There is nowadays consensus in the community of didactics of science regarding the need to include the philosophy of science in didactical research, science teacher education, curriculum design, and the practice of science education in all educational levels. Some authors have identified an ever-increasing use of the concept of ‘theoretical model’, stemming from the so-called semantic view of scientific theories. However, it can be recognised that, in didactics of science, there are over-simplified transpositions of the idea of model. In (...) this sense, contemporary philosophy of science is often blurred or distorted in the science education literature. In this paper, we address the discussion around some meta-theoretical concepts that are introduced into didactics of science due to their perceived educational value. We argue for the existence of a ‘semantic family’, and we characterise four different versions of semantic views existing within the family. In particular, we seek to contribute to establishing a model-based didactics of science mainly supported in this semantic family. (shrink)

Unquestionably, Restorative Justice (hereafter RJ) has finally gathered some real momentum. It has become a sine qua non topic in many national and international policy and statutory agendas. However, as the restorative practice expands to deal with crimes, ages and situations it has never addressed before (at least in its contemporary version), and as its application starts to make sense not only to national but also to regional and international bodies and fora, new theoretical problems are posed. In the (...) fast-growing literature many theories and Schools have been evoked to support RJ's claims. This paper will take the discussion a step back by looking at questions of meta-theoretical character. In particular, the paper will ask: Does RJ have a place in the “world of theories,” and if it does, then what kind of theory is it, and on what level should it be placed? Second, does RJ theory need a philosophy, and why? Finally, how can restorative practices be morally justified? (shrink)

The object of this paper is the domain of semiotic theories, from “traditional” semiotics to poststructuralism and postmodernism, excluding “semiotizing” approaches such as phenomenology or cultural studies. Thus, it is metatheoretical. It is based on two matrices. The first maps semiotic theories on the basis of the continuity or discontinuity between them. The second displays the logical categories of the relationship between semiotics and Marxism, which has historically been an important influence on the field. The paper presents the views of (...) the main authors of the domain in terms of these two matrices. Some of the conclusions are: the irreconcilability between Saussurean and Peircean semiotics; the greater historical development of the former in comparison to the latter; the different orientation between Central and Eastern European semiotics on the one hand and French semiotics on the other; the strong influence of Saussure and Levi-Straussian structuralism on poststructuralism; the increase of the influence of Marxism from structuralism to poststructuralism; and the transformation from poststructuralism to North American postmodernism.The paper closes with some thoughts about the present status of the main semiotic currents and a proposal for a fertile future orientation for semiotics. (shrink)

In a recent book, McShea and Brandon argue that the observed diversity and complexity of life are explainable by a principle they call the “zero-force evolutionary law” or “ZFEL”. Although this principle would be implicit in many explanations given by biologists, it would have never been made explicit. Assuming that this idea is interesting, and that the authors are right, we will discuss the metatheoretical way in which they present said principle, as being a part of probability theory. This allows (...) the authors to claim that probability theory provides the reductive basis for all evolutionary biology. We will defend, in accordance with them, that ZFEL is not a solely biological principle, but not because it is a part of probability theory, but rather because it is a specific version of the principle of common cause. (shrink)

Ever since climate change has been identified as one of the most significant challenges of humanity, climate change deniers have repeatedly tried to discredit the work of scientists. To show how these processes work, Maria M. Sojka examines three ideals about how science should operate. These ideals concern the understanding of uncertainties, the relationship between models and data, and the role of values in science. Their widespread presence in the public understanding of science makes it easy for political and industrial (...) stakeholders to undermine inconvenient research. To address this issue, Sojka analyses the importance of tacit knowledge in scientific practice and the question of what defines an expert. (shrink)

This paper examines several intended topological features of the Region Connection Calculus (RCC) and argues that they are either underdetermined by the formal theory or given by the complement axiom. Conditions are identified under which the axioms of RCC are satisfied in topological models under various set restrictions. The results generalise previous results in the literature to non-strict topological models and across possible interpretations of connection. It is shown that the intended interpretation of connection and the alignment of self-connection with (...) topological connection are underdetermined by the axioms of RCC, which suggests that additional axioms are necessary to secure these features. It is also argued that the complement axiom gives RCC models much of their topological structure. In particular, the incompatibility of RCC with interiors is argued to be given by the complement axiom. (shrink)

In Fallibilism Democracy and the Market, Calvin Hayes proposes an original solution to the major meta-theoretical issue in moral philosophy, the is-ought problem, then utilizes it to define and/or solve practical problems in both applied ethics and public policy. The solution and its applications are based on a unified theory of rationality applicable to epistemology, ethics and public policy, predicated on a revised Popperian fallibilism. It is intended as a defense of Karl Popper's political philosophy but only after (...) a substantial revision of its theoretical and meta-theoretical basis. (shrink)

In Stig Hjarvard’s characterization, mediatization studies move beyond the positivist origins of the social sciences, as they must in order to avoid the fundamental contradiction between original commitments to classical determinism vis-à-vis human agency as acknowledged within mediatization studies. In order to sustain and enhance Hjarvard’s vision of the coherence between human agency and mediatization studies as a species of social science, I first sharpen these theoretical tensions by developing a robust account of human freedom as informed by Kant (...) and virtue ethics. I then adopt precise understandings of complementarity and epistemological pluralism as initially developed in Quantum Mechanics and subsequently by Karen Barad and Judith Simon as frameworks that can coherently conjoin contemporary social science with strong accounts of human freedom. The resulting coherency—or entanglement—between ethics and science implies new ethical responsibilities for social scientists as ‘virtuous agents’. (shrink)

I Karl Popper's Copernican Revolution Since Popper espouses what he terms " evolutionary epistemology" and since he argues that any discussion of ...

