This chapter contains sections titled: Rationality and Paradigm Shifts Incommensurable Paradigms and Holism.

The concept of ‘psycho‐metaphysical explanation’ is explained in terms of the philosophy of the German idealist J. G. Fichte, who uses this mode of explanation to account for the fact that the dispute between Idealism and Realism is one which cannot be resolved by means of rational argument. This paper presents a similar account of the contemporary dispute between competing paradigms of persons, i.e. between materialist and non-reductivist theories. Some practical and frightening implications are illustrated by showing how this (...) paradigmatic dispute is at the basis of much contemporary debate concerning the purpose of post-secondary education. Since it is argued that the interrelated disputes in question are ones which cannot be resolved by straightforward rational argument the paper concludes by resorting to such non?rational literary devices as satire, irony and metaphor. (shrink)

Relatively recent work on Carnap, based on his published papers and books as well as on his unpublished correspondence and other material, has suggested that Carnap and Kuhn might not have been miles apart when it comes to the issue of theory-change. Two prevailing thoughts are that a) Kuhnian ‘paradigms’ might be taken to be very similar to Carnapian ‘linguistic frameworks’ and b) Kuhnian ‘ incommensurability ’ between competing paradigms is consonant with Carnap’s thesis that when a linguistic (...) framework is replaced by another, there is a change of language and the analytic-synthetic distinction needs to be redrawn within the new framework. Irzik and Grunberg have gone on to note that Carnap endorsed “semantic incommensurability ”. They base their claim on the theses that a) Carnap endorsed meaning holism; b) Carnap endorsed the thesis of ‘theory-ladenness of observation’. They are certainly right in saying that “without semantic holism semantic incommensurability would be groundless; without theory-ladenness it would be severely restricted to the theoretical terms”. But, I think, they are wrong in claiming that Carnap endorsed either meaning holism or the theory-ladenness of observation. The aim of this paper is to show how Carnap avoided the alleged problem of incommensurability. Better put, Carnap’s view about the language of science is such that this problem does not arise. Drawing on his published and unpublished material, I highlight some connections between his work on semantics and his mature work on the structure of scientific theories, which was based on his re-invention of the Ramsey-sentences. (shrink)

By linking the conceptual and social dynamics of change in science, Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions proved tremendously fruitful for research in science studies. But Kuhn’s idea of incommensurability provoked strong criticism from philosophers of science. In this essay I show how Raimo Tuomela’s Philosophy of Sociality illuminates and strengthens Kuhn’s model of scientific change. After recalling the central features and problems of Kuhn’s model, I introduce Tuomela’s approach. I then show (a) how Tuomela’s conception of group ethos aligns with (...) Kuhn’s notion of paradigms as group commitments, and (b) how Tuomela’s distinction between I-mode and we-mode forms of collective intentionality can capture the shifting paradigmatic commitments in Kuhn’s model of change as a cycle of normal and revolutionary science. But Tuomela’s analysis does not rely on meaning holism, and thus does not involve the problematic notion of incommensurability that burdened Kuhn’s analysis. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine in detail the similarities and dissimilarities between Werner Heisenberg’s account of closed theories and Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific revolutions. My analysis draws on a little‐known discussion that took place between Heisenberg and Kuhn in 1963, in which Heisenberg, having just read Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, compares Kuhn’s views to his own account of closed theories. I conclude that while Heisenberg and Kuhn share a holist conception of theories, a revolutionary model (...) of theory change, and even a notion of incommensurability, their views diverge fundamentally when it comes to the issue of scientific realism. I show that, contrary to popular opinion, Heisenberg is not an instrumentalist, but rather a pluralistic realist. (shrink)

Modern generally accepted models of the growth of knowledge are scrutinized. It is maintained that Thomas Kuhn’s growth of knowledge model is grounded preeminently on Heidegger’s epistemology. To justify the tenet the corresponding works of both thinkers are considered. As a result, the one-to-one correspondence between the key propositions of Heideggerian epistemology and the basic tenets of Kuhn’s growth of knowledge model is elicited. The tenets under consideration include the holistic nature of a paradigm, the incommensurability thesis, conventional status of (...) a paradigm caused by pragmatist way of its vocabulary justification and even the basic instance – connection between Aristotelean and Newtonian mechanics. It is conjectured that an indirect influence of Heidegger upon Kuhn should be taken into account to explain the isomorphism. For instance, through the works of Alexandre Koyré admired by Kuhn. As is well-known, Koyré had close professional links with another Russian émigré – Alexandre Kojev – who presented in his 1933-1939 Paris lectures Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” seen through the cognitive lens of Heideggerian phenomenology. Key words: Martin Heidegger, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, growth of knowledge, paradigm, incommensurability thesis, holism, pragmatism. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn this paper I argue that Kuhn's and Hanson's notion of incommensurable paradigms is rooted in the rhetoric of finality of the Copenhagen dogma — the orthodox philosophical interpretation of quantum physics. I also argue that arguments for holism of a paradigm, on which the notion of the impossibility of its gradual modification is based, misinterpret the Duhem-Quine thesis. The history of science (Copernican, Chemical, and Quantum Revolutions) demonstrates fruitful selective appropriation of ideas from seemingly “ (...) class='Hi'>incommensurable” paradigms (rather than the impossibility of communication between their representatives). I argue in conclusion that such openness underlies scientific creativity, and that dialogue between different alternatives is indispensable for the growth of knowledge. (shrink)

