In the Algerian War of Independence, women famously used both traditional and modern clothing as part of their revolutionary efforts against French colonialism. This paper uncovers some of the principal lessons of this historical episode through a phenomenological exploration of agency, religion, and political transformation. Part I draws primarily on the philosophical insights of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty alongside the memoirs of Zohra Drif, a young woman member of the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale, in order to (...) explore the worldly and habitual nature of human agency in contrast to the Enlightenment stress on individual rationality and autonomy. Part II turns to John Russon’s phenomenological interpretation of religion in order to argue for the ineluctable significance of religion on human existence, in contrast to the modern tendency to oppose religious tradition and secular modernity. Part III analyzes the dynamics of intercultural communication, and argues for the political power of phenomenology as a critical enterprise that enables more just and emancipatory visions of collective human life and political transformation to come to the fore. (shrink)

Did Chinese mysticism vanish after its first appearance in ancient Taoist philosophy, to surface only after a thousand years had passed, when the Chinese had adapted Buddhism to their own culture? This first integrated survey of the mystical dimension of Taoism disputes the commonly accepted idea of such a hiatus. Covering the period from the Daode jing to the end of the Tang, Livia Kohn reveals an often misunderstood Chinese mystical tradition that continued through the ages. Influenced by but ultimately (...) independent of Buddhism, it took forms more various than the quietistic withdrawal of Laozi or the sudden enlightenment of the Chan Buddhists. On the basis of a new theoretical evaluation of mysticism, this study analyzes the relationship between philosophical and religious Taoism and between Buddhism and the native Chinese tradition. Kohn shows how the quietistic and socially oriented Daode jing was combined with the ecstatic and individualistic mysticism of the Zhuangzi, with immortality beliefs and practices, and with Buddhist insight meditation, mind analysis, and doctrines of karma and retribution. She goes on to demonstrate that Chinese mysticism, a complex synthesis by the late Six Dynasties, reached its zenith in the Tang, laying the foundations for later developments in the Song traditions of Inner Alchemy, Chan Buddhism, and Neo-Confucianism. (shrink)

Some contributors to this volume defend this view on theological and philosophical grounds.

The author's thesis is that moral agency and determination of the good are independent of any divine will. he also proposes that morality cannot be based on religion, although a religious belief can be dependent on our own sense of good and bad, but only to the extent that moral understanding must be logically prior to any religious assent. (staff).

ABSTRACT This paper is intended as a contribution to the study of science and religion in late modern Catholic societies. I explore the treatment of natural philosophy vis-à-vis religious authority, the teaching of Biblical geology, and the use of natural theology in texts from Río de la Plata in the transition from late colonial to early independent times. After reviewing the assimilation of modern science into scholastic teaching and the articulation of reason and religious authority, the article considers the (...) handling of the early history of the Earth in the theses of scholastic teachers and in the geological memoirs of the naturalist priest from Montevideo Dámaso Larrañaga. The core of the paper is devoted to the treatment of natural theology in Larrañaga’s Diary of Natural History and in the speeches and documents of enlightened crown bureaucrats. The conclusion is reached that the harmonious character of the relationships between science and religion in this period and location harboured tensions which could be accounted for in terms of the inherent inconsistencies in the programme of Catholic Enlightenment. (shrink)

This book examines why individuals and communities invest heavily in their religious life through multi-disciplinary perspectives. It pursues philosophical, psychological, deep time historical and adaptive answers to this question. Religion is a profoundly puzzling phenomenon from an evolutionary perspective. Commitment to religions are typically expensive, and most of the beliefs that motivate them cannot be true (since religious belief systems are inconsistent with one another). Yet some form of religion seems to be universal and resilient in historically known (...) cultures – though not, if archaeology is to be trusted, in human communities early in the evolution of our species. We have collectively invented religion over about the last 100,000 years. Stemming from an interdisciplinary workshop, this book grapples with these challenges and features diverse contributions: some offer evolutionary and historical analyses, identifying hidden adaptive benefits to religion independent of the veracity of religious belief. Others see connections between religious commitment and commitment to the social norms that make cooperative life possible and explore aspects of human psychology that make religious belief tempting. Broad in scope and theoretically ambitious, Religion and Its Evolution: Signals, Norms and Secret Histories will be a key resource for scholars and researchers of religious studies, sciences of religion, psychology, anthropology, the cultural evolution of religion and the sociology of religion. This book was originally published as a special issue of Religion, Brain & Behavior. (shrink)

The fundamental freedoms of speech, conscience, privacy, and religion are now an essential part of the fabric of contemporary society, set down in our most basic laws and regularly invoked in our political and cultural debates. These freedoms play a vital role in securing the spaces and opportunities within which people are able to pursue their own lives in their own ways. Independence of Mind takes this accepted thought a step further, by exploring the ways in which the (...) fundamental freedoms help us to achieve something even more profound, by enabling us to arrive at beliefs, convictions and voices of our own, so that we truly come to think, believe and speak for ourselves in the rich and various ways that the freedoms then protect. Privacy grants us the distance and refuge from others necessary to develop views of our own; freedom of speech calls on us to imagine ways of expressing ourselves that are both true to the views we have developed and innovative in their own right; freedom of conscience enables each of us to create a distinctive rational personality in which to embed the convictions that we wish to treat as non-negotiable; freedom of religion allows groups of us to endorse certain beliefs as articles of faith, free from the full demands of rational scrutiny. Much has been written about the political and legal implications of the fundamental freedoms and their entrenchment in bills of rights. This is the first book to undertake a comprehensive philosophical examination of their moral bases. It offers a penetrating analysis of what makes these particular freedoms matter to us in the ways that they do, and of the true significance of their entrenchment in law. (shrink)

