olmadığını göstermektedir ve bu durum Mecelle hazırlanırken izlenen usûle aykırıdır. Hanefi mezhebindeki bazı ihtilaflı meselelerde hangi görüşün râcih olduğu konusunda tercih ehli fakihler ihtilaf etmişlerdir. Bu meselelerde Mecelleʼde düzenleme yapılırken nasıl bir yol izlendiği açıklanmamıştır. Bu meseleler incelendiğinde çoğunluk tarafından tercih edilme, kolaylığı temin etme ve bazı fakihler tarafından tercih edilme gibi hususların etkili olduğu söylenebilir. Mecelleʼdeki tercihler sadece şerʻî hükümler arasında gerçekleşmemiştir. Buna ilaveten tanımlar ve tanımlarda yer alan kayıtlar da tercihe konu olmuştur. Bu kapsamda Kitâbüʼl-Büyûʻdaki beyʻ akdi, mevkûf akid ve gabn-i fâhişin tanımına ilişkin tercihler örnek olarak zikredilebilir. Hanefi mezhebin içerisindeki ihtilaflı bazı meseleler Mecelleʼde düzenlenmemiştir. İhtilaflı meselelerin çokluğu ve dolayısıyla bütün bunları kapsayan bir kanun hazırlamanın zorluğu dikkate alındığında bu durum doğaldır. Ayrıca bu meselelerden bazıları sık gerçekleşmediği ve lüzumlu görülmediği için Mecelleʼde düzenlenmemiş olabilir. Ancak düzenleme yapılmayan ihtilaflı meselelerin tamamını bu sebeplerle izah etmek mümkün değildir. Zira yasal düzenleme yapılmayan ihtilaflı meselelerin bazıları temel, görece önemli meselelerdir ve muhtasarlarda yer almaktadır. Bu durum Mecelle hazırlanırken, ihtilaflı bazı meselelerde tercih yapmak yerine bu meselelere ilişkin düzenleme yapmama metodunun benimsendiğini göstermektedir. İhtilaftan ârî bir kanun metni oluşturmanın bir yolu olarak da bu usûlün benimsendiği söylenebilir. Böylece bu meselelerde râcih görüşü tespit etme işi hâkimlere bırakılmıştır. Bu durum Mecelleʼnin hedefi olan râcih görüşleri tespit etme ihtiyacını gidermeye uygunluk arz etmemektedir. Ancak bu durum bütün meseleleri kuşatan bir kanun yapmanın güçlüğünün bir sonucudur. (shrink)

Ayetler, ele aldıkları konular itibariyle geniş bir konu yelpazesine sahiptir. Bu konuları ise bazen doğrudan ve yoruma gerek bırakmayacak şekilde bazen de bu netlikte olmadan ortaya koyarlar. Bu durum, ayetle muhatap olan kişinin metni doğru anlamasında belli bir yöntem ve birikime sahip olmasını gerekli kılar. Bu ise muhatabın metni anlama ve yorumlamasında, sahip olduğu bakış açısının etkisini baskın hale getirir. Bu bağlamda ahkâm ayetlerine bakıldığında onların sınırlı ve bazı alanları düzenleyici oldukları görülür. Ayrıca içerdikleri ahkâma dair de çoğu kez (...) farklı yorumlanabilecek bir üslûba sahiptirler. Bu durum, onları anlamaya çalışan fukaha için bir taraftan geniş bir yorum sahası açarken diğer taraftan yapılan yorumda hesabı verilebilirlik unsurunu öne çıkartır. Bu zeminde ahkâma dair ayetler, fakihler tarafından çeşitli yorumlara tabi tutulmuştur. Ayetlerden hüküm çıkarmaya çalışan bu ilim adamları, çeşitli etkenler altında bu ameliyeyi gerçekleştirmişlerdir. Bu etkenlerden bir tanesi de takip edilen amelî mezheptir. Bu makale, ahkâm tefsirlerinin ilklerine sahip olan, bununla birlikte farklı fıkhî mezheplere tabi bulunan üç fakih-müfessir üzerinden meselenin bu veçhesine eğilmektedir. Bu sayede mevcut etkinin varlığı, ne boyutta olduğu gibi hususlarda bir fikir elde edilebilecektir. (shrink)

Majalla al-Aḥkam al-‘Adliyyah, which is the first example of codification based on Islamic law, has been the subject of criticism from different angles in terms of its preparation and content. The main reasons for criticism are following the casuistic method, being limited to the Hanafi sect, and therefore, the regulations on some issues not meeting the needs of the period, and the lack and excesses that do not comply with the content of the civil law. The commentator of the Majalla, (...) ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi, also criticized Majalla from different angles. In this study, it was aimed to identify, describe, and classify Ali Ḥaydar Efendi's critics of the Majalla, and -with some exceptions- no evaluation was made about the criticism of the commentator. Ali Ḥaydar Efendi, the author of the most comprehensive and famous commentary of the Majalla, Dureru'l-hukkâm, criticized the Majalla both in terms of law technique and content, justified his criticisms, and offered alternative suggestions regarding the issues he criticized. Although Ali Ḥaydar Efendi criticized an item for only one reason, he criticized some items from more than one point of view. In the article, each of the criticisms of Ali Ḥaydar Efendi on the Majalla’s items is discussed under a separate heading, and the items criticized from more than one point of view are discussed under a separate heading and exemplified as much as possible. His criticisms of the Majalla in terms of law technique are as follows: The statements of the items are prone to making wrong judgments, not of a general nature, the concepts are not used appropriately, both the concepts and the items are not compatible with each other and with the fiqh books, having some missing, unnecessary or incorrect statements in the items, and the lack of records in the statements. Among the criticisms made in terms of content, first of all, the fact that the provision contained in the article is contrary to the ruling in the fiqh books or the view of the sect should be mentioned. Some of the criticisms in terms of content are related to the preferences made while preparing the Majalla. In this context, it has been the subject of criticism that some of the preferred views are not suitable for the needs of the period or the preferred view in the madhhab, conflicting between preferences from time to time, and not making a choice in some controversial issues. The existence of provisions that do not comply with the requirements of the time, and the asl-far' incompatibility is another reason for criticism. In such criticisms, the suitability of the content of the law with the madhhab books in various aspects has been tried to be revealed, and inappropriate aspects have been criticized. However, ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi also pointed out that the text of the law should be prepared by making use of the provisions of different madhhabs, since it does not meet the needs of the time, although it is in accordance with the provisions of the madhhab. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi also criticized the Majalla in terms of missing some issues or not being regulated sufficiently, and included provisions regarding the qarḍ contract and crimes against animals, which were not dealt with even though they should have been included in the Majalla. However, he never touched upon the subjects of consumption and ribā, which were not dealt with in the Majalla, although they should have been. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi said that there is a deficiency in the items dealing with subjects such as luqata and hacr, since some conditions regarding these issues are not included. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi also criticizes the Majalla in terms of the contradiction between the provisions contained in the items; the lack of unity in language, style and terminology among the items; and unnecessary repetitions both between the items and within the items. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi, who did not make any criticism about the repetitions due to the fact that the Majalla was prepared with the casuistic method, justified or criticized the other repetitions and offered suggestions to avoid such repetitions. Also, according to him, there are deliberate repetitions in the Majalla. In addition, he also criticized the Majalla from a systematic point of view, such as the incompatibility of the title and content, the arrangement of similar subjects in different chapters/items/paragraphs, or the handling of different subjects in the same chapter/item/paragraph. Another criticism of ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi about the Majalla is about definitions. He criticizes the definitions made as not being collectively exhaustive, mutually exclusive and not being in the definition technique such as the tautology, but also on the grounds that it is not comprehensive, contrary to the method followed in other definitions made in the Majalla, and not being included in the fiqh books. (shrink)

