The thesis analyses the relation between Rousseau’s musical writings and elements of his moral, social and linguistic philosophy. In particular, I am concerned to demonstrate: (i.) how the core of Rousseau’s theory of musical imitation is grounded in the same analysis of the nature of man which governs his moral and social philosophy; (ii.) how this grounding does not extend to the stylistic prescriptions the justification of which Rousseau intended his musical writings to offer. The central argument draws (...) on Rousseau’s analysis of the origin of man as distinctively human. This origin extends to the awareness of moral and aesthetic value, and to communication in speech and song. Rousseau’s moral analyses of social and political life usually take the form of relating contemporary practice to the original structure in which man’s awareness of his own good is commensurate with that of the good of others. The analysis of music follows a similar model: music is to be considered good in so far as it replicates, or faithfully reflects, the original model of communication. The value of music is thereby understood to extend to moral as well as aesthetic goodness. Given the subtlety of Rousseau’s understanding of the ‘origin’, I argue that this analysis of music’s aesthetic value is powerful and far‐ reaching in its relevance for contemporary musical aesthetics. However, I also argue that while the analysis in general is good in this way, it does not entail the specific kind of musical‐stylistic preferences which Rousseau sought to use it to advance. (shrink)

The subject of this article is the way in which Grotius imitated his Roman model Tacitus in his own Annales. He does this by quotations and allusions, but also, more subtly, by adopting some of Tacitus stylistic peculiarities like brevitas, inconcinnitas and the insertion of sententiae. The imitation of Tacitus is most conspicuous in important sections of the Annales like the opening chapters and the introductions of the main characters. Tacitus is the prime model of Grotius, but not (...) the only one, as is shown by borrowings from Sallust, Pliny the Younger and Vergil. (shrink)

Musical elements in the structure of G. MacDonald’s Phantastes and Lilith in the context of the theory of intermediality are studied. The following musical elements are analyzed: motif of fairy world’s music, images of music of nature, musical description of characters’ voices, insertions of songs, interpretation of music as an art. These musical elements act as a characterization of topoi, landscape, characters, technique of stylistic imitation and means of rhythmic organization of narration, expression of author’s point of view. (...) The paper concludes that music in G. MacDonald’s fairy romances is represented by means of intermedial imitation and intermedial thematization used for creation of full of sound fairy world and expression of Romantic view on music essence. (shrink)

The development of G. H. von Wright’s work in ethics is traced from the early 1950s to the publication of The Varieties of Goodness in 1963, with special focus on the influences stemming from Wittgenstein’s later thought. In 1952, von Wright published an essay suggesting a formal analysis of the concept of value. This attempt was soon abandoned. The change of approach took place at the time von Wright started his work on Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and tried to articulate the main (...) lines of Wittgenstein’s Philosophische Untersuchungen in spoken and written form. This preoccupation with Wittgenstein led to a new approach to value judgments in an 1954 article, which shows strong late-Wittgensteinian influences on methodical as well as stylistic levels. Some traces of the 1954 approach are still visible in The Varieties of Goodness, while the stylistic imitations and allusions have mostly been dropped. Furthermore, von Wright’s approach in The Varieties is wider in scope, aiming at a broad overview of the phenomenon von Wright calls the “varieties of goodness”. But new conncections to the later Wittgenstein also seem to emerge: the idea of a "perspicuous presentation" of ethical concepts and the will to make philosophy relevant for "kulturens större sammanhang". (shrink)

It is the aim of this work to examine the pivotal role of Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768) as a judge of classical sculpture and as a major contributor to German art criticism. John Harry North seeks to identify the key features of his treatment of classical beauty, particularly in his famous descriptions of large-scale classical sculpture. Five case studies are offered to demonstrate the academic classicism that formed the core of his philosophy of art. North aims to establish Winckelmann's place (...) in the development of the German language. His prose contributed to a literary style that was suitable for the expression of an emotional response to visual experiences. His use of rhetoric in the assessment of classical art, however, make his judgements propagandist rather than analytical. The published works of Winckelmann, his draft essays and his collected private correspondence are advanced as criteria in the evaluation of his impact on the development of German classicism that culminated in the Weimar group of poets and writers. His Grecophile enthusiasm, however, led him to introduce stylistic categories in the development of classical marble sculpture that are no longer regarded as truly reflecting the evolution of Greco-Roman art. Thus his historicity and his classification of styles remain in doubt. Winckelmann proposed that the training of modern artists should concentrate on the observation and imitation of classical models instead of looking to nature as the source of inspiration. This plan succeeded to some extent in the generation that followed his untimely death. Throughout the succeeding century, artists and their sponsors did favour classical models and developed stylistic classicism in European freestanding sculpture, in painting and in architecture. (shrink)

