Modern societies are increasingly becoming multinational and multi-religious. In such a situation, reaching public consensus in modern societies is critical for understanding the further development of the state and society, in particular, in multinational Kazakhstan. The research is aimed at identifying and interpreting approaches to understanding the idea of social consensus in the Western and Eastern traditional philosophical paradigms, represented by some of most influential philosophers. The study also identifies the role and place of traditional Kazakh philosophical thought and the (...) possibility of its application in modern social relations. The strategies of harmony within the philosophical paradigms of the conditional mega-regions of the East and West are determined by a narrow segmentation of philosophical texts. In the course of the study, it is proposed to single out two basic consensus strategies, rational–pragmatic and spiritual–moral, or, in other words: communicative rationality and axiological identity. (shrink)

As unstintingly irreligious as he was, Karl Marx was not an atheist. He was a staunch opponent of supernatural belief, yet neither did he embrace agnosticism as the position of claiming no answer to the question whether or not God exists. Rather, Marx argued that it was incoherent and pointless even to pose that very question. His irreligion is best understood not primarily as an ontological stance on the existence or nonexistence of God, but rather as part and parcel of (...) a philosophical worldview radically committed to sweeping such questions aside, to centering the human perspective ontologically and epistemologically, to overthrowing “all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being,” and to taking as its core principle that “man is the highest being for man.” A “religious worldview” for Marx includes not only the plainly divine, but any perspective that subordinates the value of human beings to a superior entity, operating externally to human beings and imperviously to their influence. I begin by explaining the relationship between Marx's historical materialism and his position on the existence of God. It may seem obvious how irreligion would follow from a philosophical materialist stance. I show that Marx's historical materialist irreligion, however, warrants a closer and more nuanced assessment than we might at first realize. I go on to discuss why Marx's historical materialism leads him to regard questions about the existence of God as fundamentally misguided. I then unpack the meanings of Marx's infamous statement that religion is “the opium of the people.” I conclude with a discussion of Marx's pronouncement that “the criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest being for man,” a teaching that separates mere atheism from radical irreligion. (shrink)

(1997). Refocussing the subject: The anarchopsychological tradition revisited. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 89-106. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.1997.tb00530.x.

Derrida’s deconstruction of Marx was a hegemonic reading of Marx that he always wanted to do but in his own way. Derrida is often quoted saying that “I meant to read Marx my way when the time came.” And when communism fell, in the ruins of Marxism, on the grave of Marxist–Leninist–Stalinism, the time had finally come for Derrida to read Marx, his way, or rather deconstruct Marx, his way. Derrida’s deconstruction of Marx calls for a new reading of Marx. (...) It was a reading of the haunted and the haunting Marx, whose ghosts continue to encounter us in the future that is not present, but also no less spectral than the past. That is, Derrida’s deconstruction of Marx is the return of the ghost that is always spectral. The play of difference between the spirit and the spectral is the différance of Derrida’s deconstruction of Marx. Derrida’s Specters of Marx has been popularly recognized as the long-awaited reading of Marx or Marxist (but not Marxists). The book was the publication of the two lectures that Derrida delivered at the Conference on “Whither Marxism?” organized by the Center for Ideas and Society at the University of California, Riverside, 1993. The paper is an attempt to bring forth the working of deconstruction in Derrida’s reading of Marx as given in his Specters of Marx. (shrink)

