Studies investigating the COVID-19 pandemic from a psychological point of view have mostly focused on psychological distress. This study adopts the framework of existential positive psychology, a second wave of positive psychology that emphasizes the importance of effective coping with the negative aspects of living in order to achieve greater wellbeing. Trait emotional intelligence (trait EI) can be crucial in this context as it refers to emotion-related personality dispositions concerning the understanding and regulation of one’s emotions and those of others. (...) The present study investigated the relationship between trait EI and both wellbeing and psychological distress (i.e., depression, anxiety, and stress), while exploring the mediating role of meaning-centered coping (proactive transformative strategies based on meaning in life) and maladaptive coping (i.e., behavioral disengagement and self-blame) during the first few months of the COVID-19 pandemic. A sample of 326 Lebanese adults completed measures of trait EI, wellbeing, psychological distress, coping, and meaning-centered coping. Results showed a strong positive correlation between trait EI and meaning-centered coping. Trait EI also correlated positively with wellbeing and negatively with psychological distress. Structural equation modeling showed that meaning-centered coping partially mediated the relationship between trait EI and wellbeing. Maladaptive coping fully mediated the relationship between trait EI and psychological distress. Findings indicate that trait EI is positively related to dealing with a stressful situation such as the pandemic in positive ways at both the cognitive level, by reformulating the situation to see something valuable in it, and behavioral level, by being proactive about it. Trait EI was positively linked to seeing the situation as an opportunity for personal growth, finding personal meaning in this situation, maintaining an attitude of hope and courage, and acting more responsibly with one’s self and others during the current crisis. In turn, this coping formula was related to lower psychological distress and improved mental health. These results are consistent with the existential positive psychology framework and can inform implementation programs and policies aiming at raising awareness and promoting healthy and successful coping during the pandemic. (shrink)

_Requiem for the Ego_ recounts Freud's last great attempt to 'save' the autonomy of the ego, which drew philosophical criticism from the most prominent philosophers of the period—Adorno, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. Despite their divergent orientations, each contested the ego's capacity to represent mental states through word and symbol to an agent surveying its own cognizance. By discarding the subject-object divide as a model of the mind, they dethroned Freud's depiction of the ego as a conceit of a misleading self-consciousness and (...) a faulty metaphysics. Freud's inquisitors, while employing divergent arguments, found unacknowledged consensus in identifying the core philosophical challenges of defining agency and describing subjectivity. In _Requiem_, Tauber uniquely synthesizes these philosophical attacks against psychoanalysis and, more generally, provides a kaleidoscopic portrait of the major developments in mid-20th century philosophy that prepared the conceptual grounding for postmodernism. (shrink)

Ego Sum proposes a provocative and unprecedented reading of Descartes. By paying attention to mode of presentation of Descartes's philosophy, Nancy challenges our common understanding of the Cogito and shows how Descartes's ego is not the self-certain, self-transparent Subject of metaphysics but a mouth that opens to utter: ego sum.

Shaw explores the concept of the ego and its role in human psychology and philosophy. He discusses different theories of the ego and its relationship to the self and society. This book is a must-read for anyone interested in psychology or philosophy. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly (...) other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The blackhole at the center of consciousness reveals its event horizon in bursts of neon.

Ego sum moribundus, or Heidegger's call -- I am the dead person I see in the mirror, or Lacan's subject -- Return to Descartes -- the equivocations of phenomenology -- The field of immanence -- The carnal synthesis, the chiasm -- How touching touches itself touching : the (im)possibility of the chiasm -- In contact with the untouchable : the remainder -- This is (not) my body : the remainder of incorporation -- Beyond the other -- The crisis of the (...) chiasm -- From hatred to love -- From archi-agony to resurrection -- Toward deliverance (instasy). (shrink)

