This chapter contains sections titled: What Was First Funny? The Basic Pattern in Humor: The Playful Enjoyment of a Cognitive Shift Is Expressed in Laughter The Worth of Mirth.

Richard Sorabji presents a unique exploration of the development of moral conscience over 2500 years, from the playwrights of classical Greece to the present. His virtuoso study of the development of pagan, Christian, and secular conceptions of conscience culminates in a consideration of the nature, value, and role of conscience today.

The ancient Greeks played a fundamental role in the history of mathematics and their ideas were reused and developed in subsequent periods all the way down to the scientific revolution and beyond. In this, the first complete history for a century. Reviel Netz offers a panoramic view of the rise and influence of Greek mathematics and its significance in world history. He explores the Near Eastern antecedents and the social and intellectual developments underlying the subject's beginnings in Greece (...) in the fifth century BCE. He leads the reader through the proofs and arguments of key figures like Archytas, Euclid and Archimedes, and considers the totality of the Greek mathematical achievement which also includes, in addition to pure mathematics, such applied fields as optics, music, mechanics and, above all, astronomy. This is the story not only of a major historical development, but of some of the finest mathematics ever created. (shrink)

Richard Sorabji presents a unique discussion of the development of moral conscience over a period of 2500 years, from the playwrights of the fifth century BCE to the present. He addresses key topics including the original meaning and continuing nature of conscience, the ideas of freedom of religion and conscience with climaxes in the early Christian centuries and the seventeenth, the disputes on absolution or 'terrorisation' of conscience, dilemmas of conscience,and moral double-bind, the reliability of conscience if it (...) is shaped by local custom, and modern opposition to the idea of conscience and its role in legislation. (shrink)

This volume is the result of a three-year collaboration (funded by the American Council of Learned Societies and the British Academy) between scholars of early China and of ancient/Hellenistic Greece to investigate the emergent discourses of emotions in philosophy, medicine, and literature from around the fifth century BCE to the second century CE. It brings together scholars working on the history and philosophy of emotions in the two ancient traditions, and with different areas of expertise, to investigate (...) the emotions and their conceptualization at a crucial period in the cultural and intellectual development of both cultures. The project was motivated by a desire to make an intervention in the existing scholarship on emotions in both fields, which stands to benefit from a greater methodological self-awareness about the category of emotions and the kinds of commitments it entails. The volume aims to explore how the tools of cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary investigation might be deployed to advance our understanding of the emotions in the two ancient societies and to use that understanding as a contribution to current research on the emotions more generally. (shrink)

The hypothesis that democracies rarely fight each other is well-supported for the contemporary era. Yet evidence for it in another era of many democracies—Greece in the fifth century BCE—is weak at best. This article considers several reasons why the experience of the two eras may differ. It shows that the causal reasoning of the contemporary democratic peace depends on key assumptions about how institutions constrain leaders that did not apply well in ancient polities. Analysis of these differences helps (...) to clarify theoretical understanding of interstate relations in both eras. (shrink)

Beyond the Fifth Century brings together 13 scholars from a range of disciplines to explore interactions with Greek tragedy from the 4th century BCE up to the Middle Ages. The volume breaks new ground in several ways; in its chronological scope, the various modes of reception considered, the pervasive interest in interactions between tragedy and society-at-large, and the pursuit of comparative vistas.

At the very end of Plato's Symposium our narrator awakes to find Socrates still hard at it, and making Agathon and Aristophanes agree that the composition of tragedy and comedy is really one and the same thing:… προсαναγκάӡειν τὸν Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὺс τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸс εἷναι κωμωιδίαν καὶ τραγωιδίαν ἐπἰсταϲθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνηι τραγωιδοποιὸν ὄντα καὶ κωμωιδοποιὸν εἷναι. ταῦτα δὴ ἀναγκαӡομένουϲ αὐτοὺϲ … the two playwrights succumb to sleep, leaving Socrates triumphant. Socrates had to ‘force’ his case; and (...) it is a fact that, though we know of well over 100 fifth-century playwrights, we do not know of a single one who produced both tragedy and comedy. In a famous fragment the comedian Antiphanes complains that the tragedians have an easy time—familiar stories, the deus ex machina etc.—ἡμῖν δὲ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἔсτιν … It is a matter of ‘them’ and ‘us’. Furthermore, there was an entire separate genre besides tragedy and comedy. As Demetrius put it, τραγωιδία χάριταϲ μὲν παραλαμβάνει ἐν πολλοῖϲ, ὁ δὲ γέλωϲ ἐχθρὸϲ τραγωιδίαϲ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπινοήϲειεν ἄν τιϲ τραγωιδίαν παίӡουϲαν, ἐπεὶ ϲάτυρον γράψει ἀντὶ τραγωιδίαϲ. (shrink)

This collection brings together a selection of writings on art by the internationally acclaimed novelist, historian and critic Marina Warner. For 30 years Warner has published widely on a range of art-world subjects and objects, from contemporary installation and film works to paintings by Flemish and Italian Renaissance masters, through Victorian photography and twentieth-century political drawings and prints. Warner's extraordinary curiosity in art and culture is conveyed in writing that is at once poetic and playful, elegant and rigorous, training (...) our eyes on the smallest of details while painting a broad-brushstroke landscape of art past and present. Themes familiar to Warner's readers--myth and fantasy, psychic and sexual experience, the vast and marvelous expanse of the human imagination--are treated in the lectures and articles, stories, interviews and essays contained here, some of which are published for the first time or republished from out-of-print sources. For the first of two volumes, editor Vivian Sky Rehberg has assembled themed sections titled "Playing in the Dark," "Telling Tales" and "Phantom Technologies." Texts include interviews with Tacita Dean and Paula Rego; catalogue essays on Leonora Carrington, Henry Fuseli, Zarina Bhimji, Tony Oursler and Fischli/Weiss; articles on Tracy Emin, Marlene Dumas, Louise Bourgeois; stories for artist's books by Kiki Smith and Helen Douglas; and lectures on Francis Bacon, Hieronymous Bosch and William Kentridge. "The Symbol Gives Rise to Thought" invites us to explore new ways of seeing and engaging with the traces of our artistic heritage. Marina Warner is a writer of fiction, criticism and history. Holder of 12 honorary degrees and two honorary fellowships, Warner is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the Royal Society of Literature. She has judged the The Jerwood Drawing Prize and the Turner Prize; she is a regular broadcaster on the BBC, and has taught and given lectures worldwide, including the National Gallery and ICA, London and the Prado in Madrid; she has delivered the Presidential Lecture at Stanford University and the Carpenter Lecture at Harvard. She has been awarded a CBE, Chevalier de l'Ordre des Arts et des Lettres, France and Commendatore dell'Ordine della Stella di Solidareità, Italy. Warner is a winner of the Aby Warburg Prize and a Getty Scholar. Vivian Sky Rehberg is an art historian and critic based in Paris and Rotterdam. A founding editor of "Journal of Visual Culture," she is a contributing editor of "Frieze," and has written for numerous contemporary art publications. Previously Chair of the department of Critical Studies at Parsons Paris School of Art + Design, where she taught modern and contemporary art, Rehberg is currently Course Director for the Masters in Fine Art at Piet Zwart Institute in Rotterdam.. (shrink)