The “erasing race” effect is the reduction of the salience of “race” as an alliance cue when recalling coalition membership, once more accurate information about coalition structure is presented. We conducted a random-effects model meta-analysis of this effect using five United States studies (containing nine independent effect sizes). The effect was found (ρ = 0.137, K = 9, 95% CI = 0.085 to 0.188). However, no decline effect or moderation effects were found (a “decline effect” in this context would (...) be a decrease in the effect size over time). Furthermore, we found little evidence of publication bias. Synthetically correcting the effect size for bias stemming from the use of an older method for calculating error base rates reduced the magnitude of the effect, but the it remained significant. Taken together, these findings indicate that the “erasing race” effect generalizes quite well across experimental contexts and would, therefore, appear to be quite robust. We reinterpret the theoretical basis for these effects in line with Brunswikian evolutionary-developmental theory and present a series of predictions to guide future research in this area. (shrink)

Metaphysical theories are beautiful. I mean it literally. At the end of this book, I defend the view that metaphysical theories possess aesthetic properties and that these play a crucial role when it comes to theory evaluation and theory choice. But this is the end of a long journey – a journey that is perhaps more important than the destination. Before we get there, the philosophical path I propose to follow starts with three discussions of metaphysical equivalence. I argue that (...) there are cases of metaphysical equivalence, cases of partial metaphysical equivalence, as well as interesting cases of theories that are not equivalent. Thus, claims of metaphysical equivalence can only be raised locally. My slogan is : the best way to do meta -metaphysics is to do first-level metaphysics. To do this work, I focus on the nature of primitives and on the role they play in each of the theories involved. I emphasize the utmost importance of primitives in the construction of metaphysical theories and in the subsequent evaluation of them. I then raise the simple but complicated question: how to make a choice between competing metaphysical theories? If two theories are equivalent, then perhaps we do not need to make a choice. But what about all the other cases of non-equivalent "equally good" theories? I use some of the theories discussed in the first part of the book as examples and I examine some traditional meta -theoretical criteria for theory choice only to show that they do not allow us to make a choice. But if the standard meta -theoretical criteria cannot help us in deciding between competing non-equivalent metaphysical theories, how then shall we make that choice? This is where I argue that metaphysical theories possess aesthetic properties – grounded in non-aesthetic properties – and that these play a crucial role in theory choice and evaluation. This view, as well as all the meta -metaphysical considerations discussed throughout the book, then naturally lead me to a form of anti-realism, and at the end of the journey I offer reasons to think better of the kind of anti-realist view I propose to embrace. (shrink)

In “Models and Reality”, H. Putnam formulated his model-theoretic argument against “metaphysical realism”. The article proposes a meta-reconstruction of Putnam’s model-theoretic argument in the light of two mutually compatible interpretations of it–elaborated by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Igor van Douven. A critical reflection on these interpretations and their adequacy for Putnam’s argument allows us to expose new theses coherent with Putnam’s reasoning and indicate new paths to improve this argument for our reconstruction task. In particular, we show that Putnam’s position (...) may be coherent with van Douven’s versions of Global Descriptivism under some conditions, but Putnam cannot reject realism as quickly as Carpintero suggests. We show that Suszko’s canonic axiomatic system and Sneed’s concept of theory may provide valuable support for Putnam’s argument. Finally, we critically evaluate Carpintero’s theses about the genesis of unintended interpretations of our languages, adopting the machinery of the Upward Skolem–Loewenheim Theorem and Knight’s Theorem. (shrink)

Meta-arguments are arguments about one or more arguments, or argumentation in general. They contrast to ground-level arguments, which are about natural phenomena, historical events, human actions, abstract entities, etc. Although meta-arguments are common in all areas of human cognitive practice, and although implicit studies of them are found in many works, and although a few explicit scholarly contributions exist, meta-argumentation has never been examined explicitly, directly, and systematically in book-length treatment. This lacuna is especially unfortunate because such (...) treatment can offer not only an understanding of a special class of arguments, but also a promising way of doing logic and argumentation theory. This is the first book that attempts a systematic treatment of meta-arguments, providing both an illustration of the meta-argumentational approach to logical theory, and an analysis of an especially rich collection of meta-arguments. First, it elaborates an empirical methodology derived partly from a critical appreciation of Stephen Toulmin's applied-logic approach, and partly from a novel application of the author's historical-textual approach. Then it examines theoretical meta-arguments, by such scholars as Tony Blair, Robert Fogelin, Alvin Goldman, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Ralph Johnson, Henry Johnstone, Erik Krabbe, Frans van Eemeren, Carl Wellman, and John Woods, on such topics as defining argument, methods of criticism, deep disagreements, and conductive or pro-and-con arguments. Thirdly, it studies famous meta-arguments by such classics as John Stuart Mill, David Hume, and Galileo Galilei, on such topics as freedom of discussion, women's liberation, the existence of God and intelligent design, and the motion of the earth. (shrink)

Evolutionary game theory is ethically neutral: its assumption of ‘rationality’ has nothing to do with selfishness but is in fact entirely compatible with altruism. If altruism has an evolutionary explanation then this fact is of no theological relevance: in particular it is not any sort of evidence of a divine plan etc.

ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the differences between orthodox and heterodox economics as well as between American and British Global Political Economy. It is found that the main differences within both disciplines are related to meta-theoretical premises. However, meta-theory turns out to be also a uniting factor between disciplines. Orthodox economics and American GPE mostly share positivist meta-theory, while heterodox economics and British GPE are largely based on critical realist meta-theory. Instead of building bridges within disciplines, it (...) is suggested that it would be more feasible to combine some parts of orthodox economics with American GPE and some parts of heterodox economics with British GPE. This paper also discusses the role of mathematics in economics, critically assessing Tony Lawson’s claim that there is no place for mathematical modelling in heterodox economics. (shrink)

In the literature on self-referential paradoxes one of the hardest and most challenging problems is that of revenge. This problem can take many shapes, but, typically, it besets non-classical accounts of some semantic notion, such as truth, that depend on a set of classically defined meta-theoretic concepts, like validity, consistency, and so on. A particularly troubling form of revenge that has received a lot of attention lately involves the concept of validity. The difficulty lies in that the non-classical logician (...) cannot accept her own definition of validity because it is given in a classical meta-theory. It is often suggested that this mismatch between the consequence relation of the account being espoused and the consequence relation of the meta-theory is a serious embarrassment. The main goal of the paper is to explore whether certain substructural accounts of the paradoxes can avoid this sort of embarrassment. Typically, these accounts are expressively incomplete, since they cannot assert in the object language that certain invalid arguments are in fact invalid. To overcome this difficulty I develop a novel type of hybrid proof-procedure, one that takes invalidities to be just as fundamental as validities. I prove that this proof-procedure enjoys a number of interesting properties and I analyze the prospects of applying it to languages capable of expressing self-referential statements. (shrink)

Traditional philosophy is no longer viable,‭ ‬relevant and acceptable.‭ ‬It might be possible to continue doing philosophizing in traditional ways.‭ ‬It is possible to continue fabricating fictional realities in the manner of the Pre-Socratics,‭ ‬Spinoza,‭ ‬Leibniz,‭ ‬Husserl,‭ ‬Hegel,‭ ‬Plato,‭ ‬et al.‭ ‬It is possible to devise pictures of realities and depictions of‭ ‬human consciousness and cognition like Descartes or in the Kantian manner. -/- One of the major issues with traditional philosophy is its lack of self-awareness,‭ ‬the absence of (...) class='Hi'>meta-cognition.‭ ‬This lack of meta-cognition of traditional philosophers leads to the creation of all sorts of questionable phenomena and fake problems. -/- Traditional philosophy,‭ ‬metaphysics,‭ ‬ontology,‭ ‬epistemology,‭ ‬ethics,‭ ‬philosophy of sciences,‭ ‬religion,‭ ‬arts,‭ ‬etc are little more than the possibilities,‭ ‬limits and restrictions enabled and allowed by the philosopher's methodology,‭ ‬techniques and tools.‭ -/- It is most likely possible to envisage a project to devise a collection or synthesis of‭ ‬many alternative realities by means of the insights and theories of theoretical physics,‭ ‬mathematics,‭ ‬bio-chemistry,‭ ‬biology and other sciences,‭ ‬the depictions produced by the arts and pictures of realities presented by the humanities.‭ ‬If such a system of pictures of reality is philosophically relevant and meaningful is however another matter. -/- The original,‭ ‬creative thinking philosopher constitutes alternattive or new realities by his philosophizing.‭ ‬This philosophizing employs and resembles aspects and stages of the processes of theorizing. -/- The real goal of philosophizing is to increase ever greater wisdom.‭ ‬Not merely wisdom in an abstract sense,‭ ‬but different kinds of practical and applied wisdom in all areas of human,‭ ‬everyday existence.‭ ‬In other words,‭ ‬like spirituality and mysticism philosophizing attempts to embody or incarnate wisdom.‭ ‬While mysticism or the mystical paths and aspects of religions aspire to unity experience,‭ ‬to become one with THE ONE,‭ ‬to become the ONE,‭ ‬REAL SELF,‭ ‬to realize the Buddha mind or to be united or‭ '‬married‭' ‬to the Beloved of Sufism. (shrink)

This article investigates the proof theory of the Quantified Argument Calculus as developed and systematically studied by Hanoch Ben-Yami [3, 4]. Ben-Yami makes use of natural deduction, we, however, have chosen a sequent calculus presentation, which allows for the proofs of a multitude of significant meta-theoretic results with minor modifications to the Gentzen’s original framework, i.e., LK. As will be made clear in course of the article LK-Quarc will enjoy cut elimination and its corollaries.