Bu çalışma, Türkiye’deki Şer’i yönetişim aktörlerinden olan banka içi danışma komitelerinin Şer’i yönetişimdeki yeri ve önemini keşfetmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu minvalde nitel araştırma desenlerinden olan durum çalışması tercih edilmiş ve 5 danışma komitesi üyesi ve 2 danışma komitesi başkanıyla yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlar gerçekleştirilmiştir. Mülakatlar neticesinde toplam 625 dakikalık ses kayıtları elde edilerek çözümlenmiş ve 85 sayfalık metin elde edilmiştir. Elde edilen metinler ve görüşme notları ATLAS.ti programı aracılığıyla analiz edilerek BİDK, Şer’i yönetişim ve Merkezi Danışma Kurulu olmak üzere 3 ana tema (...) ve bunlara bağlı 26 alt temaya ulaşılmıştır. İlgili temalar BİDK’nin Türkiye’deki Şer’i yönetişimdeki yeri ve önemini keşfetmek açısından zengin bir içerik sunmaktadır. Türkiye’deki Şer’i yönetişimi ele alan çalışmaların literatürde sınırlı olması ve bu çalışmanın hem saha çalışmasına hem de Türkiye’deki Şer’i yönetişimde yer alan, katılım bankacılığının tarihine eş bir ömre sahip BİDK’ları konu etmesi literatürde özgün bir yere sahip olacağına işaret etmektedir. Islamic finance has developed the Shariah governance mechanism to ensure compliance and control of IFIs with the principles of Islamic law. However, the levels of Shariah governance are different from each other due to the different legal affiliations of each country, the level of development of Islamic finance, and regime differences. International Islamic financial institutions such as Islamic Financial Services Board and The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions have published standards to define the general lines of Shariah governance and have brought Shariah governance practices to a certain point, at least in principle. After the Shariah governance standards of IFSB and AAOIFI, studies on Shariah governance have increased rapidly. By 2010, while there were only 18 publications on Shariah governance in the two most well-known indexes, this number increased to 42 in 2015 and 159 in 2020. This academic interest shows that Shariah governance issues are followed closely. In this context, there have been some remarkable developments at the regulatory and supervisory level in terms of Shariah governance in Turkey, and the TKBB Advisory Board was established in 2018, bringing one step closer to international Shariah governance practices. (shrink)

The Hanafi Sect was the first among the fiqh sects that completed its formation and codification. Abu Hanifa, the founding imam of the sect, raised many students. His most prominent students were Abu Yusuf, Muhammed al-Shaybani and Zufar. While teaching his students, Abu Hanifa created a free environment and was pleased that his students adopted opposing views to his. Accordingly, different views emerged among the imams in question for reasons such as interpreting the texts, taking into account the changes in (...) customs and time, and approaching the issues from different perspectives. After the death of Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf served as a kadi, i.e. a judge. Muhammad al-Shaybani played an important role in the formation of the sect. Zakat is one of the subjects where different opinions and disagreements occurred among the imams of the madhhab, or sect. Hanafi books exhibited different approaches in revealing these differences of opinion. For example, there were jurists who mentioned and discussed their differences of opinion in detail, as in Ka-sana’s work Bedai al-sanai fi tertib al-sharai, as well as in Mawsili’s work el-Ihtiyar li-talil al-Muhtar. There were also jurists who took a middle way on the subject. In this study, the differences of opinion of the sect imams Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf, Muhammed al-Shaybani and Zufar on zakat will be explained based on the book al-Hidaye by Burhaneddin al-Merginani, which is one of the most popular books of the Hanafi sect. However, the commentaries of al-Hidaye and the books of the sect on fiqh will also be consulted occasionally. In this study, the subjects that are considered more important than the others in regard to the fiqh of zakat will be analyzed. (shrink)

Money, the most important element of economic life, has attracted the attention of many branches of science throughout history. As a result, various disciplines have examined the issue of money and made some determinations about it. One of the disciplines that deals with the money issue is jurisprudence. Jurisprudence has examined the position of money vis-à-vis commodities and other currencies and has tried to establish a fair and just relationship between them. Islamic jurists have also dealt with the legal status (...) of money and discussed the conceptual framework of money in legal terms. The monetary value of gold and silver is accepted in Islamic law and a verdict has been reached on this acceptance. However, there is divergence of opinion on the legal status of the counterfeit money that has been used by many societies and states in history. While Abū Ḥanīfa and, according to one opinion, Abū Yūsuf accepted that fals (coin) are not money, Muḥammad maintained that fals are money. As in many areas of law, sales and debt contracts are also judged according to this assumption. However, if we look at the details of Abū Yūsuf's opinion, we see that some of the contracts accept the monetary value of fals. So, if we assume that we lend 1000 Turkish Liras (TL) with today's coins - according to Abū Ḥanīfa - it means that in case the lent money is withdrawn from circulation, the money should be paid back according to the the weight of the coins that made 1000 TL. Regardless of the weight of the 1000 TL, Abū Yūsuf says that the value of 1000 TL should be repaid. In this case, Abū Yūsuf considers the monetary aspect of these coins. Therefore, it can be stated that there are some differences in the details of the view that counterfeits are accepted as absolute goods in the Hanafi school, and the monetary aspect of counterfeits is also present. Imam Muḥammad dealt with the trade of coins in a special section and examined the position of coins vis-à-vis various goods. He stated several times in this section that fals are in the position of dīnārs and dirhams (gold and silver coin). While Imam Muḥammad evaluated rock as money, he defended this view in practical terms. Namely, he accepted that one of the important features of coins, denomination by signs, is also present in coins and that one can pay with rocks (fals) other than the coin shown in the purchase. However, it should be noted that the coins to be paid must be in circulation. Likewise, the company, salam (forward sale), etc. assumes the monetary value of the rock (fals) and has decided accordingly. There is no complete consensus on this issue within the Ḥanafi tradition. Although in the early works the views of Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf dominate, one sees that in the later works the view of Imam Muḥammad is preferred. This view was also preferred in the recent Medjelle. In commercial life, goods are essential and money is used as a means of transportation for goods. Therefore, it should not be disregarded that money as a means of measuring value is based on the acceptance of people, regardless of what metal it is made of. Therefore, the monetary nature of the goods used as money by society should be accepted. In fact, the Medjelli-yi Aḥkām-i ʻAdliyye, which was established on the basis of the Ḥanafi school, accepted that fals are money and introduced laws in this direction in some areas of the Islamic law. Opinions in this direction have been expressed in some studies written in modern times. In this study, firstly, information about the structure of the fals and their use in Islamic history is given. Then, the Ḥanafi School founding scholars’ assessments of fals are discussed theoretically. In the following section, the disagreements of the Ḥanafi imams in some areas of law are practically examined. (shrink)

Ḥanafī scholars resorted to various methods such as abrogation (naskh), specification (takhṣīṣ), preference, (tarjīh) interpretation (taʾwīl) in order to eliminate the incompatibility between the views of the founding authorities of the madhab (ashāb) and the nass (verses and hadiths). According to the famous narration attributed to Abu’l-Hasan al-Karkhī (d. 340/952), one of the Iraqī Ḥanafī scholars, it is thought that the nass contradicting the views of the madhhab scholars are abrogated, or that other evidence is preferred over them, but it (...) is more appropriate to reconcile and interpret them. However, this approach adopted by the Hanafīs has brought some criticism and accusations that the views of the madhab scholars are prioritized over the nass or that these were ignored in the face of their views. On the other hand, the discourse that the views of the madhab scholars should be preferred in case of incompatibility between the views of theirs and the nass, seems problematic and in need of explanation at first glance. Due to the reason mentioned, these statements, which reveal the general attitude of Ḥanafīs, need to be explained theoretically. In this study, firstly, the Hanafīs’ justifications for adopting this approach are discussed, and then it is seen that this does not mean “the nass is ignored or the views of the jurists are prioritized” as it is claimed. (shrink)