Many accounts of ethnic phenomena imply that processes such as stereotyping, essentialism, ethnocentrism, and intergroup hostility stem from a unitary adaptation for reasoning about groups. This is partly justified by the phenomena’s co-occurrence in correlational studies. Here we argue that these behaviors are better modeled as functionally independent adaptations that arose in response to different selection pressures throughout human evolution. As such, different mechanisms may be triggered by different group boundaries within a single society. We illustrate this functionalist framework (...) using ethnographic work from the Quechua-Aymara language boundary in the Peruvian Altiplano. We show that different group boundaries motivate different ethnic phenomena. For example, people have strong stereotypes about socioeconomic categories, which are not cooperative units, whereas they hold fewer stereotypes about communities, which are the primary focus of cooperative activity. We also show that, despite the cross-cultural importance of ethnolinguistic boundaries, the Quechua-Aymara linguistic distinction does not strongly motivate any of these intergroup processes. (shrink)

In the fifth century BCE, Melissus of Samos developed wildly counterintuitive claims against plurality, change, and the reliability of the senses. This book provides a reconstruction of the preserved textual evidence for his philosophy, along with an interpretation of the form and content of each of his arguments. A close examination of his thought reveals an extraordinary clarity and unity in his method and gives us a unique perspective on how philosophy developed in the fifth century, (...) and how Melissus came to be the most prominent representative of what we now call Eleaticism, the monistic philosophy inaugurated by Parmenides. The rich intellectual climate of Ionian enquiry in which Melissus worked is explored and brought to bear on central questions of the interpretation of his fragments. This volume will appeal to students and scholars of early Greek philosophy, and also those working on historical and medical texts. (shrink)

Born in the fifth century BCE, Plato was one of the primary thinkers of Classical Greece. A mathematician, scientist, and philosopher, Plato is considered to be a foundational figure in Western thought.

This book is a concise, readable introduction to the Greek author Thucydides, who is widely regarded as one of the foremost historians of all time.Why does Thucydides continue to matter today? Perez Zagorin answers this question by examining Thucydides' landmark History of the Peloponnesian War, one of the great classics of Western civilization. This history, Zagorin explains, is far more than a mere chronicle of the conflict between Athens and Sparta, the two superpowers of Greece in the fifth (...) class='Hi'>century BCE. It is also a remarkable story of politics, decision-making, the uses of power, and the human and communal experience of war. Zagorin maintains that the work remains of permanent interest because of the exceptional intellect that Thucydides brought to the writing of history, and to the originality, penetration, and the breadth and intensity of vision that inform his narrative. The first half of Zagorin's book discusses the intellectual and historical background to Thucydides' work and its method, structure, and view of the causes of the war. The following chapters deal with Thucydides' portrayal of the Athenian leader Pericles and his account of some of the main episodes of the war, such as the revolution in Corcyra and the Athenian invasion of Sicily. The book concludes with an insightful discussion of Thucydides as a thinker and philosophic historian.Designed to introduce both students and general readers to a work that is an essential part of a liberal education, this book seeks to encourage readers to explore Thucydides--one of the world's greatest historians--for themselves. (shrink)

Prompted by Levy’s observations and questions, our brief review of symbolic space in ancient Greece suggests that some features of Greek culture that at first sight seem rationalist and modernizing, signs of the transformation of the archaic city, were deeply rooted in the culture of the city-states from as early as we can study them.11 It may be that they are factors that contributed to the intellectual process referred to as the breakthrough or enlightenment which is not easily attributed entirely (...) to economic and social changes in the late sixth and early fifth centuries BCE. The largely secular political tradition is sometimes, and plausibly, invoked as a cause (cf. Humphreys 1986). It should probably be seen as part of the overall ordering of the sacred vis-à-vis the profane. By the later fourth century BCE, contact with a larger, multiethnic world and the growth of impersonal market relationships produced or hastened secondary urbanization and with it the fracturing of a social coherence. In the intervening classical period, in some areas, such as drama, festival, and the visual arts, the first stirrings of the enlightenment may actually have fostered a more intense deployment of traditional resources. The symbolic use of space in the Greek cities probably never matched, despite important similarities, the more complex traditional systems of their South Asian counterparts. Greece’s traditional culture only reached its acme when new winds were blowing (and even because of them), but before they had swept away the delicate links that held the culture together. (shrink)

Although ancient Greek and Indian philosophers held remarkably similar philosophical positions, the possibility of these two traditions having developed independently cannot be discounted. However, in the fifth century BCE substantial parts of Greece and India were under the Persian rule and belonged to the same political entity. It is very likely that Greeks and Indians sat together in the Persian court where translation services were provided to mitigate the language barrier. In the fourth century BCE there were (...) Greek kingdoms for more than a century in and around northwest frontiers of India paving the way for substantial political and commercial contact. Greeks like Megasthenes, Diogenes Laertius, Suidas, Porphyry, etc. testify that eminent Greek thinkers like Democritus, Pyrrho, etc. visited India and/or that Plato, Plotinus, etc. knew about or admired Indian wisdom. Some of this evidence is relatively late but cannot be dismissed in the absence of specific rebuttal; thus, Indo-Greek scholarly exchange is likely. (shrink)