In locating friendly fire in contemporary philosophy of religion, D.Z. Phillips shows that more harm can be done to religion by its philosophical defenders than by its philosophical despisers. Friendly fire is the result of an uncritical acceptance of empiricism, and Phillips argues that we need to examine critically the claims that individual consciousness is the necessary starting point from which we have to argue: for the existence of an external world and the reality of God; that God (...) is a person without a body, a pure consciousness; and that to assent to a religious belief is essentially to assign a truth value to a proposition independent of any confessional context. When these products of friendly fire are avoided, we arrive at a new understanding of belief, trust and the soul, and refuse to say more or less than we know about the realities of human life in the service of religious apologetics. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Liberalism Religion, Nationalism, and Citizenship Religion and Public Philosophy Anti‐liberalism Works cited.

Reflection on religion inevitably involves consideration of its relation to morality. When great evil is done to human beings, we may feel that something absolute has been violated. Can that sense, which is related to gratitude for existence, be expressed without religious concepts? Can we express central religious concerns, such as losing the self, while abandoning any religious metaphysic? Is moral obligation itself dependent on divine commands if it is to be objective, or is morality not only independent of (...) religion, but its accuser if God is said to allow horrendous evils? In any case, what happens to the absolute claims of religion in what is, undeniably, a morally pluralistic world? These are the central questions discussed by philosophers of religion and moral philosophers in this collection. They do so in ways which bring new aspects to bear on these traditional issues. (shrink)

When the West African nation of Ghana attained its independence from colonial rule in 1957, its traditional culture was to be promoted in all sectors of public life. Similarly, what was construed as Ghanaian traditional religion was to be treated equally with Christianity and Islam. The ritual offering of libations to ancestral spirits and deities was considered the Ghanaian equivalent to Christian and Muslim prayers, and it has been performed side by side with them in all sorts of (...) national events. Later on, the libation ritual became a symbol of both Ghana’s religious diversity and its national culture, transcending religious divisions. Many Christian groups, especially from the Pentecostal-charismatic movement, have refused to accept the public status of the libation ritual in view of its alleged immoral ‘pagan’ associations. When the pouring of libations was removed from the Independence Day ceremonies held at the state capital in 2011, the public debate soon turned to the relationship between the government and Pentecostal churches, and accusations of religious intolerance were levelled. This article discusses how the arguments about the status of the ritual boil down to differences in semiotic ideology and notions about proper agency – namely, how forms of agency pertaining to words, objects, persons and spiritual beings involved in the ritual are understood differently by the disputants. (shrink)

The ethics of belief involves an inquiry into what beliefs are legitimate to hold, including religious beliefs. Whatever the criteria determined in such an investigation, adopting a belief that does not meet this criterion is seen as illegitimate and it is considered an ethical violation. English mathematician W. K. Clifford (d. 1879) defines “sufficient evidence” as a criterion in his famous essay, “The Ethics of Belief”. Clifford’s evidence-centered argument becomes one of the most frequent references in the evidentialist objection against (...) theism. It turns out that this argument is not functional in the face of the diversity of beliefs. In this context, different suggestions are presented about what the ethics of belief could be. American philosopher William James (d. 1810), one of the founding names of pragmatism, offers a new proposal. In his classic work, “The Will to Believe”, James claims that Clifford is wrong in seeking the requirement of evidence for all beliefs. Because it is not possible to prove beliefs from the passionate nature of human beings, especially religious beliefs. Following this distinction, James proposes a new criterion for religious beliefs: a religious belief can be vivid or dead, forced or avoidable; and momentous or trivial. If a religious belief is vivid, forced, and momentous, it is necessary to have the courage to believe in it instead of suspending it. James' proposal is often valued as a strong counter-challenge or defense of religious beliefs. However, this argument also has aspects that are open to criticism. One of them is that the will to believe argument concurrently accepts conflicting religious beliefs or, in other words, confronts the issue of religious diversity. According to J. Hick, for example, this argument inevitably results in religious pluralism, even though James does not want to. Contrary to Hick, S. F. Aikin claims that the will to believe does not result in religious pluralism. According to Aikin, who draws attention to the relationship of argument with pragmatism, James obscures religious beliefs and removes them from being claims about truth. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the classical sense. So, which of the objections is valid? Does the will-to-believe argument result in religious pluralism by legitimizing more than one religious belief at the same time, or does it make a purely pragmatic proposition by devaluing religious beliefs? Which religion do I have the right to believe in according to the will to believe? The aim of this article is to provide an answer to the mentioned question. In the article, unlike the current evaluations, it is argued that the argument is closely related to James's theory of knowledge, radical empiricism, not pragmatism as it is usually made. For this purpose, after showing the relationship between the arguments of Clifford and James, the argument will be re-examined in this context and it will be revealed that James has two steps regarding religious beliefs: to make religious beliefs independent from factual beliefs; leaving theism to accept a monistic vision of God and basing religion on mystical experience, which is an emotional experience. As details emerge, it will become clear that James defends a natural religion that excludes traditional religions in his philosophical system and that he defends the beliefs of a humanized religion. With an individual definition of religion based on emotion, James on the one hand ensures the commonality of religious feeling, on the other hand, he makes religion independent from the field of facts. Therefore, with this study, it will be seen that the argument of the will to believe does not aim to legitimize believing in traditional religions, and diversity is not a fundamental problem. (shrink)