Egoism and altruism are unequal contenders in the explanation of human behaviour. While egoism tends to be viewed as natural and unproblematic, altruism has always been treated with suspicion, and it has often been argued that apparent cases of altruistic behaviour might really just be some special form of egoism. The reason for this is that egoism fits into our usual theoretical views of human behaviour in a way that altruism does not. This is true on the biological level, where (...) an evolutionary account seems to favour egoism, as well as on the psychological level, where an account of self-interested motivation is deeply rooted in folk psychology and in the economic model of human behaviour. While altruism has started to receive increasing support in both biological and psychological debates over the last decades, this paper focuses on yet another level, where egoism is still widely taken for granted.Philosophical egoism is the view that, on the ultimate level of intentional explanation, all action is motivated by one of the agent's desires. This view is supported by the standard notion that for a complex of behaviour to be an action, there has to be a way to account for that behaviour in terms of the agent's own pro-attitudes.Psychologicalaltruists, it is claimed, arephilosophicalegoists in that they are motivated by desires that have the other's benefit rather than the agent's own for its ultimate object. This paper casts doubt on this thesis, arguing that empathetic agents act on other people's pro-attitudes in very much the same way as agents usually act on their own, and that while other-directed desires do play an important role in many cases of psychologically altruistic action, they are not necessary in explanations of some of the most basic and most pervasive types of human altruistic behaviour. The paper concludes with the claim that philosophical egoism is really a cultural value rather than a conceptual feature of action. (shrink)

Writers of very different persuasions have relied on arguments about self-ownership; in recent years, it is libertarians who have rested their political theory on self-ownership, but Grotian authoritarianism rested on similar foundations, and, even though it matters a good deal that Hegel did not adopt a full-blown theory of self-ownership, so did Hegel's liberal-conservatism. Whether the high tide of the idea has passed it is hard to say. One testimony to its popularity was the fact that G. A. Cohen for (...) a time thought that the doctrine of self-ownership was so powerful that an egalitarian like himself had to come to terms with it; but he has since changed his mind. I have tackled the topic of self-ownership glancingly elsewhere, but have not hitherto tried to pull together the observations I have made in passing on those occasions. The view I have taken for granted and here defend is that self-ownership is not an illuminating notion—except in contexts that are unattractive to anyone of libertarian tastes. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Marxist theory of the proletariat in many ways projects a romanticized self-description or 'false shadow' of its revolutionary spokesmen, and hence more proximately describes the missionary complex and Bohemian life-style of marginalized political intellectuals than a 'really existing' working class. This 'mistaken iden tity play' between spokespersons and their favourite sociological con stituency, which is already alluded to in various historical left-wing and right-wing 'farewells to the proletariat', is more systematically criti cized in recent reassessments (...) by, for example, Bahro, Gouldner, Gorz, or Bauman. Next to its psychological and sociological infrastructure, classical proletarian standpoint theory has also attracted critical atten tion because of its suggestive epistemological linkage between the con dition of estrangement and claims for scientific objectivity. This connection is reasserted by recent feminist and postcolonial standpoint epistemologies - which, however, also tend to repeat the logic of classi cal Marxism's metonymic 'identity play'. The paper concludes with a defence\of the idea of 'situated knowledges', which wishes to preserve the classical liaison between objectivity, distanciation and marginality, while simultaneously rendering it more reflexive in critical confron tation with the ubiquitous 'spokesperson problem'. (shrink)

The article examines the metaphilosophical conception of Galina Koryavko (1944–2018), doctor of philosophy, professor, an outstanding scholar and teacher, who worked in Samara in the 1990s. Those years were difficult not only for the country but also for Russian philosophy, it was caused by a radical revision of the attitude to Marxist philosophy, which in the Soviet period was considered as the only true philosophical teaching, whereas in the post-Soviet period, Marxism was mostly passed over in silence. This circumstance initiated (...) the search for new, often very far from Marxism, interpretations of the meaning of philosophical activity, the nature of philosophy, its place in the intellectual culture of modern Russia. The practical significance of such studies was determined, first of all, by the fact that under the new conditions it was necessary, in a short time, to qualitatively restructure the teaching of philosophy courses in Russian universities. The metaphilosophical conception of G.E. Koryavko, developed in the late 1980s, was based, like the vast majority of philosophical works of that time, on the Marxist philosophical paradigm, which, in the spiritual atmosphere that has developed in Russia over the past 30 years, expectedly led this conception to almost complete oblivion. This study identifies the strengths of G.E. Koryavko’s interpretation of philosophy and also identifies the controversial points inherent in that interpretation. The goal of the article to reconsider G.E. Koryavko’s conception in order to indicate the directions of strengthening and modernization, to carry out its new reading. The article’s author comes to the conclusion that this conception represented one of the significant and timely attempts to comprehend the conceptual prerequisites of the crisis of public consciousness in the USSR in the 1980s, which implied a a demand for significant modernization of Soviet Marxism, taking into account the latest scientific achievements for that time, the entry of mankind into the post-industrial and information era. Unfortunately, the author of the conception failed to dialectically reconstruct the interpretation of ideology as “false consciousness” (F. Engels), as well as to substantiate the fundamental need for the presence of qualitatively different forms of false consciousness in any historical types of civilizations. (shrink)