On the analogy of the colloquial register in some modern languages, where narrative and argument may be punctuated by oaths and exclamations in order to maintain a high affective level and compel the hearer's attention, it is reasonable to postulate that Attic conversation also was punctuated by oaths, that this ingredient in comic language was drawn from life, and that the comparative frequency of ║ M M Δ in comedy is sufficiently explained thereby. There are obvious affinities between some (...) passages of comedy, relaxed conversation in Plato and Xenophon, and the forceful, man-to-man tone which Demosthenes sometimes adopts to such good effect . Compare, for instance, Ar. V. 133 f. στιν δ' νομα ⋮ τ μν γέροντι ⋮ Φιλοκλέων / να μ Δία, τ δ' υε κτλ., where the oath is a response to imagined incredulity, and X. Smp. 4.27 ατν δ σέ, η, γ εδον να μ τν πόλλω, τε κτλ. . It is also important that the commonest oaths fit, in most of their forms, the end of an iambic trimeter: μ τν Δία, ν Δία,ν τούς θεούς, μ τος θεούς. Add that in Aristophanic dialogue over half the iambic trimeters end with major pause, and half the remainder with minor pause, and we can see why Δ / established itself early as a distinctive comic pattern. Out of 105 examples of M M Δ cited from comedy in Section II above, 59 have the oath at verse-end. In the case of πάνυ, which was almost exclusively Attic and — to judge from its great rarity in tragedy — felt by Athenian poets to be prosaic, we lack evidence on its functions in the colloquial register; it may or may not have served as affective punctuation. In prose, we have to reckon with the fact that π Mπ and Mπ π constituted a genuine stylistic choice as far back as the evidence will take us, since the two earliest instances in prose are [X.] Ath. 2.3 πάνυ δι χρείαν and ibid. 3.5 πολλ τι πάνυ. The oath, as treated by the comic poets on the basis of colloquial usage, is bound to have served as a model for πάνυ, exerting an influence which pulled πάνυ to the end of the verse, but there was also a powerful metrical constraint. As a dibrach ending in a vowel which could not be elided or enter into crasis, πάνυ was especially appropriate for verse-end. That in itself was enough both to establish Mπ π as the dominant pattern in comedy and to promote Mπ … π. Out of the total of 104 examples of Mπ π in comedy, 93 have πάνυ at verse-end, which makes Mπ π / one of the hallmarks of comic style. Mπ … π does not occur in prose in association with any other feature identified as colloquial, but it should be noted that Aiskhines and Demosthenes are much fonder of Mπ π than other prose authors. In some cases one can see that the order Mπ π avoids a succession of short syllables or hiatus or both , but there are other cases in which it has the opposite effect . The possibility of comic influence on oratorical language cannot be dismissed out of hand. It is also possible that someone will find positive determinants which will explain all the cases of Mπ π in prose. σόδρα, which, like πάνυ, is peculiarly Attic, is metrically more tractable than πάνυ, since it can be elided; even so, out of the 80 comic examples of Mσ σ no less than 58 have σόδρα at verse-end, and of those 58 there are 22 at major pause, 8 at presumed major pause and 9 at minor pause. The comic treatment of σόδρα is thus comparable with the treatment of πάνυ, and Timokles 222.4 τηρεν…σόδρα is in fact the closest analogy we have to Ar. Pl. 234 f. χθομαι…πάνυ. δέ and γάρ are a different matter, and in some significant respects different from each other. Postponement of δέ is especially prominent in Aeschylus and then abundant in fourth-century comedy. It is much less common in Euripides , rare in Sophocles and Aristophanes , and virtually limited in prose to the categories which I labelled –. There is as yet no evidence to associate postponement of δέ with colloquial language; on the contrary, it seems to have begun as a feature of poetic language and to have been taken up and exploited by fourth-century comedy. If, in addition to being Aeschylean, it was colloquial in the fourth century, what happened to it afterwards? Except for such an isolated and inexplicable case as Diod. xx85.1 — in a military narrative — it is not a feature of the Koine at literary, documentary or subliterate level. Postponement of γάρ was no doubt encouraged by postponement of δέ, but it is not itself notably poetic ). One can see how it could possibly have developed in the spoken language of the fourth century, extending the function of γάρ as an explanatory particle in a way which makes it comparable with the English ‘you see’ in ‘He didn't dare pick it up. He hurt his back last year, you see’. For an extension of this kind we may compare the current extension of the English genitive affix in ‘Then the girl whose place she was taking's mother turned up’ and ‘The man that Christopher liked's Introduction is much better’. Moreover, postponed γάρ appears in a segment of conversation constructed in indirect speech by Theophrastus in Char. 8.9 τ πργμα βοσθαι γάρ . Again we must ask: what happened to it afterwards? A couple of cases in Theophrastus' botanical works could be a reflex of the influence of comedy on literary language at Athens. The influence was plainly short-lived, since it did not affect the Koine. It is not hard to see why serious poetry in the fifth century and earlier should have experimented occasionally with the postponement of δέ and γάρ: treatment of M M q as a valid alternative to M q M is metrically very convenient. No poet, however, could afford to use common words in a bizarre, un-Greek way merely to save himself time and trouble in constructing a verse. Linguistic innovation is normally analogical, proceeding by extension from a starting-point already there, and the most obvious starting-point for postponement of δέ and γάρ is constituted by my class . This consideration provides comic postponement with a pedigree, but does not deny it individuality. The remarkable scale and frequency with which comedy exploited a phenomenon which tragedy used with restraint and prose hardly at all gives comic postponement the right to be regarded as a quite distinctive artificial feature of comedy. (shrink)

On the analogy of the colloquial register in some modern languages, where narrative and argument may be punctuated by oaths and exclamations (sometimes obscene or blasphemous) in order to maintain a high affective level and compel the hearer's attention, it is reasonable to postulate that Attic conversation also was punctuated by oaths, that this ingredient in comic language was drawn from life, and that the comparative frequency of ║ (|)M M(M) Δ in comedy is sufficiently explained thereby. There are (...) obvious affinities between some passages of comedy, relaxed conversation in Plato and Xenophon, and the forceful, man-to-man tone which Demosthenes sometimes adopts to such good effect (e.g. xxi 209). Compare, for instance, Ar.V.133 f.ἔστιν δ' ⋯νομα ⋮ τῷ μ⋯ν γέροντι ⋮ Φιλοκλέων / να⋯ μ⋯ Δία, τῷ δ' υἱεῖ κτλ., where the oath is a response to imagined incredulity, and X.Smp.4.27αὐτ⋯ν δ⋯ σέ, ἔɸη, ⋯γὼ εἶδον να⋯ μ⋯ τ⋯ν Ἀπόλλω, ὅτε κτλ. (‘Oh, yes, I did!’).It is also important that the commonest oaths fit, in most of their forms, the end of an iambic trimeter:(να⋯) μ⋯ τ⋯ν Δία, ν⋯ (τ⋯ν) Δία,ν⋯ τούς θεούς, μ⋯ τοὺς θεούς. Add that in Aristophanic dialogue (by contrast with Menander) over half the iambic trimeters end with major pause, and half the remainder with minor pause, and we can see why Δ / established itself early as a distinctive comic pattern. Out of 105 examples ofM M(M) Δ cited from comedy in Section II above, 59 have the oath at verse-end.In the case ofπάνυ, which was almost exclusively Attic and — to judge from its great rarity in tragedy — felt by Athenian poets to be prosaic, we lack evidence on its functions in the colloquial register; it may or may not have served as affective punctuation. In prose, we have to reckon with the fact thatπ MπandMππconstituted a genuine stylistic choice (cf. n. 32) as far back as the evidence will take us, since the two earliest instances in prose are [X.]Ath.2.3πάνυ δι⋯ χρείανand ibid. 3.5πολλ⋯ ἔτι πάνυ. The oath, as treated by the comic poets on the basis of colloquial usage, is bound to have served as a model forπάνυ, exerting an influence which pulledπάνυto the end of the verse, but there was also a powerful metrical constraint. As a dibrach ending in a vowel which could not be elided or enter into crasis,πάνυwas especially appropriate for verse-end. That in itself was enough both to establishMππas the dominant pattern in comedy and to promoteMπ…π. Out of the total of 104 examples ofMπ(…)πin comedy, 93 haveπάνυat verse-end, which makesMπ(…)π/ one of the hallmarks of comic style.Mπ…πdoes not occur in prose in association with any other feature identified as colloquial, but it should be noted that Aiskhines and Demosthenes are much fonder ofMππthan other prose authors. In some cases one can see that the orderMππavoids a succession of short syllables (e.g. D. xviii 130, liv 1) or hiatus (e.g. D. xxx 36) or both (e.g. D. xliii 10), but there are other cases in which it has the opposite effect (e.g. D. xxiv 140, xliii 53). The possibility of comic influence on oratorical language cannot be dismissed out of hand. It is also possible that someone will find positive determinants which will explain all the cases ofMππin prose.σɸόδρα, which, likeπάνυ, is peculiarly Attic, is metrically more tractable thanπάνυ, since it can be elided; even so, out of the 80 comic examples ofMσ(…) σ no less than 58 haveσɸόδραat verse-end, and of those 58 there are 22 at major pause, 8 at presumed major pause and 9 at minor pause. The comic treatment ofσɸόδραis thus comparable with the treatment ofπάνυ, and Timokles (CGFP) 222(b).4τηρεῖν…σɸόδραis in fact the closest analogy we have to Ar.Pl.234 f.ἄχθομαι…πάνυ.δέandγάρare a different matter, and in some significant respects different from each other. Postponement ofδέis especially prominent in Aeschylus (45 examples, including a few in which the text is suspect) and then abundant in fourth-century comedy. It is much less common in Euripides (18 examples), rare in Sophocles (6) and Aristophanes (6), and virtually limited in prose to the categories which I labelled (l)–(3). There is as yet no evidence to associate postponement ofδέwith colloquial language; on the contrary, it seems to have begun as a feature of poetic language and to have been taken up and exploited by fourth-century comedy. If, in addition to being Aeschylean, it was colloquial in the fourth century, what happened to it afterwards? Except for such an isolated and inexplicable case as Diod. xx85.1 (v.l.!) — in a military narrative — it is not a feature of the Koine at literary, documentary or subliterate level.Postponement ofγάρwas no doubt encouraged by postponement ofδέ, but it is not itself notably poetic (20 examples in tragedy, of which only three come in my class (5)). One can see how it could possibly have developed in the spoken language of the fourth century, extending the function ofγάρas an explanatory particle (rather on the lines ofγε) in a way which makes it comparable with the English ‘you see’ in (e.g.) ‘He didn't dare pick it up. He hurt his back last year, you see’. For an extension of this kind we may compare the current extension of the English genitive affix in (I heard both examples a year or two ago) ‘Then the girl whose place she was taking's mother turned up’ and ‘The man that Christopher liked's Introduction is much better’. Moreover, postponedγάρappears in a segment of conversation constructed in indirect speech by Theophrastus inChar.8.9τ⋯ πρ⋯γμα βο⋯σθαι γάρ(p C N γάρ). Again we must ask: what happened to it afterwards? A couple of cases in Theophrastus' botanical works (CPiii 11.3 andHPiv 6.1) could be a reflex of the influence of comedy on literary language at Athens. The influence was plainly short-lived, since it did not affect the Koine.It is not hard to see why serious poetry in the fifth century and earlier should have experimented occasionally with the postponement ofδέandγάρ: treatment ofM M qas a valid alternative toM q Mis metrically very convenient. No poet, however, could afford to use common words in a bizarre, un-Greek way merely to save himself time and trouble in constructing a verse. Linguistic innovation is normally analogical, proceeding by extension from a starting-point already there, and the most obvious starting-point for postponement ofδέandγάρis constituted by my class (3). This consideration provides comic postponement with a pedigree, but does not deny it individuality. The remarkable scale and frequency with which comedy exploited a phenomenon which tragedy used with restraint and prose hardly at all gives comic postponement the right to be regarded as a quite distinctive artificial feature of comedy. (shrink)