Do the same epistemic standards govern scientific and religious belief? Or should science and religion operate in completely independent epistemic spheres? Commentators have recently been divided on William James’s answer to this question. One side depicts “The Will to Believe” as offering a separate-spheres defense of religious belief in the manner of Galileo. The other contends that “The Will to Believe” seeks to loosen the usual epistemic standards so that religious and scientific beliefs can both be justified by a (...) unitary set of evidentiary rules. I argue that James did build a unitary epistemology but not by loosening cognitive standards. In his psychological research, he had adopted the Comtian view that hypotheses and regulative assumptions play a crucial role in the context of discovery even though they must be provisionally adopted before they can be supported by evidence. “The Will to Believe” relies on this methodological point to achieve a therapeutic goal—to convince despairing Victorians that religious faith can be reconciled with a scientific epistemology. James argues that the prospective theist is in the same epistemic situation with respect to the “religious hypothesis” as the scientist working in the context of discovery. (shrink)

_Religion and the Rise of Modern Culture_ describes and analyzes changing attitudes toward religion during three stages of modern European culture: the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Romantic period. Louis Dupré is an expert guide to the complex historical and intellectual relation between religion and modern culture. Dupré begins by tracing the weakening of the Christian synthesis. At the end of the Middle Ages intellectual attitudes toward religion began to change. Theology, once the dominant science that had (...) integrated all others, lost its commanding position. After the French Revolution, religion once again played a role in intellectual life, but not as the dominant force. Religion became transformed by intellectual and moral principles conceived independently of faith. Dupré explores this new situation in three areas: the literature of Romanticism ; idealist philosophy ; and theology itself. Dupré argues that contemporary religion has not yet met the challenge presented by Romantic thought. “This beautifully crafted essay by Louis Dupré makes an original contribution to our understanding of the emergence and development of modernity, which dispensing with religion as a governing discourse and form of life, nonetheless attempts to find a place for it in a world sufficiently depleted of meaning and value as to require reenchantment. It supplements Dupré’s two magisterial texts on the topic of the modernity covering the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods, and whets the appetite for the forthcoming volume on Romanticism. Deep learning is worn lightly in this marvelously readable book.” —_Cyril O'Regan, University of Notre Dame_ “A stunning synthesis of Dupré's magisterial intellectual history of modernity and his distinctive and important philosophy of religion.” —_David Tracy, emeritus, The University of Chicago Divinity School_ “Louis Dupre's literate and sweeping review of the fate of religious faith in modern culture will help contemporary readers, who share his closing yearning for ways in which ‘transcendence can be recognized again,’ to appreciate why many of us find a postmodern climate—for better or worse—more conducive to fulfilling that desire. For his dramatic depictions of modernity teach us how different is the culture in which we now live.” —_David Burrell, CSC, Hesburgh Professor Emeritus in Philosophy and Theology, University of Notre Dame_. (shrink)

Cécile Laborde has argued that the freedom we think of as ‘freedom of religion’ should be understood as a bundle of separate and relatively independent freedoms. I criticise that approach by pointing out that it is insufficiently sensitive to facts about the sorts of entities that liberal states are. I argue that states have good reasons to mould phenomena such as religion into easily governable monoliths. If this is a problem from the normative point of view, it is (...) not due to descriptively inadequate accounts of religion, but a problem with a lack of realism about the sort of institutions states are. My conclusion is a three-way disjunction: either one must reckon with liberal states’ historically determined limitations in the management of changing social phenomena, or one should direct one’s frustration at the marriage of liberalism and the state, or the very existence of states is normatively problematic. (shrink)

Few outstanding questions in the human behavioral sciences are timelier or more urgently debated than the evolutionary source of religious behaviors and beliefs. Byproduct theorists locate the origins of religion in evolved cognitive defaults and transmission biases. Others have argued that cultural evolutionary processes integrated non-adaptive cognitive byproducts into coherent networks of supernatural beliefs and ritual that encouraged in-group cooperativeness, while adaptationist models assert that the cognitive and behavioral foundations of religion have been selected for at more basic (...) levels. Here, we survey these differing approaches, noting their respective strengths and weaknesses. We then advance a novel model that centers on the ability of language to generate alternative worlds independent of immediate empirical facts, and thus highlight the similarities between religious belief and the modes of cognition that underlie institutions in general. The institutional cognition model of religion accounts for some of the shortcomings of extant approaches and draws attention to the human ability to create non-empirical worlds; that is, worlds that are imaginary. Both religious beliefs and institutional facts—such as jurisdictional borders—are non-empirical assertions, yet they are socially accepted as truths and reified through ritual and behavior. One type of non-empirical, linguistically generated belief—supernatural agent belief—is particularly effective for stabilizing systems of arbitrary norms by rooting them in deontic rather than utilitarian reasoning. The evolutionary roots and continued persistence of religion are thus functions of the capacity for humans to generate cognitive alternatives to empirical reality, and the need to stably coordinate those alternative conceptions. (shrink)

