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  1. Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - London and New York: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
    How do we go about weighing evidence, testing hypotheses, and making inferences? The model of " inference to the best explanation " -- that we infer the hypothesis that would, if correct, provide the best explanation of the available evidence--offers a compelling account of inferences both in science and in ordinary life. Widely cited by epistemologists and philosophers of science, IBE has nonetheless remained little more than a slogan. Now this influential work has been thoroughly revised and updated, and features (...)
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  2.  48
    Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - London and New York: Routledge.
    How do we go about weighing evidence, testing hypotheses, and making inferences? According to the model of _Inference to the Best Explanation_, we work out what to infer from the evidence by thinking about what would actually explain that evidence, and we take the ability of a hypothesis to explain the evidence as a sign that the hypothesis is correct. In _Inference to the Best Explanation_, Peter Lipton gives this important and influential idea the development and assessment it deserves. The (...)
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  3.  19
    Inference to the best explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - New York: Routledge.
    "How do we go about weighing evidence, testing hypotheses and making inferences? According to the model of 'inference to the Best explanation', we work out what to inter from the evidence by thinking about what would actually explain that evidence, and we take the ability of a hypothesis to explain the evidence as a sign that the hypothesis is correct. In inference to the Best Explanation, Peter Lipton gives this important and influential idea the development and assessment it deserves." "The (...)
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  4.  59
    Précis of Inference to the Best Explanation, 2 nd Edition.Peter Lipton - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):421-423.
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  5. Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2005 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 193.
    Science depends on judgments of the bearing of evidence on theory. Scientists must judge whether an observation or the result of an experiment supports, disconfirms, or is simply irrelevant to a given hypothesis. Similarly, scientists may judge that, given all the available evidence, a hypothesis ought to be accepted as correct or nearly so, rejected as false, or neither. Occasionally, these evidential judgments can be made on deductive grounds. If an experimental result strictly contradicts a hypothesis, then the truth of (...)
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  6. Understanding without explanation.Peter Lipton - 2008 - In Henk W. De Regt, Sabina Leonelli & Kai Eigner (eds.), Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 43-63.
  7. Contrastive Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1990 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:247-266.
    According to a causal model of explanation, we explain phenomena by giving their causes or, where the phenomena are themselves causal regularities, we explain them by giving a mechanism linking cause and effect. If we explain why smoking causes cancer, we do not give the cause of this causal connection, but we do give the causal mechanism that makes it. The claim that to explain is to give a cause is not only natural and plausible, but it also avoids many (...)
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  8.  80
    The epistemology of testimony.Peter Lipton - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (1):1-31.
  9. All else being equal.Peter Lipton - 1999 - Philosophy 74 (2):155-168.
    Most laws are ceteris paribus (cp) laws: they say not that all Fs are G but only that All Fs are G all else being equal. Most philosophical accounts of laws, however, have focused on strict laws. This paper considers how some of the standard philosophical problems about laws change when we switch attention from strict to cp laws and what special problems these laws raise. It is argued that some cp laws do not simply reflect the complexity of the (...)
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  10. What Good Is an Explanation?Peter Lipton - 2001 - In G. Hon & S. Rakover (eds.), Explanation. Springer Verlag. pp. 43-59.
    We are addicted to explanation, constantly asking and answering why-questions. But what does an explanation give us? I will consider some of the possible goods, intrinsic and instrumental, that explanations provide. The name for the intrinsic good of explanation is `understanding', but what is this? In the first part of this paper I will canvass various conceptions of understanding, according to which explanations provide reasons for belief, make familiar, unify, show to be necessary, or give causes. Three general features of (...)
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  11. Is explanation a guide to inference? A reply to Wesley salmon.Peter Lipton - 2001 - In Giora Hon (ed.), The Why and How of Explanation: An Analytical Exposition. Springer.