Straipsnyje plėtojama apšvietos idealų kritika, pabrėžiamas sąžiningo proto ir objektyvios saviapgaulės ribotumas ir aiškinamos egzistencijos ir nepamatiškumo sąsajos. Objektyvacija, principingumas, nuoseklus sąžiningumas yra apšvietos paskatinti krypsmai, kurie ir šiandien veikia politinius ir institucinius sprendimus ir visuomenės reguliavimą. Straipsnyje polemiškai analizuojami: a) Hegelio samprotavimai apie apšviestą sąžiningą ir nelaimingą protą, objektyvacijos ribotumą, tarnystę abstraktiems principams, kurie išdėstyti „Dvasios fenomenologijoje“; b) Sartre’o diskusija apie sąžiningą, nuoseklią, principingą saviapgaulę ir žmogaus būties kartu su kitais fenomenas, aiškinami kūriniai „Būtis ir Niekis“ ir „Egzistencializmas – (...) tai humanizmas“; c) aptariamas nepamatiškumas kaip egzistencinio apsisprendimo prielaida ir jo sąsajos su politiškumu ir alternatyvų svarstymu. Straipsnyje aptariamas veiklus, integruotas į visuomenę ir įgalinantis žmogus, kuris kartu su kitais nuolatos peržengia objektyvizmo ir principingumo suvaržymus, atveria kelią alternatyviam dialogui, diplomatijai ir politiškumui. Straipsnio tikslas yra aktualizuoti sąžiningo proto ir apšviestosios saviapgaulės kritiką, kuri taikoma dabarties objektyvistinėms nuostatoms ir tariamai pakankamai pagrįstiems socialinio konstruktyvizmo sprendimams. (shrink)

This essay identifies two different methodological strategies used by the proponents of anarchism. In what is termed the "ontological" approach, the rationale for anarchism depends on a particular representation of human nature. That characterization of "being" determines the relation between the individual and the structures of social life. In the alternative approach, the epistemological status of "representation" is challenged, leaving human subjects without stable identities. Without the possibility of stable human representations, the foundations underlying the exercise of institutional power can (...) be challenged. This epistemological discussion is traced from Max Stirner to the twentieth-century movement known as poststructuralism. (shrink)

FOR NIETZSCHE, THERE IS NO TRUTH. WHAT THEN ARE WE TO SAY OF HIS DOCTRINES OF WILL TO POWER AND ETERNAL RECURRENCE WHICH SEEM TO BE HELD AS TRUTHS? THEY TOO ARE ILLUSIONS. BUT, IF SO, HOW CAN ONE HOLD THAT THESE ILLUSIONS ARE TO BE PREFERRED TO OTHER ILLUSIONS? BECAUSE THE HIGHEST STATE IS TO BE THE SOURCE OF ALL VALUE AND MEANING ONESELF WITHOUT RELYING ON AN INDEPENDENT STANDARD OF TRUTH.

