Symbols enable people to organize and communicate about the world. However, the ways in which symbolic knowledge is learned and then represented in the mind are poorly understood. We present a formal analysis of symbolic learning—in particular, word learning—in terms of prediction and cue competition, and we consider two possible ways in which symbols might be learned: by learning to predict a label from the features of objects and events in the world, and by learning to predict features from a (...) label. This analysis predicts significant differences in symbolic learning depending on the sequencing of objects and labels. We report a computational simulation and two human experiments that confirm these differences, revealing the existence of Feature-Label-Ordering effects in learning. Discrimination learning is facilitated when objects predict labels, but not when labels predict objects. Our results and analysis suggest that the semantic categories people use to understand and communicate about the world can only be learned if labels are predicted from objects. We discuss the implications of this for our understanding of the nature of language and symbolic thought, and in particular, for theories of reference. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine Sextus Empiricus' treatise Against the geometers . We first set this treatise in the overall context of the sceptic's polemics against the liberal arts. After a discussion of Sextus' attitude to the quadrivium , we discuss the structure, the sources and the target of the Against the geometers . It appears that Euclid is not Sextus' source, and neither he, nor the professional geometers, seem to be Sextus' main targets. Of course, Sextus never really makes (...) clear his precise target, but his attacks are rather directed against geometry as a means of modelling the physical world, thus ruining the support geometry was intended to bring to the physical part of dogmatic philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:120 A WORD ON BEHALF OF DEMEA Little attention has been given to the a priori argument for God's existence espoused by Demea in Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. This circumstance is neither surprising nor unjustified. Given Hume's well-known theological sympathies, certainly no one would be tempted to regard Demea as Hume's spokesman. Demea's argument plays so small a role in the Dialogues as to suggest that Hume does (...) not take it at all seriously. He may present it only to establish that he is aware of alternative arguments for God's existence, but thinks them even less successful than the design argument and hence undeserving of extensive critique. Yet, if a philosopher criticizes an argument he deems unworthy of respect, he should still provide sound, not spurious, reasons for rejecting it. This is exactly what D. C. Stove has argued that Hume fails to do in Part IX of the Dialogues, assuming, as is generally done, that the speeches of Cleanthes and Philo present reasoning that Hume would personally endorse. Stove argues that most of the criticisms of Demea's argument are "extremely defective, and that they even include an inconsistency" (Stove, p. 300). This contention has been challenged by Donald Stahl, who has published a succinct point by point rebuttal of Stove's contentions.3 The Stove-Stahl controversy only deals with the reasoning presented in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 10 of Part IX because those are the contentions Stove attacks. He has "nothing to say against" the criticisms presented in paragraphs 8 and 9, which he assumes will be generally agreed to be 121 less important than the others (Stove, p. 308). He totally ignores the argument of paragraph 11. However, I am not convinced that the criticisms of these paragraphs are less important and I do have something to say against them. Consequently, instead of intervening directly on either side of the dispute between Professors Stove and Stahl, I shall attend principally to the argumentation of paragraphs 8, 9, and 11. I shall (1) summarize Demea's argument, (2) argue for the significance of the criticisms of paragraphs 8-9, (3) examine those criticisms, and (4) assess the role of Philo's concluding remarks in paragraphs 10-11. 1. Demea's Argument Early on Hume has Demea speak so obviously inconsistently as to make the reader wonder whether this character is supposed to think at all about the implications of the claims he espouses. At the beginning of Part II, he proclaims that God's existence is surely not at issue, since no one of common sense... ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident." The nature of God is the only proper object of theological inquiry, and that is "altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us" (D 141)! Given such a radically apophatic position (Hume calls it "mystical"), it is hardly surprising that the sceptical Philo readily concurs, once he specifies that he takes 'God' to mean just "the original cause of this universe (whatever it be)" (D 142). But Demea immediately buttresses his alleged self-evident truth by appealing to the authority of Father Malebranche and the whole tradition of Christian theology, apparently oblivious to the impropriety of 122 supporting an indubitable truth by citing authorities (D 141-142). Further, scarcely more than a page later, after Cleanthes has sketched out the design argument, this same Demea is horrified that Cleanthes gives no abstract arguments or a priori proofs and calls for a "demonstration of the being of a God" (D 143). When, in Part IX, Demea himself undertakes to provide the "simple and sublime argument a priori" (D 188) he expected from Cleanthes, he characterizes the argument as "the common one," which suggests he is more engaged in paraphrasing authority than in thoughtfully arguing. The argument, in fact, as has been generally recognized, closely follows one given by Samuel Clarke in the Boyle Lectures of 1704. 5 Demea begins by assuming that "whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence," (D 188) since nothing can cause itself to exist. He then states a dilemma: in tracing the... (shrink)