A meta-ethical analysis demonstrates that care ethics is a grounded in a distinct mode of moral reasoning. This is comprised primarily of the rejection of principles such as impartiality, and the endorsement of emotional or moral virtues such as compassion, as well as the notion that the preservation of relations may override the interests of the individuals involved in them. The main conclusion of such a meta-ethical analysis is that such meta-ethical foundations of care ethics are not (...) sound. Reasonable alternatives for care ethics may be its formulation as an additional principle within an established principlist framework, or the move to a dialogical ethics, where the good to be acted upon is not decided in advance but rather critically discussed and established within the encounter of the parties involved. (shrink)

A priori reflection, common sense and intuition have proved unreliable sources of information about the world outside of us. So the justification for a theory of the categories must derive from the empirical support of the scientific theories whose descriptions it unifies and clarifies. We don’t have reliable information about the de re modal profiles of external things either because the overwhelming proportion of our knowledge of the external world is theoretical—knowledge by description rather than knowledge by acquaintance. This (...) undermines the traditional idea that to be an object of category C is to be an object with such- and-such characteristic possibilities of combination. But this is no loss because de re modal thought lacks utility for creatures like us. (shrink)

There is strong reason to doubt that the intuitions Chalmers' meta-problem focuses on are widespread or independent of proto-theoretical prompting. So it's unlikely that they result from factors connected to the nature of consciousness. In any case, it's only the accuracy of the problem intuitions that matters for evaluating theories of consciousness or revealing the nature of consciousness, not an explanation of how they arise. Unless we determine that they're accurate about consciousness, we mustn't assume that realism about (...) consciousness incorporates them, or that denying them means denying that consciousness exists. And we must assess whether they're accurate independently of how they arise. (shrink)

Meta-programs, which treat other computer programs as data, include compilers, editors, simulators, debuggers, and program transformers. Because of the wide ranging applications, meta-programming has become a subject of considerable practical and theoretical interest. This book provides the first comprehensive view of topics in the theory and application of meta-programming, covering problems of representation and of soundness and correctness of interpreters, analysis and evaluation of meta-logic programs, and applications to sophisticated knowledge-based systems.Harvey Abramson is Reader in (...) Computer Science at the University of Bristol, England; M. H. Rogers is Professor of Computer Science, also at the University of Bristol. Meta-Programming in Logic Programming is in the series Logic Programming Research Reports and Notes, edited by Ehud Shapiro. (shrink)

In this paper, we describe four broad ‘meta-methods’ employed in scientific and philosophical research of qualia. These are the theory-centred metamethod, the property-centred meta-method, the argument-centred meta-method, and the event-centred meta-method. Broadly speaking, the theory-centred meta-method is interested in the role of qualia as some theoretical entities picked out by our folk psychological theories; the property-centred meta-method is interested in some metaphysical properties of qualia that we immediately observe through introspection ; the argument-centred (...) meta-method is interested in the role of qualia in some arguments for non-physicalism; the event-centred metamethod is interested in the role of qualia as some natural events whose nature is hidden and must be uncovered empirically. We will argue that the event-centred metamethod is the most promising route to a comprehensive scientific conception of qualia because of the flexibility of ontological and methodological assumptions it can provide. We also reveal the hidden influences of the different meta-methods and in doing so show why consideration of meta-methods has value for the study of consciousness. (shrink)

Although much of the growing literature on organizational identity implicitly recognizes the normative nature of identity, the ethical implications of organizational identity work and talk have not yet been explored in depth. Working from a meta-ethical perspective, we claim that the dynamic, processual, and temporal activities recently associated with organizational identity always have an ethical dimension, whether "good" or "bad." In order to describe the ethical dimensions of organizational identity, we introduce the balance theory of practical wisdom as a (...) theoretical framework, and connect this theory to existing organizational identity concepts. We present an empirical case focused on an international paint company to illustrate the relevance of this theory for empirical organizational identity research. Our intention is to expand existing theory by bringing an aspect of organizational identity that has been tangentially acknowledged to the forefront, and by identifying it as a fruitful avenue for future theory development as well as empirical research. (shrink)

If you wish to think/write about many dimensional things like the‭ ‘‬world‭’‬,‭ ‬persons,‭ ‬consciousness,‭ ‬human thinking etc,‭ ‬you should at least think multi-dimensional and many levelled. Questioning the purpose,‭ ‬the subject-matter and the methodology,‭ ‬methods of the discipline. I have already dealt in detail about the disappearance of different subject from the philosophical discourse with the differentiation of other disciplines, as well as the involvement in philosophy in inter-disciplinary areas such as cognitive sciences, the creation of experimental philosophy and the (...) philosophies of other discourses, eg art, religion, science, mathematics, sport and every subject possible. Philosophy has/is often interpreted as consisting of logic, which in has its own discourse, while other aspects or forms of logic really form part of mathematics. The doing of philosophy as the doing of (usually informal) logic is in some way related to this belief. As far as the method of philosophy goes, it is always seen as employing arguments, argumentation and reasoning. But all kinds of writing and talking employ arguments, argumentation, reasoning and informal logic – not just philosophy. I conclude with a discussion from theoretical physics (in the past associated with the philosophical discourse) that provides us with ontologies as philosophy used to do. Against that background I present articles on the multiverse, more conventional articles on our universe, our world, our physical reality and the origins of life. I think these are some of the many things that it is necessary that philosophy should take note of and consequently question itself, its aims, objectives, subject-matter and methodologies. We might then have something different than one-levelled and one-dimensional thinking and more many layered and levelled and multi-dimensional thinking. Is this not how our consciousness functions? On many levels, layers and dimensions simultaneously? So should this not be the manner in which we conceive of ‘it’, its nature and functioning? We, philosophy, should at least be thinking ( instead of individual concepts, or statements, linear thinking - we should simultaneously think on many layers, on many levels and in several dimensions) in terms of 3D, for example 3D scatter plots .By this I mean the many different aspects of the person (mentally and physically, socially, culturally, as well as our environment, planetary and universe context should be included in every concept we employ; each concept should therefore be at least like a 3D scatter plot image, including all these levels and information). (shrink)