In his book The Ego and Its Own Max Stirner describes what happens when individuals subordinate themselves to an absolute or a universal idea in order to reap the associated ‘rewards’. What he calls ‘involuntary’ or ‘unconscious’ egoism are faulty versions of practical reason because they involve alienation, the pursuit of something that can never be attained by the individual. These forms of egoism characterise the rationality of agents who submit themselves to an absolute. However, proper egoism, as understood by (...) Stirner, implies that the self-interested agent is acting in accord with reality, with how the world and the self actually are. Alienation is thereby avoided. In what follows I want to examine whether the proper egoist can remain authentic in this way and still effectively pursue her interests. Given the Stirnerian ontology, with its distinction between proper and other forms of egoism, can the Stirnerian agent engage in a meaningful form of individualism? (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe notion of ideology is related to social and material reality and especially to the processes of social reproduction. Therefore, the analysis of ideology seems to fall into the domain of discourse analysis. The analysis of language and practices of signification in social contexts constitutes the basic triangle of discourse analysis. However, the Marxist concept of ideology always refers to some kind of falsity, that ultimately enables the researcher to not only analyse but also to criticize ideologies. Ideologies are always (...) in some way false, injust or inadequate. It is at this point that discourse analysts usually raise the most serious objections as they understand truth itself as a discursive product, resulting from powerful struggles of domination and exclusion. The present article explores in how far the Marxist notion can be used for the purpose of discourse analysis. It argues that even the notion of falsity as present in classical Marxism can be adapted for understanding and criticizing contemporary ideologies. I start by presenting some common understandings of ideology in the field of Discourse Studies. In a second step I will analyse elements of the notion of ideology in Marx's early writings, especially in the debate with the Young Hegelians and ask what this means for empirical discourse analysis. I will then point towards elements of the critique of ideology in Marx mature ‘political economy’ that could be fruitful for Discourse Studies. Finally, I will try to reconcile a Marxist concept of ideology based ultimately on a notion of falsity with such discourse analytical approaches highly suspicious of the possibility of the existing ‘politics of truth’. We will see that, due to the relation between ideas and material organization in ideologies, the critique of ideologies becomes not only a critique of practices of justifications but turns into a genuine social critique. (shrink)

Postlibertarianism means abandoning defenses of the intrinsic justice of laissez?faire capitalism, the better to investigate whether the systemic consequences of interfering with capitalism are severe enough to justify laissez?faire. Any sound case for laissez?faire is likely to build on postlibertarian research, for the conviction that laissez?faire is intrinsically just rests upon unsound philosophical assumptions. Conversely, these assumptions, if sound, would make empirical studies of capitalism by libertarian scholars superfluous. Moreover, postmodern approaches to ?libertarianism? perpetuate the same assumptions, in the guise (...) of a critique of the rationalist hubris that has supposedly led to the tragedies of the twentieth century. The ?libertarian? and postmodernist critics of postlibertarianism either ignore the assumptions undergirding their views, or they contend that these assumptions are not necessary when ?freedom? and ?morality? are properly defined. The latter contention amounts to an attempt to define the challenge to ?libertarianism? out of existence. (shrink)

This study is inspired by the current debate between the traditional anarchist views, the post-left and post-anarchist understandings of anarchy. It claims that the depictions of anarchy by both sides are primarily negative and develops an original and positive definition of anarchy. In particular, it argues that anarchy is the concept that refers to a way of being with the cosmos and thus instead of being posterior to the political it is in fact prior to it. This is to say, (...) it is neither political nor ontological but can only be seen as metaphysical in the sense of what cannot be spoken of in terms of a primary cause or a founding principle. Methodologically, it follows Martin Heidegger’s understanding of anarchy as an-arché and his idea to look into pre-Socratic, as in non-teleological thought, to define anarchy. But it then adopts Emmanuel Levinas’ approach that anarchy refers to what escapes the thesis- antithesis dialectic. It draws mainly upon Ancient Greek philosophy and literature as this is where anarchy appears as a term for the first time. In particular, it criticizes the Aristotelian ontological and political thought, while it is mainly assisted by the thought of Democritus as the only pre-Socratic whose work escapes ontological thinking. Moreover, the development of a positive definition of anarchy ultimately leads this study to defend the communal nature of traditional anarchism while rejecting its association with the political. (shrink)