Çocuk evliliği, tarih boyunca farklı toplumlarda bilinen ve uygulanan sosyal bir olgu olsa da son zamanlarda, modern duyarlılıkları giderek daha fazla rahatsız eden bir hal almıştır. Son iki asır öncesine kadar, Avrupa hukuki düşüncesinde çocuklar yargı önünde farklı bir muamele görmelerine imkan veren istisnai bir statüye sahip değildi. Diğer taraftan, İslam hukukunun çocuklara, özel bir hukuki statü kazandırma konusunda bazı öncü adımlar attığını söyleyebiliriz. Nitekim, en eski İslam hukuku kitaplarının bile, insanın fiziksel ve zihinsel gelişim aşamalarına ve her (...) bir aşamada ortaya çıkan hukuki hükümlere dair son derece teknik ayrıntılarla dolu olduğunu görebiliriz. Ancak çocuk hakları konusundaki bu erken farkındalığa rağmen, çocuk evliliği olgusu hem İslam toplumlarında hem de İslam hukukunda kendini gösterebilmiştir. Çünkü, İslam çocuk hukuku, ilk ortaya çıktığı dönemin kültürel şartlarından ciddi şekilde etkilenmiştir. Üstelik bu kültürel şartlar, İslam dünyası boyunca İslam çocuk hukukunun temel zemini olma işlevini sürdüre gelmiştir. Bu çalışma, alimlerin çocuk evliliğini delillendirmek üzere yapageldikleri bazı aşırı yorumları ortaya koymaya ve konuyla ilgili âyetleri metinsel bağlamıyla daha uyumlu bir şekilde okumaya çalışmaktadır.Özet: Her bağlam için geçerli olabilecek, standart bir çocuk tanımı yapmak göründüğünden daha güçtür. Bu nedenle çocuk araştırmaları sahasında çalışan akademisyenlerin, muhtelif sosyal disiplinler tarafından yapılacak herhangi bir çocuk tarifi konusunda memnuniyetsizlik içinde olması doğaldır. Diğer yandan, İslam hukukunda baştan beri ayrıntılı bir çocuk hukuku teorisi mevcuttur. İslam hukuk düşüncesinde, insanlar doğum ile yetişkinlik arasındaki gelişim döneminde üç aşamadan geçerler: Çocukluk (küçüklük), buluğ ve rüşt. Bütün fıkıh mezhepleri, insanın doğumu ile ergenliği arasındaki dönemde küçük çocuk sayılacağı kanaatindedirler. Bu çocukların mallarının en iyi şekilde idare edilebilmesi için yasal temsilcileri bulunmak zorundadır. Fakîhler çocuğun velisinin, özellikle de baba veya baba tarafından dedenin, velâyeti altındaki küçük çocuklar üzerinde mücbir bir yetkisi olduğu (velâyet-i mücbire) konusunda geniş bir fikir birliğine sahiptirler. Buna göre veliler, velâyetleri altında bulunan çocukları uygun gördükleri kişilerle evlendirme yetkisine de sahiptirler. Fakat zaman zaman beşik kertmesi olarak da anılan bu uygulama bir ön sözleşmeden ibarettir. Yani bu sözleşme doğrudan doğruya fiziksel boyutları da olan müşterek bir evlilik hayatını meşru kılmamaktadır. Çünkü cinsel hayatın ancak buluğdan sonra gerçekleşmesi ön görülmektedir. Modernite öncesi İslam tarihi boyunca, İbn Şubrume (ö. 144/761), Ebû Bekr el-Esamm (ö. 200/816) ve Osman el-Bettî (ö. 143/760) gibi bir kaç fakih dışında küçük çocukların evlenmesine kategorik olarak karşı çıkan kimselere pek rast gelinmemektedir.Hanefi mezhebinde, herhangi bir zihinsel özrü olmaksızın buluğa eren erkek ve kız çocuklar evlilik konusunda mücbir velâyetin kapsamı dışına çıkarlar. Bu, evlilik sözleşmelerini bizzat gerçekleştirebilecekleri anlamına gelmektedir. Fakat veli, uygunsuz bulduğu evliliğe karşı dava açarak bunu yargı yoluyla geçersiz kılma yoluna gidebilir. Diğer üç Sunnî mezhep ise erkek ve kız çocuklar arasında bir ayrım yapar: Buluğa eren erkek kendi evlilik akdini yapabilme hakkını elde ederken aynı durumdaki kız çocuklar velâyet altında kalmaya devam ederler. Şâfiʿî mezhebine göre, velâyeti gerekli kılan illet (bekaret) hâlâ geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Dolayısıyla veli, kızları evlendirme konusundaki icbâri yetkisini elinde tutmaya devam etmektedir. Bu durumda kızın rızasının alınması, akdin geçerliliği için şart olmaktan ziyade sadece nezaket gereğidir. Rüşte ulaşmak veya fizyolojik olgunlaşma sürecini tamamlamak ise İslam hukukunda evlilik için şart görülmemiştir.Modern zamanlara kadar geleneksel İslam hukukunun erken evlilik lehinde gösterdiği bu yaklaşımda herhangi bir değişiklik olmamıştır. 1917 yılında çıkan Hukuk-ı Aile Kararnamesi daha önce benzeri görülmemiş bir dizi düzenleme getirmiştir: İlk olarak, evlilik yaşı erkek için on sekiz kız için ise on yedi olarak belirlenmiştir. On sekiz yaşın altındaki erkeklerin hakimden evlenme izni alması; on yedi yaşından küçük kızların ise hem veli onayı hem de hakim iznine sahip olması zorunlu hale getirilmiştir. On iki yaşın altındaki erkekler ile dokuz yaşından küçük kızların ise asla evlendirilemeyeceği kararlaştırılmıştır.Mantıkî bağlam ve sentaktik yapı elverişli olmamasına rağmen fakihler çocuk evliliğini desteklemek üzere bazı Kur’ân âyetlerine (Nisâ 4/3-6, Nisâ 4/127, Talâk 65/4) referansta bulunmuşlardır. Makale içeriğinde detaylı şekilde açıklandığı üzere zorlama yorumlamalarda bulunmuşlardır. Bu makale, söz konusu âyetlere daha tutarlı bir yorum getirmeye çalışmaktadır. Aynı şekilde, Kur’an’ın çocuk evliliğini kolaylaştırıcı bir tavır içerisinde olmadığını, çocukların evlendirilebilmesi yönündeki yaklaşımların tarihsel ve kültürel şartlara bağlı olarak yapılan bazı zorlama yorumlara dayandığını ileri sürmektedir.Hz. ʿÂişe’nin Hz. Peygamber ile oldukça erken bir yaşta evlendiğine dair nakledilen rivâyet de konuyla ilgili olarak ileri sürülen başka bir argümandır. Bu rivâyetin sahih olduğuna inanılmaktadır. Buna rağmen ilginç bir şekilde bu rivâyet çok az fakih tarafından kullanılmıştır. Bunun sebebi, fakîhlerin Hz. Peygamberin mahremiyetinden bahsetmek istememeleri olabilir. Rivâyetin hücciyeti konusuna kuşkuya kapılmış olmaları da mümkündür. Söz konusu rivâyete daha yakından bakıldığında, ifadedeki menfi üslup hemen dikkat çekmektedir. Çünkü rivâyette Hz. ʿÂişe, Hz. Peygamberle evlendiği günü anlatırken sürekli olarak fizyolojik ve psikolojik açıdan olumsuz koşullardan bahsetmektedir. Nitekim Hz. ʿÂişe birden bire oynamakta olduğu salıncaktan alınmakta ve kendisinin de bilmediği bir yere doğru götürülmektedir. Rivâyet, sadece çocuk evliliğinin cevazını ortaya koymakla yetinmemekte, sanki aynı zamanda çocukların uygunsuz koşullardaki evlilik taleplerine bile itaatkar olmaları gerektiğini salık vermektedir. İçerik yanında teknik olarak bakıldığında bu rivâyet, haber-i vâhiddir. Çünkü rivâyet, sadece Hz. ʿÂişe tarafından bilinebilecek detayları içermektedir. Tarihî açıdan bir öneme sahip olmasına rağmen dinî hükümlere kanıt olma niteliğinden yoksundur. Çünkü bu rivâyette, râvi konuyla ilgili Hz. Peygamber’e ait resmi bir açıklamayı nakletmemekte; sadece kendi zaviyesinden maruz kaldığı bir durumdan bahsetmektedir. (shrink)

