(2013). Autonomy and the Normativity Question: Framing Considerations. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2012.727014.

Skeptical theism seeks to defend theism against the problem of evil by invoking putatively reasonable skepticism concerning human epistemic limitations in order to establish that we have no epistemological basis from which to judge that apparently gratuitous evils are not in fact justified by morally sufficient reasons beyond our ken. This paper contributes to the set of distinctively practical criticisms of skeptical theism by arguing that religious believers who accept skeptical theism and take its practical implications seriously will be forced (...) into a position of paralysis or "aporia" when faced with a wide set of morally significant situations. It is argued that this consequence speaks strongly against the acceptance of skeptical theism insofar as such moral "aporia" is inconsistent with religious moral teaching and practice. In addition, a variety of arguments designed to show that accepting skeptical theism does not lead to this consequence are considered, and shown to be deficient. (shrink)

In recent years skeptical theism has gained currency amongst theists as a way to escape the problem of evil by invoking putatively reasonable skepticism concerning our ability to know that instances of apparently gratuitous evil are unredeemed by morally sufficient reasons known to God alone. After explicating skeptical theism through the work of Stephen Wykstra and William Alston, I present a cumulative-case argument designed to show that skeptical theism cannot be accepted by theists insofar as it crucially undermines epistemic license (...) to the very theism it is invoked to defend. I also argue that attempts to defend a theism-friendly moderate version of skeptical theism either fail to halt the spread of damaging skepticism, or lack philosophical validity. (shrink)

This collection of new essays examines philosophical issues at the intersection of feminism and autonomy studies. Are autonomy and independence useful goals for women and subordinate persons? Is autonomy possible in contexts of social subordination? Is the pursuit of desires that issue from patriarchal norms consistent with autonomous agency? How do emotions and caring relate to autonomous deliberation? Contributors to this collection answer these questions and others, advancing central debates in autonomy theory by examining basic components, normative commitments, and applications (...) of conceptions of autonomy. Several chapters look at the conditions necessary for autonomous agency and at the role that values and norms -- such as independence, equality, inclusivity, self-respect, care and femininity -- play in feminist theories of autonomy. Whereas some contributing authors focus on dimensions of autonomy that are internal to the mind -- such as deliberative reflection, desires, cares, emotions, self-identities and feelings of self-worth -- several authors address social conditions and practices that support or stifle autonomous agency, often answering questions of practical import. These include such questions as: What type of gender socialization best supports autonomous agency and feminist goals? When does adapting to severely oppressive circumstances, such as those in human trafficking, turn into a loss of autonomy? How are ideals of autonomy affected by capitalism? and How do conceptions of autonomy inform issues in bioethics, such as end-of-life decisions, or rights to bodily self-determination? (shrink)

I argue that acting autonomously is often a far more difficult achievement than much of the recent literature on this topic would suggest. Several of the most influential autonomy achievement theories have low achievement thresholds, and there are conceptual and empirical reasons to hold that autonomy achievement ought to be viewed as having much higher thresholds in general. I consider and rebut a variety of reasons for keeping the autonomy achievement threshold low, and conclude with a brief word on the (...) normative implications of my thesis. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for what I call ‘the inherency thesis’: the thesis that an autonomous choice that succeeds in expressing an agent’s authentic identity is inherently prudentially valuable for the choosing agent. I argue that this is the case because autonomous choice is a vehicle for the expression of authentic identity, the satisfaction of which is intrinsically prudentially valuable. Moreover, I argue that no such inherent relation exists between fulfilled autonomous choice and the exemplification of moral, aesthetic or (...) perfectionist value. These conclusions suggest that accounts of the normativity of personal autonomy should focus on the notion that the demand to respect personal autonomy is grounded on the demand to promote the prudential value – and hence well-being – of others. (shrink)

Mark Piper introduces the best-known and perhaps most powerful of all the arguments against the existence of God.

It is often claimed that adultery can be morally permissible in cases where those engaged in adulterous behavior are part of an open marriage. Yet this only follows if the institution of open marriage itself can be justified. This problem has been generally overlooked, but it deserves attention, as it is far from evident that open marriage has sterling moral credentials. I argue that the most promising general justification of the institution of open marriage is not based on consequentialist or (...) aretaic principles, but rather on the principle of respect for autonomy. Yet while this principle justifies the institution of open marriage in the most general sense, it does not justify every case of adultery involving an open marriage. Whether a given case of adultery is rendered morally permissible by the presence of an open marriage will depend on whether the open marriage in question satisfies several other moral desiderata. (shrink)