This paper focusses on colour terminology as a tool for achieving ἐνάργεια in the Latin poetry of the first century c.e. After briefly outlining the developments in the concept of ἐνάργεια from Aristotle to Quintilian, the paper considers the use of Latin terms for black in three descriptive passages from Statius’ epic poem, the Thebaid. It is observed that the poet privileges the juxtaposition of the two adjectives ater and niger in a pattern of uariatio, where ater often carries a (...) figurative meaning and repeats established poetic clichés, while niger is part of unparalleled collocations that evoke a material notion of blackness. Further analysis of the uariatio in the context of each passage reveals that the juxtaposition of the two-colour terms enhances the vividness of the objects described not only by increasing their chromatic impact but also by establishing connections with other parts of the poem, and by inviting a reflection on the competing practices of imitation and transgression of poetic models. The analysis of one stylistic feature shows that this stylistic feature is used by Statius for achieving ἐνάργεια as an artistic effect, for reflecting on ἐνάργεια as an instrument through which poetic models are challenged, and for tying his own poetic practice to contemporary rhetorical discussions. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show, by the example of Hugo Grotius's Annales et Historiae de rebus Belgicis (AH), that the nature and content of the concept of Tacitism (Tacitist, Tacitean) in the period around 1600 was markedly different from modern perceptions of the style and political purport of Tacitus's works. This gap between current and early-modern conceptions of Tacitus is important to bear in mind for intellectual historians dealing with early-modern intellectual currents such as Reason of State, (...) Neo-Stoicism, Tacitism, and others. This article first describes how the Tacitean style is characterised in literary criticism around 1600; then it explores the qualities of Hugo Grotius's imitation of Tacitus from the 17th-century perspective and from that of some main aspects of the present-day view of Tacitus. It concludes that Grotius's imitation shows Tacitus's style in a characteristically 17th-century mirror, in that it puts emphasis on Tacitean syntax, brevity and choice of words (the stylistic micro-level), as well as on political iudicium and Reason of State, but omits imitation of the narrative and structural qualities of Tacitus's composition, and their implications, which are central to modern interpretations. ☆ This article is part of the outcome of a research project on Grotius's Annales et Historiae conducted at the Radboud University Nijmegen in 2004–2008 with a VENI-grant from the Dutch research organisation NWO. I thank Corinna Vermeulen, Marc van der Poel, Hans Blom and HEI's anonymous referees for their comments on this piece. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Rhetoric of Parody in Plato's MenexenusFranco V. TrivignoIn Plato's Menexenus, Socrates spends nearly the entire dialogue reciting an epitaphios logos, or funeral oration, that he claims was taught to him by Aspasia, Pericles' mistress. Three difficulties confront the interpreter of this dialogue. First, commentators have puzzled over how to understand the intention of Socrates' funeral oration (see Clavaud 1980, 17–77).1 Some insist that it is parodic, performing an (...) essentially critical function (e.g., Loraux 1986); while others claim that it is serious, in particular as an expression of Plato's political ideal (e.g., Kahn 1963).2 Adherents on both sides seem to think that the options are mutually exclusive.3 Second, commentators have had difficulty understanding why Plato would have Socrates attribute his entire oration to Aspasia (e.g., Coventry 1989, 3; Pownall 2004, 60). Most agree that this move is ironic and that it has something to do with the alleged target of the dialogue's criticism. But scholars have differed over whether the Aspasia reference is meant to implicate Pericles' funeral oration (Monoson 1998), rhetoric in general (Pownall 2004), Athens (Loraux 1986), or even Aeschines (Clavaud 1980).4 Third, scholars have struggled to make sense of the dialogue's "deliberate and fantastic anachronism" (Dodds 1990, 24). In the funeral oration, Socrates relates the history of Athens up to the King's Peace in 386 B.C., a full thirteen years after he has died. This problem has generated the least consensus, with some scholars restricting their analysis [End Page 29] to dating considerations (e.g., Dodds 1990) and at least one speculating that Socrates speaks in this dialogue as a ghost (Rosenstock 1994).5It is the contention of this article that, by understanding the rhetoric of parody in the Menexenus, one can resolve these difficulties and come to a coherent and unified understanding of the philosophical intentions of the dialogue.6 More specifically, I will show that the anachronism is a consequence of a particular parodic strategy, that of amplification; that the dialogue's parody targets not only Pericles' funeral oration in particular but funeral oratory, rhetoric, and Athens as well; and that the parody has serious philosophical implications.7 Further, I claim that the serious philosophical content is both critical and constructive. Plato subverts the civic identity and understanding of virtue encouraged by the genre of funeral oration, and he challenges its praise-based model of political discourse. At the same time, Plato's parodic criticism is not entirely negative, for it relies on alternative paradigms of civic identity, virtue, and political discourse.I. The Rhetoric of ParodyBefore turning to the Menexenus itself, I want to clarify what I mean by parody. For a working definition, I suggest that parody is "an imitation that distorts a target text, author, or genre."8 In order to make some general observations about the rhetoric of parody, I will look briefly at an exemplar of parody from Aristophanes' Frogs. I do so for three reasons: to display two strategies of parodic distortion, to show that parody can have multiple targets, and to argue that parody can have both serious and complex intentions.9In the Frogs (1331–63), Aristophanes uses at least two techniques of parodic distortion, inversion and amplification, in his extended parody of Euripides' monodies or single-actor odes.10 Parodic inversion, broadly speaking, upsets or overturns the target text by distorting the original in a way that reverses the stylistic effect or semantic intention. Parodic amplification hones in on one aspect of the target text and amplifies it to absurdity, often exposing its artificiality as a literary trope.The parodic scene features a woman who awakens, hysterical and terrified, from a god-sent dream, which has conveyed disturbing news. We find in this passage a particular kind of parodic inversion: bathos, the unexpected introduction of the vulgar, ordinary, or mundane, which undermines an otherwise somber tone.11 Consider the following excerpt:Attendants, set alight a lamp for me,Collect the dew of rivers in pitchers [End Page 30] And heat the water,So that I may wash away the god-sent dream.Oh god of the sea... (shrink)