In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...) cognitive models of concept representation. We provide new support for Kuhn 's mature views that incommensurability can be caused by changes in only a few concepts, that even incommensurable conceptual systems can be rationally compared, and that scientific change of the most radical sort—the type labeled revolutionary in earlier studies—does not have to occur holistically and abruptly, but can be achieved by a historically more plausible accumulation of smaller changes. We go on to suggest that the parallel accounts of concepts found in Kuhn and in cognitive science lead to a new understanding of the nature of normal science, of the transition from normal science to crisis, and of scientific revolutions. The same account enables us to understand how scientific communities split to create groups supporting new paradigms, and to resolve various outstanding problems. In particular, we can identify the kind of change needed to create a revolution rather precisely. This new analysis also suggests reasons for the unidirectionality of scientific change. (shrink)

Despite considerable evidence that neural activity in monkeys reflects various aspects of face perception, relatively little is known about monkeys’ face processing abilities. Two characteristics of face processing observed in humans are a subordinate-level entry point, here, the default recognition of faces at the subordinate, rather than basic, level of categorization, and holistic effects, i.e. perception of facial displays as an integrated whole. The present study used an adaptation paradigm to test whether untrained rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) display these hallmarks (...) of face processing. In experiments 1 and 2, macaques showed greater rebound from adaptation to conspecific faces than to other animals at the individual or subordinate level. In experiment 3, exchanging only the bottom half of a monkey face produced greater rebound in aligned than in misaligned composites, indicating that for normal, aligned faces, the new bottom half may have influenced the perception of the whole face. Scan path analysis supported this assertion: during rebound, fixation to the unchanged eye region was renewed, but only for aligned stimuli. These experiments show that macaques naturally display the distinguishing characteristics of face processing seen in humans and provide the first clear demonstration that holistic information guides scan paths for conspecific faces. (shrink)

The structure of explanation for methodological individualism (MI) can be represented by the expression M = M [m(P)] where the global phenomenon M results from a set of stylized individual behaviors m resulting from motivations which are themselves affected by global data P. In this, MI differs from holistic methodology in that it takes into account the individual (generally ideal–typical) reasons underlying these collective phenomena, and refuses, in principle, to treat a group as an actor endowed with a conscience and (...) a will, or to describe the individual as the crossing point of collective forces. Boudon gives several examples showing that the individualist paradigm and the rationality hypothesis it includes (according to which the actors’ reasons are, in principle, comprehensible by the observer as a function of their situation) enables sociological explanation to progress and avoid the dreaded trap of sociocentrism. (shrink)

The main purpose of this essay is to explore the relationship between the incommensurability of paradigms or general theories, a thesis due to Kuhn and Feyerabend, and the idealizations and abstractions that permeate concepts and fundamental laws of physical theories. One can find some unrealistic or idealizational suppositions underlying the semantic level of the differences between the conceptual vocabularies of incommensurable theories, on which these theories rest. This kind of suppositions relates to the idealizations and abstractions involved in (...) forming concepts and formulating laws. Generally, the fundamental laws of physical theories have an abstract and idealized character. Physical theories contain conceptual networks of kind concepts and quantitative concepts, which are interconnected by several sorts of relationships. The discrepancies between such conceptual network, and their underlying assumptions, of alternative paradigms or theories make their comparison at a theoretical level, that is, their commensurability implausible. That at once strengthens the incommensurability thesis and further supports it. In addition, it follows that Kuhn’s philosophy of science indeed involves a version of conceptual or epistemological relativism about science. (shrink)

