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  1. A Philosopher against the Bandwagon: Carnap and the Informationalization of Thermal Physics.Javier Anta - 2022 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 12 (1):43-67.
    In this paper I aim to demonstrate that Rudolf Carnap's analysis of the application of information theory within physics, an intellectual-historical precedent of current philosophical criticisms toward this tendency, is justified. First, Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952) underlined the unjustified ‘semantification’ of Shannon entropy Furthermore, Carnap criticized the ‘physicalization’ of Shannon entropy, but that criticism was not accepted by the physics community of the 1950s (Köhler 2001). Finally, in the posthumously published "Two Essays on Entropy" Carnap (1977) developed a critical assessment (...)
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  2. Rudolf Carnap and David Lewis on Metaphysics.Fraser MacBride - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (1).
    In an unpublished speech from 1991, David Lewis told his audience that he counted ‘the metaphysician Carnap ’ amongst his historical ancestors. Here I provide a novel interpretation of the Aufbau that allows us to make sense of Lewis’s claim. Drawing upon Lewis’s correspondence, I argue it was the Carnap of the Aufbau whom Lewis read as a metaphysician, because Carnap’s appeal to the notion of founded relations in the Aufbau echoes Lewis’s own appeal to the metaphysics of natural properties. (...)
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  3. Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics.Sebastian Lutz & Adam Tamas Tuboly (eds.) - 2021 - New York: Routledge.
    This volume has two primary aims: to trace the traditions and changes in methods, concepts, and ideas that brought forth the logical empiricists’ philosophy of physics and to present and analyze the logical empiricists’ various and occasionally contrary ideas about the physical sciences and their philosophical relevance. These original chapters discuss these developments in their original contexts and social and institutional environments, thus showing the various fruitful conceptions and philosophies behind the history of 20th-century philosophy of science. Logical Empiricism and (...)
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  4. How do we Have to Investigate Scientific Explanation?Erik Weber, Leen De Vreese & Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2016 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 78 (3):489-524.
    This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher, and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make descriptive and normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to, but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility (...)
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  5. The Methodological Roles of Tolerance and Conventionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics: Reconsidering Carnap's Logic of Science.Emerson P. Doyle - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    This dissertation makes two primary contributions. The first three chapters develop an interpretation of Carnap's Meta-Philosophical Program which places stress upon his methodological analysis of the sciences over and above the Principle of Tolerance. Most importantly, I suggest, is that Carnap sees philosophy as contiguous with science—as a part of the scientific enterprise—so utilizing the very same methods and subject to the same limitations. I argue that the methodological reforms he suggests for philosophy amount to philosophy as the explication of (...)
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  6. Measurement in Carnap's late Philosophy of Science.Vadim Batitsky - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (2):87-108.
  7. Geometric conventionalism and carnap's principle of tolerance: We discuss in this paper the question of the scope of the principle of tolerance about languages promoted in Carnap's The Logical Syntax of Language and the nature of the analogy between it and the rudimentary conventionalism purportedly exhibited in the work of Poincaré and Hilbert. We take it more or less for granted that Poincaré and Hilbert do argue for conventionalism. We begin by sketching Coffa's historical account, which suggests that tolerance be interpreted as a conventionalism that allows us complete freedom to select whatever language we wish—an interpretation that generalizes the conventionalism promoted by Poincaré and Hilbert which allows us complete freedom to select whatever axiom system we wish for geometry. We argue that such an interpretation saddles Carnap with a theory of meaning that has unhappy consequences, a theory we believe he did not hold. We suggest that the principle of linguistic tolerance in.David De Vidi & Graham Solomon - 1993 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (5):773-783.
    We discuss in this paper the question of the scope of the principle of tolerance about languages promoted in Carnap's The Logical Syntax of Language and the nature of the analogy between it and the rudimentary conventionalism purportedly exhibited in the work of Poincaré and Hilbert. We take it more or less for granted that Poincaré and Hilbert do argue for conventionalism. We begin by sketching Coffa's historical account, which suggests that tolerance be interpreted as a conventionalism that allows us (...)
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  8. Review of The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station by Alberto Coffa. [REVIEW]Alan Richardson - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (1):142-144.
  9. Carnap and Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Paul O’Grady - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1015-1027.
    There is a general consensus that Quine’s assault on analyticity and verificationism in ‘Two Dogma of Empiricism’ has been successful and that Carnap’s philosophical position has been vanquished. This paper so characterises Carnap’s position that it escapes Quine’s criticisms. It shows that the disagreement is not a first order dispute about analyticity or verificationism, but rather a deeper dispute about philosophical method.
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  10. The geometry of knowledge: Lewis, Becker, Carnap and the formalization of philosophy in the 1920s.Alan Richardson - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (1):165-182.
