Sin

The Book of Job is often read as the Bible's response to theodicy's 'problem of evil.' As a resolution to the logical difficulties of this problem, however, it is singularly unsatisfying. Job's ethical protest against God is never addressed at the level of the ethical. But suggested in Job's final encounter with God is the possibility of a spiritual resolution beyond the ethical. In this paper I examine the Book of Job as a response to the spiritual problem of despair; (...) despair engendered by the ethical problem of evil. My reading is informed by Kierkegaard's analysis of despair in The Sickness unto Death, and Stephen Mitchell's extraordinary translation of the Book of Job, as well as his insightful commentary. (shrink)

This is the first chapter of a projected book to be entitled, The Ego and the Spirit. This book will endeavor to examine what lies at the heart of human spiritual aspiration from a psychological, philosophical, and religious perspective. In this first chapter, I discuss the predicament of the human ego, charged with a task that it cannot fulfill: To establish itself securely within being. The ego's efforts to fulfill this task through its dealings with the things and people of (...) the material world lead to distortions in its self-experience, its relations with others, and its involvement in life in general. The world's spiritual traditions have long recognized the predicament of the ego and present themselves as a means to its resolution. In this first chapter, though, the focus is on the ego and its predicament. (shrink)

In Section 1, we begin by asking what, exactly, it might mean for God to “elect” people and how this relates to their agency and freedom. After getting clearer on what God is supposed to elect people to or for, we argue against the view that a person’s will is not involved in the process by which God elects her, which we identify in part as the person’s coming to have faith. But, in Section 2, we consider several reasons for (...) thinking that a person’s free will is not involved in her coming to have faith, as well as a potential problem facing this view. Then, in the next three sections (3, 4, and 5) we examine three views on which one’s free will is involved in one’s coming to faith, corresponding roughly to three systematic views of divine providence. We discuss certain objections to each of these “models of election,” as well as how each speaks to the possibility of the non-elect. In the sixth and final section, we conclude by addressing the concern that any such philosophizing about God is too anthropomorphic. (shrink)

Objections to the orthodox doctrine of an eternal hell often rely on arguments that it cannot be a person’s own fault that she ends up in hell. The paper summarizes and addresses three significant arguments which aim to show that it could not be any individual’s fault that they end up in hell. I respond to these objections by showing that those who affirm a classical picture of sin have Moorean reasons to reject these objections. That classical perspective holds that (...) all (serious) sin involves choosing eternal destiny apart from God and that no sin could possibly be caused by God. Consequently, it is necessary for ending up in hell that someone commit a serious sin, and it is sufficient for ending up damned that one persists forever in sin. Since the objections conflict with Moorean commitments central to the classical perspective, those who hold to such a classical perspective on sin would have good reason to reject all these arguments, which involve assumptions that would entail that such a perspective is false. (shrink)

It is a reasonable worry that God would not truly love us and want our salvation if He fixed a definite point after which He will no longer offer us the graces to repent of our sins. I propose that Thomas Aquinas succeeds in showing us that God would not be cruel or arbitrary in setting up a world where embodied agents end up after death in a state where they will inevitably fail to repent of their sins. Aquinas proposes (...) that being disembodied is to be in a state where a person cannot be mistaken about what they want, given that they know themselves perfectly. If the disembodied state were like this, it would not be surprising that being in that state makes repentance impossible, since a soul would become fully integrated around whatever one desired, without any conflicting desires that could prompt repentance. Thus, humans would persist in whatever desires they had at the moment of death and disembodiment. I conclude by arguing that, while this scenario stands in need of fuller theodicy, Aquinas’ scenario is helpful in defending a view that God is not cruel or arbitrary for creating a world in which post-mortem repentance is impossible. (shrink)

It is frequently claimed that an all-loving and good God cannot permit anyone to end up in hell. In this book, the author shows that this issue of God’s permission of hell has an intimate connection with age-old questions regarding why God would permit sin. Indeed, focus on why an all-loving and good God would permit hell is the best lens through which to explain sin. -/- Many arguments against the possibility of hell require affirming that God permits sin because (...) God could not achieve goods for us without allowing sin. The author argues that we have independent philosophical reasons to reject that sin is necessary for us in any way, and, further, we have similar reasons to hold that hell is necessarily possible if the God of classical theism exists. In the end, understanding why an all-loving and good God would permit hell reveals that there is always hope for us, even when things appear most hopeless. -/- The book will appeal to those working in metaphysics, theology, philosophy of religion, and medieval philosophy. (shrink)