What aspects of philosophical style really count? What aspects of philosophical writing count only as matters of style? Some features of philosophical writing and talking do seem to be of merely ornamental significance, worthy subjects only of gossip or banter. We are familiar with the academic sneer with which poor Professor Kluck is charged with having “somehow managed to confuse” one thing with another. A more serious stylistic matter, of course, would be Professor Kluck’s own willingness to use the (...) apparatus of modal logic in his pathetic endeavors. Or is that a matter of style? If so, does the same concept apply to such amusing and affective phenomena as accent and cadence? We have heard Professor Chisholm’s rising terminal voice inflection, if only because it is so widely imitated. One thinks of Professor Earle’s favorite condemnation “boring” pronounced with an “o” which seems to touch base on every vowel sound known to man. We are impressed by Goodman’s pithiness, and we register his penchant for alliterative triples. We compare Bergmann’s Laocöonian baroque prose with Quine’s soothing urbanity. It is an interesting fact that these are the features which come to mind when we begin to consider the whole question of philosophical style. Have we so internalized the parts that really count that they seem “white,” neutral, style-free? There might well be historical factors which encourage such blindness. Varying degrees of lingering transcendentalism about philosophical method would not be easily reconciled with the awful idea that one is merely speaking a local dialect. Of course the transcendentalism itself is rarely owned up to as such, as if it is assumed that it is Reason which speaks but that it is in poor taste to say so. Alternative methods, when confronted, generate distaste, horror, or the head-shaking sort of wonderment of the Eighteenth Century Parisian who wondered how on earth anyone could be a Persian. (shrink)

Catalepton 10 is a unique survival from antiquity: it is the only parody of an entire poem to reach us, and is written in pure iambic trimeters, a near intractable metre. Addressed to Sabinus, an upstart muleteer, the poem launches a stinging attack at him, and draws attention to his status as a parvenu. It remains incredibly close to its charming model—Catullus 4 —in structural, lexical, stylistic and metrical terms, but rather different in purport. In attempting to reassess a (...) number of problems in the text of the poem, the textual critic ought largely to be guided by the relationship of Sabinus ille to its model, as it is clear that the author of Catalepton 10 was an incredibly close reader of the Catullan text and sought not only to imitate through parody but also to subvert and deflate his predecessor's poem. (shrink)

Stefano Garzonio. Mechanisms of adaptation “to our (Russian) customs” of Italian opera librettos. The paper deals with the history of poetical translation of Italian musical poetry in the 18th century Russia. In particular, it is focused on the question of pereloženie na russkie nravy, the adaptation to national Russian customs, of Italian opera librettos, cantatas, arias, songs and so on. The author points out three different phases of this process. The first phase, in the 1730s, coincides with the reign of (...) Anna Ioannovna and it is linked to Trediakovsky’s translations of Italian intermezzos, comedies and to the first opera seria, La forza dell’amore e dell’odio (‘The force of love and hate’, 1736) by F. Araja and F. Prata; the second phase, in the period 1740–1770s, is characterized by a very varied production of translations and imitations, which undoubtedly influenced the general developing of Russian musical and dramatic poetry. It is during this periodthat pereloženie na russkie nravy is introduced into dramatic genres and sometimes it is findable in musical poetry as well. The third phase, in the 1780–1790s, is linked with the activity of such poets-translators as Ivan Dmitrevskij, Michail Popov, Vasilij Levšin and is characterized by the new practice of performing operas in Russian translations. In the paper the different forms of pereloženie na russkie nravy are pointed out, starting from the formal niveau of metrics and stylistics up to the adaptation of themes, places and realia. (shrink)

Stefano Garzonio. Mechanisms of adaptation “to our (Russian) customs” of Italian opera librettos. The paper deals with the history of poetical translation of Italian musical poetry in the 18th century Russia. In particular, it is focused on the question of pereloženie na russkie nravy, the adaptation to national Russian customs, of Italian opera librettos, cantatas, arias, songs and so on. The author points out three different phases of this process. The first phase, in the 1730s, coincides with the reign of (...) Anna Ioannovna and it is linked to Trediakovsky’s translations of Italian intermezzos, comedies and to the first opera seria, La forza dell’amore e dell’odio (‘The force of love and hate’, 1736) by F. Araja and F. Prata; the second phase, in the period 1740–1770s, is characterized by a very varied production of translations and imitations, which undoubtedly influenced the general developing of Russian musical and dramatic poetry. It is during this periodthat pereloženie na russkie nravy is introduced into dramatic genres and sometimes it is findable in musical poetry as well. The third phase, in the 1780–1790s, is linked with the activity of such poets-translators as Ivan Dmitrevskij, Michail Popov, Vasilij Levšin and is characterized by the new practice of performing operas in Russian translations. In the paper the different forms of pereloženie na russkie nravy are pointed out, starting from the formal niveau of metrics and stylistics up to the adaptation of themes, places and realia. (shrink)