This article presents two different phenomenological paths leading from ego to alter ego: a Husserlian and a Merleau-Pontian way of thinking. These two phenomenological paths serve to disentangle the conceptual–philosophical underpinning of the mirror neurons system hypothesis, in which both ways of thinking are entwined. A Merleau-Pontian re-reading of the mirror neurons system theory is proposed, in which the characteristics of mirror neurons are effectively used in the explanation of action understanding and imitation. This proposal uncovers the remaining necessary presupposition (...) of a minimalized version of the Husserlian concept of pairing and its recent and improved version in terms of the intermodal system. This leads to a layered approach to the constitution of intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, a new Cold War is being waged in our societies. During the Cold War a theoretical model of man was developed by economists and the military, an egotistical being interested only in his own benefit and in duping his opponents to achieve his ends: a modern homo oeconomicus. After his career in the Cold War ended, he was not scrapped but adapted to the needs of the twenty-first century. He became the (...) ringmaster of a new era of information capitalism. He sought to read, control and influence thoughts; to predict, price and eliminate risks. Today stock-market trading is guided by him. He uses computer algorithms and Big Data to build up detailed pictures of our preferences and then suggest and sell goods to us. The model has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We are no longer the masters of our own fate. The Game of Life runs without us. Schirrmacher traces the progress of this extreme rationalization of social life from the Cold War games of the 1950s Rand Corporation to the stock-market trading techniques that brought about the financial crash of 2008, showing how these developments were interwoven with the rise of game theory, rational choice theory and neoliberal economics. The state and politics increasingly submitted themselves to the logic of computerized game theory and an economistic view of the world, evading real decision-making in the process. In this brave new world individuals, alone in front of their computers, may think they are constructing a reality of their own choosing, but in fact they are being manipulated all along by others who are setting the rules of the game. This international bestseller by one of Germanys most distinguished journalists is a powerful indictment of a way of thinking that has become pervasive and threatens to undermine not only parliaments and constitutions but also the sovereignty of the individual to be the person he or she wants to be. (shrink)

La phénoménologie, après avoir dénoncé avec Husserl et Heidegger le contresens fatal qui aurait conduit Descartes à ne voir dans l’ego qu’une simple et banale « chose » pensante, conçue sur le modèle et à l’imitation de la choséité spatio-temporelle – celle qui caractérise la res extensa – s’est vite ravisée : Levinas réhabilite la dignité phénoménologique de la « res cogitans » ; Henry fait du sentir originel et soustrait à l’ekstase de la représentation le mode le plus fondamental (...) de la subjectivité vivante ; Marion réintroduit le moment de la chair sentante au cœur de la démarche métaphysique. L’article présente et discute ces différentes interprétations. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Egosplitting. (...) My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking. (shrink)

Philosopher and scientist Thomas Metzinger argues that neuroscience's picture of the "self" as an emergent phenomenon of our biology and the attendant fact that the "self" can be manipulated--and even controlled--raises novel and serious ...

The paper presents basic Gestalt psychological concepts of ego and self. They differ from other concepts in the way that they do not comprehend ego and self as fixed entities or as central controlling instances of the psyche, but as one specific organized unit in a psychological field in dynamic interrelation with the other organized units—the environment units—of this field. On this theme, well-known representatives of Gestalt theory have presented some general and special theories since the early days of this (...) approach that could partly be substantiated experimentally. They illuminate the relationship between ego and world in everyday life as well as in the case of mental disorders. Not only the spatial extension of the phenomenal ego is subject to situational changes, but also its place in the world, its functional fitting in this world, its internal differentiation, its permeability to the environment, and much more. The German Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Metzger emphasizes the significant functional role that this dynamic plasticity of the phenomenal world and its continuously changing segregation of ego and environment have for human life by designating the phenomenal world as a “Central Steering Mechanism.” In this article, ego and self as part of this field in their interrelation with the total psychological field will be illuminated from the perspective of the thinking of the Gestalt psychologists Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Lewin, Wolfgang Metzger, Mary Henle, Edwin Rausch, and Giuseppe Galli. (shrink)

Ego et communauté. Au contraire de la position défendue par la plupart des interprètes de Husserl qui, au nom de l'intersubjectivité, lui reprochent de suivre une "voie cartésienne" et d'accorder un privilège à l'ego cogito, il s'agit de montrer que cette critique n'est pas fondée : le primat méthodologique de l'ego est au contraire une condition nécessaire pour constituer la communauté intersubjective, et éviter de subordonner l'individualité vivante à une "transcendance" anonyme. L'enjeu est de comprendre la crise des temps modernes (...) comme celle d'un monde aliéné qui s'est fondé sur l'oubli de la vie, mais aussi sur le déni du pouvoir constituant de l'ego et la répression de toute subjectivité."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The publication of Freud's essay on narcissism in 1914 set off a discussion about the psychoanalytic concepts of the ego and of narcissism. The author reviews this discussion by reference to articles appearing in the Int. Z. ärztl. Psa. between 1914 and 1922. She highlights the theoretical and technical modifications corresponding to this discussion and demonstrates that apparently modern theories of the ego and of narcissism have their roots largely in that period.

