Hugo Grotius

_ Source: _Page Count 27 When examined collectively the trade and colonization charters that Tudor and Stuart monarchs issued demonstrate a developing English conception of world order based on trade monopolies and not on ecclesiastical premises or on the Grotian notion of freedom of the seas. There were therefore three early modern conceptions of how an international order might be created, not one, all of which affected European trade with the Americas and Asia. They all began with the assumption that (...) the discovery of the several new worlds required developing rules of engagement to reduce if not to eliminate conflict among the European nations engaged in overseas exploration, settlement, and trade. As Koen Stapelbroek has pointed out, understanding the role of legal notions in the actual historical creation and gradually evolving function of a new kind of commercial-political entity, requires a distinctly non-doctrinal focus.’. (shrink)

The Bewys van den waren Godsdienst and De veritate religionis Christianae originated against the background of Grotius’s familiarity with classical literature. To understand the innovative impact of these writings, the historical method applied must be considered. Grotius did not rely on authorities, but was compiling historical witnesses for the three religions. The availability and visibility of the witness reports are regularly referred to in the text. Thus, history and classical historians enter the picture. Interestingly, this cannot be separated from the (...) debate about the methods to be used in geography, a matter that gains importance as the difference between Bewys and De veritate is nowhere as visible as in the geographical references. The generous sprinkling of place names from different continents contributes to the poem’s factual character. The place names in the Bewys derive from the Dutch sea trade and can be found in the travel reports of the time. This is elucidated by two examples: the island Waygat in the Artic, and the coast of Mina in the Gulf of Guinea. In De veritate, however, all such references are removed. In their stead appear examples from ancient topography, to be annotated in the 1640 edition with ample quotations from Pliny, Strabo, Josephus and others. (shrink)

The Grotian Moment concept provides a lens through which to reflect on the enduring hold of state sovereignty on international environmental law. The article traces the development of the field’s customary rule framework and canvasses efforts to push its conceptual boundaries beyond the inter-state paradigm. Given their dominant role in the field, the article then provides a brief overview of treaty-based approaches to the development of international environmental law. It focuses on the global response to the climate emergency, as illustrative (...) of how international environmental law has evolved in response to the challenges posed by complex crises. The article concludes by suggesting that international environmental law is unlikely to see a Grotian Moment at the level of customary international law, but that it does hold potential for the new thinking and new approaches that could produce a ‘quasi’ Grotian Moment. (shrink)

This is the fourth instalment of our census and study of the reception of the first nine editions of De iure belli ac pacis. Here we focus on the two versions that Johannes Janssonius issued in 1632, one with a copy of Mare liberum attached to it. This report outlines the place of the 1632 Janssonius edition in the context of his long-running rivalry with the printer Willem Blaeu and his firm. It then explores the typographical differences between the two (...) issues, their causes, and their significance for our understanding of the reception of the text. Finally, it provides the preliminary results of the census concerning the circulation and provenance of the fifty-three copies of this edition that we have found. We hope that this research note on the preliminary results will attract interest in this edition and that readers will kindly inform us of further copies. (shrink)

This article provides new information on the printing and readership history of the fifth edition of De iure belli ac pacis. Building on our earlier research on the way that the dispute between Willem Janszoon Blaeu and Johannes Janssonius influenced the publication of the 1631 edition of the text, this article studies how Blaeu harnessed his position to make the 1632 edition more reputable than the earlier version published by his rival. The article considers how, over four centuries, readers have (...) appreciated the quality of the production and three engaged with the text for radically different ends: Remigius Faesch, Baron von Boineburg, and Wendell Phillips. The article draws attention to the changes and continuities in reading and annotation patterns and offers preliminary insights into the themes that these influential readers focused on. We hope that it will inspire readers to bring further copies to our attention. (shrink)