Well-being is said to concern what is good for persons. But the words ‘good for’ are indeterminate enough to support the worry that philosophers working on well-being might not be quarreling over the same conceptual territory. To allay these worries, it would be helpful to provide an analysis of prudential goodness that is substantive enough to coordinate disagreement about and adjudicate between competing theories of well-being, and yet not so substantive that it begs any important questions at the normative level. (...) The present paper is a sustained attempt to locate such a general characterization. My results are largely negative, although I conclude by cautiously supporting the idea that progress in well-being discussions requires employing more specific, stipulative characterizations of well-being rather than attempting to use a highly general characterization as a touchstone for well-being theorization. (shrink)

This paper concerns the question of whether any normative commitments necessarily accompany autonomous agency. Substantive theories claim that they do; content-neutral theories deny this. In this paper I argue that it is possible to defend a substantive account without arguing in favor of any particular normative commitments that must accompany autonomous agency. A proper appreciation of what it means for an account to be normatively substantive, coupled with an understanding of what is involved in any putatively content-neutral account of autonomy, (...) implies that all content-neutral autonomy accounts necessarily involve substantive normative commitments, in at least one important sense. On almost all accounts, the development of autonomy requires an agent to satisfy certain conditions and master certain skills. Yet it would not be possible to satisfy the conditions or master those skills unless the agent possesses, or at least possessed, normative commitments to ways of life that render their development possible. (shrink)

J. David Velleman has argued that what it makes sense to care about out of love for someone is the unimpeded realisation of her autonomy. Although Velleman refers to both Kantian and perfectionist notions of autonomy, a close look at his argument shows that the form of autonomy that he employs actually amounts instead to personal autonomy. I argue that there are in fact no value constraints on the objects of autonomous choice on this account of autonomy. The upshot of (...) this claim is that a person may exercise personal autonomy without satisfying many other important normative demands. This suggests that Velleman’s endorsement of the unimpeded realisation of one’s beloved’s autonomy is wrong, insofar as a beloved’s autonomous choice may, in securing her personal interests, thwart her achievement of important goods, especially moral goods. In such cases, we have reason to hinder the unimpeded realisation of our beloved’s autonomy, precisely out of love for her. (shrink)

Thrasymachus' variegated pronouncements on the nature of justice in Book I of the Republic have generated considerable dispute concerning whether those claims are consistent, and about what sorts of theoretical commitments those claims involve, if they are in fact consistent. After clarifying Thrasymachus' position and explaining how it generates charges of inconsistency, I argue that the charges dissolve if we approach the text with the proper conception of just action, as being synonymous with adherence to the norms that proscribe taking (...) advantage of others by fraud or force. A major virtue of this solution is that it allows us to give equal weight to virtually all of Thrasymachus' claims without being forced to isolate one as Thrasymachus' 'true' position as against his other 'merely apparent' positions. After completing my argument, I provide speculation as to why Plato might have been motivated to intentionally present Thrasymachus' position in a way so generative of consistency disputes. (shrink)

This chapter contains an overview of contemporary work on well-being and its importance for ethics.

In this article I argue that although Daniel Dennett is right to hold that moral conversation-stoppers are practically helpful, there are also moral and philosophical benefits to be gained from developing a habit of being suspicious of them.Export citation.

A bit of fiction: the long-lost epilogue to Plato's Republic focused on the Myth of Er.

In this paper I present criticism of Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian naturalistic virtue ethics as elaborated in her book On Virtue Ethics. I argue that her theory is vulnerable to the charge of partially collapsing into a form of consequentialism that falls prey to a powerful objection to that theory: the problem of instrumentally successful action (or, in Hursthouse’s case, the problem of instrumentally successful vice). I consider several possible responses from Hursthouse, and argue that they are inadequate. As a result, (...) Hursthouse must either accept the likelihood that highly morally counterintuitive traits can, for some persons or circumstances, be virtues; or she must defend the implausible notions that human nature and flourishing are more or less invariable. As both of these options are undesirable, it may be best to reject Hursthouse’s form of neo-Aristotelianism altogether. (shrink)

At present, the activity of justifying oneself is mostly discussed in psychology, where it is typically viewed as a negative or at least regrettable activity involving changing one’s attitudes, beliefs, and feelings in order to minimize psychological threats arising from cognitive dissonance. Yet there is conceptual space, even a need, for an analysis of justifying oneself that is more content-neutral in nature. In this paper I provide such an analysis. Along the way I also briefly canvass some of the empirical (...) work on self-justification in psychology and gesture towards issues surrounding the normative significance of the practice of justifying oneself. (shrink)

A reconstruction of Kant's argument for why autonomy deserves respect.

An examination, in dialogue form, of one of the core weaknesses of the design argument for God's existence.