In Islamic theological writings, under the heading of sustenance, the focus is generally on issues such as who is the provider of sustenance, whether haram is considered sustenance, and whether Allah’s consent exists for haram sustenance. Another issue that can be found between the lines of the subject of sustenance is whether it is haram for a person to work for sustenance or not. In fact, the pursuit of means of livelihood in order to sustain one’s life is, according to (...) the general and predominant acceptance of Muslim scholars, permissible and, in cases of necessity, wajib. According to a record in Uṣūl al-niḥal, during the formative period of itizālī thought, there were Mu‘tazilite sufis (ṣūfiyyat al-Muʿtazila) such as Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir’s disciple Abū Imrān Mūsā b. al-Raqqāshī, al-Naẓẓām’s apostate disciple Fadl al-Hadathī, and Husayn al-Kūfī, about whom no information is available. These names, who seem to have earned their livelihood through almsgiving, defended the forbiddenness (taḥrīm al-makāsib) of all kinds of endeavour for sustenance, contrary to the acceptance of Muslim thinkers. However, it should be noted that for them, the forbiddenness in making an effort for sustenance does not cover the definition of sustenance, which is ‘all the benefits’, but only the effort in obtaining sustenance through means such as trade and agriculture. It is interesting to find such an extreme tendency among the Mu‘tazilites, who came to the fore with their rationalist discourses. “How could a Mu‘tazilite defend tahrīm al-makāsib?”, the issue of abandonment of striving for sustenance (tark al-makāsib), from which the idea of tahrīm al-makāsib is thought to have evolved, is mentioned, and then the Mu‘tazilite sufis views on tahrīm al-makāsib are tried to be based mainly on Mu‘tazilite sources and the criticisms of Mu‘tazilite authors against them are included. It has been determined that Mu‘tazilite sufis justifications for defending tahrīm al-makāsib concentrate on three points: (i) the absence of a just order due to the absence of a just imam and the possibility of supporting the oppressors (rulers) intentionally or unintentionally, and as a result of this, some of them describe the land of Islam as dār al-kufr, (ii) again in relation to the issue of imamate, in an environment where there is no justice, i.e. legal/moral order, the halāl and harām are so intertwined that they cannot be separated from each other, and in order to protect oneself from harām, the things that are subject to sustenance can only be purified through charity and become halāl, and (iii) the fact that trust in Allah is obligatory and any effort to pursue sustenance is contrary to tawakkul. The Mu‘tazilite authors criticised the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib on the grounds that it is permissible to trade while maintaining a rational and ethical attitude, that one’s intention and interest in trade are important, and that tawakkul cannot be built on the right ground. As a result, the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib disappeared because they could not gain a foothold in the Mu‘tazilite intellectual climate due to their erroneous reasoning. (shrink)

The sciences of kalam and fiqh, which have a special importance in the history of Islamic thought and science, became prominent with their interactions with other sciences in their formation processes and their contributions to the evolution of religious thought. In the literature, the field representing the linguistic, religious, mental and practical aspects of fiqh has become widespread with the concepts of usūl-i fiqh and fürū-i fiqh, and the part about creed as usūlü'd-dīn or fiqhu'l-akbar. It has drawn our attention (...) that Imam Abū Ḥanīfa and Imam Shāfiʿī's ijtihads, fatwas and thoughts have remained up to date in every century without exception in the vortex of overdoing and understatement in these two disciplines. However, there are some narrations stating that although these imams were interested in kalam, they kept a distance from it. Their, famous students also indicated that they gave them advice in this sense. Therefore, this study has been prepared in order to examine the background of the aforementioned issues. For this purpose, the reasons why two imams preferred the science of fiqh in the main axis of the subject were subjected to a general criticism. Consequently, it has been seen that both imams had similar concerns and their ideas have been overlapping in the face of the creed developments of the period. (shrink)

The work named Fusûlü'l-İmadî, which belongs to Ebü'l-Feth Zeynüddîn el-İmadî, the grandson of Burhaneddin el-Mergînânî, the owner of the famous Hidaye, which includes the subjects of Fürû-i Fiqh and the law of trial, has been one of the main works that has been applied by influencing many mufti, kadi and jurists, especially the Ottoman sheikhs. The work is also important in terms of being a source for many fatawa and fürû-i fiqh works. The fact that the work written in the (...) Fergana region is one of the main sources referenced both in the Ottoman geography and in other Muslim geographies also shows that the work is valuable. In this study, by pointing out the importance and value of the work, it was tried to determine the contribution of the work to the Ottoman period fetâvâ mecmuas and Hanafi fiqh literature. In the study, the life of Ebü'l-Feth Zeynüddîn el-İmadî was mentioned, and his work Fusûlü'l-İmadî was examined in detail. The contribution of the Ottoman Fetvâhâne, which uses Fusûlü'l-İmadî as a source, to some of the fetâva works, which are accepted as one of the most respected fetâva journals, is discussed and some quotations from the work are included with their examples. In addition, the contribution of the work to the Hanafi fiqh literature was examined on the basis of some fürû-i fiqh works of the Ottoman period and the work called Mir'ât-ı Mecelle. Thus, by pointing out the importance of Fusûlü'l-İmadî and his contribution to the literature of fiqh and fatwa, this work was drawn attention to new studies. (shrink)