This book examines Greek engagements with the past as articulations of memory formulated against the contingency of chance associated with temporality. Based on a phenomenological understanding of temporality, it identifies four memorializing strategies: continuity , regularity , development, and acceptance of chance. This framework serves in pursuing a twofold aim: to reconstruct the literary field of memory in fifth-century bce Greece; and to interpret Greek historiography as a memorializing mode. The key contention advanced by this approach is that (...) acts of memory entailed an “idea of history” that was articulated not only in historiography, but also in epinician poetry, elegy, tragedy, and oratory. The book offers a rich account of poetic conventions and contexts through which each of these genres counterbalanced contingency through the use of exemplary and traditional modes of memory. This fine analysis highlights the grip of the present on the past as a significant feature of both historiographical and nonhistoriographical genres.The essay argues that this work fills a disciplinary gap by extending the reflection on memory to a new period, Greek antiquity. The retrospective positioning of this period at the outset of Western historical thought brings Grethlein's investigation to the center of debates about memory, temporality, and the meaning history. In engaging with the book's argument, the essay suggests that historiographical memory emerged in Greece not as a first-order encounter with time, but as a second-order encounter with forgetting. This confrontation marked a certain separation of historiography from other memorializing genres. Whereas poetic and rhetorical memories were posited against contingency, historiography sought to retrieve those aspects of the past that may otherwise have been irretrievably lost and forgotten. In doing so, it formulated the historiographical imperative as a negation of forgetting that problematized the truth-value of memory and the very act of remembering the past. (shrink)

This essay explores a curious point of intersection in the historical pairing of becoming and negation, between two thinkers and two traditions: the Sophist Protagoras of fifth-century BCE Greece and the second-century CE South Asian Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna. I offer a speculative account of how becoming and negation are linked in Protagoras—speculative because only so much can be deduced from the extant fragments and testimony. I compare that account to the more coherent picture offered by Nāgārjuna—more coherent (...) because a complete account of the logic that links becoming and negation is carefully preserved in the works attributed to Nāgārjuna. While no specific conclusions regarding the bridge that linked India and Greece may be reached, the similarities between these thinkers and the greater coherence of the Buddhist tradition nevertheless offer hypothetical possibilities for reconstructing the larger architecture of the world of sophistic thought that is now lost to us. (shrink)

As members of the most evolutionarily developed species on earth, most of us share the common-sensical belief that our treatment of animals should be based more or less on moral grounds. However, it is also an undeniable fact that for more than two millennia, from the appearance of the first moral theories in Ancient Greece until almost the last quarter of the 20th century, this traditional moral concern for animals has gone hand in hand with their systematic exclusion from (...) the moral community of human beings, which deprives them of basic protective rights against moral abuse and mistreatment. A radical paradigm shift in ethics emerges, especially in the last quarter of the 20th century, when some philosophers begin to question this anthropocentric conception of ethics and the “otherness” of animals in terms of their traditional location outside the ethical discourse. Peter Singer, who is a utilitarian, and Tom Regan, who defends the “rights view” against Singer’s utilitarianism, are two prominent representatives of this new ethical approach. After showing how Singer and Regan reject speciesism, this paper focuses on Regan’s critique of Singer’s account and adds new objections that show that utilitarianism has serious general defects even if it is restricted to human beings. Moreover, these defects give rise to more complicated problems when utilitarianism is applied to animals. After pointing to some weak aspects in Regan’s theory, the paper spells out the sketch of an alternative account that points to the possibility of a synthesis of utility principle and right principle. Accordingly, Regan’s worse-off principle deduced from the rights view is interpreted as a formal principle, while the utility principle as the material content of it is accepted: as long as there is no violation of the worse-off principle, one ought to deduce particular commands to maximize utility for specific cases out of the application of the utility principle. In this context, the worse-off principle has only a negative and formal function that prevents the utility principle from overriding individual rights by giving it its obligatory form. (shrink)

Although ancient Greek and Indian philosophers held remarkably similar philosophical positions, the possibility of these two traditions having developed independently cannot be discounted. However, in the fifth century BCE substantial parts of Greece and India were under the Persian rule and belonged to the same political entity. It is very likely that Greeks and Indians sat together in the Persian court where translation services were provided to mitigate the language barrier. In the fourth century BCE there were (...) Greek kingdoms for more than a century in and around northwest frontiers of India paving the way for substantial political and commercial contact. Greeks like Megasthenes, Diogenes Laertius, Suidas, Porphyry, etc. testify that eminent Greek thinkers like Democritus, Pyrrho, etc. visited India and/or that Plato, Plotinus, etc. knew about or admired Indian wisdom. Some of this evidence is relatively late but cannot be dismissed in the absence of specific rebuttal; thus, Indo-Greek scholarly exchange is likely. (shrink)

Xenophanes was a poet and rhapsode who lived in Greece during the late sixth and early fifth centuries BCE. Surviving fragments of his poetry touch on proper conduct at symposia, the measures of personal excellence, and aspects of his interactions with various notable individuals. Xenophanes also characterized various natural phenomena as products of a set of basic physical substances and processes. In a series of remarks concerning the stories about the gods told by Homer and Hesiod, the true nature (...) of the divine, and the tendency of believers to conceive of the gods as like themselves, Xenophanes explored questions central to the philosophy of religion. This essay addresses four questions: (1) Did Xenophanes espouse monotheism? (2) On what basis did he repudiate anthropomorphism in religion? (3) Why did he reject the possibility of knowledge concerning divine matters? and (4) How did he understand the relationship between god and the cosmos? (shrink)