This article constitutes the sixth instalment in our series on the census and study of the reception of the first nine editions of De iure belli ac pacis. This edition has long held a prominent place in studies and editions of Grotius’s work since it was the last published during his lifetime. The report first outlines the genesis of the edition in the context of Grotius’s relationship with Johann Blaeu (1596–1673) and Cornelius Blaeu (1610–1642), who had recently inherited the Blaeu (...) print firm from their father Willem. It then elucidates a number of crucial ways in which the 1642 edition differed from the five previous editions, especially via the addition of an extensive new series of annotations to ibp and a separate set addressed to the Epistle of Philemon. Finally, it concludes by providing the preliminary results of the census concerning the one hundred and twenty-one copies we have found. (shrink)

This article provides new information on the publication history of the first edition of the text that, according to many scholars, laid the ground for the growth of international law: Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis. Drawing on the preliminary findings of the Grotius Census Project at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), the following pages shed light on the first three states of the typescript, the (...) sources that Grotius had access to in France while drafting the book, and the early circulation of the 1625 edition, published by Nicolas Buon in Paris. The goal of this publication is to disseminate updated information on the printing history of this key text in the history of legal and political thought, and to invite readers to come forward with more information about the location of the remaining copies of the text, in order to advance our understanding of the rise of international law around the world. (shrink)

The first edition of Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis was published in Paris by Nicolas Buon in 1625. An unauthorised second edition appeared in Frankfurt a year later, from the reputable Wechel press. After Grotius made hundreds of changes to the first and second states of the first edition, and failed to convince the publisher Nicolas Buon of the merits of printing yet another edition of the book, the Wechels’s release of a new edition sought to capitalise on (...) the high demand for the text, as copies had sold out in Central Europe by the summer of 1625. In this preliminary report on the 1626 edition, using online and card catalogues, we have located 59 surviving copies. We examined thirteen copies in person, and another three fully digitised copies online, and on the basis of this small sample we have been able to draw a number of conclusions. We hope that this research note on preliminary results will generate interest in this unduly neglected edition, and that readers will kindly bring further copies to our attention. (shrink)

Hugo Grotius’s best-known work, De iure belli ac pacis, appeared in 1625 in Paris with the author’s approval. A second unauthorised version was published in 1626 in Frankfurt. In 1631 the Amsterdam publisher, Willem Janszoon Blaeu (1571–1638), issued the third edition, this one authorised by the author – and this edition featured nearly a thousand revisions by Grotius. The purpose of this report is to analyse the context behind the publication of this third edition and the copies’ provenance records. Using (...) online and card catalogues, we have located 154 copies. We examined 52 copies in person, and another three fully digitised copies online. We hope that this research note on preliminary results will generate greater interest in this unduly neglected edition, and that readers will kindly bring further copies to our attention. (shrink)

In this paper, I first discuss the concept of ‘Grotian Moment’ in the context of the capacity of international organizations to contribute to the formation and identification of customary international law. Afterward, I apply three levels to discuss the time element of the formation of custom. At the micro-level of the institutional practice, the time required to form a customary norm may depend on whether each form of practice is directed to the institutional or to the international dimension. At the (...) level of the organ, I reflect on the difference played by the presence or absence of member States in the institutional organ that adopts the practice relevant for custom formation. At the macro-level of the characteristics of the organization, I distinguish between so-called supranational and functional organizations. In general, I exclude the relevance of speaking in terms of a ‘Moment’ that produces a paradigm shift, and I stress the continuous change to which international law is subject. (shrink)

This contribution explores Grotian Moments in the practice of the UN Security Council in three different but closely related subject areas. The three areas are, in turn, the way the Security Council interprets the concept of ‘threat to the peace’ or more generally ‘international peace and security’, the law-making by the Security Council, and the subjects – in the sense of legal or natural persons – that the Security Council chooses to address. It turns out that the interpretation by the (...) Security Council of the UN Charter has been remarkably flexible, expanding the scope of action of the Council considerably. Whether its interpretation of the UN Charter also deserves to be labelled ‘Grotian’, however, is rather a matter of rhetoric than law. (shrink)