Religion and Morality seeks to answer two fundamental questions regarding the relation between religion and morality. The first is the puzzle posed by Socrates, the so-called ' Euthyphro dilemma', which asks: is morality valuable by virtue of its intrinsic importance and worth, or is morality valuable because, and only because, God approves it and commands us to follow its dictates? The second question is raised by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling . He asks: Is a conflict between (...) class='Hi'>religion and morality possible? Does God ever demand that we neglect our moral commitments? The discussion on these questions is divided into three parts. In the first two parts, we discuss the idea that morality depends on religion. The authors distinguish two types of dependence: strong dependence, according to which the very existence, or validity, of moral obligations depends on God's command, and weak dependence, according to which though morality itself is independent of God, God is necessary to enable human beings to know their moral duties and to carry them out. The authors reject the strong dependence thesis, as well as most versions of the weak dependence. The third part of the book discusses different versions of the view that religion might conflict with morality. The authors reject this view, and show that very few religious thinkers would follow it all the way through to its ultimate consequences. The book has implications for the philosophy of religion, in its emphasis on the centrality of the moral element in religion, and for moral philosophy, in its highlighting, among other things, of the nature of moral judgments. (shrink)

Religion is presented as a family of religions, identified by a cluster of religion-making features, most but not all of which must be present, involving beliefs and practices which are diverse and often in conflict. Because of differences in scope, application of scientific method, and vocabulary, science can also be regarded as a family—this time a family of sciences. The universality of the physical sciences contrasts with the more restricted scope of the earth sciences and the human sciences. (...) Their relationship can be shown by a three-tiered pyramid, with the physical sciences at the base, the human sciences at the top, and the earth sciences in the middle. Despite three notable differences between science and religion, science and religion are not, as popularly believed, in conflict. The contrary view, espoused by the “new atheists,” is shown to be based on oversimplified views of religion and science. There are nontheistic religions and science is committed, not to metaphysical naturalism (“scientism”), but only to methodological naturalism. Stephen Jay Gould escapes the conflict view by proposing that science and religion are independent “magisteria”, science being occupied with facts and religion with values. In divorcing the realm of facts from the realm of values, he too distorts their complex nature, for science is not devoid of values and religion makes claims about the facts. As Hume long ago suggested, facts and values are interconnected. While a fact is not the same as a value, a fact cannot support a value without presupposing another value in turn. Interaction between facts and values is here to stay. (shrink)

_Religion and Morality_ seeks to answer two fundamental questions regarding the relation between religion and morality. The first is the puzzle posed by Socrates, the so-called '_Euthyphro_ dilemma', which asks: is morality valuable by virtue of its intrinsic importance and worth, or is morality valuable because, and only because, God approves it and commands us to follow its dictates? The second question is raised by Kierkegaard in _Fear and Trembling_. He asks: Is a conflict between religion and morality (...) possible? Does God ever demand that we neglect our moral commitments? The discussion on these questions is divided into three parts. In the first two parts, we discuss the idea that morality depends on religion. The authors distinguish two types of dependence: strong dependence, according to which the very existence, or validity, of moral obligations depends on God's command, and weak dependence, according to which though morality itself is independent of God, God (or belief in God) is necessary to enable human beings to know their moral duties and to carry them out. The authors reject the strong dependence thesis, as well as most versions of the weak dependence. The third part of the book discusses different versions of the view that religion might conflict with morality. The authors reject this view, and show that very few religious thinkers would follow it all the way through to its ultimate consequences. The book has implications for the philosophy of religion, in its emphasis on the centrality of the moral element in religion, and for moral philosophy, in its highlighting, among other things, of the nature of moral judgments. (shrink)

Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) ask: “Why do agent concepts predominate in religion?” This question presupposes that we have a notion of religion that is (1) well enough defined, and (2) characterized independently of that of supernatural agents. I question these two presuppositions. I argue that “religion” is a family resemblance notion built around the idea of supernatural agency.

Hegelian ethics, which gives pride of place to the roles and relations that give substance to our moral life, is seen as a rejection of Kant's a priori treatment of morality, moral law and moral agency. Analysis of the so-called religious writings from the late 1790s to the early 1800s, 'The Positivity of the Christian Religion', the 'Love' fragment, and the essay 'On the Scientific Treatment of Natural Law', shows Hegel engaging profoundly with recognizably Kantian problems of moral metaphysics (...) about moral agency, the moral law, nature and freedom. The almost experimental approach of these early pieces yields independently interesting results as well as offering an important insight into the development of Hegel's thought. (shrink)

Reflection on religion inevitably involves consideration of its relation to morality. When great evil is done to human beings, we may feel that something absolute has been violated. Can that sense, which is related to gratitude for existence, be expressed without religious concepts? Can we express central religious concerns, such as losing the self, while abandoning any religious metaphysic? Is moral obligation itself dependent on divine commands if it is to be objective, or is morality not only independent of (...) religion, but its accuser if God is said to allow horrendous evils? In any case, what happens to the absolute claims of religion in what is, undeniably, a morally pluralistic world? These are the central questions discussed by philosophers of religion and moral philosophers in this collection. They do so in ways which bring new aspects to bear on these traditional issues. (shrink)