    On an ordinary view of the relation of philosophy of science to science, science serves only as a topic for philosophical reflection, reflection that proceeds by its own methods and according to its own standards. This ordinary view suggests a way of writing a global history of philosophy of science that finds substantially the same philosophical projects being pursued across widely divergent scientific eras. While not denying that this view is of some use regarding certain themes of and particular time (...)
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  11. Comparative Concepts. A Critique of Carnap and Hempel’s Theory. [REVIEW]Veit Pittioni - 1984 - Philosophy and History 17 (1):45-45.
  12. Foundations of the Unity of Science. Volume II, no. 7: Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science.International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, I and II. [REVIEW]J. J. C. Smart & Carl G. Hempel - 1953 - Philosophical Review 62 (3):473.
  13. Foundations of the Unity of Science, Vol. I. No. 2: Foundations of the Theory of Signs.Foundations of the Unity of Science, Vol. I. No. 3: Foundations of Logic and Mathematics.Foundations of the Unity of Science, Vol. I. No. 4: Linguistic Aspects of Science. [REVIEW]Frederic B. Fitch, Charles W. Morris, Rudolf Carnap & Leonard Bloomfield - 1940 - Philosophical Review 49 (6):678.
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  14. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Volumes I and II: Foundations of the Unity of Science.Volume I, Number 1: Encyclopedia and Unified Science.Volume I, Number 2: Foundations of the Theory of Signs.Volume I, Number 5: Procedures of Empirical Science. [REVIEW]E. N., Otto Neurath, Niels Bohr, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap, Charles W. Morris & Victor F. Lenzen - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (25):689.
  15. Peter Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. xi+300. ISBN 978-0-521-87559-2. £50.00. [REVIEW]Stephen Gaukroger - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Science 42 (2):294.
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  16. Explication Defended.Patrick Maher - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):331-341.
    How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on misunderstandings of the nature of explication. It is (...)
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  17. On Carnap sentences.P. Raatikainen - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):245-246.
    The influential proposal that the analytical component of a theory is captured by its ‘Carnap sentence’ is critically scrutinized. A counterexample which makes the suggestion problematic is presented.
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  18. Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering.Georg Brun - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1211-1241.
    Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for (...)
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  19. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Volumes I and II: Foundations of the Unity of Science. [REVIEW]N. E. - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (25):689-693.
  20. Friedman׳s Thesis.Ryan Samaroo - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (Part B):129-138.
    This essay examines Friedman's recent approach to the analysis of physical theories. Friedman argues against Quine that the identification of certain principles as ‘constitutive’ is essential to a satisfactory methodological analysis of physics. I explicate Friedman's characterization of a constitutive principle, and I evaluate his account of the constitutive principles that Newtonian and Einsteinian gravitation presuppose for their formulation. I argue that something close to Friedman's thesis is defensible.
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  21. Carnap's Explication of 'Analytic' and 'Meaning-Of'.Richard Porter Butrick - 1966 - Dissertation, Columbia University
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  22. Breve introducción al pensamiento de Carnap. [REVIEW]M. C. Caamaño Alegre - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (3).
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  23. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Vol. I, no. 1: O. Neurath, N. Bohr a.o., Encyclopedia and Unified Science; no. 2: Ch. W. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs; no. 3: Carnap, R., Foundations of Logic and Mathematics; no. 5: Victor F. Lanzen, Prodedures of Empirical Science. [REVIEW]Marcuse Marcuse - 1939 - Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 8:228.
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  24. Carnap and the Explication of Empiricism.Robert Jay Levy - 1970 - Dissertation, Duke University
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  25. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 1, parts 1 and 2. By various authors. [REVIEW]J. O. Urmson - 1958 - Mind 67:571.
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  26. Una modernizzazione incompiuta: il programma di unificazione della scienza.Gereon Wolters - 1992 - Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 10 (3/4):90-98.
    The paper shows how logical empiricism aims at a modernization of philosophy.
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  27. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Edited by Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap [and] Charles Morris.Otto Neurath - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
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  28. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science: Foundations of the unity of science...Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap & Charles William Morris - 1938 - University Press.
  29. Encyclopedia and Unified Science.Otto Neurath - 1947 - University of Chicago Press.
  30. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science: Vol. I, No. 9. Foundations of Biology. [REVIEW]Michael T. Casey - 1955 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 5:161-161.
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  31. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, Parts 1 and 2. [REVIEW]B. R. - 1956 - Review of Metaphysics 9 (3):526-526.
    These volumes comprise together the first 10 monographs in the series inaugurated 20 years ago by the Institute for the Unity of Science. All of the monographs--many of them now classic--have been published previously. It is unfortunate that a comprehensive index and bibliography have not been included.--R. B.
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  32. Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia.Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.) - 2015 - Routledge.
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  33. L'explication en linguistique.T. Zgo Ka - 1989 - Studia Filozoficzne 278:157-168.
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  34. Besprechung der „International Encyclopedia of Unified Science“.H. Marcuse - 1939 - Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 8.
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  35. Une explication de texte.Maña Angélica Berho Esteves - 1969 - Humanitas 21:57.
