Wittgenstein did not write on the philosophy of religion. But certain strands of his later thought readily lend themselves to what I call Wittgensteinian Fideism. There is no text that I can turn to for an extended statement of this position, but certain remarks made by Winch, Hughes, Malcolm, Geach, Cavell, Cameron and Coburn can either serve as partial statements of this position, or can be easily used in service of such a statement. Some of their contentions will serve as (...) targets for my argumentation, for as much as I admire Wittgenstein, it seems to me that the fideistic conclusions drawn by these philosophers from his thought are often absurd. This leads me back to an inspection of their arguments and the premisses in these arguments. (shrink)

Wittgenstein did not write on the philosophy of religion. But certain strands of his later thought readily lend themselves to what I call Wittgensteinian Fideism. There is no text that I can turn to for an extended statement of this position, but certain remarks made by Winch, Hughes, Malcolm, Geach, Cavell, Cameron and Coburn can either serve as partial statements of this position, or can be easily used in service of such a statement. Some of their contentions will serve as (...) targets for my argumentation, for as much as I admire Wittgenstein, it seems to me that the fideistic conclusions drawn by these philosophers from his thought are often absurd. This leads me back to an inspection of their arguments and the premisses in these arguments. (shrink)

Addressing the end-of-philosophy debate and the challenge it presents to contemporary philosophy, this book draws on Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, Habermas and Foucault, among others. It develops the implications of Richard Rorty's arguments in particular.

Argues that morality can exist without religion, suggests that values and principles of conduct emerge from life, and examines the consequences of moral absolutism.

Noted philosopher Kai Nielsen offers an answer to this fundamental question - a question that reaches in to grasp at the very heart of ethics itself. Essentially, this innocent inquiry masks a confusion that so many of us get caught in as we think about moral issues. We fail to realize that there is a difference between judging human behavior within an ethical context, or set of moral principles, and justifying the principles themselves. According to Nielsen, it is precisely this (...) basic muddle that has spawned all sorts of challenges to morality, from relativism and intuitionism to egoism and skepticism. Nielsen first argues the case for these challenges in the strongest possible terms; then he shows that their failure to establish themselves demonstrates a fundamental flaw - an inability to understand what it means to have good reasons for the moral claims we make. In his search for "good reasons," Nielsen must face the innocent question "Why be moral?" He tries to show us that skirmishes among supporters of specific moral principles require a different sort of resolution than those that occur between groups of ethical principles. Justifying an action within a moral point of view is quite different from making the case for having a moral point of view in the first place. In its relentless search for the very basis of morality and the limits of moral justification, Why Be Moral? outlines the essential questions that will help us clear away confusion. Nielsen's approach will interest and delight informed readers and professionals alike. This vital work addresses itself to thoughtful people everywhere who are perplexed about morality and about the foundations of the moral life. (shrink)

The method of appealing to considered judgments in Wide Reflective Equilibrium has been thought to have unwelcome relativistic or ethnocentric implications. This belief, which is widely held, is, I shall argue, mistaken. Wide Reflective equilibrium has no such untoward implications. I shall first specify what I am talking about in speaking of relativism, then generally characterize WRE, then deploy some central arguments for it and finally try to show that it has no relativistic implications.

This volume considers in depth and carefully a cluster of issues central to contemporary philosophical and social scientific investigation while utilising methods and conceptualisations at the very cutting edge of philosophy.

Since Rorty, the crisis of method and interests in philosophy has been at the forefront of metaphilosophy. In this book, Kai Nielsen, one of the most prominent critics of philosophy-as-usual, examines critically the most important claims made on behalf of philosophy. After rejecting as chimerical the ambitious claims of traditional, especially foundational, epistemology and metaphysics, he presents the case for a more modest view of what philosophy can accomplish.Nielsen insists that philosophy must be devoted to actual problems of real people (...) in everyday life. Influenced substantively by Dewey and more methodologically by Rawls, he carves out a defensible terrain for philosophy to inhabit—a terrain cleared of the more extravagant but implausible claims made by traditional philosophy.Nielsen has been a major voice in debates about the scope of philosophy, and this latest work of his will be an important contribution to the “end of philosophy debate.”. (shrink)

I want, some might say, to have my cake and eat it too for I want to be both a cosmopolitan and a nationalist, and, congruently with that, I think liberals and socialists, depending on the societies in which they live, should be either cosmopolitan nationalists or people in sympathy with liberal nationalist projects where these projects have a legitimate point. This includes people like myself who are liberal socialists committed, as all socialists are, to socialist internationalism and the international (...) solidarity that goes with it. How can—or can?—these things consistently go together? Beyond that—consistency being necessary but hardly a sufficient condition for adequacy—why go for cosmopolitan nationalism? Why not instead just go straight-out for cosmopolitanism and its internationalist outlook without the dangler 'nationalism'? (shrink)

In the first chapter of Karl Marx's Theory of History, G. A. Cohen contrasts Marx's image of history with Hegel's, contrasts, that is, a powerful form of historical idealism with historical materialism. Historical idealism stresses the “dominion of thought” ; social change, on such an account, is to be explained principally in terms of changes in consciousness, the course of history being determined by fundamental ruling ideas and conceptions. This view is to be contrasted with historical materialism. The central vision (...) of history in Hegel is formulated as follows by Cohen, “History is the history of the world spirit which undergoes growth in self-knowledge, the stimulus and vehicle of which is a culture, which perishes when it has stimulated more growth than it can contain”. Marx's vision, a historical materialist vision, is identical in structure with Hegel's, but endows the structure with a new content. This can be seen from the parallel formulation of it, given by Cohen: “History is the history of human industry, which undergoes growth in productive power, the stimulus and vehicle of which is an economic structure which perishes when it has stimulated more growth than it can contain. (shrink)