The law of prior entry was one of E.B. Titchener’s seven fundamental laws of attention. According to Titchener : “the object of attention comes to consciousness more quickly than the objects which we are not attending to.” Although researchers have been studying prior entry for more than a century now, progress in understanding the effect has been hindered by the many methodological confounds present in early research. As a consequence, it is unclear whether the behavioral effects reported in the (...) majority of published studies in this area should be attributed to attention, decisional response biases, and/or, in the case of exogenous spatial cuing studies of the prior-entry effect, to sensory facilitation effects instead. In this article, the literature on the prior-entry effect is reviewed, the confounds present in previous research highlighted, current consensus summarized, and some of the key questions for future research outlined. In particular, recent research has now provided compelling psychophysical and electrophysiological evidence to support the claim that attending to a sensory modality, spatial location, or stimulus feature/attribute can all give rise to a relative speeding-up of the time of arrival of attended, as compared to relatively less attended stimuli. Prior-entry effects have now been demonstrated following both the endogenous and exogenous orienting of attention, though prior-entry effects tend to be smaller in magnitude when assessed by means of participants’ performance on SJ tasks than when assessed by means of their performance on TOJ tasks. (shrink)

In this book, Professor Adkins undertakes an examination of certain key value-words in the period between Homer and the end of the fifth century. The behavior of these words both affected and was affected by the nature of the society in which their usage developed. The author shows how only with a complete understanding of the implications and significance of these value-words can the essence of the Greeks and their society be grasped.

Although ancient Greek and Indian philosophers held remarkably similar philosophical positions, the possibility of these two traditions having developed independently cannot be discounted. However, in the fifth century BCE substantial parts of Greece and India were under the Persian rule and belonged to the same political entity. It is very likely that Greeks and Indians sat together in the Persian court where translation services were provided to mitigate the language barrier. In the fourth century BCE there were (...) Greek kingdoms for more than a century in and around northwest frontiers of India paving the way for substantial political and commercial contact. Greeks like Megasthenes, Diogenes Laertius, Suidas, Porphyry, etc. testify that eminent Greek thinkers like Democritus, Pyrrho, etc. visited India and/or that Plato, Plotinus, etc. knew about or admired Indian wisdom. Some of this evidence is relatively late but cannot be dismissed in the absence of specific rebuttal; thus, Indo-Greek scholarly exchange is likely. (shrink)

Although ancient Greek and Indian philosophers held remarkably similar philosophical positions, the possibility of these two traditions having developed independently cannot be discounted. However, in the fifth century BCE substantial parts of Greece and India were under the Persian rule and belonged to the same political entity. It is very likely that Greeks and Indians sat together in the Persian court where translation services were provided to mitigate the language barrier. In the fourth century BCE there were (...) Greek kingdoms for more than a century in and around northwest frontiers of India paving the way for substantial political and commercial contact. Greeks like Megasthenes, Diogenes Laertius, Suidas, Porphyry, etc. testify that eminent Greek thinkers like Democritus, Pyrrho, etc. visited India and/or that Plato, Plotinus, etc. knew about or admired Indian wisdom. Some of this evidence is relatively late but cannot be dismissed in the absence of specific rebuttal; thus, Indo-Greek scholarly exchange is likely. (shrink)

In his Metrica, Hero provides four procedures for finding the area of a circular segment (with b the base of the segment and h its height): an Ancient method for when the segment is smaller than a semicircle, $$(b + h)/2 \, \cdot \, h$$ ( b + h ) / 2 · h ; a Revision, $$(b + h)/2 \, \cdot \, h + (b/2)^{2} /14$$ ( b + h ) / 2 · h + ( b / 2 (...) ) 2 / 14 ; a quasi-Archimedean method (said to be inspired by the quadrature of the parabola) for cases where b is more than triple h, $${\raise0.5ex\hbox{$\scriptstyle 4$} \kern-0.1em/\kern-0.15em \lower0.25ex\hbox{$\scriptstyle 3$}}(h \, \cdot \, b/2)$$ 4 / 3 ( h · b / 2 ) ; and a method of Subtraction using the Revised method, for when it is larger than a semicircle. He gives superficial arguments that the Ancient method presumes $$\pi = 3$$ π = 3 and the Revision, $$\pi = {\raise0.5ex\hbox{$\scriptstyle {22}$} \kern-0.1em/\kern-0.15em \lower0.25ex\hbox{$\scriptstyle 7$}}$$ π = 22 / 7. We are left with many questions. How ancient is the Ancient? Why did anyone think it worked? Why would anyone revise it in just this way? In addition, why did Hero think the Revised method did not work when $$b > 3\;h$$ b > 3 h? I show that a fifth century BCE Uruk tablet employs the Ancient method, but possibly with very strange consequences, and that a Ptolemaic Egyptian papyrus that checks this method by comparing the area of a circle calculated from the sum of a regular inscribed polygon and the areas of the segments on its sides as determined by the Ancient method with the area of the circle as calculated from its diameter correctly sees that the calculations do not quite gel in the case of a triangle but do in the case of a square. Both traditions probably could also calculate the area of a segment on an inscribed regular polygon by subtracting the area of the polygon from the area of the circle and dividing by the number of sides of the polygon. I then derive two theorems about pairs of segments, that the reviser of the Ancient method should have known, that explain each method, why they work when they do and do not when they do not, and which lead to a curious generalization of the Revised method. Hero’s comment is right, but not for the reasons he gives. I conclude with an exploration of Hero’s restrictions of the Revised method and Hero’s two alternative methods. (shrink)

Following the idea first expressed by Heinrich Swoboda, there is a general perception that the meaning of ἀτιμία in Athens eventually evolved from the original ‘outlawry’, when an ἄτιμος was liable to being deprived of his property and slayed with impunity if he returned to the land from which he had been banished, into a certain limitation on civic status, which has often been rendered as a ‘disfranchisement’. Specific outcomes of this later form of ἀτιμία varied depending on the dating (...) and circumstances of individual cases, thereby giving rise to theories of a so-called full – or ‘total’ – and partial ἀτιμία. Still, whether it was viewed as ‘full’ or ‘partial’, this ἀτιμία did not inflict the death penalty. The precise dating of the transformation of ἀτιμία has also been debated, with opinions ranging from pre-Solonian times (L'Homme-Wéry) to the late sixth (Swoboda, Hansen, Manville) or the late fifth century (Scafuro). While the exact dating is unknown, this transformation was definitely over in the fifth century, when inscriptions and literary texts mentioned punishment by ἀτιμία alongside the death penalty and the confiscation of property. Thus, according to Raphael Sealey, ἀτιμία evolved ‘from a more severe to a milder sense’, and Alick R.W. Harrison pointed to the evidence that, by the fourth century, any willing Athenian could seize an ἄτιμος who happened to be in Athenian territory and surrender him to the θεσμοθέται, instead of killing him. (shrink)