Has there already been a Grotian Moment for corruption? If not, what would it take for new legal rules and doctrines on corruption to crystallise? This article seeks to answer these two questions by reviewing the relevant history of international legal scholarship, the current public international law framework for anticorruption, and recent developments in international legal practice. We conclude that a Grotian Moment may have been reached for a narrow concept of corruption, focused on petty corruption and bribery, with the (...) proliferation of international anticorruption law following the Cold War. However, a Grotian Moment for a broadened understanding of corruption, based on other forms such as institutional, political, and grand corruption, ought to emerge to comprehensively address all forms of corruption. Given the range of challenges, including resistance from political elites and the indeterminacy of criminal liability, a Grotian Moment for a broadened concept of corruption remains improbable. (shrink)

Self-determination is one of international law’s most reviled and yet most important principles. The legal development of self-determination – or specific forms thereof – as a customary norm of international law has been shaped and spurred by key moments. These include the American and French declarations of 1776 and 1789, the conclusion of the UN Charter, and the General Assembly’s resolution 1514 (xv) in 1960. This article analyses whether, in characterising the effect of such moments, the label ‘Grotian’ moment adds (...) meaningfully to the analysis. It concludes that the example of self-determination suggests that the ‘Grotian’ moment concept is not meaningfully illuminating; tending either to reduce to a slight of hand in favour of the so-called ‘Great Powers’, or alternatively to pathologise developments that would be amenable to standard forms of customary legal analysis. (shrink)

Grotian Moments are instances of accelerated formation of customary law, sparked by significant world events, such as wars, terrorism attacks, developments in technology, or natural catastrophes. This article will apply the Grotian Moment theory to the legal criteria of statehood, in an attempt to assess whether an evolution in specific elements of statehood has resulted in such paradigm-shifting Grotian Moments. In particular, this article will argue that the evolving political nature of our world order has contributed toward the need to (...) re-conceptualize the legal theory of statehood. This article will thus posit that this constitutes a so-called Grotian Moment 2: a period of time when significant contestation of prevailing international legal norms and institutions occurs, and when novel thinking, norms and institutions attempt to replace elements of the old but may not succeed in doing so. This article posits that developments in the legal theory of statehood may be best described as Grotian Moment 2 although various historical and political developments have reshaped our contemporaneous conception of statehood, it may be argued that international law itself has neither contributed to the evolution of a new legal theory of statehood nor changed its own norms. (shrink)

Mass data surveillance practices have received heightened attention in international law since the Snowden revelations of 2013. In this article, I examine whether that attention has given rise to a “Grotian moment” regarding the regulation of these activities under international law. At the outset, I answer that question in the negative and conclude that no general customary international law rules have emerged. Yet, that is not the end of the story. At a more fundamental and conceptual level, far reaching transformative (...) process are underway in international law within the context of datafication. These concern new forms of power and/or control over data flows, and data surveillance practices are an inherent feature of that power. I contend that although there is no accelerated process of customary international law formation regarding data surveillance activities, it may be that a prolonged, epochal, Grotian moment is taking place. To that end, I argue that data surveillance must be understood as one manifestation of a broader constellation of shifts, through which ‘developments that profoundly impact the logic of territory or/and the “logic of capital” without signalling the arrival of a new international order’ are arguably in the making. (shrink)

Due to its enormous importance, Grotius’s contract doctrine has been extensively investigated by legal historians. This paper seeks to enhance scholarly understanding of this topic by looking at commentaries on De jure belli ac pacis written by German theologians and jurists in the second half of the seventeenth century. The paper focuses on comments concerning promises: the criteria for promises that are binding under natural law; the foundations of the obligation to keep promises; error and duress; and immoral promises. Grotius’s (...) contract doctrine rested on a mélange of sources, both theological and juridical, which were not always consistent. Commentators sought to harmonise them by looking at them from different perspectives: some comments were mainly based on interpretations of ius commune texts, whereas others reflected a moral theological approach. The results drew distinctions between law and moral theology that contributed to the fragmentation of Grotius’s synthesis. (shrink)