Sunnah is the second main source for Islamic law following the Qur’ān. Sunnah in the books on the Methodology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) is examined in two main parts, one of which is as the source for religious commands and the other is being as religious/taklīfī commands. Sunnah is divided into three categories in terms of being the source for Islamic commands: qawlī (verbal), fi‘ilī (behavioral) and taqrīrī (approval). In the Islamic literature, when the word “sunnah” is mentioned, first (...) of all, it is understood as a verbal appeal, which is qawlī sunnah (hadith). Verbal sunnah has a rhetoric/wording that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). And ultimately to the wording of this verbal address, some religious commands, such as farḍ/wājib, sunnah/mandūb, and permissible/mubāḥ are attributed. The behavioral sunnah (the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad), on the other hand, does not have a rhetoric that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). The command/judgment is based on rhetoric. In other words, if there is an address, there is a command; if there is no address, there is no command/judgment. Therefore, it is problematic that the acts of the Prophet are decreed in the form of farḍ/ wājib, sun-nah/mandūb and mubāḥ. For this reason, the acts of the Prophet in the books on the Method-ology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) have been particularly examined under the title of Afʿāl al-Rasūl. While some of the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad have a religious character, some of them are the acts that he performed completely in accordance with the customs and traditions in the society he lived in. Therefore, not all of the Prophet’s deeds/acts (behavioral sunnah) are at the same level in terms of obligation. Therefore, while some of the acts/deeds of the Prophet express wucūb, some other mandūb (sunnah-mustaḥab) and still some other ibāhā/mubāḥ. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad, in terms of being the source of religious commands, are divided into two categories: the tashrīī (religiously) qualified and non tashrīī (religiously) qualified. What is meant by a religious act is the actions of the Prophet, which he performed as being a prophet, for the purpose of worshiping and that he wanted his followers act accordingly. What is meant by a non-religious act is the behavior of the Prophet as a human being or as a requirement of the society he lived in. Sunnah, in terms of being a religious com-mand, refers to commands other than fard and wājib. Ḥanafī scholars are of the opinion that sunnah as a religious decree is divided into two parts as sunnah-i hudā and sunnah-i zawāid. The acts of the Prophet, in accordance with his being a human or the custom of the society he lived in, are included in the scope of sunnah zawāid. In other words, sunnah zawāid generally means the actions of the Prophet that he did not do with the intention of worship. In this con-text, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad are important. Because, the acts of the Prophet are not the same in terms of qualification (command), nor are they the same in terms of their nature (being religious or humanly natural). The acts of the Prophet Muḥammad with a religious nature are divided into two as known qualities and unknown qualifications. In principle, the religious acts of the Prophet, whose qualities are known, are also obligation for the ummah (Muslims). Therefore, when it is known for what purpose the Prophet Muḥammad made a deed/behavior, that act is accordingly is binding for the ummah (Muslims). Accordingly, if the attribute of a deed/behavior made by the Prophet is wājib/farḍ, it is also wājib for the ummah and permissible (ibāḥā) for the ummah if it is permissible. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet in the Qur’ān as a mujmal (ambiguous nass /verse) are also subject to the command of mujmal. There is a dispute regarding the verdict of the Prophet’s acts of religious nature whose qualifications are unknown. According to the majority of Hanafī scholars, what is essential in the actions of the Prophet whose qualifications are unknown and that contain the characteris-tics of worship, is that it is mustahab/mandūb. According to Kerkhī (d. 340/952), what is es-sential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. Jassās (d.370 / 980) expresses the same opinion with Kerkhī. Opinions on this issue are conveyed from Imām Mālik and Imām Shafiī that he declared permissibility. The preferred opinion in Hanbalis is to declare permissibility. Non-religious acts of the Prophet Muḥammad as a human being or as per the custom of the society he lives in are not obligation for the ummah. Therefore, what is essential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. (shrink)

The scholars of Ahl as-Sunnah, who are united in the view that sin will not nullify faith and other good deeds, dissented from opinion on the status of the deeds of the person who converted to Islam after his apostasy, in the first Muslim period. In general, Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs argued that those deeds would be in vain with direct apostasy, while Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs also stipulated death for this purpose, and claimed that a person's previous deeds would not be lost with apostasy alone. (...) Comprehensive interpretations on this issue have found a place for itself mostly in tafsir rather than disciplines such as kalam, fiqh and usûl. Here, while Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs grounds on verse 5/5 of the Surah al-Ma’idah, which only mentions that deeds will be in vain through apostasy; Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs is based on verse 2/217 of Surah al-Baqarah, which connects this futility to death as apostasy. The parties made different inferences against each other over the relevant verses and gave various answers. The most fundamental point of disagreement among these was the question of whether the first verse, which is muṭlaq in terms of usūl, should be attributed to the second verse, which is in the position of muqayyad. While Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs objected to this process with the thought that the conditions for attributing muṭlaq to the muqayyad were not met in the relevant verses, Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs, which took a more flexible stance on this issue, approved this attributing process within the framework of the conditions and accordingly reached their relevant views. When the parties evaluated the relevant verses, they made their explanations mostly in the explanation of the 2/217 verse of the Surah Baqarah, which is prior to the arrangement and is in the position of a muqayyad. Since Shāfiʽī/Ash'arī scholars are already based on the relevant verse, it is quite understandable that the place where they examine the subject is the interpretation of this divine word. Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, on the other hand, examined the issue here in order to respond to the meaning attributed to the verse by Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs. Shafi'i/Ash'aris based their judgments on one of the two verses, Surah Baqara, 2/217, as a requirement of attributing mutlaq to the muqayyad, and in fact, accepted a single verse as a criterion. On the other hand, Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, made separate judgments from both of them, claiming that the conditions for attributing muṭlaq to the muqayyad, were not fulfilled in the two related verses. In this context, they concluded from the first verse that death as apostasy necessitates eternal disappointment, and from the second verse, apostasy absolutely wastes deeds. Here, the most typical result of the separation between the two sects emerges as to whether a person will repeat the pilgrimage, for example, he performed while he was a Muslim when he returns to Islam after apostasy. While the Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs, who thought that deeds will be wasted only by death due to apostasy, did not consider it necessary to go on pilgrimage again, while Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, who thought that deeds will be lost directly with apostasy even if death does not occur, held the person responsible for pilgrimage. In this study, it will be tried to explain the basic intellectual framework of the view advocated by the parties and the background of what kind of criticism they brought to their opponents. (shrink)

"(...) Felsefeye ilişkin Arapça ve Fransızca bazı eserleri mütalaa ettiğim sırada felsefi terimlerin bu iki dilde tesadüf ettiğim karşılıklarını bir mecmuaya kaydetmiştim. Bunların perişan bir halde kalmasına ve sarfettiğim emeğin bu şekilde heder olmasına gönlüm razı olmadı. Gerçekten de bu konuda sarfedilen mesai öyle pek kolay feda edilecek bir şey değildi. Çünkü bu işe en evvel, felsefeyi İbn Bâcce'nin en seçkin öğrencilerinden tahsil etmiş olan meşhur Musevi hakîm Ebû İmrân Musa bin Meymun'un Delâletü'l-Hâirîn başlıklı eserinden başlamış idim. Bu kitap İbrani (...) harfleriyle, Arap dili üzere yazılmış olduğundan felsefeye ait fasıllarının Fransızca tercümesiyle tatbikinde pek ziyade güçlük çekmiş idim. Bu eser Avrupaca Guide des Égarés başlığıyla tanınıp, mütekellimlerin mezhebi hakkında en önemli bilgi kaynağı sayılmıştır. Bunu müteakiben, bir taraftan Aristoteles'in bazı eserlerini ve diğer taraftan İbn Rüşd'ün bunlardan iktibâsen yazdığı Telhîsât'ı, Kütübhâne-i Hidivî'den istinsâh ettirerek mütalaa ettim. Sonra da Şehristânî'nin Kitâbü'l-Milel ve'n-Nihal'i, Zevzenî'nin Muhtasar Târîh-i Hukemâ'sı, Fârâbî ile İbn Sînâ'nın bazı eserleri, Ebû Abdullâh el-Kâtib'in Mefâtîhu'l-Ulûm'u, İbnu'n-Nedîm Bağdâdî'nin Kitâbü'l-Fihrist'i gibi Avrupa'da basılmış birtakım nadir kitapları ve diğer birçok mantık kitaplarını gözden geçirerek, bunlardan her ne buldumsa aldım. Bu şekilde cem ettiğim kelimeler ve tabirler büyücek bir mecmua teşkil etmiş ise de bunlar mantık ve eski felsefeye ait olduğundan yeni terimlerin de karşılıklarını bulmak lazım geldi. Bu noksanı da âcizâne kütüphanemde mevcut lûgat kitaplarından Fransız ve İngiliz ve Arap ve Fars dillerine ait olan kamuslara müracaat ederek ve bunlarla maksadın temini mümkün olamadığı halde kelimelerin etimolojik anlamlarına nazaran birer tabir bulmak suretiyle mümkün mertebe ikmal etmek üzere bu Lûgatçe'nin tertip ve tanzimine başladım. Ve Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie başlığıyla yayınlanmakta olan süreli yayının bazı numaralarında, 1904 senesinden beri yer almış ve bu kere son bulmuş ise de henüz ayrıca kitap şeklinde toplanmamış olan Yeni Felsefe Lûgatçesi'ni başlıca kaynak kabul ederek, buna dâhil edilmiş olan yeni terimlerin hemen hepsini aldım. E. Goblot'nun Felsefe Lûgatçesi'yle diğer lûgatçelerde mananın açıklık kazanmasına hizmet ediyor gördüğüm özet bilgileri de ait oldukları kelimelere ilave ettim. Kısacası bu naçiz eser, diğer lûgatlerin hiçbirine henüz geçmemiş olan yeni felsefe terimlerinden başka felsefeyle ilgili olan tıp bilimine ve sosyal ve ekonomik bilimlere ait bir hayli kelimeleri de içermektedir. Bununla beraber âcizâne eserimin pek noksan olduğunu ve ancak ilim ve irfan erbabının tashih kalemleri için hazırlanmış bir müsveddecik teşkil edebileceğini itiraf ederim. Yegâne emelim mütalaa erbabına naçizâne bir hizmette bulunarak hayır ile yâd olunmaya hak kazanmaktan ibaret olduğundan görülecek hataların iyi niyetime bağışlanacağı ümidindeyim". İsmail Fenni Ertuğrul. (shrink)