The aim of my dissertation is to investigate how universal concepts are formed according to the later medieval Franciscan theologian Peter Auriol (d. 1322). Specifically, in the dissertation I inquiry into the relation between Auriol's ontology - according to which only individuals, and not universals, have real, extra-mental existence - and his philosophical psychology, a study of how extra-mental particulars can give rise to universal concepts, according to Auriol's view. In the past academic year I refined the topic of (...) my PhD thesis in two ways : first, I have delineated the definitive table of content ; second, I have wrote down the results of my research. The thesis comprises two volumes. The second one contains a collation of Peter Auriol's,Reportatio II, d. 9, qq. 2 - 3. The text has been obtained by confronting two manuscripts, considered as the exemplars of the two main families that convey his Second Book of the Sentences: ms. Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale centrale, ms. conv. soppr. A.3.120 (Fb); (iii) il ms. Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, ms. 161 scaff. IX (Pg). The first volume, instead, has been divided into five chapters: the first two offer a historical introduction, while the remaining three are dedicated to the study of Auriol's doctrine, starting from the analysis of the text proposed in the collation, then extending the investigation to all the documentary heritage available relating to the Franciscan master. The first chapter provides a survey of the main theories of the universals of the early fourteenth century, taking into account in particular the opinions of those thinkers who, like Duns Scotus, in addition to marking a philosophical era, have been significant for Auriol's developing of his theory of universals. These are: John Duns Scotus, Henry of Harclay, Walter Bulery and Hervaeus Natalis. In order to properly understand the philosophical proposal of the Doctor facundus, it is necessary to know how it fits into a debate that in the academic debate of the fourteenth century. The second chapter is mainly aimed at the identification of the sources of Rep. II, d. 9, qq. 2 - 3. In the quaestio secunda, Auriol deals with the foundation of the universals. In a.1, he discusses the opinion of multiwho he labels as 'platonic'. We tried, therefore, to detect the targets of his criticism. Burley, Wylton, Bacon, Duns Scotus have been identified as possible addresses. In a. 2 of the same question, Auriol analyzes the position of Duns Scotus on the common nature. It has been then hypothesized that the two articles - aa. 1-2 - has to be considered as a general presentation and specific case of it; as a thesis common to several forms of realism and the realism of one of its most important interpreters. The third chapter focuses Auriol's criticism of the different forms of realism reported in a. 1 and of Duns Scotus's theory, as it is found in a. 2. In both cases, Auriol reproaches the realists for breaking the unity of substance, into a multiplicity of formalitatesreally occurring in reand corresponding to the concepts of genus and difference. On the contrary, Auriol maintains that universal concepts have no unity in the extra-mental reality. Only individuals really exist and numerical unity the only fully existing unity. As a consequence, the unity of the universal concept is just similitudinaria,that is only given a concept. Successively, the criticisms that Auriol makes to the principle of individuation are considered. Generally speaking, everything that exists, insofar as it exists, is singular, according to him. It is a primitive fact and it is not, therefore, necessary to search for the causes of its individuation. Thus, mirroring the structure of the quaestio secunda, in q. 3, Auriol discusses, in the first place, Duns Scotus's position and secondly a group of theories, arisen during the scholastic debate between the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century. Interestingly, to reconstruct this set of doctrines, Auriol follows almost literally the reconstruction that Scotus himself makes of the same theories in his Ordinatio. Now, relying on the assumption that everything that exists is individual, Auriol gives shape to the notions of individuality and singularity and their mutual difference. This is one of the hubs of the dissertation. According to Auriol, a singularity is an entity that does not admit the existence of other realities that can be considered as similar with it. In this sense, God is the only authentic singularity. Ordinary reality, on the other hand, is made up of individualities. An individuality is an entity that, being finite, does not exhaust in itself the totality of the species to which it belongs (as far as the species as such exists only in virtue of an act of the intellect), admits the existence of other realities conceivable as similar with it. Thus, inasmuch as reality is made up of individuals or individualities, the mind is able to form the corresponding universal concepts. Being finite, for Auriol, is the condition of the validity of universals. In this respect, the relation between the concept of individuality and that of singularity is taken into account. Subsequently, we analyze the function of the category of Quantity, as it is related to individuality. According to Auriol, Quantity has no individuating capacity. At most, in bodily substances, it functions as principle of distinction. Being, in fact, discrete realities, a material substance spatially ends where another one begins. The fourth chapter is a kind of juncture between the third one, in which the structure of the concrete individual is analyzed, and the fifth one, in which the cognitive side of the process of concept formation is discussed. What is discussed here are the rationes. According to Auriol, the rationesare the basic units that constitute the quiddity of each individual and serve to direct our thought to form certain concepts. Each concept is the concept of a ratio,indeed. In this respect, Auriol claims that, say, Socrates has the rationes substance, corporeality, sensitivity, rationality. Additionally, rationes of the same type occurring in different objects are "maximally similar" (simillimae). For example, the rationesof Socrates are utterly similar with those of Plato (Cf. Scriptum, d. 2, q. 1, a. 4). Therefore, although these rationes are non-universal characteristics - inasmuch as a ratio belongs to one and only one individual - due to their maximal similarity they do count as the extramental ground for our general concepts (Cf.II Sent., d. 9, q. 3, a. 1). According to these premises, Auriol can hold that different singulars can be mutually highly similar, without participating in the same common nature (Cf. II Sent., d. 9, q. 3, a. 3).At the same time, it is relevant to note these rationesdo not compromise the unity of an existing particular. Rather each ratiocoagulates into each other giving birth to the individual's ultimate ratio. This final ratiois an indivisible ratio (ratio atoma), which cannot be further specified or divided (II Sent., d. 9, q. 3). According to Auriol, then, the rationesqua rationesdo not exist in extra-mental reality. Rather, the exist as such only in virtue of an act of the intellect. This means that they have an ambiguous being. On the one hand, they indicate a nature that cannot be altered by the intellect. On the other, the need the mind's activity to exist as rationes. According to Auriol, therefore, the rationesare independent of any cognitive act, with regard to the content they express, while they depend on mind's activity with regard to their unity and their existence. Now, the opaqueness concerning the ontological consistency of rationesdirectly depends on Auriol's understanding of cognition. Chapter five mainly deals with the different stages of the process of formation of the universal concept. In this respect, the notion of impressiois what is firstly analyzed. The impressionescan be considered, for Auriol, as the rationesthat are 'deposited' in the intellect and constitute, in cooperation with the cognitive faculty, what the Franciscan theologian calls the actus intellectus. The intellectual act, according to Auriol, is an entity composed of the impressed similarity of the object and the intellectual power, in fact. Moreover, in his view, it is really identical to the intelligible species. Now, the identity that the Franciscan theologian establishes between these two noetic tools, which were traditionally considered as distinct, imposes a reinterpretation of the notion of species. Coinciding with the act, the species can no longer be considered as an entity juxtaposed to it, deputed to the activation of the cognitive process performed by the intellect. Indeed, all those theories of universal concepts that add other noetic tools to the act, be they a species, a quality, or something else, would necessarily compromise intellection, preventing it from having acquaintance with extra-mental reality. According to Auriol, considering intellectual cognition as a connotation allows us to avoid such inconveniences. According to this view, the intellectual cognition must be regarded as an activity that poses nothing but to allow something to appear to the cognizer. In this respect, the concept, for Auriol, is nothing but the real object qua appearingto the intellect, fully identical with the intellectual act in recto,while denominatively distinct in obliquo. In this perspective, the definition of intellection that the Franciscan theologian proposes is analyzed, trying, in particular, to determine the ontological status of the concept and its epistemological function. In conclusion, with this study we have tried to give an account of Auriol's philosophical attitude, of the scope of his theory of universals, focusing on the relationship between ontology and philosophical psychology. Using Auriol's texts and specifically the collation of Rep. II, d. 9, qq. 2 - 3, the answers to these questions were searched for in the words of the Franciscan theologian himself. The picture emerged is that of an autonomous, critical thinker, but perfectly inserted in the historical context in which he lives. A thinker who places himself, so to speak, halfway between Duns Scotus's realism and Ockham's nominalism, nevertheless succeeding, albeit with some opacity, in balancing an ontology in which the metaphysical priority is granted only to the individual and the universal concepts have a solid foundation and validity. (shrink)

If rituals persist in part because of their memory-taxing attributes, from whence do they arise? I suggest that magical practices form the core of rituals, and that many such practices derive from learned pseudo-causal associations. Spurious associations are likely to be acquired during problem-solving under conditions of ambiguity and danger, and are often a consequence of imitative social learning. (Published Online February 8 2007).