This article investigates the formal purpose of declaring wars for Hugo Grotius. Grotius was adamant that states always use justification in a duplicitous way to conceal their real motivation to go to war. As such, the purpose of declaration is not to assert the just cause of war. Rather, what any public declaration does, is provide recognition that confers legal validation to the disputing parties. The legal rules of war were described by the law of nations and occasionally permitted states (...) to commit certain ‘war crimes’ with impunity. For Grotius, this was not a moral sanctioning of such crimes but rather a means to prevent the occurrence of wars, which such endless repudiations risked causing or exacerbating. Grotius’s concern for the effects of war is conspicuous; and recounting his maxim that war should always be a last resort, this article argues that declaration of war has a distinct moral purpose for Grotius. In fact, public declaration of war is, together with constraints on the conduct of war, a ‘principle of moderation’ Grotius insists should be upheld in times of war. Declaration of war gives the parties avenues to seek peace and reconciliation, and, therefore has a humanitarian purpose for Grotius by ultimately seeking to prevent the disparaging effects of war. Even in wars that do not demand a public declaration, such as those regulated by natural law such as punitive wars or defensive wars, Grotius cautions that declarations of war are advisable. The remaining lingering issue is how to engage with unlawful enemy combatants, such as pirates - a distinct problem that the international community still faces with increasing regularity. Grotius was certainly aware of the legal consequences of recognising belligerency we cannot possible hope to build moral relations with, and, this article claims, ‘unlawful’ enemies ultimately demarcates the boundary of international society. (shrink)

The article discusses the reception of Grotius by Catholic lawyers at the university of Prague. It focuses on the Grotius commentary by Nicolaus Ignaz Königsmann, which was meant as a response to the discussion of Central European Catholic lawyers on questions of toleration and permissions in law. I argue that Königsmann agreed with Grotius because his conception could be combined with the Catholic belief in free will and dictamen sanae rationis. He grounded natural law in rational human nature and rejected (...) attempts to derive natural law from the highest principle. (shrink)

The idea that a simple unilateral promise, until it is accepted, is not binding according to natural law is defended by Grotius in his major work with an argumentation drawn directly from Lessius, an important source of inspiration for the Dutch jurist, who in turn solves the dispute rooted in the tradition of ius commune. This article aims to reconstruct, in its essential stages, an itinerary through the main positions of medieval and early modern civil and canon lawyers about this (...) controversial issue. These sources constitute the background of early modern scholastics and Grotius as well. The paper analyses some of the principal texts of both bodies of law, highlighting arguments and adding new findings. Notably it is shown that Lessius’s and Grotius’s statements represent a turning point, as far as they react against the resumption of the theory of the binding force of simple unilateral promises in the sixteenth century. With Lessius and Grotius, on the other hand, acceptance became a necessary requirement for every transfer of rights and duties to be enforceable. (shrink)

In the framework of the issue of the observance of promises and agreements, Grotius discusses the question of whether Christians should be allowed to conclude treaties or alliances with those who were named infideles in the canonical and theological terminology. The question was ancient: since the early Middle Ages, alliances of Christians with infidels had been labeled as ‘impious’. Grotius’s solutions are based on the converging traditions of medieval canon law and theology: treaties and alliances with infidels are intrinsically lawful (...) according to natural and positive divine law, although they should be avoided in certain circumstances. Grotius’s concern, however, was not so much to affirm the theoretical lawfulness of the fedus cum infidelibus. The outcome of his argument consists in promoting the cohesion of Christians: he thinks that a joint action of the Christian nations is a moral and juridical obligation in the face of the aggressions caused by the enemies of Christendom. (shrink)

This paper explores the presence of late medieval ius commune in Grotius’s thought on the use of force in internal strife and war, based on De iure belli ac pacis. To this end, it examines Grotius’s use of ius commune sources, and considers some similar sources, which he does not actually cite, but which relate to his discussion. By clarifying Grotius’s selection and use of ius commune sources, the paper intends to contribute to the achievement of a double aim: firstly, (...) to determine the place of rebellion and civil war in De iure belli ac pacis, especially in relation to war; and, secondly, to assess Grotius’s approach to the two former issues, particularly with regard to the criteria by which a distinction between rebellion and civil war can be drawn, and to the effects of this distinction. (shrink)