The dominant view among academic political philosophers in the English speaking world is that radical political differences, such as those between socialists and non-socialists, are in the last analysis differences of value-judgment, or ‘ideals,’ or ‘principles.’ Few perhaps would now endorse the view of Weldon that the Marxist's espousal of common ownership and the liberal's of private enterprise are ultimate, unarguable principles — as if the entire economic work of Karl Marx or W.S. Jevons could be reduced to sets of (...) changes rung on the themes ‘private enterprise, boo!’ or ‘private enterprise, hurrah!.’ But it is generally assumed that at some point in the argument, value-judgments will be reached, and that it is these that explain the disagreement. (shrink)

The dominant view among academic political philosophers in the English speaking world is that radical political differences, such as those between socialists and non-socialists, are in the last analysis differences of value-judgment, or ‘ideals,’ or ‘principles.’ Few perhaps would now endorse the view of Weldon that the Marxist's espousal of common ownership and the liberal's of private enterprise are ultimate, unarguable principles — as if the entire economic work of Karl Marx or W.S. Jevons could be reduced to sets of (...) changes rung on the themes ‘private enterprise, boo!’ or ‘private enterprise, hurrah!.’ But it is generally assumed that at some point in the argument, value-judgments will be reached, and that it is these that explain the disagreement. (shrink)

Maupassant’s short horror story Horla (1887) contains a treatment of anxiety that can be analyzed in the context of Existentialist philosophy: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Levinas or Cioran all observed the anticipatory trait of this affect. From a psychological point of view, anxiety leads to neurosis and/or psychosis, to the splitting of the principle of identity. This inner duality is famously expressed in the short story’s scene of the “empty mirror”, where the main character fails to see his own reflection. The descent (...) into madness of Horla’s diarist makes us think that he experiences the possession of the monster in terms of radical alterity, something that Cioran has called the not-man. I argue that through the lenses of this category of (psychological and theological) inhumanity we can understand Horla as a Nietzschean evolutionary tale that cautions against the end of mankind as we know it. (shrink)

The following paper is concerned with the description of “agony” at Kierkegaard and Cioran. Taking into consideration that both authors have common traits as marginal philosophers and advocates of a mixture of existentialism and nihilism, I have compared Kierkegaard’s notion of “sickness unto death” (a powerful term, that combines the prestige of several other keywords such as “torture”, “death”, “anxiety” and so on) with Cioran’s description of “agony” from his first Romanian work, On The Heights of Despair. Both Kierkegaard and (...) Cioran, with their emphasis on existential death seem to make a powerful case against Schopenhauer’s equation that pain and death are opposed, therefore imagining damnation to an immanent hell for the modern subject. -/- . (shrink)

There is a constant tension that exists within each individual. This is the struggle between the hidden ideologies and fixed ideas which enslave the individual and the need to rid themselves of them. It is through these that implicit religion forms. We require, in order to counteract this, a new theology, a secular theology – one which emphasizes the individual. In order to bring about a new theology, it is necessary to reconsider the philosophies of Adam Weishaupt, Louis Althusser, and (...) Max Stirner and bring them into the modern discussion of implicit religion. This paper aims to bring together these understudied philosophers as well as contemporary leaders in political theology in order to reimagine the potential of the individual to rid themselves from fixed ideas and to realize their potential. (shrink)

Since 2000, different types of organisations have registered for the UN Global Compact, an essential guide for undertaking socially and environmentally responsible business. As revealed by the UNGC data, enthusiasm in Muslim majority countries for subscribing to the Compact is comparatively much less than in any other parts of the world. Analysing the phenomenon and the possible reasons thereof, this article examines individuals’ economic responsibility in these MMCs in adhering to the principles of the UN Global Compact. The work shows (...) that regime types, economic conditions, economic structures, and civil society conditions seem to have contributed significantly in the UN Global Compact participation by organisations in MMCs. The paper argues that Muslims should fulfil their individual religious obligation by valuing, upholding, and applying the principles of “public interest” in all commercial dealings not awaiting national consent or the organisations’ conformity to the Global Compact. (shrink)