For and against moral conversation-stoppers

Think 17 (50):39-50 (2018)
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Abstract

In this article I argue that although Daniel Dennett is right to hold that moral conversation-stoppers are practically helpful, there are also moral and philosophical benefits to be gained from developing a habit of being suspicious of them.Export citation.

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Mark Piper
James Madison University

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