Significant attention as been devoted to the problem of ‘divine hiddenness’ proposed by JL Shellenberg. I propose a novel response that involves denying part of the empirical premise in divine hiddenness arguments, which holds that nonresistant nonbelievers are capable of relationship with God. While Plantinga and others in ‘reformed’ epistemology have at times appealed to original sin as an explanation for divine hiddenness, such responses might seem outlandish to many, given the way that many find nonbelievers to be no more (...) or less epistemically or morally blameworthy than believers. Further, such appeals to original sin seem to give a ‘just-so’ story that at least leaves the situation dialectically balanced. I show that a classically Augustinian notion of original sin can provide a sufficient response to those objections, and that appeal to original sin can form an empirically grounded response to the divine hiddenness problem, beyond a simple defense. If the possibility of original sin-type scenarios is compatible with God’s perfect love, then the phenomenon of apparently nonresistant nonbelievers would push us toward considering the possibility that humans have lost those capacities for relationship with God by a Fall-like event in the past. (shrink)

The Christian tradition teaches that some people will suffer eternally in hell. But why? Doesn't an all-powerful God have the ability to prevent this from happening to anyone? Wouldn't a perfectly good and loving God want to prevent it? And doesn't the traditional teaching about hell function as a threat, coercing those who truly believe it? These questions convey the problem of hell, the most disturbing of all theological problems and one of the most difficult to solve. Thinking Through the (...) Problem of Hell is a rigorous yet accessible treatment of the issue. The solution that it develops, called the divine presence model, is that heaven and hell are the various ways that the righteous and the wicked experience the presence of God after the final judgment. In its fully developed form, the divine presence model addresses a whole host of theological issues: the purpose of suffering, the meaning of salvation, the nature of free will and self-deception, and the reason that God remains partially hidden in this life, even to those who earnestly seek Him. This is a book for those who refuse pat, simplistic answers to the hardest questions of the Christian faith. (shrink)

Review of Mercè Prats, Une parole attendue. La circulation des polycopiés de Teilhard de Chardin, préface d’Étienne Fouilloux, Paris, Salvator, 2022, 252 p., 21 €.

The 14th-century Dominican theologian and philosopher Durand of Saint-Pourçain was among the intellectuals who took part in the medieval debate on virginity, especially on the relationship between virginity and marriage. This paper discusses a question of his Sentences Commentary (Super Sent., II, d. 20, q. 2), in which Durand poses the question of “whether or not there would have been a loss of virginity in marriage” (utrum in actu matrimoniali fuisset amissio virginitatis) both in statu innocentiae and in statu post (...) peccatum. This paper shows how Durand’s solution to the problem is in opposition to Augustine’s and Thomas Aquinas’s views, based on formal and material aspects of virginity. (shrink)

An important study that brings together the results of more than 30 years of work on Schelling and Pareyson by one of Italy's leading experts.

I remain unsatisfied by a lack of philosophical clarity among Báñezian authors on the nature of freedom. In a recent paper, I therefore posed a problem for Báñezianism that resembles what is called the “grounding problem” for Molinism: where do the truths about alternative possibilities come from? And I illustrated the problem in the context of the account of grace given by one famous defender of the view, Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, whose work in turn was recently promoted by Taylor Patrick (...) O’Neill. O’Neill responds in this present journal issue to that paper, arguing that I failed to be attentive to distinctions drawn by Garrigou-Lagrange which would resolve the dilemma. However, I fear that O’Neill’s presentation of both the dilemma and his own resolution is conceptually confused. I will try to illustrate that O’Neill’s own responses are at many points either a concession to a certain fork of the dilemma that I posed in the original paper, or change the subject and fail to address my concerns except superficially. However, since at many points O’Neill implies that I reject Báñezianism, despite my explicit qualification in the paper that I do not, I will end by proposing what would constitute a sufficient response to the dilemma. (shrink)