Late modernity has witnessed a growing semantic shift from “religion” to “spirituality.” In this article, I argue what underlies this shift is a cultural structure I call the religion of the heart. I begin with an explication of what I mean by the “religion of the heart,” and draw on the work of Ernst Troeltsch and Colin Campbell to identify what I take to be its historical antecedents. Second, I analyze the ambiguous relationships fostered between the (...) class='Hi'>religion of the heart and the discourses of science and religion, respectively, in late modernity. I illuminate how the social conditions of late modernity undermine or challenge what we conventionally think of as scientific and religious authorities, while at the same time creating existential needs that the religion of the heart is well adapted to meet. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this process, especially as it relates to the sustainability of science and religion, as independent enterprises, in the twenty‐first century. (shrink)

The religious transnationalism evident in the 21st century has heralded a new paradigm of religion ‘made to travel’ as adherents of religions navigate various cultural frontiers within Africa, Europe and North America. The role of Africa in shaping the global religious landscape, particularly the Christian tradition, designates the continent as one of the major actors of the Christian faith in the 21st century. The inability of European Christianity to address most of the existential realities of Africans and the stigmatisation (...) of African Traditional Religion mainly contributed to the emergence of African Independent Churches in the 19th century in Africa. The emergence and proliferation of African Independent Churches in Africa was Africa’s response to Europeanised Christianity with its imperialistic doctrines and practices that negated expectation of its new context – Africa. Despite the declining fortunes of Christianity in the West, African Christianity, which includes the African Independent Churches and African Pentecostal traditions, is now a major non-commodity export within Africa and North America. Apart from their rituals and peculiarities, African Independent Churches like other faith organisations are development actors. Although notions about the role of religion in development amongst some social scientists are mainly negative, African Independent Churches over the years are actively involved in various human and community transformation initiatives. This study argues that the transnational status of African Independent Churches has led to the emergence of developmental ideals that defy territorialisation. The collaboration with some Western development agencies by some of the African Independent Churches in Diaspora further blurs the concept of diaspora as the members of this Christian movement are active development actors in the receiving nations and their former home countries. This study argues that the role of religion in development in any context cannot be overemphasised. As a result of the globalisation of African Independent Churches, the United Kingdom and Nigeria will serve as our case study using historical survey and descriptive analyses to highlight African Independent Churches as development actors. (shrink)

This study aims to understand the relationship between religion and identity in adolescents and to determine the level of religious identity of adolescents; to reveal the predictive effects of the independent variables of gender, class level, type of school, mother’s educational status, father's educational status, socio-economic level, level of family religiosity and worship rate (praying) status on adolescents' religious identity levels; how adolescents define themselves as identities and determine the distribution of the findings about the identity definitions of adolescents (...) according to their religious identity levels. The research is in the relational survey model and the study group consists of 1000 high school students studying in the high schools of Konya Provincial Directorate of National Education. In this study, a “Religion-Identity Relationship Scale” was used to determine the religious identity levels. In order to determine the relationship between dependent variables and independent variables, non-parametric tests were used and cross-table, descriptive statistics, Chi-square, Mann Whitney U, Kruskal Wallis-H analysis method was used in the analysis of the data. As a result of the research, it was determined that the religious identity levels of adolescents differed significantly according to gender, class level (age), school type, mother education status, father education status, socio-economic level, level of family religiosity and worship rate (praying); 51.9% of the adolescents have their own identity “Religious Identity”; 25.6% of “T.C. Citizens”; It was found that 9.5% of the participants defined the “Ethnic Identity”. It was found that adolescents' identity definitions differ significantly depending on their religious identity levels. Adolescents with a high level of religious identity score identified their own identity as religious identity with 49.2%. (shrink)

In this paper several problems are raised concerning Ian Barbour's four ways of interrelating science and religion—Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and Integration—as put forward in such publications as his highly influential Religion in an Age of Science (1990) and widely adopted by other writers in this field. The authors argue that this taxonomy is not very useful or analytically helpful, especially to historians seeking to understand past engagements between science and religion.

Ukraine for the third time in its history is experiencing a process of national revival, which not only intensified the activities of different faiths, but also raised the question of the place of religion in the life of the nation in general. That rehabilitation of religion, which took place in public opinion during the years of Ukraine's independence, changes in social assessments of its role in spiritual and national revival, Ukrainian state building, as we are, is more (...) likely to be a response to propagation of religious spirituality by the mass media, a kind of illusion of the desired, rather than a reflection of the real processes in church and religious life. (shrink)

There is considerable controversy concerning the ability of the Internet to provide communal experiences. This article looks at the ability of the World Wide Web to foster religious community, particularly from a Christian perspective. It looks at the nature of religion and community and shows to what extent the Internet has and has not been successful in recreating religious community. It looks at the reaction of two particular groups of users and categorizes Web sites into five types: research sites, (...) extensions of local community, independent sites, spiritual retreats, and online worship. Finally it discusses the limitations of disembodied experience and argues that most individuals use the media within these limitations. (shrink)

A clinical ethics consultant may, at times, be called upon to make independent substantive moral judgments and then offer justifications for those judgments. A CEC does not act unprofessionally by utilizing background beliefs that are religious in nature to justify those judgments. It is important, however, for a CEC to make such judgments authentically and, when asked, to offer up one’s reasons for why one believes the judgment is true in a transparent fashion.