This article is part of the Dossier on Tacitus published in last year's issue of Grotiana. It offers a combined study of both the content and the language and style of Grotius' account of the capture of Breda in the second book of the Historiae, published in 1657 together with the Annales under the title Annales et Historiae de rebus Belgicis. A thorough analysis of Grotius' account of this eventful and dramatic turning point in the Dutch revolt reveals that it (...) is nothing but a defective and occasionally unclear rehearsel of the standard narrative of the capture based on the well-known and in Grotius' day widely read history-books written in French and Dutch. The rather artificial imitation of Tacitus's brevitas on the stylistic level does not suffice to qualify Grotius's account as a masterful piece of Tacitean writing, because it does not highlight the motives of the chief characters in the story nor the connection between the events and their effects, and because Grotius fails to present his own perspective on this important episode in the war against Spain. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy is beginning to pay to problems of linguistic justice the attention that they deserve in today’s heavily interconnected world. However, contemporary philosophy, as a part of today’s world, has problems of linguistic justice of its own which deserve meta-philosophical attention. At least in the philosophical tradition that is mainstream in much of the world today, viz. analytic philosophy, methodological and sociological mechanisms make it the case that the voices of non-native-speaking philosophers are substantially less heard. In this essay, (...) I briefly outline the problems non-native speakers face in contemporary analytic philosophy. I then move on to analysing the possible causes of the current problems. Among these reasons, I argue, is the emphasis given to linguistic style and appearances as signs of clarity, precision and rigour in the treatment of philosophical problems. I argue that the current emphasis on linguistic style in analytic philosophy is not justifiable, in part because it deprives contemporary analytic philosophy of a wider variety of philosophical perspectives. I argue that an important remedy for the emphasis on linguistic appearances within philosophy is to foster greater linguistic diversity. I conclude by presenting and motivating a recent initiative that aims to achieve such a goal. (shrink)

To the extent that language is conventional, non-verbal individuals, including human infants, must participate in conventions in order to learn to use even simple utterances of words. This raises the question of which varieties of learning could make this possible. In this paper I defend Tomasello’s (The cultural origins of human cognition. Harvard UP, Cambridge, 1999, Origins of human communication. MIT, Cambridge, 2008) claim that knowledge of linguistic conventions could be learned through imitation. This is possible because Lewisian accounts (...) of convention have overstated what one must know to participate in conventions; and because the required knowledge could be learned imitatively. The imitation claim that I defend is consistent with what we know about both the proliferation of conventional behaviours in human children, who are skilful imitators, and the comparative absence of such behaviours in non-human great apes, who are poor at imitative learning. (shrink)

To be human is to imitate. This is a strong claim, and a contentious one. It implies that the turning point in hominid evolution was when our ancestors first began to copy each other’s sounds and actions, and that this new ability was responsible for transforming an ordinary ape into one with a big brain, language, a curious penchant for music and art, and complex cumulative culture. The argument, briefly, is this. All evolutionary processes depend on information being copied with (...) variation and selection. Most living things on earth are the product of evolution based on the copying, varying and selection of genes. However, once humans began to imitate they provided a new kind of copying and so let loose an evolutionary process based on the copying, varying and selection of memes. This new evolutionary system co-evolved with the old to turn us into more than gene machines. We, alone on this planet, are also meme machines. We are selective imitation devices in an evolutionary arms race with a new replicator. This is why we are so different from other creatures; this is why we alone have big brains, language and complex culture. There are many contentious issues here; the nature and status of memes, the validity of the concept of a replicator, the difference between this and other theories of gene-culture co-evolution, and whether memetics really is necessary, as I believe it is, to explain human nature. I shall outline the basic principles of memetics, show how memes could have driven human evolution, and consider some of these questions along the way. (shrink)

Moral virtue is, for Aristotle, famously acquired through the practice of virtuous actions. But how should we understand the activity of Aristotle’s moral learner, and how does her activity result in the acquisition of virtue? I argue that by understanding Aristotle’s learner as engaged in the emulative imitation of a virtuous agent, we can best account for her development. Such activity crucially involves the adoption of the virtuous agent’s perspective, from which I argue the learner is positioned so as (...) to appreciate the value of virtuous action—its fineness—and what it would be to act finely herself. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Agency and Access to the World Speaking and Seeing Imitation Some Resources of Narration The Varieties of Narrative Imitation.

Etudie les aspects, les moyens et les précédents de l'interprétation que fait Plotin (205-270) de l'idée platonicienne de participation. L'auteur met en avant l'importance de la notion d'imitation dans l'hypothèse d'un processus d'engendrement des existences à partir des trois réalités véritables (l'Un, l'Intellect et l'Ame).

What is the relationship between imitation and culture? This article charts how definitions of imitation have changed in the last century, distinguishes three senses of “culture” used by contemporary evolutionists (Culture1–Culture3), and summarises current disagreement about the relationship between imitation and culture. The disagreement arises from ambiguities in the distinction between imitation and emulation, and confusion between two explanatory projects—the anthropocentric project and the cultural selection project. I argue that imitation gives cultural evolution an inheritance (...) mechanism for communicative and gestural skills (but not technological skills), and cultural selection yields the cognitive mechanisms that make imitation possible. (shrink)

IMITATION is a matter of such familiarity to us all that it goes usually unattended to: so much so that professed psychologists have left it largely undiscussed. Whether it be one of the more ultimate facts or not, suppose we assume it to be so; let us then see what we can explain by it, and where we may be able to trace its influence in the developed mind.