    Earlier in this volume, Wesley Salmon has given a characteristically clear and trenchant critique of the account of non-demonstrative reasoning known by the slogan `Inference to the Best Explanation'. As a long-time fan of the idea that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference, I was delighted by the suggestion that Wes and I might work together on a discussion of the issues. In the event, this project has exceeded my high expectations, for in addition to the intellectual gain that (...)
     
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  12. Alien abduction: Inference to the best explanation and the management of testimony.Peter Lipton - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):238-251.
    This paper considers how we decide whether to believe what we are told. Inference to the Best Explanation, a popular general account of non-demonstrative reasoning, is applied to this task. The core idea of this application is that we believe what we are told when the truth of what we are told would figure in the best explanation of the fact that we were told it. We believe the fact uttered when it is part of the best explanation of the (...)
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  13.  35
    VI*—Is the Best Good Enough?Peter Lipton - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1):89-104.
    Peter Lipton; VI*—Is the Best Good Enough?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 89–104, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.
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  14.  13
    Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2000 - In W. Newton-Smith (ed.), A companion to the philosophy of science. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. pp. 184–193.
    Science depends on judgments of the bearing of evidence on theory. Scientists must judge whether an observation or the result of an experiment supports, disconfirms, or is simply irrelevant to a given hypothesis. Similarly, scientists may judge that, given all the available evidence, a hypothesis ought to be accepted as correct or nearly so, rejected as false, or neither. Occasionally, these evidential judgments can be make on deductive grounds. If an experimental result strictly contradicts a hypothesis, then the truth of (...)
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  15.  34
    Tracking Track Records.Peter Lipton & John Worrall - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74:179-235.
    [Peter Lipton] From a reliabilist point of view, our inferential practices make us into instruments for determining the truth value of hypotheses where, like all instruments, reliability is a central virtue. I apply this perspective to second-order inductions, the inductive assessments of inductive practices. Such assessments are extremely common, for example whenever we test the reliability of our instruments or our informants. Nevertheless, the inductive assessment of induction has had a bad name ever since David Hume maintained that any attempt (...)
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  16.  21
    Tracking Track Records.Peter Lipton & John Worrall - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74:179-235.
    From a reliabilist point of view, our inferential practices make us into instruments for determining the truth value of hypotheses where, like all instruments, reliability is a central virtue. I apply this perspective to second-order inductions, the inductive assessments of inductive practices. Such assessments are extremely common, for example whenever we test the reliability of our instruments or our informants. Nevertheless, the inductive assessment of induction has had a bad name ever since David Hume maintained that any attempt to justify (...)
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  17.  62
    Making a Difference.Peter Lipton - 1993 - Philosophica 51.
    An effect is typically explained by citing a cause, but not any cause will do. The oxygen and the spark were both causes of the fire, but normally only the spark explains it. What then distinguishes explanatory from unexplanatory causes? One might attempt to characterise this distinction in terms of intrinsic features of the causes. For example, some causes are changes while others are standing conditions, and one might claim that only the changes explain. Both the spark and the oxygen (...)
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  18.  89
    Testimony: a primer.Martin Kusch & Peter Lipton - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):209-217.
  19. Contrastive explanation and causal triangulation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):687-697.
    Alan Garfinkel (1981) and Bas van Fraassen (1980), among others, have proposed a contrastive theory of explanation, according to which the proper form of an explanatory why-question is not simply "Why P?" but "Why P rather than Q?". Dennis Temple (1988) has argued in this journal that the contrastive explanandum "P rather than Q" is equivalent to the conjunction, "P and not-Q". I show that the contrast is not equivalent to the conjunction, nor to other plausible noncontrastive candidates. I then (...)
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  20.  86
    Tracking track records, I.Peter Lipton - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):179–205.
    From a reliabilist point of view, our inferential practices make us into instruments for determining the truth value of hypotheses where, like all instruments, reliability is a central virtue. I apply this perspective to second-order inductions, the inductive assessments of inductive practices. Such assessments are extremely common, for example whenever we test the reliability of our instruments or our informants. Nevertheless, the inductive assessment of induction has had a bad name ever since David Hume maintained that any attempt to justify (...)