Astronism: the religion of the stars is a technical summary of the Astronist religion and philosophy that uses terminology unique to the Astronists and specialised knowledge of Astronist beliefs. It is the perfect brief introduction to Astronism for those with prior understanding of the academic disciplines of eschatology, soteriology, theology and philosophy as the Astronist view on all of these subject areas and more is provided. Astronism: the religion of the stars attempts to explain the narrative that underlies Astronist beliefs (...) and presents a particular conception of how humans should not only lead their lives but also how we as an entire species should consider our collective future on planet Earth, and more importantly, all beyond. (shrink)

The Astronist Statement on the Situation of the Human Species, often simply referred to as The Astronist Statement, is a non-technical manifesto of the Astronist philosophy and religion, altogether referenced as the Astronist belief system. It provides a summary of the Astronist perspective on the human condition as this pertains to and is influenced by the ultimate goals of Astronism and the purposes it prescribes to human life through its doctrines on transcension, cosmocentrism, suronality and astrosis. The Astronist Statement is (...) made equivalent to other kinds of theological or ideological manifestos in that it outlines the fundamental problems that Astronism sees effecting the human species and presents solutions to these problems identified. The underlying principle of The Astronist Statement and thereby, all Astronism, is that due to the pervading cosmic limitation, human beings both individually and collectively are limited in our capacities to do and be. This means that the human species is inherently though not hopelessly limited which is pinpointed as the underlying reason for all the suffering, evil and wrongdoing in the world. It is the goal of the Astronist religion to extinguish human limitation because in humanity, Astronism sees the potential for transcension meaning that humanity may one day, via our expansion into the astronomical world, transverse the boundaries of cosmic limitation to become unlimited beings possessing total freedom and thereby having also extinguished our woes of suffering and evil. The Astronist Statement conveys this message of humanity's capacity to transverse limitation via the salvific process of transcension, an endeavour that has indeed become the central dogma of the Astronist religion and thereby the central goal and life purpose of all Astronists. (shrink)

This book develops a Thomistic, Christian theodicy, the aim of which is to help us better understand not only why God allows evil, but also how God works to redeem it. In my view, the existence of evil does not generate any intellectual problem that theists must address or solve to vindicate God or the rationality of theism. This is because acknowledging the existence of evil rationally leads to acknowledge the existence of God. However, it is still necessary to understand, (...) using theodicy, how these two facts - the existence of evil and the existence of God - are compatible. And so, in developing my theodicy, I draw on diverse elements of Aquinas's philosophy and theology to build an argument that evil only exists within God's world because God has willed there to be so much good. Moreover, God can and does bring good out of all evil - redeeming it - both cosmically and within the context of our own, individual lives. I engage both contemporary work on the problem of evil and address a broad range of doctrines or topics within Thomistic and Christian thought, including God, creation, providence, original sin, redemption, heaven and hell, and the theological virtues. (shrink)

A number of Christian theologians and philosophers have been critical of overly moralizing approaches to the doctrine of sin, but nearly all Christian thinkers maintain that moral fault is necessary or sufficient for sin to obtain. Call this the “Moral Consensus.” I begin by clarifying the relevance of impurities to the biblical cataloguing of sins. I then present four extensional problems for the Moral Consensus on sin, based on the biblical catalogue of sins: (1) moral over-demandingness, (2) agential unfairness, (3) (...) moral repugnance, and (4) moral atrocity. Next, I survey several partial solutions to these problems, suggested by the recent philosophical literature. Then I evaluate two largely unexplored solutions: (a) genuine sin dilemmas and (b) defeasible sinfulness. I argue that (a) creates more problems than it solves and that, while (b) is well-motivated and solves or eases each of the above problems, (b) leaves many biblical ordinances about sin morally misleading, creating (5) a pedagogical problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that (5) places hefty explanatory burdens on those who would appeal to (b) to resolve the four extensional problems discussed in this paper. So Christian thinkers may need to consider a more radical separation of sin and moral fault. (shrink)