The claim that we want to put forward is that Thomas Kuhn ’s growth of knowledge concept is drawn upon Heidegger’s epistemology. To bolster the tenet the corresponding works of both thinkers are considered. As a result, the one-to-one correspondence between the key propositions of Heideggerian epistemology and the basic tenets of Kuhn ’s growth of knowledge model is dawned. The tenets under consideration include the holistic nature of a paradigm, the incommensurability thesis, conventional status of a paradigm caused by (...) pragmatist way of its vocabulary justification and even the basic instance – connection between Aristotelean and Newtonian mechanics. It is conjectured that an indirect influence of Heidegger upon Kuhn should be taken into account to explain the isomorphism. For instance, through the works of Alexandre Koyré admired by Kuhn. As is well-known, Koyré had close professional links with another Russian émigré – Alexandre Kojev – who presented in his 1933-1939 Paris lectures Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” seen through the cognitive lens of Heideggerian phenomenology. Key words: Martin Heidegger, Thomas Kuhn, growth of knowledge, paradigm, incommensurability thesis, holism, pragmatism. (shrink)

An apparent incommensurability of two leading gravitational paradigms (metric and nonmetric) is considered. It is conjectured that the application of neutral language of A.P. Lightman, D.L. Lee and Kip S. Thorne (“The Foundation of Theory of Gravitational Theories”. Phys. Rev. D 1973, vol.7, pp.3563-3572) can help to solve the theory –choice problem in principle. Key words: neutral language, theory choice, gravity.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion and the Body in Medical ResearchCourtney S. Campbell (bio)AbstractReligious discussion of human organs and tissues has concentrated largely on donation for therapeutic purposes. The retrieval and use of human tissue samples in diagnostic, research, and education contexts have, by contrast, received very little direct theological attention. Initially undertaken at the behest of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, this essay seeks to explore the theological and religious questions embedded (...) in nontherapeutic use of human tissue. It finds that the “donation paradigm” typically invoked in religious discourse to justify uses of the body for therapeutic reasons is inadequate in the context of nontherapeutic research, while the “resource paradigm” implicit in scientific discourse presumes a reductionist account of the body that runs contrary to important religious values about embodiment. The essay proposes a “contribution paradigm” that provides a religious perspective within which research on human tissue can be both justified and limited.The retrieval and use of human tissue samples for diagnostic, therapeutic, research, and educational purposes represent further developments in scientific study of the human body as a source of medical information. Following the completion of its examination of the ethical and policy issues pertaining to human cloning in the spring of 1997, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) returned to the set of questions for which it had been originally constituted, including ethical issues that arise in human subjects research. One issue that proved controversial for the human genetics subcommittee of NBAC was the scientific, philosophical, and legal status of tissue and other body parts (usually surgical specimens) that had been retrieved from patients (not research subjects) who had given general consent to the use of their body materials for research and educational purposes. The subcommittee addressed questions about the adequacy of general versus specific [End Page 275] consent, the scientific merits of identifiable versus anonymous samples and claims about patient confidentiality, and the justification for patient refusals and requests that the materials be returned to the patient or discarded rather than made available for scientific research. In an effort to better understand the ramifications of research on human tissue, the subcommittee commissioned several background papers that examined these questions from ethical, legal, research, and religious perspectives. What follows is a modified version of the report on religious considerations originally presented to the genetics subcommittee of NBAC.The central question examined in this article is whether tissue banking for purposes of research presents distinctive theological issues or prompts objections from religious communities or scholars. Religious discussion of human organs and tissues has focused largely on donation for therapeutic purposes (what I describe as the “donation paradigm”); hence, there is very little direct consideration of nontherapeutic uses of such tissue. It is possible, however, to describe implications and suggest inferences by considering (1) religious attitudes to the human body and to organs, tissues, and cells removed from the body, and (2) religious discussions of modes of transfer of body parts, such as donations, offerings, sales, and abandonment. By and large, this discussion will reflect themes that emerge from the central Western religious traditions, with some attention given to Eastern and Native perspectives.The Body: Religious Holism, Scientific Reductionism, Private PropertyThe human body as an organic totality has long been the subject of theological reflection and a symbol for religious communities. However, much less attention has been devoted to the religious status of organs, tissues, cells, and DNA. The reflection of religious scholars and communities on the status of body parts has been prompted by the necessity to confront practical questions in personal and public health and in communal life, such as justifications for surgery, autopsies, organ donation, or burial. Scientific and research interest in parts of the body can sometimes conflict with religious values about bodily integrity. Indeed, E. Richard Gold cites the “disparate claims of scientific investigation and religious belief on the body” as the exemplary case of incommensurate values regarding the body. According to Gold (1996, p. 149), “The body, from a scientific viewpoint, is a source of knowledge of physical development, aging, and disease. From a religious perspective, the body is understood [End Page 276] as a sacred object, being created in the image... (shrink)

