Thirty years after its publication, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is still the source of much discussion in economics. Its rel-ativistic tone has often been used to fuel the claims of dissident traditions against the prevailing orthodoxy, or at least to plead the case for intellectual pluralism. Through his arguments regarding the incommensurability of different theoretical approaches to a particular subject, Kuhn's work has allowed many to argue that dissident traditions are just as legitimate as orthodoxy for analyzing (...) a subject, since there is no objective or independent means of arbitrating between them. This has caused an opposing response by those more supportive of the prevailing theoretical approach to economics. The latter have tried to find a defense to relativist challenges in more “rational” philosophies of science, such as that of Lakatos. (shrink)

My intention here is to show that the rhetorical approach to economics is based on a doctrine (the McCloskeyian doctrine) which, at least in some respect, is flawed. I will argue that Donald McCloskey fails to establish three central thesis which this doctrine articulates: first, that the rhetorical approach can explain the success of economics, a fact that I will clearly challenge; second, that only “insiders” can and should set the scientific standards in economics, an idea I will vigorously reject; (...) and third, that philosophical epistemology and methodology is useless for economists because the only thing philosophers are interested in is to find a demarcation criterion, and since this is impossible, philosophy of economics should be completely ignored by economists.; hence, I will argue here that McCloskey’s account of methodology is not grounded. (shrink)