How is the philosophical study of religion best pursued? Responses to this meta-philosophical question tend to recapitulate the analytic-Continental divide in philosophy in general. My aim is to examine the nature of this divide, particularly as it has manifested itself in the philosophy of religion. I begin with a comparison of the stylistic differences in the language of the two traditions, taking the work of Alvin Plantinga and John Caputo as exemplars of the analytic and Continental schools respectively. In (...) order to account for these stylistic divergences, however, it is necessary to delve further into meta-philosophy. I go on to show how each philosophical school models itself on different theoretical practices, the analytic school mimicking the scientific style of inquiry, while in Continental philosophy it is the arts and humanities rather than the sciences that provide the model for philosophical discourse. By situating themselves in such different genres, analytic and Continental philosophers have developed contrasting, if not mutually exclusive, methods for pursuing the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

We predict multistakeholder benefits as a measure of organizational performance from the perspective of important organizational stakeholders. Specifically, we identify the relative importance of theoretical antecedents that affect the different dimensions of stakeholder benefits. Offering the first empirical synthesis of multistakeholder benefits to date, we assess the statistical explanatory power of different theories in the literature, focusing on the extent to which their suggested antecedents of organizational performance may lead to improvements in multiple dimensions of stakeholder benefits. Based on (...) 110 empirical studies since 1990 to date concerning any two of four stakeholder groups (investors, customers, employees, and community /environment), we find no evidence for any single theory to have sufficient explanatory power in predicting benefits concerning all four stakeholder groups. Thus, we cannot reduce different mechanisms leading to multistakeholder benefits to a grand model or theory but need to resort to a multi-theoretical synthesis. Taking stock of the meta-analysis, we suggest future studies should fill three gaps: multiple dimensions within a stakeholder benefit, causal complexity, and inequality of stakeholder benefit creation. (shrink)

Investigating meta-programming within the logic programming paradigm, Meta-Logics and Logic Programming presents original research on an important extension of logic programming that makes it more amenable for knowledge representation and programming in general. The 12 contributions, many written especially for this book, explore the foundations, language design issues, and applications of meta-programming in logic programming. Meta-programming—the process of writing computer programs that can manipulate representations of other programs—has been key both in the foundations of computer science (...) and in its practical developments. Examples of meta-programs include compilers, interpreters, program analyzers, and partial evaluators. The choice of logic programming as a basis for meta-programming offers several practical and theoretical advantages: among them, the possibility of tackling critical foundational problems of meta-programming within a strong theoretical framework, and the surprising ease of programming. The usual framework of logic programming (and more generally first-order logic), however, has to be modified and extended to formally deal with meta-programs, extensions the editors call "meta-logics." Along with an exploration of meta-programming in logic programming, the definitions, formal properties, and use of these extensions constitute one of the book's main themes. The first part of the book, Foundations, focuses on the representation problem—how object programs are represented within meta-programs. The second part, Language Support for Meta-Logics, is concerned with language extensions that make meta-programming easier and more elegant. The third part, Meta-Logics for Knowledge Management, deals with the use of meta-logic for advanced knowledge representation purposes. Logic Programming series. (shrink)

We argue that new meta-theoretically based applications of non-traditional perspectives of knowledge in science, and sport science, that highlights the question of ‘being woman’, and our understanding of woman as a social and biological being through sport, can enrich the general understanding of gender, identity, body and sport by developing and deepening a critical humanistic sport science perspective through athletes’ artistic reflections of their own athletic female body.

Our shared moral framework is negotiated as part of the social contract. Some elements of that framework are established (tell the truth under oath), but other elements lack an overlapping consensus (just when can an individual lie to protect his or her privacy?). The tidy bits of our accepted moral framework have been codified, becoming the subject of legal rather than ethical consideration. Those elements remaining in the realm of ethics seem fragmented and inconsistent. Yet, our engineering students will need (...) to navigate the broken ground of this complex moral landscape. A minimalist approach would leave our students with formulated dogma—principles of right and wrong such as the National Society for Professional Engineers (NSPE) Code of Ethics for Engineers—but without any insight into the genesis of these principles. A slightly deeper, micro-ethics approach would teach our students to solve ethical problems by applying heuristics—giving our students a rational process to manipulate ethical dilemmas using the same principles simply referenced a priori by dogma. A macro-ethics approach—helping students to inductively construct a posteriori principles from case studies—goes beyond the simple statement or manipulation of principles, but falls short of linking personal moral principles to the larger, social context. Ultimately, it is this social context that requires both the application of ethical principles, and the negotiation of moral values—from an understanding of meta-ethics. (shrink)