The subject of general utterances (al-lafdh al-āmm) being certain or presumptive in their usage as an indication to all their members is controversial amongst the methodists. Ḥanafī methodists suggest that the indication of general utterances to all of their members as certain and unless they are specified with a certain evidence, they can’t be specified with a presumptive evidence. Like the ḥanafī methodists, the ẓāhirī methodists also suggest that the general utterance is certain indicant for all of its members and (...) can be specified only with another evidence in the same rank. The main difference between the two groups focuses on whether al-khabar al-wāhid (single prophetic narration) is a certain or a presumptive evidence in terms of certitude. According to ḥanafīs, al-khabar al-wāhid is a presumptive evidence and unless the general utterances in Qur’ān are specified initially with another certain evidence, they can’t be specified with al-khabar al-wāhid. However, al-khabar al-wāhid is a certain evidence according to ẓāhirīs and it can specify general utterances in Qur’ān. In this study, the comparison of the views of the methodists of two schools regarding the indication of general utterances in Quran and their specification (takhsīs) with al-akhbar al-wāhid is made and their influence on Islamic Law regulations is studied afterwards. In this study, the two sect’s approaches are compared over the provision of reading al-Fatehah during prayer, the number of milk sucking to establish the kinship, the rights of women divorced with bain talaq and the execution of the death penalty in the Harem region.Summary: The purpose of this study is to try to demonstrate that an assertion in the Ph.D. thesis, The History and Doctrine of Ẓāhirī Madhhab, completed by Amr Osman in 2010 is incorrect. It can be summarized that in his study, Amr Osman claims that the affiliation of the schools to ahl-al-hadith and ahl-al-ra’y in conventional classification is wrong. According to him, contrary to what is known, the School of Ẓāhiriyya is closer to School of Ḥanafiyya rather than schools coming out of ahl-al-hadith. In this study, one of the arguments that he relied on to support his claim is studied in order to prove that his claim was inaccurate. Osman claims that ẓāhirīs are closer to ḥanifīs, based on the view that in both schools the general utterances embrace all of their members in their usage and they are a certain indicant to all of their members. At this stage, although the views of both schools are common, the ḥanifīs don’t accept the idea that the general statements of Qur’ān can be established with al-khabar-al-wāhid, those which they acknowledge as presumptive as of certitude. However, according to the ẓāhirīs, the certitude of al-khabar al-wāhid is as precise as the narrated report, so it can specify the general statements of Qur’ān which are in equal power. The related dispute between the schools has been reflected on many Islamic law regulations. Some of them are:1. Ḥanafīs state that the correct Quranic prayer may be performed by reading any or a few verses of the Qur’ān in prayer, which is a practice based on the verse “Read what you can read from the Qur’ān now”. On the other hand, the ẓāhirīs have established the related order based on the report “There is no prayer without reading Umm Al-Quran (Surah al-Fatehah)” and it is obligatory (fardh) to read Surah al-Fatehah in prayers.2. Because that the terms milk-mother and milk sister are in general form in the verse “It is forbidden to you to marry these people...Your milk-mothers who nursed you, your milk-sisters who nursed you” the ḥanafīs clarify that it is sufficient for a child to breastfeed only one time in order to form a milk-kinship. They do not act in accordance with the solitary report (al-khabar-al-wāhids) which indicate that the milk kinship specifying the verse shall only be formed with at least three or five breastfeeding. However, one of the ẓāhirīs, Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, has specified the verse with the report indicating that the kinship shall not be formed with less than three breastfeeding by the child, and Ibn Ḥazm has specified it with Salim hadith which indicates that the kinship shall be formed with five breastfeeding.3. According to ḥanafīs, there is an alimony and inhabiting right of the widow woman to be procured by the husband within the period of delay who divorced her either with irreversible divorce (talāq al-bāin) or reversible divorce (talāq al-ric‘ī) according to the generalization of the verse “Give shelter to them (the women you have divorced) in some part of your household within your capacity.” They did not act with the report of Fātima binti Qays, who specified the generalization of the verse. On the other hand, the ẓāhirīs recognize the abovementioned rights only for the women who got divorced with irreversible divorce or the ones who are pregnant, specifying the verse with the report indicating that His Holiness the Prophet does not grant alimony and inhabiting to the woman who was divorced with reversible divorce.4. According to ḥanafīs, the criminal who committed a crime that would require a death penalty and took refuge in the Harem region could not be executed while in Ḥarem, according to the common statement of the verse, “Whoever enters there, will be safe.” Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, one of the ẓāhirīs has specified the verse with the report indicating that His Holiness the Prophet has authorized the execution of the sentence to Ibn Khattal in Ḥarem on the day of the conquering of Mecca and he states that the death sentence can be executed wherever the criminal is caught, even if it is inside the Harem. Ibn Ḥazm shares the same view with ḥanafīs regarding the provision of this issue. However, the reason for his opinion stems from the fact that the report about Ibn Khattal was an event specific to that day. As it is seen, even though the ḥanefīs and ẓāhirīs share the same opinion about the general utterances being a certain indicant to all their members, they have disagreements upon the argument about the general utterances of Quran being specified by al-khabar al-wāhid and many Islamic Law regulations have been issued by these schools based on such disagreements. According to us, in the final analysis, Amr Osman’s claim must be met with caution. (shrink)

The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

Assume that epistemic justification has a cognitive function and that a belief's being justified is not just its being caused by the appropriate information (for this property of the belief may be cognitively impenetrable). What is the function of epistemic justification? it cannot be to actualize knowledge-The belief's being caused by appropriate information alone does that! so what is its function? I suggest it is to cause us to believe and/or take action.

This is the first of several sourcebooks charting the reception of Avicenna in the Islamic East in the 12th-13th centuries CE. It translates and analyzes hundreds of passages on topics like existence, universals, free will, and proofs of God.