This paper introduces the idea that if theories of history generate different taxonomies of history they too are incommensurable. I argue this is unavoidable for Kuhn given what he says about incommensurability and I investigate the consequences in relation to reflexivity, justification, and paradox for Kuhn’s account of science. I want to do this on two levels, firstly looking at different possibilities for characterising individual paradigms. I will look at some examples from ancient and early modern astronomy as (...) here it is clearest that paradigms can be characterised in different ways and that this has important consequences. I will argue in particular that Kuhn’s characterisation of the paradigm for astronomy which emerges from antiquity is favourable to his general account of the history of science, but that there is a very plausible and extremely damaging alternative. I argue that these differing characterisations generate differing, incommensurable taxonomies of the history of astronomy, with attendant “local holism,” untranslatability of key terms and issues of theory choice. If so, Kuhn then has problems with generating an adequate decision making protocol for choosing between the two paradigm characterisations. That is problematic in itself, but I also argue this problem is systemic and affects the evidence needed for Kuhn to justify his general account of the history of science. I also want to investigate the implications of differing taxonomies of the history of science at a more abstract level. Kuhn’s general theory of the history of science generates a taxonomy of the history of science, as do other theories such as those of Popper and of gradualism. If so, the incommensurability involved here, again with attendant “local holism,” untranslatability of key terms and issues of theory choice, leads to issues of paradox and justification for Kuhn’s general account of the history of science. With this broader understanding of taxonomic issues, some important Kuhn statements about scientific theories become self-referential, again generating problems of paradox and justification. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.3 (2003) 248-263 [Access article in PDF] The Incommensurability Thesis and the Status of Knowledge Maurice Charland The view that inquiry can be understood in terms of rhetorical theory can be traced to Thomas Kuhn's influential work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Kuhn is often cited by scholars concerned with the discursive strategies by which the natural and social or human sciences justify themselves and (...) their specific claims. Kuhn's legacy is well captured by Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey in the opening essay of The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences (1987) where they link him to Stephen Toulmin and Chaïm Perelman as instigators of the study of the Rhetoric of Inquiry. In their words, Kuhn's landmark classic "challenges philosophy to account for the actual operation of scientific communities—their professional devices of communication and socialization, their political structures, their reliance on aesthetics, and their rhetorical dependence on persuasion" (Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey 1987, 12). Despite this reaction, however, Kuhn's project was in many ways modest. He was not seeking to develop a sociology of science or a rhetoric of inquiry. He sought only to account for the form of modern science's history, which is not marked by linear progress, but by a succession of dominant frameworks, or what he termed paradigms.As I will argue in this essay, Kuhn's conception of paradigms is incompatible with rhetoric, except during scientific revolutions or under conditions of incommensurability. Incommensurability is a problematic category, however, for the opening it affords rhetoric ultimately undermines the very idea of paradigms. Consequently, locating rhetoric within normal science either undermines the very category distinctions that provide science with its specificity, or reduces rhetoric from a particular genre of discourse directed toward human agency to "rhetoricality," an aspect of all discourse. As we shall see, such blurring of genre distinctions is itself fundamentally [End Page 248] problematic, for science and rhetoric as discursive genres and practices are themselves incommensurable, even if not in Kuhn's terms. Rhetoric and revolution Kuhn observed that modern science is characterized by the bracketing of major disagreements regarding basic assumptions except during periods of "crisis." While pre-modern inquiry saw the contemporaneous co-existence of fundamentally incompatible frameworks, each competing for adherents, modern science normally excludes such divisions. Instead, modern science is characterized by a succession of frameworks. Only at periods of transition that are temporally bounded, for which Kuhn coined the term "scientific revolutions," does more than one framework have currency within a given sub-specialty (1962, 10-22).Kuhn accounts for this curious historical phenomenon by arguing that modern science is precisely constituted through an enforced bracketing of debates over first principles. The first principles, or paradigm, of any field are more than a set of epistemological or ontological assumptions. They are the set of rules constitutive of science as an activity. They orient scientists in their work, providing background assumptions, methodological principles, criteria of validity, a research agenda, and so on. The hegemony of a paradigm frees scientists from having to justify their work philosophically, socially, or politically. As Kuhn observes, normally science has the form of puzzle solving (35-42). He even likens it to a game, and like any game the participants need not concern themselves with the extrinsic validity of its rules or of the game itself. As Kuhn notes: Though many scientists talk easily and well about particular individual hypotheses that underlie a concrete piece of current research, they are little better than laymen at characterizing the established bases of their field, its legitimate problems and methods. If they have learned such abstractions at all, they show it mainly through their ability to do research. That ability can, however, be understood without recourse to hypothetical rules of the game. (47) Paradigms render modern science possible by producing practitioners and practices rather than by providing explicit knowledge of the principles such practices instantiate. In Foucault's language, we could say that practices are discursive formations (see Foucault 1972, 31-39). They are productive: [End Page 249] they give to knowledge... (shrink)