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  21.  30
    Quests of a realist.Otávio Bueno, Igor Douven, Peter Lipton & Michael Redhead - 2001 - Metascience 10 (3):341-366.
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  22. What can Bas believe? Musgrave and Van Fraassen on observability.Paul Dicken & Peter Lipton - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):226–233.
    There is a natural objection to the epistemic coherence of Bas van Fraassen’s use of a distinction between the observable and unobservable in his constructive empiricism, an objection that has been raised with particular clarity by Alan Musgrave. We outline Musgrave’s objection, and then consider how one might interpret and evaluate van Fraassen’s response. According to the constructive empiricist, observability for us is measured with respect to the epistemic limits of human beings qua measuring devices, limitations ‘which will be described (...)
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  23. Science and religion : the immersion solution.Peter Lipton - 2009 - In John Cornwell & Michael McGhee (eds.), Philosophers and God: at the frontiers of faith and reason. New York: Continuum. pp. 31--46.
    This essay focuses on the cognitive tension between science and religion, in particular on the contradictions between some of the claims of current science and some of the claims in religious texts. My aim is to suggest how some work in the philosophy of science may help to manage this tension. Thus I will attempt to apply some work in the philosophy of science to the philosophy of religion, following the traditional gambit of trying to stretch the little one does (...)
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  24.  79
    Where guesses come from: Evolutionary epistemology and the anomaly of guided variation.Edward Stein & Peter Lipton - 1989 - Biology and Philosophy 4 (1):33-56.
    This paper considers a central objection to evolutionary epistemology. The objection is that biological and epistemic development are not analogous, since while biological variation is blind, epistemic variation is not. The generation of hypotheses, unlike the generation of genotypes, is not random. We argue that this objection is misguided and show how the central analogy of evolutionary epistemology can be preserved. The core of our reply is that much epistemic variation is indeed directed by heuristics, but these heuristics are analogous (...)
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  25.  73
    Prediction and prejudice.Peter Lipton - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1):51 – 65.
    Abstract Evidence that supports a theory may be available to the scientist who constructs the theory and used as a guide to that construction, or it may only be discovered in the course of testing the theory. The central claim of this essay is that information about whether the evidence was accommodated or predicted affects the rational degree of confidence one ought to have in the theory. Only when the evidence is accommodated is there some reason to believe that the (...)
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  26. Truth, existence, and the best explanation.Peter Lipton - 1994 - In A. A. Derksen (ed.), The scientific realism of Rom Harré. Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg University Press.
  27.  9
    Tracking Track Records, I.Peter Lipton - 2000 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1):179-205.
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  28.  53
    Alien Abduction: Inference to the Best Explanation and the Management of Testimony.Peter Lipton - 2007 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3):238-251.
  29.  68
    Kant on wheels.Peter Lipton - 2003 - Social Epistemology 17 (2-3):215-219.
    At a New York cocktail party shortly after the war, a young and insecure physics postgraduate was heard to blurt out to a woman he had met there: ‘I just want to know what Truth is!’ This was Thomas Kuhn and what he meant was that specific truths such as those of physics mattered less to him than acquiring metaphysical knowledge of the nature of truth. Soon afterwards, he gave up physics, but rather than take up philosophy directly, he approached (...)
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  30.  17
    I–John Worrall.Peter Lipton - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):179-205.
  31.  55
    The Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - Cogito 5 (1):9-14.
  32. Causation and Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2009 - In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press UK.
  33. Causation outside the law.Peter Lipton - 1992 - In Hyman Gross & Ross Harrison (eds.), Jurisprudence: Cambridge essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 127--148.
     
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  34. The reach of the law.Peter Lipton - 2002 - Philosophical Books 43:254-260.
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  35. Mathematical Understanding.Peter Lipton - 2011 - In John Polkinghorne (ed.), Meaning in mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  36. A Real Contrast.Peter Lipton - 1987 - Analysis 47 (4):207 - 208.