Over 35 years ago, Meltzoff and Moore (1977) published their famous article ‘Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates’. Their central conclusion, that neonates can imitate, was and continues to be controversial. Here we focus on an often neglected aspect of this debate, namely on neonatal spontaneous behaviors themselves. We present a case study of a paradigmatic orofacial ‘gesture’, namely tongue protrusion and retraction (TP/R). Against the background of new research on mammalian aerodigestive development, we ask: How (...) does the human aerodigestive system develop and what role does TP/R play in the neonate’s emerging system of aerodigestion? We show that mammalian aerodigestion develops in two phases: (1) from the onset of isolated orofacial movements in utero to the post-natal mastery of suckling at 4 months after birth, and; (2) thereafter, from preparation to the mastery of mastication and deglutition of solid foods. Like other orofacial stereotypies, TP/R emerges in the first phase and vanishes prior to the second. Based upon recent advances in activity-driven early neural development, we suggest a sequence of three developmental events in which TP/R might participate: the acquisition of tongue control, the integration of the central pattern generator for TP/R with other aerodigestive CPGs, and the formation of connections within the cortical maps of S1 and M1. If correct, orofacial stereotypies are crucial to the maturation of aerodigestion in the neonatal period but also unlikely to co-occur with imitative behavior. (shrink)

Turing’s Imitation Game is often viewed as a test for theorised machines that could ‘think’ and/or demonstrate ‘intelligence’. However, contrary to Turing’s apparent intent, it can be shown that Turing’s Test is essentially a test for humans only. Such a test does not provide for theorised artificial intellects with human-like, but not human-exact, intellectual capabilities. As an attempt to bypass this limitation, I explore the notion of shifting the goal posts of the Turing Test, and related tests such as (...) the Total Turing Test, away from the exact imitation of human capabilities, and towards communication with humans instead. While the continued philosophical relevance of such tests is open to debate, the outcome is a different class of tests which are, unlike the Turing Test, immune to failure by means of sub-cognitive questioning techniques. I suggest that attempting to instantiate such tests could potentially be more scientifically and pragmatically relevant to some Artificial Intelligence researchers, than instantiating a Turing Test, due to the focus on producing a variety of goal directed outcomes through communicative methods, as opposed to the Turing Test’s emphasis on ‘fooling’ an Examiner. (shrink)

Imitation has been understood in different ways: as a cognitive adaptation subtended by genetically specified cognitive mechanisms; as an aspect of domain general human cognition. The second option has been advanced by Cecilia Heyes who treats imitation as an instance of associative learning. Her argument is part of a deflationary treatment of the “mirror neuron” phenomenon. I agree with Heyes about mirror neurons but argue that Kim Sterelny has provided the tools to provide a better account of the (...) nature and role of human imitation. What we call imitative learning is an instance of social learning. It has little to do with empathy, emotional contagion, or mind reading. (shrink)

Various deficits in the cognitive functioning of people with autism have been documented in recent years but these provide only partial explanations for the condition. We focus instead on an imitative disturbance involving difficulties both in copying actions and in inhibiting more stereotyped mimicking, such as echolalia. A candidate for the neural basis of this disturbance may be found in a recently discovered class of neurons in frontal cortex, 'mirror neurons' (MNs). These neurons show activity in relation both to specific (...) actions performed by self and matching actions performed by others, providing a potential bridge between minds. MN systems exist in primates without imitative and ‘theory of mind’ abilities and we suggest that in order for them to have become utilized to perform social cognitive functions, sophisticated cortical neuronal systems have evolved in which MNs function as key elements. Early developmental failures of MN systems are likely to result in a consequent cascade of developmental impairments characterised by the clinical syndrome of autism. (shrink)

What is the evolutionary significance of the various mechanisms of imitation, emulation and social learning found in humans and other animals? This paper presents an advance in the theoretical resources for addressing that question, in the light of which standard approaches from the cultural evolution literature should be refocused. The central question is whether humans have an imitationbased inheritance system—a mechanism that has the evolutionary function of transmitting behavioural phenotypes reliably down the generations. To have the evolutionary power of (...) an inheritance system, an imitiation-based mechanism must meet a range of demanding requirements. The paper goes on to review the evidence for and against the hypothesis that there is indeed an imitation-based inheritance system in humans. (shrink)

Imitation research has focused on turn‐taking contexts in which one person acts and one person then copies that action. However, people also imitate when engaging in joint actions, where two or more people coordinate their actions in space and time in order to achieve a shared goal. We discuss how the various constraints imposed by joint action modulate imitation, and the close links between perception and action that form the basis of this phenomenon. We also explore how understanding (...) imitation in the context of joint action yields new insights into cultural phenomena such as teaching and innovation. (shrink)

It has been noted that certain similarities can be detected between the work of the Bakhtin Circle and the work of Jürgen Habermas. While I do not deny that these sorts of similarities can be detected, I also argue that the insights of the Bakhtin Circle can be used to provide the basis of a critique of Habermas. My specific aim is to show how Habermas perpetuates a ‘stylistic’ approach to discourse theory. ‘Stylistics’, as conceived by the Bakhtin Circle, (...) explores discourse through the dualism of an objectively defined set of linguistic norms that can be appropriated through the creative linguistic competence of individual speakers. On this understanding, individuals within their everyday environment choose elements from objective linguistic norms in order to make sense of their world. However, a stylistic approach to discourse implicitly denigrates the usefulness of everyday utterances because it suggests that, for language to gain normative meaning and understanding, it must always refer back to an objective linguistic system. By using the Bakhtin Circle’s theoretical insights, I flag up several problems that emerge from Habermas’s particular standpoint on stylistics. (shrink)

Being 'biblical' : contexts and starting points -- Jesus of Nazareth : great moral teacher or friend of sinners? -- Paul : follower or founder? -- Mark : suffering for the kingdom -- Matthew : being truly righteous -- Luke-Acts : a universal concern -- John : teaching the truth in love -- Apartheid : an ethical and generic challenge to reading the New Testament.