ARE HUMAN beings material substances? If not, are they made of material stuff? And is the world otherwise materialistic? These are ancient questions for which the dominant intellectual framework of our age compels us toward affirmative answers. In this paper, I want to reinterpret the questions, critically examine the currently most popular way of making the case for the affirmative answers, and argue for a somewhat novel way of casting negative answers in search of a more adequate philosophical understanding of (...) human beings, minds, and persons. (shrink)

People intend to do things, try to do things, and do things. Do they also will to do things? More precisely, if people will to do things and their willing bears upon what they do, is willing, or volition, something distinct from intending and trying? This question is central to the intention/volition debate, a debate about the ingredients of the best theory of the nature and explanation of human action. A variety of competing conceptions of volition, intention, and trying have (...) been advanced in the literature; it would be impossible to examine each thoroughly in a single paper. We can show, however, that the major functional roles ascribed to volition are nicely filled by a triad composed of intention, trying, and information feedback. Sections I and II below develop an account of the connection between intention and trying. Section III examines leading arguments for the existence of volitions and decomposes volitions into members of the triad just identified. (shrink)

The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into (...) two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop. (shrink)

This paper traces the application of information theory to philosophical problems of mind and meaning from the earliest days of the creation of the mathematical theory of communication. The use of information theory to understand purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition, and more marked the beginning of the naturalization of mind and meaning. From the inception of information theory, Wiener, Turing, and others began trying to show how to make a mind from informational and computational materials. Over the last 50 years, (...) many philosophers saw different aspects of the naturalization of the mind, though few saw at once all of the pieces of the puzzle that we now know. Starting with Norbert Wiener himself, philosophers and information theorists used concepts from information theory to understand cognition. This paper provides a window on the historical sequence of contributions made to the overall project of naturalizing the mind by philosophers from Shannon, Wiener, and MacKay, to Dennett, Sayre, Dretske, Fodor, and Perry, among others. At some time between 1928 and 1948, American engineers and mathematicians began to talk about `Theory of Information' and `Information Theory,' understanding by these terms approximately and vaguely a theory for which Hartley's `amount of information' is a basic concept. I have been unable to find out when and by whom these names were first used. Hartley himself does not use them nor does he employ the term `Theory of Transmission of Information,' from which the two other shorter terms presumably were derived. It seems that Norbert Wiener and Claude Shannon were using them in the Mid-Forties. (shrink)

The least element 0 of a finite meet semi-distributive lattice is a meet of meet-prime elements. We investigate conditions under which the least element of an algebraic, meet semi-distributive lattice is a (complete) meet of meet-prime elements. For example, this is true if the lattice has only countably many compact elements, or if |L| < 2ℵ0, or if L is in the variety generated by a finite meet semi-distributive lattice. We give an example of an algebraic, meet semi-distributive lattice that (...) has no meet-prime element or join-prime element. This lattice L has |L| = |LC| = 2ℵ0 where Lc is the set of compact elements of L. (shrink)

We analyse the contention that privacy is an alien concept within Japanese society, put forward in various presentations of Japanese cultural norms at least as far back as Benedict in The chrysanthemum and the sword: patterns of Japanese culture. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1946. In this paper we distinguish between information privacy and physical privacy. As we show, there is good evidence for social norms of limits on the sharing and use of personal information (i.e. information privacy) from traditional interactions in (...) Japanese society, as well as constitutional evidence from the late 19th century (in the Meiji Constitution of 1889). In this context the growing awareness of the Japanese public about problems with networked information processing by public sector and commercial organisations from the 1980s (when a law governing public sector use of personal information was first passed) to recent years (when that law was updated and a first law governing commercial use of personal information was adopted) are not the imposition or adoption of foreign practices nor solely an attempt to lead Japanese society into coherence with the rest of the OECD. Instead they are drawing on the experience of the rest of the developed world in developing legal responses to the breakdown of social norms governing interchange and use of personal information, stressed by the architectural changes wrought by networked information processing capabilities. This claim is supported by consideration of standard models of Japanese social interactions as well as of Supreme Court judgements declaring reasonable expectations of protection of privacy to hold in Japan. (shrink)

The intentionality of sensation -- The first person -- Substance -- The subjectivity of sensation -- Events in the mind -- Comments on Professor R.L. Gregory's paper on perception -- On sensations of position -- Intention -- Pretending -- On the grammar of "Enjoy" -- The reality of the past -- Memory, "experience," and causation -- Causality and determination -- Times, beginnings, and causes -- Soft determinism -- Causality and extensionality -- Before and after -- Subjunctive conditionals -- "Under a (...) description" -- Analysis competition--tenth problem -- A reply to Mr. C.S. Lewis's argument that "naturalism" is self-refuting. (shrink)

In this essay I examine the contribution a philosophy of life is able to make to our understanding of morality, including our appreciation of its evolution or development and its future. I focus on two contributions, namely, those of Jean-Marie Guyau and Henri Bergson. In the case of Guyau I show that he pioneers the naturalistic study of morality through a conception of life; for him the moral progress of humanity is bound up with an increasing sociability, involving both the (...) intensification of life and its expansion. In the case of Bergson I show that he also pioneers a novel naturalistic appreciation of morality, one that is keen to demonstrate morality’s two sources and so as to give us a firm grasp of the chances of a moral progress on the part of humanity. I suggest that of the two appreciations of morality Bergson’s is the richer since it contains a set of critical reflections on humanity’s condition that is lacking in Guyau. I conclude by suggesting that Bergson’s idea that modern humanity is confronted with the decision whether it wishes to continue living or not has lost none of its relevance today. (shrink)

While prophethood is the backbone of the Islamic tradition and an uncompromised tenet of faith, the impact of modernity with its ambivalent status afforded to the prophet and institution of prophethood shook many Muslim scholars. Through analysis of these modern debates on prophethood in Islam, this book situates Muhammad Iqbal's (1877-1938) and Said Nursi's (1877-1960) discourses within it and assesses their implications on the modern period. This book introduces the 'what, who and how' of the prophets in the Islamic tradition. (...) It unveils the rich Islamic literature of both the classical and modern periods and analyses the construction of their philosophies and theologies. Concise in both historical and textual analysis, this book makes an important contribution to our understanding of contemporary debates on prophecy and prophethood in Islam, and will be of great interest to postgraduate students and researchers of Islam, religious studies, medieval studies and contemporary studies of Islam and religion. (shrink)

As a statistician, whose job is to advise on how to make inductions from observations with the aid of the theory of probability, I hope I shall be pardoned some comments on Mr. Kneale's discussion of this subject.

"This book brings together articles, which I previously published on my blog, Barrarsīhā-ye Tārīkhī, about the history of kalām and falsafa (Islamic theology and philosophy). Many of the articles contain research on the history of Muʿtazilī kalām, especially among the Shīʿa, whether Zaydīs or Imāmīs. Some articles also discuss the history of philosophical theology in Islam, the Avicennian tradition in Khurāsān and the relationship between the theologians and the philosophers, especially in the sixth and seventh centuries hijrī. A chapter about (...) the maktab-e tafkīk is also included, in which the relationship between the Akhbārī position and the philosophical approach among the Imāmiyya, is discussed. In addition, some of the articles treat the concept of imāma according to Zaydī and Muʿtazilī thinkers, and the genre of imāma in their literature, as well as the refutations that were written between Zaydīs and Muʿtazilīs, and also Imāmīs. Some articles on the history of Sunnī kalām are also included. Part of the book takes a bibliographical approach, or is based on texts, and part takes a historical approach to study the history of kalām and falsafa as well as the relationship between both. The purpose of this book is to provide readers a historical reading of the history of kalām and falsafa —mostly within the Shīʿī and Muʿtazilī traditions. Even at present, many Muʿtazilī texts have not been edited and studied. Although most of the texts of Ibn Sīnā and his students have already been edited, we still need to provide a historical approach to the falsafa of Ibn Sīnā in order to situate the philosophical questions in the Avicennian tradition in a broader context, among the theologians and the philosophers. Many of the topics which are discussed in the Avicennian tradition are also approached in theological texts by the Muʿtazilīs and the Ashʿarīs, and I hope that this book provides a basic foundation in preparation for future studies on this topic." -- from publishers. (shrink)

Tom 1. Logicheskie ischisleni͡a, algebry i funkt͡sionalnye svoĭstva.