This article explores the concept of recognizing a face holistically and examines the experimental paradigms that serve as the “gold standards” for holistic perception. It discusses the contribution of featural and configural information to the holistic process and the controversy surrounding these often misunderstood concepts. It claims that the recruitment of holistic processes is what distinguishes faces from most types of object recognition. The discussion focuses on the kind of featural and configural information that is impaired in an inverted (...) face as well as the information that is spared. Finally, the article considers the concept of a “perceptual field” that allows for the preservation of both featural and configural information within a restricted spatial region of an inverted face. (shrink)

This paper starts with an intuitive notion of representational spaces, which is intended to provide an improved version of Kuhn's concept of paradigms. It then proceeds to study the following topics in terms of this new notion: incommensurability, paradigm change, explanation of anomalies, explanation of regularities, explanation of irregularities, and physical necessity. In the course of the investigation, "representational space" gets clarified and defined. It is envisaged that this new concept should throw light on many issues in the philosophy (...) of science. (shrink)

Discoveries in physics imply two elements. The firstone is the belief that formal tools, already foundedin the framework of existing mathematical theories,may offer the solution to a puzzling anomaly. Thesecond one is the ability to assign a physical meaningto the adopted formalism, and to consider all itstheoretical implications.Discussing an historical case where the adoption of aparticular formalism represents the real motor of thecreative intuition, we mean to delineate scientificdiscovery both as a discontinuous change with respectto previous achievements and as a (...) linear process ofknowledge enrichment. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In recent experimental work, the spectrum-like nature of the phenomenon of ordering subjectivity has been accounted for by recourse to the distinction, within the class of subjective adjectives, between multi-dimensional and judge-dependent ones. One way to cash out judge-dependency is in terms of some kind of experiencer-sensitivity. In this paper, we argue that this approach is insufficient. Applying Solt’s experimental paradigm to moral adjectives suggests that, within the class of judge-dependent adjectives, one must draw a further distinction between experiential (...) and evaluative adjectives. This opens up the question of what, if anything, characterizes judge-dependency. We propose that judge-dependency is characterized by the notion of holistic multi-dimensionality: a predicate is holistically multidimensional just in case its denotation is composed by various dimensions whose contribution is inseparable. (shrink)

Having for thirty years believed and taught the doctrine of phlogiston… I for a long time felt inimical to the new system, which represented as absurd that which I hitherto regarded as sound doctrine; but this enmity… springs only from force of habit… [Black to Lavoisier, 1791]This paper is abstracted from a forthcoming book which defends a particular answer to the question of just what it is that shifts when a paradigm shifts. The claim is that what shifts are habits (...) of mind. And in particular the claim is that the most striking cases of paradigm shift will characteristically turn on a shift in some single, uniquely critical, habit of mind: the barrier. An account of a radical discovery — discovery that prompts the Kuhnian symptoms of incommensurability, so that intuitions that seem irresistible to some seem perverse to their rivals — then characteristically turns on how some individual got past the barrier (escaped the critical habit of mind), while at least for a while others could not do so. (shrink)

Dworkin and Raz reject moral skepticism and offer holistic and non-derivative defenses of the objectivity of value. Furthermore, they acknowledge a role for social practices in the explanation of t...

Thirty years after its publication, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is still the source of much discussion in economics. Its rel-ativistic tone has often been used to fuel the claims of dissident traditions against the prevailing orthodoxy, or at least to plead the case for intellectual pluralism. Through his arguments regarding the incommensurability of different theoretical approaches to a particular subject, Kuhn's work has allowed many to argue that dissident traditions are just as legitimate as orthodoxy for analyzing (...) a subject, since there is no objective or independent means of arbitrating between them. This has caused an opposing response by those more supportive of the prevailing theoretical approach to economics. The latter have tried to find a defense to relativist challenges in more “rational” philosophies of science, such as that of Lakatos. (shrink)