It has been hypothesized that our believing that, or its seeming to us as though, the world is in some way dynamical partially explains (and perhaps rationalizes) future-bias. Recent work has, in turn, found a correlation between future-bias and near-bias, suggesting that there is a common explanation for both. Call the claim that what partially explains our being both future- and near-biased is our believing/it seeming to us as though the world is dynamical, the dynamical explanation. We empirically test two (...) versions of the dynamical explanation. The first is the moving ego explanation—according to which it is our belief that the ego moves, or our phenomenology as of the ego moving, that jointly (partially) explains future- and near-bias. The second is the moving time explanation—according to which it is our belief that time robustly passes, or our phenomenology as of robust passage, which jointly (partially) explain future- and near-bias. We found no evidence in favour of either explanation. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Ego-splitting. (...) My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking. (shrink)

À partir de l’indécision apparente du concept de substance dans le corpus cartésien, on formule l’hypothèse que le « traité de la substance » des Principia I peut jeter une lumière sur les Meditationes (§ 1) ; en effet les Principia I développent deux définitions de la substance, tantôt comme chose existante par soi, tantôt comme support des attributs (§ 2) ; or ces deux définitions correspondent exactement aux deux lieux des Meditationes mobilisant la substance : la Meditatio III recourt (...) à la substance des Principia I, 51, et la Meditatio VI recourt à la substance des Principia I, 52 (§ 3). On en déduit que le cogito de la Meditatio II ne saurait remonter de l’attribut principal à la substance suivant la logique de Principia I, 52 (§ 4) et que l’ ego, alors entendu selon Principia I, 51, ne pouvait que perdre sa substantialité dès l’instant que se trouvait exhibée sa dépendance envers Dieu, à la fin de la Meditatio III (§ 5). Dès lors, les Principia nous paraissent trancher des indécisions cartésiennes avec une certaine efficacité (§ 6). (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

The starting point of the investigation is the correspondence between the term and concept of Ego ("I") and the various types of experience. Two main ways of introducing and applying of the term "I" (Ego) in Russian philosophy are investigated from the semantic-analytical point of view. The first takes the Ego as initially existed either as a spiritual substance or a given form uniting experiences. This way of treating is realized in L. Lopatin's and V. Soloviev's philosophical teachings. The second (...) containing some moments of reflexion on the concept treated the Ego as a result of experience. It was developed in M. Karinskij und G. Spet. In context of difference between the Ego and the subject or consciousness the question of the owner of consciousness is considered. (shrink)

Sartre’s conception of “the look” creates an ontological conflict with no real resolution with regard to intersubjective relations. However, through turning to the pages of The Transcendence of the Ego one will be able to begin constructing a rich public ego theory that can outline a dynamic and fruitful notion with regard to interpersonal relations. Such a dynamic plays itself out between the bad faith extremes of believing too much in an all-powerful look on the one hand, as well as (...) believing too much in some deep “I” or persona on the other. Indeed: Through a rigorous analysis of Sartre’s main principles regarding his conception of the ego, we will see that the latter is first and foremost a transcendent object for reflective consciousness; an object, moreover, that gets “magically” reversed into a subject-bearer of states, qualities, and the like, only in a secondary moment. This has the consequence that there is no deep, graspable “I”; but precisely because of this one’s personality is there in the world, to be shared and displayed, discussed and challenged, at every turn. Thus a Sartrean notion of personality involves a matching up of external aspects of ourselves that others in fact know better, with our own interiorities that can nevertheless always be shared through a reflective language that always has the same structural core. (shrink)

This is the first chapter of a projected book to be entitled, The Ego and the Spirit. This book will endeavor to examine what lies at the heart of human spiritual aspiration from a psychological, philosophical, and religious perspective. In this first chapter, I discuss the predicament of the human ego, charged with a task that it cannot fulfill: To establish itself securely within being. The ego's efforts to fulfill this task through its dealings with the things and people of (...) the material world lead to distortions in its self-experience, its relations with others, and its involvement in life in general. The world's spiritual traditions have long recognized the predicament of the ego and present themselves as a means to its resolution. In this first chapter, though, the focus is on the ego and its predicament. (shrink)

My critical focus in this article is on Rick Repetti's compatibilist conception of free will, and his apparent commitment to a Kantian conception of autonomy, which I argue is in direct conflict with the Buddhist doctrine of no‐self. As an alternative, I defend a conception of ego‐less agency that I believe better coheres with core Buddhist teachings. In the course of the argument, I discuss the competing conceptions of free agency and autonomy defended by Harry Frankfurt, John Martin Fischer, Christine (...) Korsgaard, and David Velleman. (shrink)