Using traditional meta-analytic techniques, we compile relevant research to enhance conceptual appreciation of ethical climate theory (ECT) as it has been studied in the descriptive and applied ethics literature. We explore the various treatments of ethical climate to understand how the theoretical framework has developed. Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive picture of how the theory has been extended by describing the individual-level work climate outcomes commonly studied in this theoretical context. Meta-analysis allows us to resolve inconsistencies (...) in previous findings as well as confirm the central tenets of the overall ethical climate framework. In addition, we consider the ethical climate relationships in the larger context of the␣theoretical framework, using path analysis to test the structural relationships. Overall, our results provide evidence of the relationships between ethical climate perceptions and individual-level work outcomes. Based on our analyses, we offer future research directions important for further development of ECT. (shrink)

There are some arguments supporting the pessimistic meta-induction, coming from the direction of quantum theory (A. Kukla and J. Walmsley), from the direction of Laudan’s list with successful but false theories, and from the specific direction of the phlogiston theory (whom Kukla Walmsley, and S. Psillos consider to be false). Against these arguments we believe we can successfully oppose, in the first case the interactive quantum realism of I. Niiniluoto, in the second case the realism of the theoretical (...) theoretical constituents responsible for the empirical success of the theories of S. Psillos, and in the third case the analysis of the phlogiston theory done by V. Verronen, R. Vihalemm and E. McMullin (who suggested that this theory was simultaneously insufficiently mature and approximately true). Our conclusion does not necessary prove that the perspective of the scientific realism is true, but rather that the pessimistic meta-induction attack against it proves to be unconvincing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:META-ONTOLOGY AND META-FICTION by Denis E. B. Pollard Peter van inwagen's attempt to explain the nature of fiction makes use of Quine's program in meta-ontology.1 This program comprises four basic theses: (i) that being is the same as existence, (ii) that being is univocal, (iii) that this univocal sense is best captured, for the purposes of formalization, by die existential quantifier, and (iv) that deciding what (...) to believe about what there is comes to a decision about what theories we should accept. As the aim of formalization is explicitness, then theories should be rendered into canonicalese and their commitments identified through those sentences which are prefaced with the existential quantifier. For Inwagen, as for his mentor Quine, acceptance of theory expressed in this canonical form entails acceptance of the ontology expressed in those quantified sentences. Bringing these considerations to bear on fiction, Inwagen asks, "What are theories about fiction?" and replies that they are "theories that treat stories as having an internal structure" (p. 72). The upshot of this is that such theories contain sentences which, when formally rendered, revead commitments to fictional objects. It is further claimed that such sentences can be vehicles of objective truth. Thus Inwagen finds he cannot wholeheartedly dismiss Sarah Gamp as a nonentity. In this respect, his view contrasts with two contemporary accounts, the "reductivist" one which denies Sarah Gamp's existence and her possession of any properties whatever, and the more recent "Meinongian" view which would agree that Sarah Gamp does not exist, but would nonetheless strenuously maintain that she is a nurse, fat, old, and decidedly the worse for drink. Inwagen's Sarah is neither ofthese: pace both these positions, she exists all right, but with properties such as being a theoretical entity of criticism, being a satiric villainess, not being a woman, and not being fond of gin. Inwagen's attempt to steer what seems to be a middle course has yielded, if anything, a more counterintuitive result than either ofthe other views. What is die explanation for this? 244 Denis E. B. Pollard245 To begin with, it is important to note a distinction, which Inwagen himself accepts, between two kinds of sentences. Let us take the following elementary examples: (1) "Sarah Gamp is a nurse," and (2) "Sarah Gamp is a character in a nineteenth-century novel." With specimens like (1), Inwagen sides with the reductivist: such sentences asefalse, and are not about anything. But it is with examples like (2) that ontology becomes a real issue, since sentences of this kind belong to literary theory. Neither authors nor critics who make use of sentences of the first kind are committed to the existence of fictional entities. So far, so good. But what is it that compels such commitment in the second case? Inwagen is sceptical about reductivist analyses which seek to paraphrase such sentences in order to remove any "misleading" implications. Such paraphrases he would regard as at best "messy," and more seriously, unlikely to preserve intuitive meaning without appearing to say that there are fictional characters. Unfortunately, he brushes this aside as a "narrow technical issue" at the very point where rather more argument is needed. However, on the issue of preservation of intuitive meaning, it might well be argued that his contention is somewhat question-begging, suggesting a rather literal reading of (2) above as a straightforward predication superficially akin to (3) "McEnroe is a seeded player in this year's Wimbledon tournament." So by a strange alchemy, the expression "Sarah Gamp" in (2) is accorded a referential status denied to it in (1). It is at this point that the notion of"theoretical entity" is introduced to supply the need for a referent dictated by the Quinean program. Inwagen's Sarah Gamp, in this theoretical disguise, can now literally satisfy predicates like "... is a character in a nineteenth-century novel," but not predicates like "... is a nurse." The parallel being exploited here is that with scientific theory. An ideal gas can satisfy Boyle's Law, but cannot literally be ignited, put into containers, or have an offensive smell. But there is more than a suspicion of equivocation over the term... (shrink)