A central goal of typological research is to characterize linguistic features in terms of both their functional role and their fit to social and cognitive systems. One long-standing puzzle concerns why certain languages employ grammatical gender. In an information theoretic analysis of German noun classification, Dye, Milin, Futrell, and Ramscar enumerated a number of important processing advantages gender confers. Yet this raises a further puzzle: If gender systems are so beneficial to processing, what does this mean for languages that make (...) do without them? Here, we compare the communicative function of gender marking in German to that of prenominal adjectives in English, finding that despite their differences, both systems act to efficiently smooth information over discourse, making nouns more equally predictable in context. We examine why evolutionary pressures may favor one system over another and discuss the implications for compositional accounts of meaning and Gricean principles of communication. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Demea's Departure James Dye Although Demea's departure atthe end ofpart 11 is one ofthe dramatic highlights ofthe Dialogues,1 it has prompted little comment. That is a pity, since it is a striking departure from Hume's Ciceronian model in De natura deorum, and the motivation for the change is far from clear. What is clear is that to this point Philo and Demea have been informal allies. The conclusions ofPhilo's (...) sceptical arguments have dovetailed nicely with Demea's negative theology—an alliance, as it were, between reason aware of its own failure and faith which accepts the invincible mysteriousness of the divine. Both distrust reason's competence to attain knowledge of God. After Demea's departure, Cleanthes and Philo seem to embark on a more conciliatory relationship for which the preceding parts have so ill-prepared the reader that Philo's "reversal" or "confession" in part 12 has become a standard exegetical problem in the literature. If Demea must go to facilitate the reconciliation ofPhilo and Cleanthes, what motivates his exit now? The usual view takes the departure to be motivated by Demea's unhappiness with Philo's disquisition on evil. This is so vague as to be useless, especially since through most of part 10 Demea eagerly co-operates with Philoin describinglife in terms which make thereaUty of evil all the more compelling. If the dialogue is psychologically coherent, the subsequent conversation must introduce something else tomotivate Demea's departure. Whatis ofsuch significance that Hume chooses to punctuate it with the dramatic flourish of Demea's exit? It does have much to do, I think, with something Philo says, but not about "the problem ofevil" as that is usually construed. It has something to do with the problem of evil, but more with the implications of what Philo says than with his explicit claims. It will be necessary, however, to setthese factorsin theircontext; andfor that purpose,let's startwith part 9. Part 9 Many have located the beginnings ofa Demea-Philo rupture in part 9, not in Demea's perception ofPhilo, but in Philo's willingness to attack Demea. Specifically, Philo has commonly been taken to approve Cleanthes'criticisms ofDemea's argument and to add his own to them. The temptation to interpret Philo as endorsing Cleanthes' criticisms is particularly strong because those criticisms seem to echo Volume XVIII Number 2 467 JAMESDYE characteristically Humean positions. However, in this context, as criticisms ofDemea's argument, they are question-begging and, in fact, backfire on Cleanthes.2 Moreover, Philo does not say that he accepts Cleanthes'arguments. (Heisperhaps astonished that Cleanthes, inhis eagerness to attack any view which smacks of "old-fashioned" a priorism, can forcefully espouse views which undercut his own position.)3 His first remarks after Cleanthes' exceptionally spirited attack on Demea strongly resemble his remarks in part 2 following Demea's equally spirited initial objection (appealing to tradition and authority) to Cleanthes' argument.4 Both responses are playfully ironic, and we should no more presume that Philo endorses Cleanthes' argumentation in part 9 than we should assume him to endorse Demea's in part 2. Nor are Philo's own contributions to part 9 such as to give affront to Demea. He pointedly classifies the first ofthe two points he makes as "upon another topic" (D 191). Then he invokes as an example the fact that adding the digits ofany product of9 always yields either 9 or some lesser product of 9. The point of the example is that this fact, which initially seems marvellous and inexplicable, ceases to astonish one who understands mathematics sufficiently well to see that it is arithmetically necessary that the products of 9 have this property. Philo claims that it is probable that the similarly astonishing order of the universe may in like manner be determined by some intrinsic necessity in matter, which would seem equally unremarkable to us had we far more thorough knowledge of the nature of matter than we currently possess. The crux ofPhilo's argument is that ifa remarkable regularity or orderfound in certain numbers is numerically necessary, itrequires no further explanation; similarly, ifa remarkable regularity or order in nature is necessary, it does... (shrink)

Increasing emphasis on genetic research means that growing numbers of human research projects in Australia will involve complex issues related to genetic privacy, familial information and genetic epidemiology. The Office of Population Health Genomics (Department of Health, Western Australia) hosted an interactive workshop to explore the ethical issues involved in the disclosure of genetic information, where researchers and members of human research ethics committees (HRECs) were asked to consider several case studies from an ethical perspective. Workshop participants used a variety (...) of approaches to examine the complex ethical issues encountered, but did not consistently refer to the values and principles outlined in the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (NHMRC 2007) or apply rational ethical approaches. Overall, the data suggested that both researchers and HREC members may benefit from further education and support regarding the application of ethical frameworks to the issues encountered in genetic research. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine Sextus Empiricus’ treatise Against the geometers. We first set this treatise in the overall context of the sceptic’s polemics against the liberal arts. After a discussion of Sextus’ attitude to the quadrivium, we discuss the structure, the sources and the target of the Against the geometers. It appears that Euclid is not Sextus’ source, and neither he, nor the professional geometers, seem to be Sextus’ main targets. Of course, Sextus never really makes clear his precise (...) target, but his attacks are rather directed against geometry as a means of modelling the physical world, thus ruining the support geometry was intended to bring to the physical part of dogmatic philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:122 HUME ON CURING SUPERSTITION In the first volume of his masterful treatment of the Enlightenment Peter Gay says that "David Hume proclaimed philosophy the supreme, indeed the only, cure for superstition." The context suggests that Hume had great "confidence" in this project and that he shared Diderot's view of the philosopher as the apostle of truth who would teach all mankind. Certainly Hume, in common with his philosophical (...) compatriots, thought that superstition was a great evil. He may also have thought that philosophy was the best weapon with which to oppose superstition. But did he think that it was a "cure" and that the philosopher was a pathfinder for a new and glorious dawn of universal enlightenment? He seems rather to have held a somewhat more modest and circumspect view of what philosophy can accomplish by way of liberating humanity from superstition than did some of his more optimistic contemporaries — a view 2 worthy of closer examination. The purpose of this paper is to explain just what he did think by examining those texts where he writes about the curative virtues of philosophy. So that any shifts in Hume's views may be more apparent, the relevant passages will be considered according to their chronological order. In the conclusion to Book I of the Treatise (1738) Hume characterizes the results of his reasoning as a "forelorn solitude" in which he is separated, not only from the crowd, and from "metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians, and even theologians," but also from philosophers, who, like all others, follow the inconsistent dictates of imagination in alternating between belief in the continual existence of sensible matter and the 123 reliability of causal reasoning, which teaches us that sensible objects are in us, rather than in external nature (T 265-6). His own philosophical reflections have led to the realization that even the causal "connexion, tie, or energy lies merely in themselves," as certainly as do sensed qualities. Thus the philosophical quest itself, which seeks a knowledge of "the ultimate and operating principle... which resides in the external object," is revealed as a contradictory or meaningless enterprise. We are left with a "very dangerous dilemma, whichever way we answer it," whose horns are precisely superstition and philosophy. That is, we may either "assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy... often contrary to each other... [which will] lead us into such errors, absurdities, and obscurities, that we must at last become asham'd of our credulity;" or we may "take a resolution to reject all the trivial suggestions of the fancy, and adhere to the understanding" which will lead us to the conclusion that there is "not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life" (T 266-8). He believes that philosophy has come to an impasse which he does not know how to escape, and which we commonly deal with by simply ceasing to think about the problem, finding ourselves "absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life" (T 269). Observation of the actual effects of philosophy upon conduct warrants the conclusion that "refin'd reflections have little or no influence upon us," excepting, of course, for that brief time in which those reflections leave us quite agitated and confounded by our inability to provide answers to the questions which most trouble us. 124 Philosophy is here characterized, not as a cure for superstition, but as an equal and opposite mental disposition, whose reflections ultimately undermine its own rational credentials, so that they seem no more valid than those of superstition. He does indeed resort to the therapeutic metaphor, but only to make nature the physician which "cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium" by applying that "carelessness and inattention" which he earlier identified as that which "alone can afford us any remedy" for philosophical despair (T 218). So philosophy is itself in need of the cure afforded by amusement and the various "common affairs of life" with which gentlemen occupy themselves. When engaged in those pursuits, philosophy seems individually and socially useless, in effect "an abuse of time" (T 270). If one returns to... (shrink)

AUTHORITY AND INEQUALITY UNDER CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM: USA, USSR, AND CHINA by Barrington Moore, Jr. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. 142 pp., $29.95.

A main objective of this study is to assess the opinions of 50 behavioral health patients on selective control over their behavioral and physical health information. We explored patients' preferences regarding current consent models, what health information should be shared for care and research and whether these preferences vary based on the sensitivity of health information and/or the type of provider involved. The other objective of this study was to solicit opinions of 8 behavioral health providers on patient-driven granular control (...) of health information and potential impact on care.Electronic surveys were implemented at an outpatient Behavioral Health facility that provides care for behavioral health patients with non-serious mental illnesses. The Patient Survey included questions regarding patients' demographics and about their concerns and preferences for data sharing for care and research. The Provider Survey included questions about their view on the current consent process and perceptions on barriers and facilitators to implement patient-controlled granular consent models.This novel study provides valuable preliminary data that can help guide future studies to better understand privacy choices of this underrepresented patient group. (shrink)