This article starts with a critical reflection on John Westlake’s reading of the history of empire and the English/British East India Company – for him, essentially, the proper concern of ‘constitutional history’ rather than international law. For Westlake, approaching this history through the prism of nineteenth-century positivist doctrine, the Company’s exercise of war powers could only result from state delegation. Against his warnings to international lawyers not to stray from the proper boundaries of international legal inquiry, the article proceeds to (...) recover Hugo Grotius’s theory of corporate belligerency in his early treatise De iure praedae. For Grotius, corporations could wage public war on behalf of the state yet, at the same time, were in law capable of waging private war in their own right. The article proceeds to reflect on the practice of corporate belligerency in the centuries separating Westlake and Grotius; it concludes with observations on the implications of Grotius’s theory of corporate belligerency today. (shrink)

This article explores the writings of Hugo Grotius on the law of civil war. First, the article takes a look at what Grotius wrote about the Dutch revolt, the civil war during which he himself lived and which he helped to legitimise. Second, the article notes how in legal practice the Dutch revolt also provided a valuable early precedent for the later scholars of the law of civil war, who were more concerned with questions of revolutionary prize jurisdiction and the (...) problem of recognition. Third, the article explores the elements relating to these questions of civil war in Grotius’s volitional law of nations as presented in De iure belli ac pacis. These provided Grotius’s most enduring legacy for the later scholars on the law of civil war. (shrink)

This article discusses to what extent the widely accepted hypotheses of Hugo Grotius’s crucial impact on the theory of contract law – also in Scandinavia – may be maintained or even positively confirmed. Although few direct references to the works of Grotius can be found in Scandinavian legal literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, it would be premature to draw a negative conclusion. An impact of Grotius’s thoughts may rather be demonstrated by thoroughly analysing patterns of argumentation concerning specific (...) contractual topics both in legal literature and case law. The article provides the reader with necessary information on the institutional and intellectual preconditions for the reception of Grotius in the Scandinavian legal orders before discussing the impact of the ‘will-theory’ on the requirements of a legally binding contractual agreement in the works of selected influential legal scholars and in case law in more detail. The analysis confirms that Grotius’s work contributed substantially to shaping the intellectual framework in which the first contract law doctrines in Scandinavia evolved. (shrink)

One of the odd things about Grotius’s thought is that he – advocate of a rebellious regime – was not very supportive of the right of resistance. Justifying the revolt at the time not only meant legitimizing the new regime he was serving; it also meant ruling out opposition against it. That posed an intricate puzzle; a puzzle Grotius solved by drawing on the theorizing on just revolt of the previous decades. This paper purports to show the connection between Grotius’s (...) thought on just revolt and the intellectual and political environment in which Grotius came of age. It also sets out to show that the solution to the puzzle lies in the element of authority and the particular view taken on the constitutional position of the States in the Low Countries.1. (shrink)

In neither of his two major forays into the laws of war and peace – De iure praedae or De iure belli ac pacis – did Hugo Grotius discuss the legal institutions of reprisal – whether special or general – or privateering in their own right. His profoundly novel reading of the just war doctrine in the context of his theory of natural rights, however, gave powerful legitimisation to the practices of special reprisals, as well as of privateering in times (...) of war and of peace. (shrink)

Thanks to Barbeyrac, Pufendorf and others, there is a long-familiar picture of Grotius as offering a groundbreaking account of natural law. By now there is also a familiar observation that there is no agreement what makes Grotius’s account innovative. Sometimes this leads to skepticism about how innovative Grotius’s account of natural law really is. Some scholars suggest that Grotius’s account of natural law resembles Suárez’s account. But others continue to argue that Barbeyrac is right to see Grotius as breaking the (...) ice of previous philosophy and laying the groundwork for a distinctively modern moral philosophy. I plan to contribute to the debate by arguing that, properly understood, Grotius’s position is similar to Suárez’s on a range of fundamental questions, and, furthermore, that seeing Grotius as making a radical break with the past violates his own self-conception. 1. (shrink)