Julian Dodd has characterized the default position in metaphysics as meta-ontologically realist: the answers to first-order ontological questions are thought to be entirely independent of the things we say and think about the entities at issue. Consequently, folk ontologies are liable to substantial error. But while this epistemic humility is commendable where the ontology of natural kinds is concerned, it seems misplaced with respect to social kinds since their ontology is dependent upon the human social world. Using art and (...) art-kinds as paradigmatic examples of social kinds, I argue that meta-ontological realism sets conditions that are too strict to apply to social kinds. Nevertheless, I argue that we should not be too quick to embrace the conclusion that our folk theories of social kinds cannot err substantially. By modelling the reference of social kind-terms on that of natural kind-terms, it becomes clear that in both cases, our sole epistemic privilege lies in our ability to pinpoint the subject of our inquiries. (shrink)

The biophilia hypothesis posits an innate biological and genetic connection between human and nature, including an emotional dimension to this connection. Biophilic design builds on this hypothesis in an attempt to design human-nature connections into the built environment. This article builds on this theoretical framework through a meta-analysis of experimental studies on the emotional impacts of human exposure to natural and urban environments. A total of 49 studies were identified, with a combined sample size of 3,201 participants. The (...) primary findings indicated that exposure to natural environments had a medium to large effect on both increasing positive affect and decreasing negative affect. This finding supported the anticipated emotional dimension of the biophilia hypothesis and lends credibility to biophilic design theory. Evidence was revealed in support of the affective/arousal response model. Immersion in environments indicated a larger effect size than laboratory simulation of environments. Methodological recommendations for future experimental research were few, however the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule outcome measure was recommended as a measure of both positive and negative affect for further studies. A combination measurement of stress related outcome variables was proposed to further explore the affective/arousal response model and its potential relationship to the biophilia hypothesis. The meta-analysis provides evidence for fundamental theories regarding human-nature connection, while revealing gaps in current knowledge. (shrink)

Recently, alternatives to both the structure and content of ‘orthodox’ just war theory have been proposed by Jeff McMahan and David Rodin. In this paper, I draw on this debate to show that key ideas in just war theory can be disputed in both of these respects. More broadly, it is unclear how we should assess the debate between differing conceptions of individual principles (such as just cause and proportionality) and the competing wider theories in which they might be situated. (...) I employ the idea of reflective equilibrium, taken from John Rawls, to show how these conflicting viewpoints might be understood and assessed. I argue, then, that contemporary just war theory faces both important questions of substance, and a set of difficult meta-theoretical issues concerning the grounds on which competing just war theories can be assessed. Futhermore, I contend, this should influence the character of – and our expectations for – real-world just war institutions. (shrink)

This article argues that the theoretical concept of meta-argumentative fallacy is useful. The authors argue for this along two lines. The first is that with the concept, the authors may clarify the concept of meta-argumentation. That is, by theorizing where meta-argument goes wrong, the authors may capture the norms of this level of argumentation. The second is that the concept of meta-argumentative fallacies provides an explanatory model for a variety of errors in argument otherwise difficult (...) to theorize. The authors take three as exemplary: the straw man, both sides, and free speech fallacies. (shrink)

Posterior a Hiroshima y Nagasaki se hizo visible hacia dónde conducirían la obtención y uso de conocimientos y creación de artefactos que no se correspondieran a las metas de subsistencia y mejoramiento humanos, emergieron movimientos y estudios relacionados con los impactos sociales de la ciencia y la tecnología. Surgió en ese contexto el campo denominado Ciencia- Tecnología- Sociedad (CTS), centrado en las complejas interrelaciones que la ciencia y la tecnología y la sociedad. El presente texto tiene el objetivo de profundizar (...) en el trabajo de fundamentación teórica a partir del reconocimiento de algunas ideas como: la relación de los seres humanos con sus entornos es socio- tecno- cognitiva, la interacción conocimiento- sociedad es contradictoria, y es preciso reconocer la complejidad del conocimiento CTS. Por último, una nueva propuesta, en las circunstancias actuales un acrónimo más abarcador que el de CTS puede ser SOCITEI (So: sociedad, CI: conocimiento, Te: tecnología, In: innovación). After Hiroshima and Nagasaki the destiny of the obtaining and use of knowledge as well as the creation of artifacts that were not according to the goals of human subsistence and improvement became visible, movements and studies related to the social impacts of science and technology emerged. The field called science - technology - society (CTS) (Spanish acronym) arose in that context, focused on the complex interrelationships in science technology and society. This text aims to deepen the work of theoretical foundation in recognition of some ideas like: the relationship of human beings with their environments is socio-techno - cognitive, interaction knowledge - society is contradictory, and we must recognize the complexity of knowledge CTS. Finally, in the new circumstances a new proposal a more encompassing acronym than the CTS can be SOCITEI (SO: society, CI: knowledge, TE: technology, IN: innovation) (Spanish acronyms). (shrink)