The language of structural sin is most often used to describe sin that inheres in laws, institutions, or social roles—in short, in the objective social architecture of our everyday lives. This article argues that structural sin should also be understood as including a subjective dimension, describing the determinate habits or dispositions instilled by sharing in the life of a particular society. Part of what is structured by structural sin, in other words, is agency itself. The reason that many theologians have (...) resisted this idea is that it seems to undermine the conditions of moral responsibility. If our capacities for knowing and loving the good are always already concretely misshapen, can we rightly be held accountable for what we do? This article argues further that we can, drawing on the work of Judith Butler to sketch a fresh account of personal responsibility in the face of structural sin. (shrink)

An interconnected and interdependent world in the age of globalisation invites Christianity to a different understanding of sin, which has been individualistically understood, because individualistic understanding of sin is impotent to address injustice or oppression caused by collective sins, wherein human beings have been collectively involved in. In order to overcome individualistic understanding of sin, this article is critically engaged in the concepts, such as concrete totality, which sees both individuality and socialness as constitutive parts of human beings, tyranny of (...) collective identity through which oppression and injustice is carried out to unspecified others and retreat from truth to omnipotence, which is a concretised example of tyranny of collective identity in a nation-state building of the United States. Retreat from truth to omnipotence means that the United States covers its blamable history with relation to Native Americans and immigrants and justifies the discrimination and exclusion of others using untrue social, political, hygienic and economic reasons. Retreat from truth to omnipotence is not a temporal aberration but a constant repetition in the US history. To address discrimination and exclusion of others necessitates a new understanding of sin, that is, sin of human beings as concrete totality rather than an exclusively individualistic view of sin.Contribution: The article explores a necessity of emphasizing collective dimension of sin to address injustice and oppression caused by tyranny of collective identity in a globalizing world. It provides a theological foundation for building a welcoming political community to immigrants who have been unjustly discriminated or excluded. (shrink)

In this article I explore the relation between God's absolute governance of the world and ecclesial dominion over other communities in a shared political forum that seeks the greatest good of all. On this question I compare the positions of Colin Gunton, Robert Jenson, and Edward Schillebeeckx as representatives of three distinct political theologies. Whereas Gunton's reservation regarding the participation of the church's politics in divine governance shows excessive deference to human sinfulness, Jenson on the contrary tends to absorb God's (...) Rule into ecclesial politics. Drawing upon Schillebeeckx's Christology, I argue that God's absolute Rule is compatible with ecclesial sovereignty; however, this does not allow for unilateral ecclesial dominion over others, inasmuch as God's Rule is disclosed as forgiveness. (shrink)

The T&T Clark Handbook of Analytic Theology provides theological and philosophical resources that demonstrate analytic theology's unique contribution to the task of theology. Analytic theology is a recent movement at the nexus of theology, biblical studies, and philosophy that marshals resources from the analytic philosophical tradition for constructive theological work. Paying attention to the Christian tradition, the development of doctrine, and solid biblical studies, analytic theology prizes clarity, brevity, and logical rigour in its exposition of Christian teaching. Each contribution in (...) this volume offers an overview of specific doctrinal and dogmatic issues within the Christian tradition and provides a constructive conceptual model for making sense of the doctrine. Additionally, an extensive bibliography serves as a valuable resource for researchers wishing to address issues in theology from an analytic perspective. (shrink)

This essay experiments with Kant’s writings on rational religion distilled through the Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde as canonical confrontations with primal problems of evil. It suggests boundaries between Stevenson’s characters and their occupations comparable to the those conflicted in the Kantian university, namely, law, medicine, theology, and philosophy (which makes a short anticipatory appearance in his earlier text on rational religion). With various faculties it investigates diffuse comprehensions—respectively, legal crime, biogenetic transmission, and original sin—of key ethical (...) modes: will, inheritance, incorporation, freedom, duty, obligation, love, living, and killing to conclude on the possible logic of evil (or evils of logic) collateral and possibly innate to Kant’s comprehension of radical evil. (shrink)