A critical review of Chapter 79 of T. Irwin, The Development of Ethics.

In this paper I introduce, elaborate, and defend a new form of ethical reasoning instruction. The pedagogy, which I have titled mass-audience interactive narrative ethical reasoning instruction, is an initiative designed to teach ethical reasoning effectively on a broad scale over an extended period of time. The hope is that such a program, if duly supported, will help to ensure the widest possible engagement, and high levels of retention, in an institution-level program of ethical reasoning.

My concern in this paper is with subjective theories of well-being. My goal is to unpack the two leading subjective theories of well-being – informed desire satisfaction accounts and experiential accounts – and to argue that experiential theories should have pride of place. In the course of the paper I also respond to the Experience Machine objection, which is widely taken to be one of the strongest arguments against experiential accounts of well-being. Importantly, I am not claiming that experiential theories (...) of well-being are the best theories of well-being all things considered. My thesis is more modest: if one is attracted to well-being subjectivism, there are good reasons to consider experiential theories superior to informed desire satisfaction theories. (shrink)

A popular justification of education for autonomy is that autonomy possession has intrinsic prudential value. Communitarians have argued, however, that although autonomy may be a core element of a well-lived life in liberal societies, it cannot claim such a prudential pedigree in traditional societies in which the conception of a good life is intimately tied to the acceptance of a pre-established worldview. In this paper I examine a recent attempt made by Ishtiyaque Haji and Stefaan Cuypers to respond to this (...) challenge by reestablishing the intrinsic prudential value of autonomy, and I argue that although their work has merit in some respects, it suffers from a notable theoretical deficiency as well as a practical deficiency. Like Haji and Cuypers, I wish to argue that autonomy has intrinsic prudential value; but my argument is not grounded on the claim that autonomy is a necessary part of well-being. I argue, rather, that it stands to reason—and that liberals and traditionalists alike have reason to accept—that autonomous assent to a conception of the good life is an intrinsically prudentially better state of affairs than nonautonomous assent to the same. My goal in this essay, then, is to clarify the prudential significance of (and to provide a justification for) education for autonomy in a manner that will be appealing to liberals and traditionalists alike. (shrink)

A critical review of Anne Margaret Baxley's book, Kant's Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy.

The Humean conception of the self consists in the belief-desire model of motivation and the utility-maximizing model of rationality. This conception has dominated Western thought in philosophy and the social sciences ever since Hobbes’ initial formulation in Leviathan and Hume’s elaboration in the Treatise of Human Nature. Bentham, Freud, Ramsey, Skinner, Allais, von Neumann and Morgenstern and others have added further refinements that have brought it to a high degree of formal sophistication. Late twentieth century moral philosophers such as Rawls, (...) Brandt, Frankfurt, Nagel and Williams have taken it for granted, and have made use of it to supply metaethical foundations for a wide variety of normative moral theories. But the Humean conception of the self also leads to seemingly insoluble problems about moral motivation, rational final ends, and moral justification. Can it be made to work? (shrink)

Hume's Reception in Early America: Expanded Edition brings together the original American responses to one of Britain's greatest men of letters, David Hume. Now available as a single volume paperback, this new edition includes updated further readings suggestions and dozens of additional primary sources gathered together in a completely new concluding section. From complete pamphlets and booklets, to poems, reviews, and letters, to extracts from newspapers, religious magazines and literary and political journals, this book's contents come from a wide variety (...) of sources published in colonial America and the early United States between 1758 and 1850. As well as classics by Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, it contains scores of unknown and hard-to-locate items, many of which have not been reprinted since their original publication. These responses are divided into four parts covering Hume's Essays; his Philosophical Writings; his History of England; and his Character and Death. Each of those parts has a separate introductory essay, and every selection is introduced by a short headnote that sets the piece in its historical context and provides bibliographical references. Packed with new insights into Hume and American thought and culture, Hume's Reception in Early America reveals the relevance and impact of Hume on American political, philosophical, historical, religious, and aesthetic debates. (shrink)

Prologue, invitation to thinking about God In the Hebrew Bible? -- Part I, questions about God? -- Why does God in the Bible have a body? -- What do God's body parts in the Bible mean? -- Why is God angry in the Bible? -- Does God in the Bible have gender or sexuality? -- Part II, questions about God in the world? -- What can creation tell us about God? -- Who-or what-is the Satan? -- Why do people suffer (...) according to the Hebrew Bible? -- Epilogue, God in the Bible and beyond. (shrink)