To defend the fatherland, to obey the laws and authorities, and to honour the State's cults are the principal points the Athenian citizen promised to fulfil in his oath of allegiance—called ephebic, because he took it as a recruit —at least since the second half of the fourth century B.C.. These duties are fundamental for the citizen's attachment to hispolis, so one will hardly assume that the content of the oath depends upon the existence of the Athenian institution of (...) cadet-training which is attested by inscriptions not earlier than 334/3 B.C. Some ambiguous passages in fifth- and fourth-century authors give no reliable clue to determine the form or origin of theephebeia.I shall consider sworn civic duties and the organisation of military training as different things, and shall treat the oath independently from the disputed question of when theephebeiacame into existence. My purpose is to draw attention to some fifth-century allusions to the oath which seem to have remained unnoticed so far.This oath is transmitted by Pollux, Stobaeus, and a fourth-century inscription from the Attic deme Acharnae. I give the epigraphic version, following G. Daux's text. I omit the first part of the whole inscription and the last part. (shrink)

For anyone working in aesthetics interested in understanding the richness of the Chinese aesthetic tradition this handbook is the place to start. Comprised of general introductory overviews, critical reflections and contextual analysis, it covers everything from the origins of aesthetics in China to the role of aesthetics in philosophy today. Beginning in early China (1st millennium BCE), it traces the Chinese aesthetic tradition, exploring the import of the term aesthetics into Chinese thought via Japan around the end of the 19th (...) century. It looks back to early practices of art and craftsmanship, showing how the history of Chinese thought provides a multitude of artifacts and texts that give rise to a wide range of aesthetic creations and notions. Introducing various perspectives on traditional arts in China, including painting, ceramics, calligraphy, poetry, music and theatre, it explores those aesthetic traditions not included in "canonic" art forms, such as martial arts, rock gardening, and ritual performance. Written by Chinese, European, and American theoreticians and practitioners, this authoritative research resource enhances contemporary aesthetics by revealing the possibilities of a Chinese philosophy of art. (shrink)

The study of bi- and multilingualism in the ancient Mediterranean has come into its own in recent decades. The evidence is far greater for the Hellenistic and Roman periods than the Classical, so naturally scholarly attention has focussed less on the earlier era. This has led to some enduring notions about bilingualism in the fifth century b.c.e. which are yet to be fully scrutinized, including the idea that a Greek's speaking another tongue was inherently transgressive. What did it (...) mean for a Greek to speak a second language? This article re-evaluates the evidence for individual bilingualism in Herodotus and Thucydides in their fifth-century context, focussed on our two best-documented examples of bilingual Greek individuals (Histiaeus of Miletus and Themistocles of Athens). Close reading of Herodotus and Thucydides suggests that not only does the notion of an inherently transgressive bilingualism hold little water for this period, but bilingualism may even be a sign of μῆτις. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to present the dissertation research which studies the Olympian Zeus’ temples built during the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. The intention is to understand how Olympia was responsible for the origin and dissemination of Olympian Zeus´cult through the Greek world. From the poleis survey that consecrated these temples to the deity and by the mapping of the cult in association to textual informations we will discuss the Olympios epiteth and the name Olympieion, the (...) spacial configuration of the Olympian Zeus sanctuaries and the relationship of the cult and the tyranny. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Europe and EmbodimentA Levinasian PerspectiveJames Mensch (bio)The question of Europe has been raised continually. Behind it is the division of the continent into different peoples, languages, and cultures, all in close proximity to one another. Their plurality and proximity give rise to the opposing imperatives of trade and war. Since ancient times, the need to promote trade and the desire to prevent war have driven the search for (...) a basis for European unity. Various candidates, from that of Roman law in ancient times to the current economic and regulatory union of today, have been tried. Such bureaucratic solutions, however, have not proved sufficient. They regulate external relations but do not touch what is within. This, however, is the difficulty: how do we understand nations and their relations from within? On an individual level, it is customary to speak of the inner as “subjectivity.” Such a term generally means the “subject” of experience, the unique and individual self that has experience. If we are to avoid the Cartesian conceptions of this self, we have to speak of such a subject as an embodied whole: an organic unity that is both conscious of its environment and distinguishes itself from the latter. Such an organic unity cannot be thought in terms of Descartes’s distinction between mind and body, the mind being nonextended and the body being extended. The body grasped simply as extended is inanimate. To use [End Page 41] the German term, it is a Körper, a material body among bodies. The corresponding term for the animate, living body is Leib. A living body is characterized both by its organic needs and its ability to satisfy these through its “I can” (i.e., its capability to act to fulfill such needs). Subjectivity, as embodied, has to be thought in terms of the latter.Such thoughts, however, only increase the difficulty of speaking of the subjectivity of nations. Nations are political concepts. To speak of them as organic unities seems to return us to a discredited analogy, where we say just as the body has a common boundary separating its inside from the outside, so a nation has its frontiers. Similarly, we assert that just as an organic unity embraces the mutually dependent functioning of its parts — e.g., its various organs and limbs — so the state consists of the interdependent functioning of its classes and professions. Paul employs this analogy in speaking of the body of Christ.1 It also appears in Plato’s division of the classes of the state. One can also see it at work in the division of castes in Hindu society. As such examples indicate, its focus on natural classes makes it an inappropriate analogy for the modern state, where citizenship rather than class is the dominant conception. What, then, would be an appropriate way to speak of the subjectivity of nations? In what follows, I am going to use Levinas’s conception of corporalité (Leiblichkeit in German) to answer these questions. My claim will be that it permits the extension of subjectivity to the national level. Such an extension, I will argue, is crucial for understanding the group of nations that we call Europe. It is what allows us to catch sight of Europe’s particular identity.Two Views of European IdentityThere is a certain paradox in attempting to speak of the identity of Europe. Given the spread of the scientific rationality that originated in Europe, it is often claimed that what distinguishes Europe is the universality of the rationality that defines it. Husserl, in the twentieth century, made this claim. Such universality, he writes, is “contained from the start in the idea of philosophy” that appeared in Greece.2 [End Page 42] Philosophy, for the Greeks, was a general term that included “all the special sciences” — mathematics, astronomy, and so on — that developed as part of it. All these make universal claims. What they assert is claimed to hold everywhere, without exception. As Husserl admits, “philosophy, together with all the special sciences, makes up only a partial manifestation of European culture.” But for Husserl, “this part is the functioning brain” of “European spiritual life.”3... (shrink)