McCarthy et al.’s proposal gains much of its plausibility by relying on a superficial treatment of justice, human dignity, sin, and the common good within the Christian tradition. Upon closer inspection of what these terms mean within the context of Christianity, it becomes clear that despite using the same phrases (e.g., a commitment to “protecting vulnerable populations,” the goal of “promoting justice,” etc.) contemporary secular bioethical goals are often deeply at odds with goals of Christian bioethics. So, while the authors (...) are right that there is room for dialogue (and even agreement) concerning general moral principles, the process of specification and application of these principles will often be heavily influenced by competing ethical traditions. Such divergent influences will often frustrate cooperative ventures between secular and religious bioethical projects. Thus, when put into action, McCarthy et al.’s proposal will—at best—produce a divided kingdom; one that cannot hope to stand. (shrink)

Drawing on centuries of wisdom from the Christian ethical tradition, this book takes readers on a journey of self-examination, exploring why our hearts are captivated by glittery but false substitutes for true human goodness and happiness. The first edition sold 35,000 copies and was a C. S. Lewis Book Prize award winner. Now updated and revised throughout, the second edition includes a new chapter on grace and growth through the spiritual disciplines. Questions for discussion and study are included at the (...) end of each chapter. Contents 1. Why Study the Vices? 2. Gifts from the Desert: The Origins and History of the Vices Tradition 3. Vainglory: Image Is Everything 4. Envy: Feeling Bitter When Others Have It Better 5. Sloth (Acedia): Resistance to the Demands of Love 6. Avarice: Possession and Mastery 7. Wrath: Holy Emotion or Hellish Passion? 8. Gluttony: Feeding Your Face and Starving Your Heart 9. Lust: Sexuality Stripped Down 10. The Rest of the Journey: Self-Examination, the Seven Capital Vices, and Spiritual Formation Epilogue Index. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the four elements—universal sinfulness, natural sinfulness, inherited sinfulness, and Adamic sinfulness—of the doctrine of original sin in both the Reformed confessions, with particular attention to the Canons of Dort, and the Council of Trent’s definitive teaching on Original Sin. I give particular attention to the question regarding how all men are implicated in the sin of Adam. Realism and federalism will be analyzed as answers to this question. Even if a theological account is given that (...) justifies the claim that God may justly impute Adam’s sin to his posterity, that still leaves unanswered the question of unconditional negative reprobation, also called, preterition (praeteritio), namely, that God passes over some and not others. Does preterition jeopardize the Church’s call to evangelization? That question will need to be reconsidered briefly, and in conclusion, in light of the doctrine of divine election and its implications for the preaching and hence proclamation of the gospel. (shrink)

Catholic theologians after Trent saw the Protestant teaching about the remnants of original sin in the justified as one of the ‘chief ’ errors of Protestant soteriology. Martin Luther, John Calvin, Martin Chemnitz, and many Protestant theologians believed that a view of concupiscence as sinful, strictly speaking, did away with any reliance on good works. This conviction also clarified the Christian’s dependence on the imputed righteousness of Christ. Catholic theologians condemned this position as detracting from the work of Christ who (...) takes away the sins of the world. The rejection of this teaching—and the affirmation of Trent’s statement that original sin is taken away and that the justified at baptism is without stain or ‘immaculate’ before God—is essential for understanding Catholic opposition to Protestant soteriology. Two Spanish Dominican Thomists, Domingo de Soto and Bartolomé de Medina, rejected the Protestant teaching on imputation in part because of its connection with the view on the remnants of original sin in the justified. Adrian and Peter van Walenburch, brothers who served as auxiliary bishops of Cologne in the second half of the seventeenth century, argued that the Protestants of their time now agreed with the Catholic Church on a number of soteriological points. They also drew upon some of their post–Tridentine predecessors to offer a Catholic account of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. Nonetheless, the issue of sin in the justified remained a point of serious controversy. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the question whether God intends that sin occur. We clarify the question, consider some of the answers given in the Christian tradition, and give a careful commentary on a few especially telling passages from the Christian Scriptures. We consider two philosophically informed interpretative strategies, one derived from the work of Frances Kamm, the other from Reformed scholasticism, against our interpretation of these passages. While we concede that in other passages such interpretations may allow a way (...) of escaping our argument, we conclude that in the case of the telling passages we have selected there is simply no comparably plausible alternative interpretation. (shrink)