This paper compares and contrasts the concept of a stance with that of a paradigm qua disciplinary matrix, in an attempt to illuminate both notions. First, it considers to what extent it is appropriate to draw an analogy between stances (which operate at the level of the individual) and disciplinary matrices (which operate at the level of the community). It suggests that despite first appearances, a disciplinary matrix is not simply a stance writ large. Second, it examines how we might (...) reinterpret disciplinary matrices in terms of stances, and shows how doing so can provide us with a better insight into non-revolutionary science. Finally, it identifies two directions for future research: “Can the rationality of scientific revolutions be understood in terms of the dynamic between stances and paradigms?” and “Do stances help us to understand incommensurability between disciplinary matrices?”. (shrink)

This paper compares and contrasts the concept of a stance with that of a paradigm qua disciplinary matrix, in an attempt to illuminate both notions. First, it considers to what extent it is appropriate to draw an analogy between stances and disciplinary matrices. It suggests that despite first appearances, a disciplinary matrix is not simply a stance writ large. Second, it examines how we might reinterpret disciplinary matrices in terms of stances, and shows how doing so can provide us with (...) a better insight into non-revolutionary science. Finally, it identifies two directions for future research: “Can the rationality of scientific revolutions be understood in terms of the dynamic between stances and paradigms?” and “Do stances help us to understand incommensurability between disciplinary matrices?”. (shrink)

The Cambridge Journal of Economics witnessed an important debate between Mark Pernecky and Paul Wojick on the one side and Rod Thomas on the other about the usefulness of Thomas Kuhn's sociology and philosophy of science in explaining why Keynes's revolutionary ideas exposed in the General Theory have been 'lost in translation'. This brief note is an attempt to reconcile Pernecky and Wojick's claim that Keynes's new economics of the General Theory and Walrasian General Equilibrium are incommensurable paradigms (...) in a Kuhnian understanding and Thomas's critique that – if they were incommensurable – Pernecki and Wojick's appraisal of Keynes's paradigm as a better approximation to the 'real world' than Walsrasian General Equilibrium is inconsistent within that very Kuhnian framework. (shrink)

One of the most controversial ideas in recent philosophy of science is the incommensurability of scientific theories. For Kuhn, the claim that two theories are incommensurable is the claim that there is no common language within which both theories could be fully expressed (Kuhn 1977, p. 301). In others words, two theories are incommensurable if and only if they are articulated in languages that are not mutually translatable or communicable without loss. This type of incommensurability, according to Kuhn, (...) is the result of changes in worldview. The proponents of different paradigms practice their researches in different worlds (Kuhn 1970, p. 150). They may have different classifications of objects in the world due to their different cultures. For example, the astronomers who belonged to Ptolemy’s paradigm grouped the sun, moon, and Mars into the same set, while the astronomers who belonged to Copernicus’s paradigm classified them into three different categories. (shrink)

No social life is possible without order. Order being the most constituent element of society, it is not surprising that so many theories have been developed to explain what social order is and how it is possible, as well as to explore the features that social order acquires in its different dimensions. The book leads these many theories of social order back to a few main matrices for the use of theoretical and practical reason, which are defined as 'paradigms (...) of order'. The plurality of conceptual constructs regarding social order is therefore reduced to a manageable number of theoretical patterns and an intellectual map is produced in which the most significant differences between paradigms are clearly outlined. Furthermore, the 'paradigmatic revolutions' are addressed that marked the most relevant turning points in the way in which a 'well-ordered society' should be understood. Against this background, the question is discussed on the theoretical and practical perspectives for a cosmopolitan society as the only suitable possibility to meet the global challenges with which we are all presently confronted. (shrink)

Incommensurability was Kuhn’s worst mistake. If it is to be found anywhere in science, it would be in physics. But revolutions in theoretical physics all embody theoretical unification. Far from obliterating the idea that there is a persisting theoretical idea in physics, revolutions do just the opposite: they all actually exemplify the persisting idea of underlying unity. Furthermore, persistent acceptance of unifying theories in physics when empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted means that physics makes a persistent (...) implicit assumption concerning unity. To put it in Kuhnian terms, underlying unity is a paradigm for paradigms. We need a conception of science which represents problematic assumptions concerning the physical comprehensibility and knowability of the universe in the form of a hierarchy, these assumptions becoming less and less substantial and more and more such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all, as one goes up the hierarchy. This hierarchical conception of science has important Kuhnian features, but also differs dramatically from the view Kuhn expounds in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In this paper, I compare and contrast these two views in a much more detailed way than has been done hitherto. I show how the hierarchical view can be construed to emerge from Kuhn’s view as it is modified to overcome objections. I argue that the hierarchical conception of science is to be preferred to Kuhn’s view. (shrink)