As debates rage over the place of faith in our national life, Tocqueville’s nineteenth-century crediting of religion for shaping America is largely overlooked today. Now, in _Republicanism, Religion, and the Soul of America,_ Ellis Sandoz reveals the major role that Protestant Christianity played in the formation and early period of the American republic. Sandoz traces the rise of republican government from key sources in Protestant civilization, paying particular attention to the influence of the Bible on the Founders and (...) the blossoming of the American mind in the eighteenth century. Sandoz analyzes the religious debt of the emergent American community and its elevation of the individual person as unique in the eyes of the Creator. He shows that the true distinction of American republicanism lies in its grounding of human dignity in spiritual individualism and an understanding of man’s capacity for self-government under providential guidance. Along the way, he addresses such topics as the neglected question of the education of the Founders for their unique endeavor, common law constitutionalism, the place of Latin and Greek classics in the Founders’ thought, and the texture of religious experience from the Great Awakening to the Declaration of Independence To establish a unifying theoretical perspective for his study, Sandoz considers the philosophical underpinnings of religion and the contribution that Eric Voegelin made to our understanding of religious experience. He contributes fresh studies of the character of Voegelin’s thought: its relationship to Christianity; his debate with Leo Strauss over reason, revelation, and the meaning of philosophy; and the theory of Gnosticism as basic to radical modernity. He also provides a powerful account of the spirit of Voegelin’s later writings, contrasting the political scientist with the meditative spiritualist and offering new insight into volume 5 of _Order and History_. _Republicanism, Religion, and the Soul of America_ concludes with timely reflections on the epoch now unfolding in the shadow of Islamic jihadism. Bringing a wide range of materials into a single volume, it confronts current academic concerns with religion while offering new insight into the construction of the American polity—and the heart of Americanism as we know it today. (shrink)

The contribution starts with a concise account of Kant's moral philosophy. It is shown that a moral will is necessarily an autonomous will and that only the "formal" character of the moral law can establish its universal validity. Some widespread misunderstandings are discussed, especially with regard to the alleged emptiness of the moral law; the relationship between duty and inclination; the role of natural incentives in a moral will; and the necessary objects of such a will. This leads to the (...) idea of the highest good as the objective final end and duty of a finite rational being. Again, typical misunderstandings are dealt with: the reproach of eudaimonism, and heteronomy, and the role of the highest good as incentive; and an alleged inconsistency between Analytic and Dialectic of the Second Critique. In the then following discussion of Kant's doctrine of the postulates and his philosophy of religion, it is shown that religion is totally dependent on morality as philosophy of religion is on moral philosophy; that a belief in God is required neither for the validity of the moral law nor for the obedience to it; that the so-called moral proof is not a proof of God's existence, but only of the practical necessity of its assumption; and that the idea of the highest good refers throughout exclusively to another world. The last chapter first gives a concise account of Kant's teleological philosophy of history and then comes to the result of the whole inquiry: that there is a principle difference between philosophy of religion and philosophy of history which makes them not only independent of each other, but also keeps them in well distinguished fields. The philosophy of religion presupposes moral philosophy. Its main function is to determine what the idea of God morally means to man. Its achievement is to yield a reason of belief for the hope that the realization of the highest moral good is possible and that therefore the moral life of man is not necessarily pointless, as long as he fulfills his respective duty. It has meaning only for the one who is conscious of being subject to the moral law and ready to act accordingly. The philosophy of history on the other hand presupposes especially the doctrine of right. Its main function is to determine what the future of mankind on earth politically means to man. Its achievement is to yield empirical reasons for the hope that the realization of the highest political good is possible and that therefore the political life of man is not necessarily pointless, as long as he fulfills his respective duty. It has meaning only for the one who is conscious of being subject to the law of right and ready to act accordingly, although, it is true, the attainment of the historical aim itself is possible even by acting from purely prudential reasons. (shrink)

This text of Elizabeth Fox-Genovese's is published posthumously in the context of pieces dedicated to her memory. It is unclear whether she intended it for eventual publication or whether she had intended it as a lecture; nor is there decisive evidence for a date of composition. In it, she reviews the stance of feminist literary criticism toward religion and finds it to be generally negative. She regrets that feminist critics see in religion mostly a means of subordinating women (...) to men, given that most of the writers whose work they explicate were themselves fervently religious. She then examines the feminization of religion in nineteenth-century America and the growing idea at the time of female moral stewardship. After examining the contrasting approaches taken to the process of feminization by Harriet Beecher Stowe and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Fox-Genovese then takes as her main case Augusta Jane Evans's novels Beulah and St. Elmo. She argues that feminist critics, in concentrating on questions about the marriage or independence of Evans's characters miss Evans's central concern, which was the loss and recovery of her characters' faith. The feminist critics (given their hostility to religion) misunderstand that Evans's stance was not one against female individualism, but rather (given her commitment as a Christian) a stance against the unbridled individualism of modern American society. (shrink)

The emergence of a science of religion and religions in which the sacred became a topic of disinterested, objective inquiry was itself an important statement about the general character of social change and can be taken as an index of secularization. It implies a level of critical self-reflexive scrutiny in society. In the West, the study of ‘religion’ as a topic of independent inquiry was initially undertaken by theologians who wanted to understand how Christianity could be differentiated from (...) other religions. The problem of religious diversity had arisen as an inevitable consequence of colonial contact with other religious traditions and with phenomena that shared a family resemblance with religion, such as fetishism, animism and magic. The science of religion implies a capacity for self-reflection and criticism, and it is often claimed that other religions do not possess such a science of religion. While different cultures give religion a different content, Christianity was defined as a world religion. In Hegel's dialectical scheme, the increasing self-awareness of the Spirit was a consequence of the historical development of Christianity. The contemporary scientific study of religion and religions is confronted by significant epistemological problems that are associated with globalization, and the traditional question about the nature of religion has acquired a new intensity. (shrink)