Although long forgotten, the sociology of Gabriel Tarde has suddenly re-emerged. This article backs up the renewed interest in Tarde in four ways. First, drawing upon the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann, it demonstrates that the usual critique of Tarde is false: Tarde’s theory of imitation is not trapped in any kind of psychologism but is, indeed, a pure sociology. Against this background, the second part of the article argues that the notion of imitation is closely tied to (...) urbanity, which brings Tarde close to the spatial turn of social thought. While Tarde’s work thus seems compatible with contemporary sociological currents, it also transcends what is presently discussed. The third part of the article therefore examines Tarde’s analysis of urban crowds, as the crowd demonstrates the paradoxical nature of the social. Finally, drawing upon Henri Lefebvre, the article outlines the contours of a particular, contemporary Tardean analysis of imitations. More specifically, the suggestion is to add a more explicitly structural dimension to Tarde’s work, which, it is argued, may be accomplished by pursuing a rhythmanalysis. The rhythmanalysis enables one to bring together Tarde’s focus on imitation, urbanity and crowds. (shrink)

L'imitation est-elle l'apanage de l'espèce humaine? Dans quelle mesure l'imitation, abondamment mentionnée dans le discours colonial, est-elle révélatrice des ambiguïtés de la situation coloniale? Comment rendre intelligible l'adoption délibérée par des individus tant de comportements que de gestes imitatifs? Qu'il s'agisse des rapports entre les colons français et les "indigènes" , de la constitution de Tahiti en paradis touristique , des différences entre hip-hop français et américain , ou encore des liens entre les dimensions biologique, psychologique et culturelle (...) de l'imitation , tous les textes réunis ici révèlent l'importance du rôle joué par l'imitation dans le phénomène de la culture. (shrink)

In the past 20 years or so, the psychological research on imitation has flourished. However, our working definition of imitation has not adequately adapted in order to reflect this research. The closest that we've come to a revamped conception of imitation comes from the work of Michael Tomasello. Despite its numerous virtues, Tomasello's definition is in need of at least two significant amendments, if it is to reflect the current state of knowledge. Accordingly, it is our goal (...) in this paper to reformulate Tomasello's definition of imitation in order to account for both the latest empirical findings and the conceptual considerations that follow from them. Specifically, we argue that a satisfactory definition of imitation ought to be formulated as follows: imitation is the reproduction of an observed behavior where the agent imitating recognizes the behavior of the demonstrator as goal-directed and has some particular interest in or concern for replicating the precise technique performed by the aut.. (shrink)

In Mortal Imitations of Divine Life, Diamond offers an interpretation of De Anima, which explains how and why Aristotle places souls in a hierarchy of value. Aristotle’s central intention in De Anima is to discover the nature and essence of soul—the prin­ciple of living beings. He does so by identifying the common structures underlying every living activity, whether it be eating, perceiving, thinking, or moving through space. As Diamond demonstrates through close readings of De Anima, the nature of the soul (...) is most clearly seen in its divine life, while the embodied soul’s other activi­ties are progressively clearer approximations of this principle. This interpretation shows how Aristotle’s psychology and biology cannot be properly understood apart from his theological conception of God as life, and offers a new explanation of De Anima’s unity of purpose and structure. (shrink)