The subjective effects and therapeutic potential of the shamanic practice of journeying is well known. However, previous research has neglected to provide a comprehensive assessment of the subjective effects of shamanic-like journeying techniques on non-shamans. Shamanic-like techniques are those that demonstrate some similarity to shamanic practices and yet deviate from what may genuinely be considered shamanism. Furthermore, the personality traits that influence individual susceptibility to shamanic-like techniques are unclear. The aim of the present study was, thus, to investigate experimentally the (...) effect of shamanic-like techniques and a personality trait referred to as "ego boundaries" on subjective experience including mood disturbance. Forty-three non-shamans were administered a composite questionnaire consisting of demographic items and a measure of ego boundaries (i.e., the Short Boundary Questionnaire; BQ-Sh). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: listening to monotonous drumming for 15 minutes coupled with one of two sets of journeying instructions; or sitting quietly with eyes closed for 15 minutes. Participants' subjective experience and mood disturbance were retrospectively assessed using the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) and the Profile of Mood States-Short Form, respectively. The results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between conditions with regard to the PCI major dimensions of visual imagery, attention and rationality, and minor dimensions of imagery amount and absorption. However, the shamanic-like conditions were not associated with a major reorganization of the pattern of subjective experience compared to the sitting quietly condition, suggesting that what is typically referred to as an altered state of consciousness effect was not evident. One shamanic-like condition and the BQ-Sh subscales need for order, childlikeness, and sensitivity were statistically significant predictors of total mood disturbance. Implications of the findings for the anthropology of consciousness are also considered. (shrink)

We discuss the structure of Buddhist theory, showing that it is a kind of moral phenomenology directed to the elimination of egoism through the elimination of a sense of self. We then ask whether being raised in a Buddhist culture in which the values of selflessness and the sense of non-self are so deeply embedded transforms one’s sense of who one is, one’s ethical attitudes and one’s attitude towards death, and in particular whether those transformations are consistent with the predictions (...) that Buddhist texts themselves make. We discover that the effects are often significant, but not always expected. (shrink)

Pourquoi donc sommes-nous si accrochés à notre maigre « je »? Pourquoi refusons-nous d'accepter les leçons les plus radicales de la neuroscience ou de la psychologie cognitive à propos de notre « identité » ou de ce que nous aimons à considérer comme notre « libre arbitre »? Quel mal y aurait-il à accepter que nous soyons le résultat de déterminations qui nous dépassent – et que nos choix ne soient que des colifichets ayant pour seule fonction de nous rassurer? (...) Dans Lost Ego, François De Smet répond à toutes ces questions de la meilleure manière qui soit : en mettant le doigt sur les peurs qui continuent à nous voir nous accrocher à des reliques de notre « moi » en miettes et que nous refusons de regarder en face. Non, nous n'existons pas – mais c'est précisément parce que nous n'existons pas que nous pouvons trouver le moyen de vivre. Seuls, et surtout ensemble. (shrink)

La propuesta gnoseológica de Ricardo Sánchez Ortiz de Urbina de retirar al Ego trascendental sus funciones gnoseológicas no es inocua para el materialismo. Tiene consecuencias ontológicas y socio-antropológicas. En esta primera parte se ilustran las primeras, discutiendo las diferencias entre el materialismo filosófico del Gustavo Bueno, tal como aparece formulado en sus textos canónicos, y el materialismo fenomenológico, que propone Urbina a propósito de lo «trascedental». Para ello uso como filtro crítico un tercer materialismo, el de Gilles Deleuze, sobre cuya (...) filosofía nómada sólo se efectúan unos apuntes esquemáticos, pero suficientes para «espantar» a los fantasmas de la razón. La referencia a Deleuze en el debate sobre las consecuencias ontológicas que trae el planteamiento de Urbina es obligada, no sólo por las prevenciones que manifiesta Urbina en su texto «a causa de su radicalidad», sino sobre todo, porque sus propuestas estaban ya presentes (como referencia implícita) en las propias formulaciones iniciales del materialismo filosófico. (shrink)

It is an ancient view, to be found even in Aristotle’s analysis of friendship, that the other is an alter ego, another myself. More recently, this conception has provoked spirited debate within and without the phenomenological tradition. It can be found in a wide variety of texts, from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations to Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?” The basic position can be summarized as follows. Intentional experiences are subjective, first-person experiences, not objective, third-person experiences.

Failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms, one of the hallmarks of referential opacity, is standardly explained in terms of the presence of an expression (such as a verb of propositional attitude, a modal adverb or quotation marks) with opacity-inducing properties. It is thus assumed that any term in a complex expression for which substitutivity fails will be within the scope of an expression of one of these types, and that where there is an expression of one of these types there (...) will be failure of substitutivity for terms within its scope. I shall discuss a series of examples that have been thought to challenge this explanation by exhibiting failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms for positions not within the scope of any of the standard opacity-inducing expressions. If these examples are genuine, then the usual explanations of opacity are either incomplete – because there are sources of opacity other than those standardly identified, or completely mistaken – because the standardly identified expressions are not causes of opacity. I will argue, however, that the examples only exhibit failure of substitutivity of non-coreferential terms, and, hence, do not present a challenge to standard explanations of opacity. (shrink)

L’Ego cartésien entretient des rapports complexes avec l’homme singulier René Descartes – ce qui n’implique aucune confusion entre le « Sujet » et le moi empirique. Dans un premier temps, on montre que la situation propre à Descartes physicien le conduit à poser la question du fondement de la science en des termes très différents de ceux de la philosophie transcendantale. Une relecture des Méditations conduit ensuite à proposer l’idée qu’elles ne constituent pas seulement une recherche du fondement de la (...) science, mais aussi une découverte de soi par le sujet philosophant, qui peut certes être tout homme, mais qui est ici Descartes lui-même. Enfin, l’étude des relations entre la volonté et la passivité qui naît de l’union de l’âme et du corps est mise en regard de l’« autobiographie » du Discours de la Méthode. Ainsi peut-on voir la spécificité de la philosophie cartésienne et son originalité par rapport à la philosophie du Sujet dont elle est pourtant la source. (shrink)

The Transcendence of the Ego may be regarded as a turning-point in the philosophical development of Jean-Paul Sartre. Prior to the writing of this essay, published in France in 1937, Sartre had been intimately acquainted with the phenomenological movement which originated in Germany with Edmund Husserl. It is a fundamental tenet of Husserl, the notion of a transcendent ego, which is here attacked by Sartre. This disagreement with Husserl has great importance for Sartre and facilitated the transition from phenomenology to (...) the doctrine of Being and Nothingness. (shrink)

El presente escrito ensaya la crítica al colonialismo en la filosofía de Enrique Dussel centrándose en tres tópicos relevantes que ayudarán a la explicación y argumentación expuestos: (i) el ego conquiro, sujeto colonial previo al ego cogito cartesiano; (ii) la propuesta del proyecto de pluriverso transmoderno como proyecto de superación de la unilateralidad del mundo colonial, y; (iii) la idea de Segunda Emancipación de América Latina que recuerda que en ella aún hay una deuda pendiente para socavar las relaciones neocoloniales. (...) Este recorrido está precedido por una introducción en la cual se pone un necesario énfasis en la importancia de la experiencia del propio Enrique Dussel en Europa y Medio Oriente durante los años sesenta del siglo pasado, en la cual la recepción de la obra de Leopoldo Zea juega un papel relevante. Finalmente, el escrito termina con un par de reflexiones que se derivan de la argumentación elaborada. (shrink)

O ego e o outro: sobre a crítica de Husserl ao cogito cartesiano.

코기토 철학의 전통에 맞서 자아의 문제를 새롭게 사유하려는 공통된 목적 아래, 레비나스의 침전(hypostase)론과 라깡의 거울단계론은 여러 지점에서 서로 깊이 소통한다. 그럼에도 불구하고 우리가 알기로는 양자의 밀접한 연관성은 이제까지 전혀 조명된 바 없다. 이는 아마도 양자가 서로 다른 학문분과에서 독립적으로 수행되었던 사정 때문일 것이다. 본 논문은 그러한 공백을 메우기 위한 첫 단계의 작업이다. 본 작업이 보여주고자 하는 바, 두 자아론은 자아 발생의 배경을 인간 존재의 근원적 정황에 대한 공통된 이해에 입각하여 조명하고 있으며, 충동에너지의 유동(流動)과 정체(停滯) 및 이 두 위상의 상호 변환을 (...) 추적하는 에너지론의 관점에서 자아 사건을 해명하고 있다. (shrink)

ABSTRACTInitial acts of self-control can reduce effort and performance on subsequent tasks – a phenomenon known as ego depletion. Ego depletion is thought to undermine the capacity or willingness to engage executive control, an important determinant of success for many tasks. We examined whether ego depletion improves performance on a task that favours less executive control: insight problem solving. In two experiments, participants completed an ego-depletion manipulation or a non-depleting control condition followed by an insight problem-solving task. Participants in the (...) depleting condition demonstrated greater insight problem-solving accuracy than those in the non-depleting control condition. Priming theories of willpower did not impact these results. Although ego depletion is widely regarded as a “state of impairment”, attendant decreases in executive control may foster insightful thinking. (shrink)