The main intent of this paper is to give an account of the relationship between bio-cognition and culture in terms of coevolution, analysing religious beliefs and language evolution as case studies. The established view in cognitive studies is that bio-cognitive systems constitute a constraint for the shaping and the transmission of religious beliefs and linguistic structures. From this point of view, religion and language are by-products or exaptations of processing systems originally selected for other cognitive functions. We criticize such (...) a point of view, showing that it paves the way for the idea that cultural evolution follows a path entirely autonomous and independent from that of biological evolution. Against the by-product and exaptation approaches, our idea is that it is possible to interpret religion and language in terms of coevolution. The concept of coevolution involves a dual path of constitution: one for which biology (cognition) has adaptive effects on culture, the other for which, in turn, forms of culture have adaptive effects on biology (cognition). This dual path of constitution implies that religion and language are (at least in some aspects) forms of biological adaptations. (shrink)

With the Reformation, philosophers sought to establish a new way of thinking independent of religion. Borrowing principles popularized religious reformers: the right of conscience, the utter transcendence of God, the sinfulness of the world, they constructed a new metaphysics that highlighted the mystery of God and the complete intelligibility of 'rational man.' From this history an understanding of our religious situation is distilled. The chapters of this work develop for the reader the intellectual structure of religion and show (...) how its language, imagery and ritual function. They argue that if religion no longer presents a challenge, it is because we think of it in terms of the 'new metaphysics.' To recapture the reality, we must join our contemporaries who are attacking the premises of classical modern philosophy and so experience ourselves afresh. (shrink)

Die Abhängigkeit des Menschen von der Natur ist der Grund der Religion. In diesem Satz verdichtet sich das Religionsverständnis, das Ludwig Feuerbach in seiner kurzen Schrift "Das Wesen der Religion" (1846) dargelegt hat. Mit ihr rückte er den Naturbegriff in den Mittelpunkt seiner Religionsforschung. Gegenüber seiner berühmtesten Abhandlung "Das Wesen des Christentums" (1841) trieb er auf diesem Wege die Gedankengänge, die zum Ursprung der Religion führen sollten, um einige Stollen tiefer. Der Wurzelgrund der Religion liegt nicht (...) allein im Menschen, sondern vielmehr im Verhältnis des Menschen zu der von ihm unabhängigen Natur. Feuerbach erkannte in dieser Bestimmung den Schlüssel zu einem aufgeklärten Religionsverständnis. The Essence of Religion The dependence of human beings on nature is the basis of religion. This statement summarizes the understanding of religion of Ludwig Feuerbach as he presented it in his short treatise "The Essence of Religion" (1846). With this work he shifted the focus of his religious research on the concept of nature. In comparison with his most famous work "The Essence of Christianity" (1841) his thinking, trying to get to the origins of religion, is working here on a somewhat deeper level. The root of religion is not to be found only in humanity but much more in the relationship of humanity with a nature which is independent from human beings. Feuerbach saw in this definition the key to an enligthened understanding of religion. (shrink)

Alternate Universes: Religion assumes the other world after death: paradise, hell, nirvana, karma.. Our world is incomplete, because there is truer universe, replicating Plato: behind something is something.. till the true idea - last judgment, karma.. R. Descartes's "I think, therefore I am", is independent of Plato. I'm thinking, regardless of there is truer idea or not. As I'm thinking, I can realize my first idea was false (eg. solving a math problem), and then the Plato's truer idea reappears. (...) Plato and Descartes precede each other as chicken and egg.. Paradox of Religion: Religions' rules (e.g. don't lie) increase chances of future paradise. Hume's: "A" preceding "B" doesn't need to cause "B" turns to: Expectation of "B" can cause "A" NOW Believers expect paradise to forever delay it. Paradise can paradoxically occur only by deviation from the religion... Exhibited in Holland Park, W8 6LU, The Ice House between 18. Oct - 3. Nov. 2013. (shrink)

One of the pressing problems of contemporary Ukrainian religious studies is the study of its own history, some of which were either deformed or silenced in Soviet times. The practice of silence primarily concerned representatives of the Ukrainian revival of the early twentieth century, who, through their socio-political and scientific activities, asserted the right of the Ukrainian nation to independent development. The cohort of these prominent figures included Nikita Shapoval. Studying his religious heritage is important in view of the following (...) points: first, it will make it possible to understand the history of our religious studies in its totality, and secondly, to expand the range of ideas, concepts, provisions for addressing the pressing issues that the national is working on religious studies. One of the most important issues is the nature and functionality of religion. (shrink)