Similar words and utterances in the Qurʾān are the subject of the technical term lafẓī mutashābih. The rephrasing of meanings (maʿnā) and use of different words (lafẓ) in the Qurʾān are dealt with under the rubric of the theme “Qurʾānic style.” The stylistic variations in the Qurʾān are expressed as takrār al-Qurʾān, tasrīf (Affix and Paraphrase), ʿudūl (inversion), and tafannun (stylistic variation). However, when compared with other terms of exegesis, “tafannun” remained in the background and its conceptualization was (...) thwarted. This could be attributed not only to other concepts brought to the fore but also to the fact that tafannun underwent semantic restriction and was confined to iftinān within the framework of badīʿ. This study aims to clarify the true meaning of tafannun which reflects stylistic variations in the Qurʾān and revealing the contribution of this term to the more appropriate interpretation of the Qurʾān, assessing its significance for the field of tafsīr. The first chapter of this study deals with the etymology of tafannun, its historical background and conceptualization as well as the relationship between iʿjāz (inimitability) and tafannun in the history of tafsīr, while the second one identifies and illustrates the kinds of tafannun to expound on the true nature of this concept.Summary: Similar words and utterances in the Qurʾān are the subject of the technical term lafẓī mutashābih. The change and variety of the rephrasing of meanings (maʿnā) and words (lafẓ) in the Qurʾān are dealt with under the rubric of the theme “Qurʾānic style.” The stylistic differences and variations in the Qurʾān are expressed in the literature with terms such as takrār al-Qurʾān, tasrīf (affix and paraphrase), ʿudūl (inversion), tafannun (stylistic variation). However, in the terminology of exegesis, the term “tafannun” remained in the background, and its conceptualization was thwarted. This could be attributed not only to other concepts brought to the fore but also to the fact that the word tafannun underwent semantic restriction and therefore was confined to iftinān within the framework of badīʿ. Yet in earlier times it was widely used in the exegesis literature as part of Arabic language to identify the stylistic variations in the Qurʾān. Starting with 8th century AH, there have been numerous references to the term tafannun. From 9th century AH to present, many Muslim exegetes, especially Ibn Āshūr (1879-1973) used tafannun as one of the fundamental concepts to understand and explain the proper meaning of the Qurʾān. This study aims to clarify the true meaning of tafannun which reflects stylistic variations in the Qurʾān and revealing the contribution of it to the proper interpretation of the Qurʾān, assessing its significance for tafsīr. The first chapter of this study deals with the etymology of tafannun, its historical background and conceptualization as well as the relationship between iʿjāz (inimitability) and tafannun in the history of tafsīr, while the second one identifies and illustrates the kinds of tafannun to expound on the true nature of this concept.According to the result of this research, iftinān means following various styles and genres (types), while tafannun denotes variations in styles and genres (types). In vernacular, these two terms are considered the same. The term iftinān was dealt with in some works under the subject of muhassināt al-maʿnaviyya within the framework of badīʿ. In the Arabic literature, when the definition of the term iftinān was given, the term tafannun was not defined under any section of any book or any other place in the rhetoric of science. Tafannun is used to express the way any action is carried out, as it is mentioned in the definition of iftinān.The word tafannun was used to demonstrate the expertise, depth and mastery of Islamic scholars in one or various fields of Islamic studies in the early works of Islamic literature. In later times, the term iftinān was used to show rhetorical and oracy skills of a person. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (d. 400/1009) define tafannun as “the variation in words while two paragraphs bear the same meaning.” His definition proved to be a turning point in the conceptualization process of the word tafannun. Al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) was the first Islamic scholar to refer to the word tafannun in the interpretation of the Qurʾān. He used the words iftinān and tafannun in the same sense in his works. He mostly regarded examples of iltifāt as iftinān. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 666/1268), establishing a connection between tafannun and repetition, stated that the term tafannun was used to avoid boredom of repetitive diction.Among other authors who used the term tafannun in their works, Bayḍāwī, (d. 685/1286), Nīsābūrī (d. 730/1329), Ibn Cemāʿa (d. 733/1333), Abū Ḥayyān (d. 745/1344), Samīn al-Ḥalabī (d. 756/1355), Zarkashī (d. 794/1392), Suyūṭī, (d. 911/1505), Ḥaṭīb al-Shirbīnī (d. 977/1570), Shihāb al-Dīn al-Khafājī (d. 1069/1659), Ālūsī, (d. 1270/1854), Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905)-Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935) and Ibn Āshūr are the notable ones. Rather than merely defining the term tafannun, the majority of these commentators emphasized the function, benefit and aim of this word. Thanks to the use of this word by these commentators, a distinction was made between tafannun called iftinān as a literary device in the science of badīʿ and tafannun gaining a new meaning used to express stylistic variations. As a result, two words with the same dictionary definition were distinguished from each other during the conceptualization process. Among the authors using the word tafannun, Ibn Āshūr clearly defined the term and contributed significantly to its conceptualization. He defines the word tafannun as the uniqueness of the Qurʾān in employing stylistic variations by offering synonymous words in case of iʾtirāz (discursive), tanzīr, (resemblance), tazyīl (appendix) and takrār (repetition), creating the most comprehensive definition until that time.Tafannun is also defined as expression of the same meaning through re-signifying, stylistic variation in two verses, difference in the repetition of parables, variations in choice of diction and synonymous words, and avoidance of repetition. As a result of its definition, the word tafannun also denotes providing stylistic variations, using vivid language, avoiding prosaic diction, using denotative and connotative language, helping readers to grasp shades of meaning and read between the lines in the most clear and economic way.In the related literature, there are a lot of references to the word tafannun when demonstrating iʿjāz of the Qurʾān. When looked at the historical development of the relationship between iʿjāz and tafannun, it is observed that tafannun was accepted to be an element of iʿjāz. Defined as providing stylistic variation, tafannun is employed in various ways. The literary devices used to carry out tafannun are through ʿudūl, iltifāt, taqdīm and taʾhīr, change of utterances, use of synonymous words, objection, resemblance, and addition. In the proper interpretation of the Qurʾān, tafannun has a comprehensive usage, making many more academic studies a necessity with a view to making a significant contribution to a deeper and better grasp of words and shades of meanings employed in the Qurʾān. (shrink)