Corporate and commercial values are inducing some healthcare organizations to prescribe a customer service model that reframes the provision of nursing care. In this paper it is argued that such a model is incommensurable with nursing conceived as a moral practice and ultimately places nurses at risk. Based upon understanding from ongoing research on compassion fatigue, it is proposed that compassion fatigue as currently experienced by nurses may not arise predominantly from too great a demand for compassion, but rather (...) from barriers to enacting compassionate care. These barriers are often systemic. The paradigm shift in which healthcare environments are viewed as marketplaces rather than moral communities has the potential to radically affect the evolution of nursing as a discipline. (shrink)

Scientists working within a paradigm must play by the rules of the game of that paradigm in solving problems, and that is why incommensurability arises when the rules of the game change. If we deny the thesis of the priority of paradigms, then there is no good argument for the incommensurability of theories and thus for taxonomic incommensurability, because there is no invariant way to determine the set of results provable, puzzles solvable, and propositions cogently formulable under a given (...) paradigm. (shrink)

Tensions between idealism and scientific realism have been resolved by an appeal to the theory/observation distinction. but many who support incommensurability reject the distinction in favor of a version of idealism, e.g., thomas kuhn who supports a version of relativist idealism in which the terms of a theory do refer, but only to a paradigm--relative world of entities. it is argued that the three kinds of idealism depend on a cluster theory of meaning for fixing the reference of scientific terms, (...) and that a realist interpretation of the growth of science must eschew such a theory of meaning. the kripke-putnam theory for reference fixing of theoretical terms is employed to show how one term, 'mass', is referentially invariant despite change in the theory of motion from newton to einstein. (shrink)

In recent years, evolutionary theorists have come to recognize that the reductionist, individualist, gene-centered approach to evolution cannot sufficiently account for the emergence of complex biological systems over time. Peter A. Corning has been at the forefront of a new generation of complexity theorists who have been working to reshape the foundations of evolutionary theory. Well known for his Synergism Hypothesis—a theory of complexity in evolution that assigns a key causal role to various forms of functional synergy—Corning puts this theory (...) into a much broader framework in _Holistic Darwinism_, addressing many of the issues and concepts associated with the evolution of complex systems. Corning's paradigm embraces and integrates many related theoretical developments of recent years, from multilevel selection theory to niche construction theory, gene-culture coevolution theory, and theories of self-organization. Offering new approaches to thermodynamics, information theory, and economic analysis, Corning suggests how all of these domains can be brought firmly within what he characterizes as a post–neo-Darwinian evolutionary synthesis. (shrink)

Kuhn regards local incommensurability as an unavoidable result of changes in worldview, but his account fails to explain both historical cases in which rivals with different paradigms obtained consensus, and psychological experiments in which people with different cultural backgrounds accurately presented other points of view. Although the conditions required to generate local incommensurability were present in the dispute between Brewster and Herschel on light absorption, they succeeded in communicating. Ultimately Brewster understood his opponent's position, in the same way that (...) subjects in Barsalou's recent psychological experiments proved able to comprehend alien conceptual structures. Building upon recent cognitive theories of graded conceptual structures, I offer a new account of incommensurability, which accommodates these historical cases and psychological results. By correcting and extending Kuhn's account I show that local incommensurability may be a matter of degree. (shrink)

This article argues that the limited influence of Ludwik Fleck's ideas on philosophy of science is due not only to their indirect dissemination by way of Thomas Kuhn, but also to an incommensurability between the standard conceptual framework of history and philosophy of science and Fleck's own more integratedly historico-social and praxis-oriented approach to understanding the evolution of scientific discovery. What Kuhn named "paradigm" offers a periphrastic rendering or oblique translation of Fleck's Denkstil/Denkkollektiv , a derivation that may also account (...) for the lability of the term "paradigm". This was due not to Kuhn's unwillingness to credit Fleck but rather to the cold war political circumstances surrounding the writing of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . Following a discussion of Fleck's anatomical allusions, I include a brief discussion of Aristotle (on menstruation and darkened mirrors) and conclude with a reference to the productivity of error in Mach and Nietzsche. (shrink)