There are, it is argued, conceptually and empirically adequate naturalistic explanations of religion that explain religion without explaining it away and without leaving out anything needed fully to comprehend religious phenomena. Moreover, naturalistic explanations arc sometimes also critiques of religion. This article concerns itself with a subspecies of such explanations through articulating and defending some naturalistic criticisms of the truth-claims of religion. The rationale is displayed for naturalistic thinkers going from truth-claim analyses to functional analyses and the central naturalistic explanations (...) of the roles and functions of religion are distinguished and related. It is shown how these analyses dovetail and, particularly when supplemented by an error-theory of religious belief, constitute a comprehensive and adequate explanation of religion. (shrink)

Will globalization promote or hinder social justice throughout the world? In this cogent analysis philosopher Kai Nielsen argues that in its present form capitalist globalization will only ensure that the rich get richer and the poor poorer. Noting that the ratio of the richest countries to the poorest has steadily grown larger under capitalism in the 20th century and that the total dollar value of the world economy has increased fivefold while the number of people living in poverty has doubled, (...) Nielsen clearly demonstrates that globalization has made and still is making a bad situation worse. While inveighing against capitalist globalization, he makes the important point that a globalization based on "market socialism" - to ensure both needed efficiency and an egalitarian conception of justice - would be a trend that people in all nations would welcome. Democratic socialism, despite historical betrayals and recent setbacks, Nielsen contends, is still humanity's best hope for achieving a classless, nonracist, and nonsexist world community. He devotes a number of chapters to a discussion of the critical theory that is the basis of this vision of a completely egalitarian international society, and he compares and contrasts his own position with that of such thinkers as Richard Rorty, John Rawls, Juergen Habermas, G. A. Cohen, and others. This well-argued critique of capitalist globalization and defense of democratic socialism as a viable alternative is essential reading for philosophers, political scientists, students of international relations, and anyone concerned about the future of democratic and egalitarian ideals. (shrink)

There are three remarks of Norman Malcolm’s with which I should like to begin. The first is his remark that.

Self-realizationist theories are among the classical attempts to develop a comprehensive normative ethical theory. Plato and Aristotle, in giving classical statements of such theories, argue that a man's distinctive happiness, a man's distinctive flourishing, will only be realized when he realizes himself, i.e. when he achieves to the fullest possible degree his distinctive function. And to achieve one's function is to develop to the full those capacities which are distinctive of the human animal. In doing this we are being most (...) truly ourselves and in doing this we are doing what it is our own nature to do. Men who cultivate to the fullest that which men and only men have will be the happiest men and in so acting they will realize themselves most fully; they will achieve their maximum potential or their fullest distinctively human growth. To so realize oneself is the final end of all moral activity. It defines what is to constitute ‘the good life’ and what is to count as ‘a good man’. (shrink)

A method of reflective equilibrium is adumbrated and then used to test the adequacy of moral conceptions appealing to fundamental human rights against Nietzschean conceptions of morality which would reject such an appeal. There is an attempt here both to articulate and critically probe a distinctive moral methodology (the method of reflective equilibrium) and to examine skeptical challenges to a foundationalism which would ground morality in fundamental rights claims. I attempt a partial testing of such a moral methodology by examining (...) its ability to meet such skeptical challenges to the rational grounding of human rights, and I assess (and this is plainly a reciprocal process) the depth of such skeptical challenges by the ability of such challenges to survive such an application of a method of reflective equilibrium. If that method is applied with discrimination and understanding, is it sufficient to defuse skeptical challenges to the pervasive belief that either rationality or the very taking of the moral point of view requires the acceptance of the belief that the design of morally acceptable social institutions and practices must be such that they aim at achieving a state of affairs in which all human beings are to be afforded equal consideration? Can a method of reflective equilibrium establish that a good society must embody such a commitment to an equality of human rights? (shrink)

An identification is made of the core metaphilosophical, philosophical, and intellectual history theses in Richard Rorty's pragmatism. Their rationale is displayed and it is argued that his metaphilosophical theses are very much dependent on certain of his non?metaphilosophical philosophical theses, most centrally his anti?representationalism. Questions emerge about the status and justification of these theses. Rorty, in his programmatic pronouncements, resists providing a vindication of them. Seeking to avoid what has been called performative contradictions, he regards it as sufficient to provide (...) the best narrative going of what is to be said here. It is argued that a more straightforward defence can be provided that does not depart from his holism or his historicism with its setting aside of claims of necessity. (shrink)

RésuméLe recours au raisonnable est partout présent dans l'œuvre de John Rawls. Et cependant, le concept lui-même est souvent vu comme problématique et nombreux sont ceux quipensent que le raisonnable ne saurait avoir la portée cruciale que Rawls lui attribue. Le concept est ici élucidé et certaines conceptualisations du raisonnable sont explicitées. L'auteur soutient que ces conceptualisationspermettent au raisonnable dejouer le rôle-clé que Rawls en attend.