While concluding my research for Martin Luther King: The Making of a Mind, I learned that King had stated in a January 19, 1956 interview with The Montgomery Advertiser that Hegel was his favorite philosopher. This was especially significant for me because my dissertation was on Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel - with emphasis on how Hegelian Kierkegaard had become.

From the "New York Times" bestselling author of "If I Stay" Allyson Healeys life is exactly like her suitcase--packed, planned, ordered. Then on the last day of her three-week post-graduation European tour, she meets Willem. A free-spirited, roving actor, Willem is everything shes not, and when he invites her to abandon her plans and come to Paris with him, Allyson says yes. This uncharacteristic decision leads to a day of risk and romance, liberation and intimacy: 24 hours that will transform (...) Allysons life. A book about love, heartbreak, travel, identity, and the "accidents" of fate, "Just One Day" shows us how sometimes in order to get found, you first have to get lost... and how often the people we are seeking are much closer than we know. The first in a sweepingly romantic duet of novels. Willems story--"Just One Year"--is coming soon. (shrink)

While concluding my research for Martin Luther King: The Making of a Mind, I learned that King had stated in a January 19, 1956 interview with The Montgomery Advertiser that Hegel was his favorite philosopher. This was especially significant for me because my dissertation was on Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel - with emphasis on how Hegelian Kierkegaard had become.

t. 1. Monologion ; Proslogion -- t. 2. Le grammairien ; De la vérité ; La liberté du choix ; La chute du diable -- t. 3. Lettre sur l'incarnation du Verbe ; Pourquoi un Dieu-homme -- t. 4. La conception virginale et le péché originel ; La procession du Saint Esprit ; Lettres sur les sacrements de l'Église ; Du pouvoir et de l'impuissance -- t. 5. Sur l'accord de la prescience, de la prédestination et de la grâce de (...) Dieu avec le libre choix ; Prières et méditations -- t. 6. Lettres 1 à 147 -- t. 9. Histoire des temps nouveaux en Angleterre. Livres I-IV ; Vie de Saint Anselme. (shrink)

Este artículo examina la concepción racionalde Hare sobre los juicios morales.Para ello, critica tajantemente la concepcióne mo t i v i s t a de l o s Po s i t i v i s t a s l ó g i c o s yde St e ve ns on. Tambi é n, s e di s t anc i a de lintuicionismo moral concebido por Moore ensus Principia Ethica de 1903. Para desarrollarel racionalismo moral parte del principio (...) queel lenguaje moral hace parte del lenguaje engeneral, del cual no puede ser desligado puescuando hacemos razonamientos morales estosse encuentran sometidos por las diferentesreglas de la lógica clásica. Por ello, Hare aplicala lógica clásica a su teoría de los imperativosy considera la ética como el estudio lógico dellenguaje moral.También se muestran las semej anzas y lasdiferencias entre la concepción de Austin y deHare, destacando la evolución del pensamientode este último filósofo. Cuando Hare escribiósu obra El Lenguaje de la Moral no estabai nf l uenci ado por l a t r i cot omí a de Aust i nsobre Los actos de habla como: Locucionarios,ilocucionarios y perlocucionarios. Influenciaq u e s e o b s e r v a e n e s c r i t o s p o s t e r i o r e s .Mi e nt r a s Ha r e ubi c a l os j ui c i os mor a l e sen l o l ocuci onari o, Austi n l os ubi ca en l oilocucionario; controversia que nos conducea r e f l e xi ona r s obr e l a i mpor t a nc i a de l apragmática en los juicios morales y a la vezsobre su racionalidad.I n t hi s pa pe r , I e xa mi ne Ha r e ’ s r a t i ona lconception on moral judgements. For this, hecriticizes sharply the emotivist conception ofLogical Positivists and of Stevenson. He alsoaparts himself from Moore’s moral intuitionism,as expounded in Principia Ethica. To developmoral rationalism, Hare starts from the principlethat moral language is apart of the generallanguage, from which it cannot be separatedsince when we do moral reasonings these areruled by the different rules of classical logic.For this reason, Hare applies classical logic tohis theory of imperatives and considers ethicsas the logical study of moral language.I also show the similarities and differencesbetween Austi n’ s and Hare’ s concepti ons,emphasizing the evolution of the thought of thelater. When Hare wrote The language of morals,he was not under the influence of Austin’stricotomic view of speech acts: locutionary,illocutionary and perlocutionary, influence thatwe can see in later works. While Hare locatesmoral judgments in the locutionary, Austin doesit in the illocutionary. This controversy leadsus to think on the importance of pragmatics inmoral judgements as well as on its rationality. (shrink)

A partir del análisis del tercer libro del Ensayosobre el Entendimiento Humano pretendomostrar como encontramos en esta obra deLocke algunos elementos que posteriormentese desarrollaron en la Filosofía Analítica delsiglo XX. Está influencia se presenta a travésdel análisis que realiza Locke sobre el papelque cumple el lenguaje en el problema delconocimiento, lo cual lo conduce a criticarla metafísica, concebir la noción demetalenguaje, analizar las diferentes funcionesdel lenguaje, plantear la noción del sentido ydel sinsentido. Pienso que estas nociones seencuentran en los planteamientos (...) de LockeBy analyzing Book III of An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding, I Intend to illustrate how we can find in this work of Locke’s some elements that were developed later in Twentieth Century Analytical Philosophy. I discuss this influence by means of Locke’s analysis of the role of language in the problem of knowledge, which leads him to criticize metaphysics, to conceive the notion of a metalanguage, to analyze the different functions of language, and to postulate the notion of sense and lack of sense.I argue for the view that we can find thesenotions in Locke’s views. (shrink)

Miracles are commonly understood in the way David Hume defined them: as violations of the laws of nature. I argue, however, that the conjunction of Hume’s definition with a neo-Humean view of the laws of nature yields objectionable consequences. In particular, the two jointly imply that some miracles are logically impossible. A better way of thinking about miracles, I suggest, is on a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics. On that view, the laws of nature contain built-in ceteris paribus clauses that allow for the (...) possibility of external influences in the natural world. Miracles, understood as instances of external, divine influence, would therefore neither violate the laws of nature nor be instances of those laws. In this respect, neo-Aristotelians have an advantage over neo-Humeans in providing a coherent account of miracles. (shrink)

Debates over research ethics have until recently revolved around two related questions: the voluntary, informed consent of subjects, and the appropriate relationship between risk and benefit to subjects in the experiment. Recently more attention has been paid to issues of justice in research studies, especially in the international arena, and to issues of the scientific and financial probity of researchers. Yet these new foci augment rather than supplant the traditional focus on consent, since arguably “the rights and wellbeing of the (...) subject take precedence over the interests of science and society”, as the Declaration of Helsinki (still) puts it. Clinically the difficulties of obtaining the informed consent of subjects to participation in research remain one of the more difficult barriers to research. Recently this issue has become more fraught in non-clinical research also, with complex debates over consent to the use and reuse of clinical …. (shrink)

The concept of contextual emergence has been proposed as a non-reductive, yet well- defined relation between different levels of description of physical and other systems. It is illustrated for the transition from statistical mechanics to thermodynamical properties such as temperature. Stability conditions are shown to be crucial for a rigorous implementation of contingent contexts that are required to understand temperature as an emergent property. Are such stability conditions meaningful for contextual emergence beyond physics as well? An affirmative example from cognitive (...) neuroscience addresses the relation between neurobiological and mental levels of description. For a particular class of partitions of the underlying neurobiological phase space, so-called generating partitions, the emergent mental states are stable under the dynamics. In this case, mental descriptions are (i) faithful representations of the neurodynamics and (ii) compatible with one another. (shrink)