In the ninth century BCE, the peoples of four distinct regions of the civilized world created the religious and philosophical traditions that have continued to nourish humanity to the present day: Confucianism and Daoism in China, Hinduism and Buddhism in India, monotheism in Israel, and philosophical rationalism in Greece. Later generations further developed these initial insights, but we have never grown beyond them. Rabbinic Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, for example, were all secondary flowerings of the original Israelite vision. Now, (...) in The Great Transformation , Karen Armstrong reveals how the sages of this pivotal “Axial Age” can speak clearly and helpfully to the violence and desperation that we experience in our own times. Armstrong traces the development of the Axial Age chronologically, examining the contributions of such figures as the Buddha, Socrates, Confucius, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, the mystics of the Upanishads, Mencius, and Euripides. All of the Axial Age faiths began in principled and visceral recoil from the unprecedented violence of their time. Despite some differences of emphasis, there was a remarkable consensus in their call for an abandonment of selfishness and a spirituality of compassion. With regard to dealing with fear, despair, hatred, rage, and violence, the Axial sages gave their people and give us, Armstrong says, two important pieces of advice: first there must be personal responsibility and self-criticism, and it must be followed by practical, effective action. In her introduction and concluding chapter, Armstrong urges us to consider how these spiritualities challenge the way we are religious today. In our various institutions, we sometimes seem to be attempting to create exactly the kind of religion that Axial sages and prophets had hoped to eliminate. We often equate faith with doctrinal conformity, but the traditions of the Axial Age were not about dogma. All insisted on the primacy of compassion even in the midst of suffering. In each Axial Age case, a disciplined revulsion from violence and hatred proved to be the major catalyst of spiritual change. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Europe and EmbodimentA Levinasian PerspectiveJames Mensch (bio)The question of Europe has been raised continually. Behind it is the division of the continent into different peoples, languages, and cultures, all in close proximity to one another. Their plurality and proximity give rise to the opposing imperatives of trade and war. Since ancient times, the need to promote trade and the desire to prevent war have driven the search for (...) a basis for European unity. Various candidates, from that of Roman law in ancient times to the current economic and regulatory union of today, have been tried. Such bureaucratic solutions, however, have not proved sufficient. They regulate external relations but do not touch what is within. This, however, is the difficulty: how do we understand nations and their relations from within? On an individual level, it is customary to speak of the inner as “subjectivity.” Such a term generally means the “subject” of experience, the unique and individual self that has experience. If we are to avoid the Cartesian conceptions of this self, we have to speak of such a subject as an embodied whole: an organic unity that is both conscious of its environment and distinguishes itself from the latter. Such an organic unity cannot be thought in terms of Descartes’s distinction between mind and body, the mind being nonextended and the body being extended. The body grasped simply as extended is inanimate. To use [End Page 41] the German term, it is a Körper, a material body among bodies. The corresponding term for the animate, living body is Leib. A living body is characterized both by its organic needs and its ability to satisfy these through its “I can” (i.e., its capability to act to fulfill such needs). Subjectivity, as embodied, has to be thought in terms of the latter.Such thoughts, however, only increase the difficulty of speaking of the subjectivity of nations. Nations are political concepts. To speak of them as organic unities seems to return us to a discredited analogy, where we say just as the body has a common boundary separating its inside from the outside, so a nation has its frontiers. Similarly, we assert that just as an organic unity embraces the mutually dependent functioning of its parts — e.g., its various organs and limbs — so the state consists of the interdependent functioning of its classes and professions. Paul employs this analogy in speaking of the body of Christ.1 It also appears in Plato’s division of the classes of the state. One can also see it at work in the division of castes in Hindu society. As such examples indicate, its focus on natural classes makes it an inappropriate analogy for the modern state, where citizenship rather than class is the dominant conception. What, then, would be an appropriate way to speak of the subjectivity of nations? In what follows, I am going to use Levinas’s conception of corporalité (Leiblichkeit in German) to answer these questions. My claim will be that it permits the extension of subjectivity to the national level. Such an extension, I will argue, is crucial for understanding the group of nations that we call Europe. It is what allows us to catch sight of Europe’s particular identity.Two Views of European IdentityThere is a certain paradox in attempting to speak of the identity of Europe. Given the spread of the scientific rationality that originated in Europe, it is often claimed that what distinguishes Europe is the universality of the rationality that defines it. Husserl, in the twentieth century, made this claim. Such universality, he writes, is “contained from the start in the idea of philosophy” that appeared in Greece.2 [End Page 42] Philosophy, for the Greeks, was a general term that included “all the special sciences” — mathematics, astronomy, and so on — that developed as part of it. All these make universal claims. What they assert is claimed to hold everywhere, without exception. As Husserl admits, “philosophy, together with all the special sciences, makes up only a partial manifestation of European culture.” But for Husserl, “this part is the functioning brain” of “European spiritual life.”3... (shrink)

An undergraduate honors thesis, this work addresses the question of whether or not the historical Socrates is best understood as a sophist, the charge Plato seems most keen to refute. Using the evidence of both Plato's dialogues and other contemporary sources, this study assesses potential arguments regarding Socrates' identity, putting forward the position that Socrates is most accurately to be described not as a sophist but as a "sage" (Greek: sophos). Although the "sage" is a model drawn from the 6th (...) and 5th centuries BCE, this thesis argues that Socrates seeks to revive traditional Greek values and models of the "wise man" and that this conservatism is at the root of his misidentification as a sophist and, thus, his conflict with the restored democracy that tries him for impiety. (shrink)

Often it is useful, if one wishes to understand how major transformations in intellectual disciplines came about, to examine the manifestations of these transformations in specific details. But it is necessary that these be facts sufficiently well attested to to constitute probative indicators. This condition is fulfilled with regard to the use of general reflections among the authors of ancient Greece. Their presence is indeed one of the characteristic features of Greek literature, in particular from the Seventh to the Fourth (...) centuries B.C. However, we can observe that their nature clearly changes in the last third of the Fifth century, precisely at the moment when, in an abrupt surge of rationalism, we suddenly see born in Athens a whole series of areas of research on man that Western civilization would later take up once more and develop further. This coincidence cannot be accidental; and it is permitted to think that there is an indicator here capable of revealing in greater detail the manner in which this development, so important for the history of thought, occurred. (shrink)

How are beliefs efficacious? One answer is: via rational intentional action. But there are other ways that beliefs are efficacious. This dissertation examines these other ways, and sketches an answer to the question of how beliefs are efficacious that takes into account how beliefs are involved in the full range of behavioral disciplines, from psychophysiology and cognition to social and economic phenomena. The account of how beliefs are efficacious I propose draws on work on active accounts of perception. I develop (...) an account based on a proposal sketched by the cognitive scientist Ulrich Neisser. Neisser sketched an active account of perception, on which dynamic anticipatory schemata direct an organism's exploration and action, and are in turn revised as a result of exploration and action. This notion of schema has roots in nineteenth century neurophysiology and in Frederick Bartlett's subsequent work on memory. Neisser appealed to it to unite what he thought was right about information-processing accounts of perception with what he thought was right about ecological accounts of perception. The point that we must anticipate in order to perceive has been recognized by philosophers in the form of the "theory-ladenness of observation." I extend the concept of anticipatory schema to include its role in social perception and social interaction; the concept of anticipatory schema provides a more interactive account of the role of expectations in the maintenance and existence of social institutions, and can be used to enrich the account of convention David Lewis provided. I also show that the concept of rational expectations, which explains the neutrality of money in terms of the efficacy of anticipatory expectations, is compatible with the proposed account of how beliefs are efficacious. I discuss how the proposal accounts for the three main modes by which beliefs can be efficacious: via their role in causing intentional action, via their role in causing economic phenomena and the existence and maintenance of social institutions, and via their role in causing unintentional physiological responses, including anticipatory physiological responses that can enable perception, cause involuntary actions and give rise to the placebo effect. (shrink)