Psychologists can measure normalcy, define madness, develop therapeutic paradigms, and list the nuances of human behavior with utmost precision. We have biofeedback, psychometrics, psychoanalysis, cognitive therapy, positive psychology, behavior modification, and a host of deeply promising projects in the research and development pipeline. To be sure, our discipline has advanced accurate understanding of the soul's essential properties and has scientifically harnessed this knowledge to clinically mitigate the deep agony of the human mind. But, despite our advances and genuine effectiveness, (...) our discipline remains incomplete. Theoretically, scientifically, and therapeutically, we fall short of the fuller effectuality that awaits us. We need Christ. It is through the Christian revelation that psychology will find its maturity. For psychology there are blessings afoot. These blessings stem from our recognition that the Clinical Christ - the activity of the God of the Christian revelation throughout the realms of our discipline - desires to redeem, relate, heal, love, and empower us. The chapters of this book explore different aspects of the Clinical Christ, Christian Holism, and their implications. A central tenet of Christian Holism is that the Holy Spirit is fully present in the clinical situation, with and within the therapist and the client, and is actively engaged in the treatment process. Ten further tenets proceeding from the central tenet are described. Other chapters include treatment of the importance of forgiveness, reconciliation and dream work in the practice of Christian Holism. There is copious material in other chapters citing significant research data validating health benefits of Christian prayer and spirituality, the need for the Church to restore the healing ministry and energetic components of Christian prayer and spirituality. (shrink)

The paradigm of Laplacean determinism combines three regulative principles: determinism, predictability, and the explanatory adequacy of universal laws together with purely local conditions. Historically, it applied to celestial mechanics, but it has been expanded into an ideal for scientific theories whose cogency is often not questioned. Laplace’s demon is an idealization of mechanistic scientific method. Its principles together imply reducibility, and rule out holism and emergence. I will argue that Laplacean determinism fails even in the realm of planetary dynamics, (...) and that it does not give suitable criteria for explanatory success except within very well defined and rather exceptional domains. Ironically, the very successes of Laplacean method in the Solar System were made possible only by processes that are not themselves tractable to Laplacean methodology. The results of some of these processes were first observed in 1964, and violate the Lapacean requirements of locality and predictability, opening the door to holism and nonreducibility, i.e., emergence. Despite the falsification of Laplacean methodology, the explanatory resources of holism and emergence remain in scientific limbo, though emergence has been used somewhat indiscriminately in recent scientific literature. I make some remarks at the end about the proper use of emergence in its traditional sense going back to C.D. Broad. (shrink)

Biological and Neuroscientific Foundations of Philosophy is an authoritative text addressing both academicians and students, and proposes an integrated and holistic view of scientific study and presents a new paradigm by which to study philosophy. It highlights, in a systematic and sufficiently simple manner, the fundamental role of neuroscience, neuropsychology and biology within philosophical reflection.

Along with “paradigm” and “scientific revolution,” “incommensurability” is one of the three most influential expressions associated with the “new philosophy of science” first articulated in the early 1960s by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. But, despite the fact that it has been widely discussed, opinions still differ widely as to the content and significance of the claim of incommensurability.

Educational practices are affected by the dominant paradigm in the belonging context, which influences the representation of the human being, the idea and the purposes of education. Consequently, as a connecting science between the human sciences, pedagogy is called upon to be a critical instance. This article examines the issue of educational poverty — and of possible actions to prevent and combat it — in light of the cultural frameworks in which it is conceived. The responses to variations of the (...) phenomenon could benefit from contaminations or from the openness to different epistemological and cultural paradigms, capable of enriching educators’ professionalism and nourishing their motivation. In order to deal with today’s Western society typical forms of poverty, it is proposed to draw from both the emerging systemic holistic paradigm and the epistemology of complexity, as well as from proto-holistic practices and guiding principles deriving from neurosciences. The reader is supported in reflecting on the foundations of an integrating education which, taking advantage of sciences from East to West, favours the flourishing and expression of human multidimensionality. (shrink)

The article shows that Kuhn's concept of incommensurability emphasizes mainly the objective dimension of communication. To the thesis about the incommensurability of the meanings of scientific concepts in competing paradigms, we oppose the idea of a three-dimensional space of communicative dimensions. We supplement the objective dimension of communication, within which the environmental evolutionary selection of the best knowledge is carried out, with equal social and temporal horizons.

How do we characterize theoretical disagreement and how does this translate into strategies for practicing scientists? I integrate Kuhn’s (1962) notions of paradigms and problem-fields with Hull’s (1982,1988) concept of populational variation and Shapere’s (1974) characterization of domains in interpreting the Ox-Phos Controversy in bioenergetics (1961-1977). The analysis highlights the differences between intraparadigm disagreement (based on proposed solutions to shared problems) and interparadigm disagreement (based on the problems themselves and views of relevant domain).Kuhn (1959,1962) introduced the notion that a (...) single, uniform paradigm guides ‘normal science’. He further suggested that scientific communities undergo gestalt-like changes in research focus, implying that all disagreement is based on ‘incommensurable’ paradigms. Philosophers and historians of science concerned largely with how consensus is established (see Laudan 1984; Laudan and Laudan 1989) have found this problematic as a universal model (e.g., Lakatos and Musgrave 1970; Laudan 1977). (shrink)