Theological attention to the Catholic doctrine of original sin has a history that extends from the letters of Saint Paul through the Council of Trent and Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical, Humani generis. The doctrine has traditionally been articulated through the Genesis narrative of Adam and Eve as the first human beings from whom all others descend, an account known as monogenism. In the course of the nineteenth century, scientific research into human origins increasingly relied upon polygenism, the descent of humanity (...) from non-human ancestors through a transitional population. Subsequent Catholic engagement with evolution included resistance to polygenism from the Vatican due to a perceived conflict with the doctrine of original sin. Humani generis included a prohibition that remains in place today in spite of widespread de facto acceptance of polygenism among theologians. Understanding the origin and persistence of this disparity stands to benefit from comparison to a corresponding ambivalence toward the sixteenth century Copernican hypothesis of a moving earth, only conclusively resolved in 1992. In Part I of this essay I introduce this historical comparison and describe the origins of monogenism and polygenism terminology in nineteenth century debate over the unity of the human race. I then describe the conceptual changes that transpired during the first half of the twentieth century and the resulting role of polygenism in the nouvelle théologie of the decade prior to Humani generis. Subsequent developments and implications follow in Part II. (shrink)

Is original sin compatible with evolution? Many today believe the answer is 'No'. Engaging Aquinas's revolutionary account of the doctrine, Daniel W. Houck argues that there is not necessarily a conflict between this Christian teaching and mainstream biology. He draws on neglected texts outside the Summa Theologiae to show that Aquinas focused on humanity's loss of friendship with God - not the corruption of nature. Aquinas's account is theologically attractive in its own right. Houck proposes, moreover, a new Thomist view (...) of original sin that is consonant with evolution. This account is developed in dialogue with biblical scholarship on Jewish hamartiology and salient modern thinkers, and it is systematically connected to debates over nature, grace, the desire for God, and justification. In addition, the book canvasses a number of neglected premodern approaches to original sin, including those of Anselm, Abelard, and Lombard. (shrink)

Communities of faith are not perfect and the readings this week invite us to deal with the reality of sin in ways that lead to positive change grounded in our mutual responsibility to and for each other.

Many people wonder as they look at their newborn child about how this perfect child can be marked by original sin. This invites us to look more deeply at our understanding of human nature and our capacity to make choices that can give life to ourselves and others, or take life and diminish it. While we have tended to identify the sin of the first couple as some sort of sexual sin, this is not supported by the text of Genesis. (...) The original sin is one of seeking knowledge, of overstepping the boundaries established by God, and grasping what is not ours. We are created in God's image, but that does not mean being equal to God-clearly not. God intimately and lovingly breathed life into the creature of the earth, but being so richly blessed is sadly not enough. The story is a complex one that leaves the reader wondering why God places the tree of the knowledge of good and evil right in the midst of the garden, where the first couple cannot avoid seeing it and continually have to confront the boundary that God has set. The role of the serpent prompts questions that will remain unanswered about how God allows the serpent to exist in the first place, let alone endanger the peace and tranquillity of the garden. (shrink)

Critiques of transhumanism from Christian theologians and philosophers often focus on the movement’s disdain for the human body. These criticisms are expressed in a number of different ways. Some argue that the transhumanists’ disdain is a new form of Gnosticism, while others argue that it leads to real violence against real human bodies. When such criticisms turn to identify the particular sin of which transhumanism is guilty, they sometimes identify vainglory as the besetting sin, but more often than not pride (...) is the sin named. After all, what is transhumanism – with its various proposals for bringing about the posthuman, which is some future being with capabilities so far beyond the human so as to border on godlike – but the latest iteration of the primal sin of humans wanting to become God on their own terms? -/- While such criticisms are valid, they do not capture the depth of transhumanism’s offense from a Christian perspective. Pride and vanity are indeed two of the deadly sins of transhumanism, but there are others at play as well. Moreover, pride is the root of all sin, so saying that pride is the problem is not necessarily helpful. We must find the particular ways in which pride manifests itself. I will argue that the sin of acedia (sometimes spelled accidie), found in ancient lists of the deadly sins, is a primary sin of transhumanism. In so doing, I hope to contribute to a more complete diagnosis of the transhumanist project from a Christian perspective, and I hope to further show why transhumanism is at odds with Christianity, contra the claims of the Christian Transhumanist Association. It should also be stated up front that this article may raise more questions than it answers. Accordingly, it should be seen as an invitation for further research, not as a definitive assessment of acedia in transhumanism. (shrink)