In two separate experiments, we examined 17-month-olds’ imitation in a third-party context. The aim was to explore how seeing another person responding to a model’s novel action influenced infant imitation. The infants watched while a reliable model demonstrated a novel action with a familiar (Experiment 1) or an unfamiliar (Experiment 2) object to a second actor. The second actor either imitated or did not imitate the novel action of the model. Fewer infants imitated the model’s novel behavior in (...) the non-imitation condition than in the imitation condition in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, infants’ likelihood of imitating was not influenced by whether they had watched the second actor imitating the model’s novel action with the unfamiliar object. The findings indicate that infants take into account a second adult’s actions in a third party context when infants receive information that contradicts their existing knowledge and when it corresponds with their own experiences. If infants do not have prior knowledge about how to handle a certain object, then the second adult’s actions do not seem to matter. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently held that the phenomenal aspect of experience cannot be adequately dealt with within a materialist account of the mind-body relation. A natural response for those who take both this objection and scientific considerations seriously is to adopt either a double-aspect theory of mind or a version of epiphenomenalism. In this paper I will examine such a view recently defended by Keith Campbell. Campbell calls his view a ‘new’ epiphenomenalism. I shall begin by considering Campbell's (...) conception of an imitation-man, a notion which has been elsewhere employed in arguments against materialism. I shall demonstrate that Campbell is thereby committed to entertaining seriously a suspect form of causation which I have labeled "sometime-causation". I shall then proceed to argue that for this and other reasons, Campbell's ‘new’ epiphenomenalism is not clearly superior to its traditional predecessor. (shrink)

To explain social learning without invoking the cognitively complex concept of imitation, many learning mechanisms have been proposed. Borrowing an idea used routinely in cognitive psychology, we argue that most of these alternatives can be subsumed under a single process, priming, in which input increases the activation of stored internal representations. Imitation itself has generally been seen as a This has diverted much research towards the all-or-none question of whether an animal can imitate, with disappointingly inconclusive results. In (...) the great apes, however, voluntary, learned behaviour is organized hierarchically. This means that imitation can occur at various levels, of which we single out two clearly distinct ones: the a rather detailed and linear specification of sequential acts, and the a broader description of subroutine structure and the hierarchical layout of a behavioural Program level imitation is a high-level, constructive mechanism, adapted for the efficient learning of complex skills and thus not evident in the simple manipulations used to test for imitation in the laboratory. As examples, we describe the food-preparation techniques of wild mountain gorillas and the imitative behaviour of orangutans undergoing to the wild. Representing and manipulating relations between objects seems to be one basic building block in their hierarchical programs. There is evidence that great apes suffer from a stricter capacity limit than humans in the hierarchical depth of planning. We re-interpret some chimpanzee behaviour previously described as and suggest that all great apes may be able to imitate at the program level. Action level imitation is seldom observed in great ape skill learning, and may have a largely social role, even in humans. (shrink)

This issue of the Kybernetes journal is concerned with the philosophical question- Can a Machine Think? Famously, in his 1950 paper `Computing Machinery andIntelligence' [9], the British mathematician Alan Turing suggested replacing this question - which he found \too meaningless to deserve discussion" - with a simple -behavioural - test based on an imagined `Victorianesque' pastime he entitled the`imitation game'. In this special issue of Kybernetes a selection of authors with a special interest in Turing's work (including those who (...) participated in the 2008 AISB Turing Symposium) have been invited to explore and clarify issues arising from Turing's 1950 paper on the Imitation Game; now more widely known as the Turing test. (shrink)

The era of sustainable transformation has witnessed an increase in corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure waves. Using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2021 as a sample, this study adopted textual analysis and machine-learning techniques to analyze ESG reports and explore the imitation behavior of ESG disclosures in emerging Chinese markets for the first time. The results show imitation behavior exists in corporate ESG disclosures from the perspective of group association. Regarding the imitation object, (...) enterprises tend to choose the peer average level as a reference rather than the best enterprise in the same industry, which reveals the inherent law that enterprises' ESG disclosures are satisfied with compliance rather than championship. In terms of effects, the ESG-mimetic isomorphic pressure has no incremental information effect but has an efficiency optimization effect. Furthermore, the imitation intensity and impact effects of ESG disclosure behavior exhibit heterogeneity owing to differences in properties, sales growth rates, and external attention. This study expands the motivation for corporate ESG disclosure behavior and enriches the empirical evidence for institutional isomorphism. (shrink)

Imitators of God: Leibniz on Human Freedom JACK DAVIDSON QUESTIONS CONCERNING DIVINE AND HUMAN FREEDOM mattered to Leibniz. He found the problems surrounding these issues important and difficult to solve, at one point writing: "There are two labyrinths of the human mind: one concerns the composition of the continuum, and the other the nature of freedom" : Although there is no unanimity among scholars about the details to his solution to the labyrinth of freedom, most have thought that Leibniz is (...) a compatibilist: Lately, however, some commentators have charged that, appearances to the contrary, Leibniz is actually an incom- patibilist about freedom.3 This new reading is exciting and important because ' All works of Leibniz are cited by page number unless otherwise indicated. The first citation is to a source in the original language. Where they exist, the English translation of the same passage is cited next. I want to thank Robert Sleigh for making available original-language sources not available in libraries, and for his generosity in sharing translations. In this paper I follow his translation of the Confessio Philosophi and of ~Du Franc Arbitre" . I quote more than is customary in a scholarly work because some of the texts are relatively inaccessi- ble and many are not translated into English. 9 I understand causal determinism to be the view that every event has a set of events causally sufficient to.. (shrink)

What effect does witnessing other students cheat have on one's own cheating behavior? What roles do moral attitudes and neutralizing attitudes (justifications for behavior) play when deciding to cheat? The present research proposes a model of academic dishonesty which takes into account each of these variables. Findings from experimental (vignette) and survey methods determined that seeing others cheat increases cheating behavior by causing students to judge the behavior less morally reprehensible, not by making rationalization easier. Witnessing cheating also has unique (...) effects, controlling for other variables. (shrink)