This article recovers James Brown Scott’s conviction in American exceptionalism, a belief that underlay both his institutional work as well as his understanding of the origins and trajectory of international law. In the first section, we discuss Scott’s interpretation of Hugo Grotius as part of his tactic to make US foreign affairs policies and perspectives more compelling by presenting them as universal. In the second section, we argue that Scott’s writings on the Spanish origins of international law were in fact (...) meant to protect Anglo-American hegemony and US influence in the Americas in the face of rapidly changing geopolitical pressures. In the final section we suggest that Scott’s US exceptionalism is reflected in his use of the United States Constitution and Supreme Court as a model for key international organizations. We conclude that Scott reframed Vitoria not to redress American bias but to enshrine it. (shrink)

This essay examines the reception of Grotius’s pioneering Annotata ad Vetus Testamentum in the ‘Biblia Americana’, a scriptural commentary written by the New England theologian Cotton Mather. Mather engaged with Grotius on issues of translation, biblical authorship, inspiration, the canon, and the legitimate forms of interpreting the Hebrew Bible as Christian Scripture. While frequently relying on the Dutch Arminian humanist in discussing philological problems or contextual questions, Mather in many cases rejected, ignored, or significantly modified Grotius’s farther-reaching conclusions on dogmatically (...) sensitive topics. This strategy marks Mather’s ‘Biblia Americana’ as an exemple of a highly sophisticated but ultimately apologetic type of biblical criticism in the context of the early Enlightenment in British North America. (shrink)

In this article Grotius’s perception of the legal relevance of consent is analysed with respect to its ongoing importance for an ethical fundament of public international law. It is argued that Grotius views the function of consent as an aspect of human law, which is limited, but also supported by what he views as the overarching framework of divine law. This can be particularly illustrated by Grotius’s idea of a duty of granting consent: such duty reflects the ethical quality of (...) individual interaction within international law. (shrink)

Gentili’s conceptualization of war as a conflict between states attempted to limit the legitimacy of war to external wars only, thus precluding the legitimacy of civil wars. It reflected both the emergence of sovereign states and the vision of international law as a law among polities rather than individuals. The conceptualization of war as a dispute settlement mechanism among polities rather than a punishment for breach of the law of nations and the idea of the bilateral justice of war humanized (...) the conduct of warfare and the content of peace treaties. The idea of perfect war excluded brigandage, piracy, and civil wars from its purview. Some scholars have suggested that perfect war had a dark side, legitimizing imperial expansion. Others have cautioned that Gentili explicitly opposed imperial expansion rather adopting anti-imperialist stances. This article suggests that these ambivalent readings of the Gentilian oeuvre reflect the ambivalence of the early modern law of nations. Under the early modern law of nations, aggression for the sake of empire was clearly unjust; nonetheless, imperial expansion took place. Whereas ‘a law which many transgress[ed] [wa]s nonetheless a law’, there was a wide divide between theory and practice.1. (shrink)

Centuries before being included in Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis and De iure praedae, the subject of reprisal was already being discussed in medieval literature. The aim of this paper is to examine the medieval and early modern practice and theory of reprisal as it developed before and during Grotius’s lifetime. Its first part investigates a number of important foundational elements, such as the issues of definition and terminology, and the common characteristics of a reprisal case. In the (...) second half, the author explores why reprisals were deemed to be a ‘perversus mos’ or ‘bad custom’ and how continued reliance on this practice was nonetheless justified by inserting it into the medieval just war doctrine. The paper does not provide a systematic study of Grotius’s own engagement with medieval reprisal sources. Rather, it should be read in conjunction with another publication in this same volume, ‘Grotius on Reprisal’ by Randall Lesaffer. (shrink)