According to the Book of Common Prayer, we have sinned against God “in thought, word, and deed.” In this paper I’ll explore one way of understanding what it might mean to sin against God in thought—the idea that we can at least potentially wrong God by what we believe. I will be interested in the philosophical tenability of this idea, and particularly in its potential consequences for the epistemology of religious belief and the problem of evil.

It might be objected to penal substitutionary theories that punishing Christ could not possibly meet the demands of divine retributive justice. For punishing another person for my crimes would not serve to remove my guilt. The Anglo-American system of justice, in fact, does countenance and even endorse cases in which a substitute satisfies the demands of retributive justice. Moreover, Christ’s being divinely and voluntarily appointed to act not merely as our substitute but as our representative enables him to serve as (...) our proxy before God, so that when he is punished, we are punished, to the satisfaction of divine justice. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer a vindication of pride. I start by presenting the Christian condemnation of pride as the cardinal sin. I subsequently examine Mandeville’s line of argument whereby pride is beneficial to society, although remaining a vice for the individual. Finally, I focus on, and endorse, the analysis of pride formulated by Hume, for whom pride qualifies instead as a virtue. This is because pride not only contributes to making society flourish but also stabilizes the virtuous agent by (...) creating a virtuous circle between our desire for self-appraisal and our aspiration to act morally. I conclude by underscoring the (virtuous) connection between pride and modesty, concomitantly arguing that humility should be discarded as vicious. (shrink)

Recent archival research has uncovered material that usefully explains why the French Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was required to remain in China for so long, despite assenting to the Six Propositions. However, the context in Rome, existing narrative evidence, and aspects of the archival evidence make it more likely than not that the Holy Office had a role in his silencing. Proposition 4 advocated monogenism, whereas Teilhard was developing a monophyletic understanding of human origins, which is consistent with recent (...) attempts to situate Adam and Eve within an evolutionary account of these. The content of Proposition 4 exceeded existing magisterial teaching and requiring Teilhard's subscription to it suppressed legitimate theological debate. (shrink)

Although Indic perspectives toward nature are now well documented, climate engineering discussions seem to still lack the views from Indic or other non‐Western sources. In this article, I will apply some of the Hindu and Jain concepts such as karma, nonviolence (Ahiṃsā ), humility (Vinaya ), and renunciation (Saṃnyāsa ) to analyze the two primary climate geoengineering strategies of solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR). I suggest that Indic philosophical and religious traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and (...) Jainism offer ethical concepts to call for humility in all acts of climate engineering leading to a favoring of CDR over SRM and a favoring of lifestyle changes (particularly vegetarianism) over both. I demonstrate these concepts by introducing the five great elements from the Hindu philosophy, two Hindu legends from Hindu mythology, the Indic ethical ideas of karma, renunciation, and humility, and the moral authority of Gandhi. (shrink)

Between 1924 and 1937, the Jesuit Curia in Rome repeatedly placed restrictions on what Jesuit priest‐paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was allowed to write on those aspects of human origins that, in the view of the Curia, had theological as well as scientific aspects. In 2018, David Grumett and Paul Bentley published an account of the first of those restrictions, together with a previously undiscovered document associated with that restriction. This article corrects a relatively important error in their historical narrative, (...) offers an alternative to their comments about the case, and concludes by embedding the events of 1924–1925 in a slightly larger history of Teilhard's relations with the Jesuit Curia and with the Holy Office. That larger narrative shows that, while Grumett and Bentley's account was mistaken about the involvement of the Holy Office in the case they discuss, it was not wrong about the concerns of that Congregation in questions of human origins. (shrink)