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  36. Realism as a Problem of Language–From Carnap to Reichenbach and Kaila.Matthias Neuber - 2012 - In R. Creath (ed.), Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Springer Verlag. pp. 37--56.
    Rudolf Carnap’s role in the debate over scientific realism is fairly unclear. In a certain sense, Carnap must be regarded as the one who rendered the whole issue irrelevant. However, it cannot be ignored that Carnap sometimes spoke of himself as an ‘empirical realist.’ So the question to be answered is: in what sense, if at all, did Carnap play a constructive role in the scientific realism debate. It is the aim of the present paper to tackle this question by (...)
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  37. An International Encyclopedia of the Unified Sciences.Otto Neurath - 2004 - In S. Rahman J. Symons (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Kluwer Academic Publisher. pp. 17--21.
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  38. Carnap's Internal and External Questions: Part I: Quine's Criticisms.Graham Bird - 2003 - In Thomas Bonk (ed.), Language, Truth and Knowledge. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 97--131.
  39. Carnap on concept determination: methodology for philosophy of science. [REVIEW]James Justus - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):161-179.
    Abstract Recent criticisms of intuition from experimental philosophy and elsewhere have helped undermine the authority of traditional conceptual analysis. As the product of more empirically informed philosophical methodology, this result is compelling and philosophically salutary. But the negative critiques rarely suggest a positive alternative. In particular, a normative account of concept determination—how concepts should be characterized—is strikingly absent from such work. Carnap's underappreciated theory of explication provides such a theory. Analyses of complex concepts in empirical sciences illustrates and supports this (...)
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  40. La teoría de los invariantes y el espacio intuitivo en Der Raum de Rudolf Carnap.Álvaro J. Peláez Cedrés - 2008 - Análisis Filosófico 28 (2):175-203.
    La consecuencia más difundida de la revolución en la geometría del siglo XIX es aquella que afirma que después de dichos cambios ya nada quedaría de la vieja noción de espacio como "forma de la intuición sensible", ni de la geometría como "condición trascendental" de la posibilidad de la experiencia. Este artículo se ocupa del intento de Rudolf Carnap por articular una concepción del espacio intuitivo que, al tiempo que se mantiene dentro del paradigma kantiano se hace eco de algunos (...)
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  41. AW Carus: Carnap and Twentieth-century Thought. Explication as Enlightenment.Jelena Issajeva - 2012 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (1).
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  42. Carnap on theoretical terms: structuralism without metaphysics.Michael Friedman - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):249 - 263.
    Both realists and instrumentalists have found it difficult to understand (much less accept) Carnap's developed view on theoretical terms, which attempts to stake out a neutral position between realism and instrumentalism. I argue that Carnap's mature conception of a scientific theory as the conjunction of its Ramsey sentence and Carnap sentence can indeed achieve this neutral position. To see this, however, we need to see why the Newman problem raised in the context of recent work on structural realism is no (...)
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  43. Explication ou expression: A propos d'une critique Des théories psychologiques.Henri Piéron - 1907 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 64:284 - 287.
  44. Sur l'explication.Jean Largeault - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 172 (3):495 - 508.
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  45. Before explication.Richard Creath - 2012 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Ideal of Explication and Naturalism. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  46. Carnapian Explication : A Case Study and Critique.Erich Reck - 2012 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Ideal of Explication and Naturalism. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 96--116.
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  47. What Are the Grounds of Explication?Eugene T. Gendlin - 1965 - The Monist 49 (1):137-164.
    In this paper I will attempt to discuss linguistic analysis and phenomenology accurately so that the adherents of each can agree with what I say, and yet also the discussion of each method must be understandable to the adherents of the other. If I can really do that, the basic similarities will appear. I will attempt to state some propositions that apply to both frames of reference. The similarities which these propositions state are basic aspects of philosophic method, and they (...)
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  48. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.Michael T. Casey - 1955 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 5:161-161.
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  49. De-synthesizing the relative a priori.Thomas Uebel - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):7-17.
    This paper considers the question whether the notion of the relative apriori, central to Michael Friedman’s transcendentalist programme for philosophy of science, is available also to philosophers who reject appeals to a synthetic a priori. After tracing the rediscovery of the relative a priori and delineating its potential, the question is considered whether Friedman’s arguments against Quinean naturalism and Carnap’s attenuated logicism tell against a conception of philosophy as scientific metatheory that combines logical and empirical inquiries. Finding an opening here (...)
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  50. The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory.Sean Crawford - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The identity theory’s rise to prominence in analytic philosophy of mind during the late 1950s and early 1960s is widely seen as a watershed in the development of physicalism, in the sense that whereas logical behaviourism proposed analytic and a priori ascertainable identities between the meanings of mental and physical-behavioural concepts, the identity theory proposed synthetic and a posteriori knowable identities between mental and physical properties. While this watershed does exist, the standard account of it is misleading, as it is (...)
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