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  37.  95
    The best explanation of a scientific paper.Peter Lipton - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (3):406-410.
    Frederick Suppe would have us reject hypothetico-deductivism, Bayesianism, and Inference to the Best Explanation, on the grounds that none of these philosophical models can account for the argumentative structure that virtually all data-based papers in science share, a structure exemplified by W. Jason Morgan's landmark paper in plate tectonics. At the core of that putative universal structure is a strategy whereby recalcitrant data are given interpretations designed to show that the theory or scientific model being advanced need not take them (...)
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  38. Accepting contradictions.Peter Lipton - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  39.  7
    Précis of Inference to the Best Explanation, 2 nd Edition.Peter Lipton - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):421-423.
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  40.  10
    Theory, Evidence, and Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1995 - Dartmouth Publishing Company.
    This work on the philosophy of science shows how it cuts across the core areas of philosophy. Topics covered include the nature of natural laws; aleatory explanations; epistemology (The Dogma that Didn't Bark by Fodor); logic versus historical theories of confirmation; and much more.
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  41.  59
    The Medawar lecture 2004: The truth about science.Peter Lipton - 2005 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 360:1259-1269.
    The attitudes of scientists towards the philosophy of science is mixed and includes considerable indifference and some hostility. This may be due in part to unrealistic expectation and to misunderstanding. Philosophy is unlikely directly to improve scientific practices, but scientists may find the attempt to explain how science works and what it achieves of considerable interest nevertheless. The present state of the philosophy of science is illustrated by recent work on the ‘truth hypothesis’, according to which, science is generating increasingly (...)
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  42. Induction.Peter Lipton - 1998 - In Martin Curd & Jan A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. Norton.
     
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  43. 5.Peter Lipton - 1996 - In David Papineau (ed.), Is the Best Good Enough? Oxford University Press. pp. 93-106.
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  44. From metaphysics to method.Peter Lipton - unknown
    The stimulating programme of The Dappled World is metaphysics in the service of methodology. To say that the world is dappled is to say that the laws of nature only apply to certain regions. A central argument for this claim is epistemic. Although the laws, especially laws of physics, are typically thought of as universal, in fact we have only managed to construct precise quantitative models for a very limited range of cases, most of which lie within the artificially simplified (...)
     
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  45. Hume's problem: Induction and the justification of belief.Peter Lipton - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):579-583.
  46. Binding the mind.Peter Lipton - 1998 - In John Cornwell (ed.), Consciousness and Human Identity. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 212--224.
    Several of the essays in this collection discuss the `binding problem', the problem of explaining in neurophysiological terms how it is that we see the various perceptual qualities of a physical object, such as its shape, colour, location and motion, as features of a single object. The perceived object seems to us a unitary thing, but its sensory properties are diverse and turn out to be processed in different areas of the brain. How then does the brain manage the integration? (...)
     
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  47. Cambridge contributions:.Peter Lipton - unknown
    To admit at a cocktail party that one does philosophy of science is a good way to end the conversation. Many people have only the haziest idea what philosophers do and many people think that philosophy and science have nothing to do with each other. So I will begin with some general remarks about the philosophy of science, before turning to the great Cambridge tradition in the subject. Finally, because the only way properly to appreciate philosophy is to worry a (...)
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  48.  11
    CP laws, reduction, and explanatory pluralism.Peter Lipton - 2008 - In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. New York: Oxford University Press.
  49.  49
    Does the Truth Matter in Science?Peter Lipton - 2005 - Arts and Humanities in Higher Education 4 (2):173-183.
    Is science in the truth business, discovering ever more about an independent and largely unobservable world? Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, two of the most important figures in science studies in the 20th century, gave accounts of science that are in some tension with the truth view. Their central claims about science are considered here, along with two arguments that bear directly on the truth question. One argument makes an appeal to past scientific failures to argue against the truth view; (...)
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  50.  33
    1 Evidence and Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2008 - In Andrew Bell, John Swenson-Wright & Karin Tybjerg (eds.), Evidence. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 19--10.
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