This meta-study of animal semantics is anchored in two claims, seemingly creating a fuzzy mismatch, that animal utterances generally appear to be simple in structure and content variation and that animals’ communicative understanding seems disproportionally more advanced. A set of excerpted, new studies is chosen as basis to discuss whether the semantics of animal uttering and understanding can be fused into one. Studies are prioritised due to their relatively complex designs, giving priority to dynamics between syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and (...) between utterers and receivers in context. A communicational framework based on utterance theory is applied as a lens for inspection of how these aspects relate to the assumed mismatch. Inspection and discussions of the studies bring several features to surface of which five are stressed in the following. Firstly, both syntactic structures and possible semantic content are seen as lean, although richer than earlier believed, and research continues to reveal new complexities in utterances. Secondly, there is a clear willingness to broaden the perception of animals’ semantic capacity to comprehend communication both by arguing theoretically and by generating empirical research in new contexts. Thirdly, the ambition to make sense of these tendencies is still often motivated by an evolutionary search for early building blocks for verbal language, with the pro et cons that such a position can have. Fourthly, the ‘allowed’ scientific frame for studying semantic capacity among animals is extended to new fields and contexts challenging the only-in-the-wild norm. Fifthly, the dilemma of integrating uttering and understanding as aspects of an after all functional communicational system, calls for new epistemological concepts to make sense of the claimed mismatch. Affordances, abduction, life-genre, and lifeworld are suggested. (shrink)

This article presents a critical analysis of the main modern approaches to the problem of meta-argumentation and suggests a method for developing a general conception of meta-argumentation. A set of theoretical-methodological difficulties along this path is revealed. Overcoming these aporias would constitute the main steps toward developing the body of a theory of meta-argumentation.

How do we come to like the things that we do? Each one of us starts from a relatively similar state at birth, yet we end up with vastly different sets of aesthetic preferences. These preferences go on to define us both as individuals and as members of our cultures. Therefore, it is important to understand how aesthetic preferences form over our lifetimes. This poses a challenging problem: to understand this process, one must account for the many factors at play (...) in the formation of aesthetic values and how these factors influence each other over time. A general framework based on basic neuroscientific principles that can also account for this process is needed. Here, we present such a framework and illustrate it through a model that accounts for the trajectories of aesthetic values over time. Our framework is inspired by meta-analytic data of neuroimaging studies of aesthetic appraisal. This framework incorporates effects of sensory inputs, rewards, and motivational states. Crucially, each one of these effects is probabilistic. We model their interactions under a reinforcement-learning circuitry. Simulations of this model and mathematical analysis of the framework lead to three main findings. First, different people may develop distinct weighing of aesthetic variables because of individual variability in motivation. Second, individuals from different cultures and environments may develop different aesthetic values because of unique sensory inputs and social rewards. Third, because learning is stochastic stemming from probabilistic sensory inputs, motivations, and rewards, aesthetic values vary in time. These three theoretical findings account for different lines of empirical research. Through our study, we hope to provide a general and unifying framework for understanding the various aspects involved in the formation of aesthetic values over time. (shrink)

Invariance criteria are widely accepted as a means to demarcate the logical vocabulary of a language. In previous work, I proposed a framework of “semantic constraints” for model theoretic consequence which does not rely on a strict distinction between logical and nonlogical terms, but rather on a range of constraints on models restricting the interpretations of terms in the language in different ways. In this paper I show how invariance criteria can be generalized so as to apply to semantic constraints (...) on models. Some obviously unpalatable semantic constraints turn out to be invariant under isomorphisms. I shall connect our discussion to known counterexamples to invariance criteria for logical terms, and so the generalization will also shed light on the current existing debate on logicality. I analyse the failure of invariance to fulfil its role as a criterion for logicality, and argue that invariance conditions should best be thought of as merely methodological meta-constraints restricting the ways the model-theoretic apparatus should be used. (shrink)

Although there is much research on the relationships of corporate social responsibility and employee-related outcomes, a systematic and quantitative integration of research findings is needed to substantiate and broaden our knowledge. A meta-analysis allows the comparison of the relations of different types of CSR on several different outcomes, for example to learn what type of CSR is most important to employees. From a theoretical perspective, social identity theory is the most prominent theoretical approach in CSR research, so (...) we aim to investigate identification as a mediator of the relationship between CSR and employee-related outcomes in a meta-analytical mediation model. This meta-analysis synthesizes research findings on the relationship between employees' perception of CSR (people, planet, and profit) and employee-related outcomes (identification, engagement, organizational attractiveness, turnover (intentions), OCB, commitment, and job satisfaction), thereby distinguishing attitudes and behavior. A total of 143 studies (N= 89,396) were included in the meta-analysis which was conducted according to the methods by Schmidt and Hunter (except of the meta-analytical structural equation model). Mean effect sizes for the relationship between CSR and employee-related attitudes and behaviors were medium-sized to large. For attitudes, the relationships were stronger than for behavior. For specific types of CSR, average effect sizes were large. Identification mediated the relation between CSR and commitment, job satisfaction, and OCB, respectively. Based on our results, we give recommendations concerning the design of CSR initiatives in a way that benefits employees. (shrink)