I wish to defend the claim that given the content and structure of any moral theory we are likely to find palatable, there is no way of uniquely breaking down that theory into either consequentialist or deontological elements. Indeed, once we examine the actual structure of any such theory more closely, we see that it can be classified in either way arbitrarily. Hence if we ignore the metaethical pronouncements often made by adherents of the consequentialist-deontological distinction, we are quickly led (...) to the conclusion that this distinction contributes nothing of consequence to an understanding of moral theory. I will try to show that there are basically two reasons for this. First, what we mean by the terms endemic to the consequentialist-deontological distinction have no unique references to particular states of affairs in actual cases of moral decision making. Hence we may justify any such concrete moral decision by reference to typically consequentialist or deontological reasoning indifferently. Second, scrutiny of actual and viable moral theories reveals a much finer-grained structure than the consequentialist-deontological taxonomy can capture. And it is this structure, rather than simple attention to consequences or principles, that determines practical moral decision making. We would thus do better to develop the richer vocabulary of causes and constituents, goals and effects, states and events (mental, social, or physical). So in the end, the consequentialist-deontological distinction is irrelevant at the normative level of actual moral reasoning, whereas at the metaethical level it crudely schematizes two opposing types of dummy theory, neither of which is convincing, upon reflection, to any practicing moral philosopher. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Post-truth, understood as a turn from collective sense and judgment to nonpublic forms of epistemic justification, is a distinctly rhetorical problem. This article offers, in response, a theorization of knowledge making as the means by which affective and material impingements upon bodies become publicly legible and rhetorically available. For this, the author turns, perhaps unexpectedly, to John Locke. Locke’s works offer the foundations of an empirical theory of rhetoric that embraces the sensible realm not as a conduit to reality (...) but as a space where social connection becomes possible. Locke engages this realm through natural historical inquiry. Tracing this inquiry to his commonplacing practices, the author presents the rhetorical-dialectical topics as a basis for the shared sense and judgment that he pursued and that post-truth demands. The topics, this article argues, guide and enlarge the senses, forming objects of knowledge with which to sustain public life—objects about which plural truths are possible. (shrink)

This paper offers a new way to make sense of disagreement expansion from a polylogical perspective by incorporating various places in addition to players and positions into the analysis. The concepts build on prior implicit ideas about disagreement space by suggesting how to more fully account for argumentative context, and its construction, in large-scale complex controversies. As a basis for our polylogical analysis, we use a New York Times news story reporting on an oil train explosion—a significant point in the (...) broader controversy over producing oil and gas via hydraulic fracturing. (shrink)

Im Zentrum des Bandes steht die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang von Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie im Kontext der mittelalterlichen Rezeption der Texte des Aristoteles an Hof und Universitäten, insbesondere der für die Epistemologie einschlägigen Passagen in "De anima" und in den "Zweiten Analytiken" sowie ihre spätantike und arabische Vermittlung. In diesem komplexen Rezeptions- und vor allem Transformationsprozeß werden zugleich die wissenschaftlichen und gesellschaftlich-institutionellen Grundlagen für den okzidentalen Prozeß der Rationalisierung und Aufklärung gelegt, deren "Dialektik" nicht nur die Geschichte Europas bis zum (...) heutigen Tag bestimmt. (shrink)

A specific issue for argumentation theory is whether information and communication technologies play any role in governing argument — that is, as parties engage in practical activities across space and time via ICTs, does technology matter for the interplay of argumentative content and process in managing disagreement? The case made here is that technologies do matter because they are not merely conduits of communication but have a role in the pragmatics of communication and argumentation. In particular, ICTs should be recognized (...) as communication-information services that are delegated degrees of responsibility for managing disagreements arising from practical activities. These services are organized around practical theories for designing disagreement space. However, recognizing this relationship between argument and technology requires accounting for procedures, techniques, or rules and speech acts that are not argumentative propositions in any strict sense but that are consequential for what becomes argumentation in any setting. An account about designing disagreement space, grounded in Jackson and Jacobs’s theory of Disagreement Management, is put forward to address these issues while more generally contributing to understanding argument in context. (shrink)

It is time to bring the rich resources of these traditions into the contemporary debate about the nature of self. This volume is the first of its kind.

A book review of Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). I will pass over her compelling critiques of cost-benefit analysis, rational desire theory, and "consequentialist" moral theories, among many topics she dispatches successfully, with fierce intelligence and wit. Instead I want to focus on the central justificatory strategy that underpins her defense of her pluralist, nonconsequentialist, rational attitude theory of value. Anderson states at the outset that she is not that interested in such (...) metaethical questions as whether value judgments express beliefs or emotions or other attitudes (p. xiii). But I think her own answers to these questions might have implications for normative and pragmatic issues of concern to her. So I want to try tinkering with the metaethical arguments in ways that might streamline her treatment of the normative and pragmatic ones somewhat. (shrink)