Religion and Morality seeks to answer two fundamental questions regarding the relation between religion and morality. The first is the puzzle posed by Socrates, the so-called ' Euthyphro dilemma', which asks: is morality valuable by virtue of its intrinsic importance and worth, or is morality valuable because, and only because, God approves it and commands us to follow its dictates? The second question is raised by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling. He asks: Is a conflict between religion (...) and morality possible? Does God ever demand that we neglect our moral commitments? The discussion on these questions is divided into three parts. In the first two parts, we discuss the idea that morality depends on religion. The authors distinguish two types of dependence: strong dependence, according to which the very existence, or validity, of moral obligations depends on God's command, and weak dependence, according to which though morality itself is independent of God, God is necessary to enable human beings to know their moral duties and to carry them out. The authors reject the strong dependence thesis, as well as most versions of the weak dependence. The third part of the book discusses different versions of the view that religion might conflict with morality. The authors reject this view, and show that very few religious thinkers would follow it all the way through to its ultimate consequences. The book has implications for the philosophy of religion, in its emphasis on the centrality of the moral element in religion, and for moral philosophy, in its highlighting, among other things, of the nature of moral judgments. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the cognitive tension between science and religion, in particular on the contradictions between some of the claims of current science and some of the claims in religious texts. My aim is to suggest how some work in the philosophy of science may help to manage this tension. Thus I will attempt to apply some work in the philosophy of science to the philosophy of religion, following the traditional gambit of trying to stretch the little (...) one does understand to cover what one does not understand. My own views on science and religion are hardly views from nowhere. My scientific perspective is that of a hopeful realist. Scientific realism is the view that science, though fallible through and through, is in the truth business, attempting to find out about a world independent of ourselves, and it is the view that business is, on the whole, going pretty well. My religious perspective is that of a progressive Jew. The problem I am worrying in this essay is my own problem. I take my other philosophical problems seriously too, but for the me the question of the relationship between science and religion has a personal edge I do not feel in my other philosophical obsessions with the likes of the problems of induction or the content of ceteris paribus laws. My reply to a charge of self-indulgence would be that my cognitive predicament is, I believe, widely shared. (shrink)

In this study, the religious philosophy of Teoman Duralı, one of the leading representatives of contemporary Turkish thought, will be discussed. We are aware that studies have been carried out in various fields regarding Teoman Duralı's thought and philosophy. As far as we know, there has been no independent study on the philosophy of religion, which is one of the most important elements of Durali's philosophical system. Duralı did not use the concept of classical religious philosophy in a technical (...) sense in any of his works. However, in many of his works, he discussed the dominant subjects of philosophy of religion such as existence, knowledge, ethics, metaphysics, God vision, mind-revelation relationship, faith-knowledge dialectic, truth, self-soul and immortality in a comprehensive, consistent, rational and objective way. Religion has a central position in Duralı's thought. While establishing the philosophy-science-religion relationship, our philosopher took into account the boundaries drawn between reason and religion by philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Ghazali, Kant and Kierkegaard. In particular, the noumenon-phenomenon dualism, which is the basis of Kant's metaphysics and epistemology, and the distinction between reason and religion based on it, have been one of the starting points for Duralı. Duralı uses his own unique philosophical terminology in his philosophy of religion. For example, although concepts such as "Truth" and "Reality", "Life and Life" are used synonymously in the TDK Turkish Dictionary, it includes these concepts by giving them different philosophical contents. Our aim is to make a modest contribution to this field by considering Teoman Duralı's views on religion and philosophy, which are sprinkled throughout his works, in the form of philosophy of religion in accordance with his sensitivity to language and concepts. (shrink)

Pragmatism is often thought to be incompatible with realism, the view that there are knowable mind-independent facts, objects, or properties. In this article, I show that there are, in fact, realist versions of pragmatism and argue that a realist pragmatism of the right sort can make important contributions to such fields as religious ethics and philosophy of religion. Using William James's pragmatism as my primary example, I show (1) that James defended realist and pluralist views in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, (...) and philosophy of religion, and (2) that these views not only cohere with his pragmatism but indeed are basic to it. After arguing that James's pragmatism provides a credible and useful approach to a number of basic philosophical and religious issues, I conclude by reflecting on some ways in which we can apply and potentially improve James's views in the study of religion. (shrink)

Almost all religions contain a code of morality, and in spite of the factthat there are moral codes and philosophies that do not rely upon anyreligion, it has been traditionally argued that there are at least threeimportant ways in which morality needs religion: the goal of the morallife is unreachable without religious practice, religion is necessary toprovide moral motivation, and religion provides morality with itsfoundation and justification. These three ways in which morality may needreligion are independent, but (...) I argue that there are conceptual connectionsamong the standard arguments for them. I identify reasons for resistance tothe idea that morality needs religion and then turn to arguments for each ofthe three ways in which morality may need religion. All three are related toclassic forms of the moral argument for the existence of God. I conclude bycomparing classic Divine Command Theory with my Divine Motivation Theory andargue that the latter has advantages over the former in the way it providesa theological foundation for ethics. (shrink)

In this paper several problems are raised concerning Ian Barbour's four ways of interrelating science and religion—Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and Integration—as put forward in such publications as his highly influential Religion in an Age of Science (1990) and widely adopted by other writers in this field. The authors argue that this taxonomy is not very useful or analytically helpful, especially to historians seeking to understand past engagements between science and religion.

Natural sciences and natural philosophy of the Jesuits are based on theology. At least the concept of God is an integral part of their theoretical structure. Examples are taken from Rudjer Boskovic, Honoré Fabri and Nicolaus Cabeus. In fact, the Jesuits, e.g. Theophil Raynaud, dealt with natural theology as the spiritual foundation of knowledge independent of revelation. But natural theology, as in Raimundus Sabundus, has an anthropocentric and hence moral dimension: it links knowledge with religion. ‘Ignatius of Loyola influenced (...) decisively the Jesuits’ concept of science and its relationship to religion through his Spiritual Exercises in which meditation and religious practice are developed into a technique and a scientific approach to faith. (shrink)