Nous nous inscrivons dans une culture, nous sommes les heritiers de multiples traditions. Le romantisme qui a su remettre la tradition a l'honneur, aussi bien que les Lumieres avec leur mefiance - allant jusqu'au refus - vis-a-vis de toute tradition, sont pour nous de telles traditions. Nous devons nous rapporter a nos traditions en Aufklarer, les soumettre a l'examen critique, mais nous devons savoir egalement que l'elucidation de la tradition ne peut se resoudre dans la pure maitrise de la critique, (...) qu'elle est reflexion a partir d'une appartenance. (shrink)

Featuring nine new articles chosen by coeditor Steven M. Cahn, the third edition of E. D. Klemke's The Meaning of Life offers twenty-two insightful selections that explore this fascinating topic. The essays are primarily by philosophers but also include materials from literary figures and religious thinkers. As in previous editions, the readings are organized around three themes. In Part I the articles defend the view that without faith in God, life has no meaning or purpose. In Part II the selections (...) oppose this claim, defending instead a nontheistic, humanistic alternative--that life can have meaning even in the absence of theistic commitment. In Part III the contributors ask whether the question of the meaning of life is itself meaningful. The third edition adds substantial essays by Moritz Schlick, Joel Feinberg, and John Kekes as well as selections from the writings of Louis P. Pojman, Emil L. Fackenheim, Robert Nozick, Susan Wolf, and Steven M. Cahn. The only anthology of its kind, The Meaning of Life: A Reader, Third Edition, is ideal for courses in introduction to philosophy, human nature, and the meaning of life. It also offers general readers an accessible and stimulating introduction to the subject. (shrink)

Ineffability, method, and ontology, by G. Bergmann.--The glory and the misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein, by G. Bergmann.--Stenius on the Tractatus, by G. Bergmann.--Naming and saying, by W. Sellars.--The ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, by E. D. Klemke.--Material properties in the Tractatus, by H. Hochberg.--Wittgenstein's pantheism: a new light on the ontology of the Tractatus, by N. Garver.--Science and metaphysics: a Wittgensteinian interpretation, by H. Petrie.--Wittgenstein on private languages, by C. L. Hardin.--Wittgenstein on private language, by N. Garver.--Wittgenstein and private languages, by (...) W. Todd.--The private-language argument, by H.-N. Castañeda.--Wittgenstein on privacy, by J. W. Cook.--"Forms of life" in Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations, by J. F. M. Hunter.--Privacy and language, by M. S. Gram.--On language games and forms of life, by F. Zabeeh.--Wittgenstein on meaning and use, by J. F. M. Hunter.--Wittgenstein on phenomenalism, skepticism, and criteria, by A. Oldenquist.--Tractarian reflections on saying and showing, by D. W. Stampe.--Wittgenstein and logical necessity, by B. Stroud.--Negation and generality, by H. Hochberg.--Facts, possibilities, and essences in the Tractatus, by H. Hochberg.--Arithmetic and propositional form in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, by H. Hochberg.--Selected bibliography (p. 543-546). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:305 HUME, HENRY MORE AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT This paper is a contribution to research on the sources of Hume's statement of the design argument, whose analysis is the great subject of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. My surmise is that Hume's statement is probably his own. It is not a direct quotation from any source, but more 2 likely a fabrication drawn from several sources which presents the strongest (...) statement Hume could devise. My aim here is to demonstrate that one of Hume's sources is the works of Henry More (16141687 ). By a comparison of their language I mean to show the extent to which Hume drew on More for his formulation of the design argument. One of More's works, Divine Dialogues (1688), could have been Hume's modern example for treating the design 4 argument in a dialogue. It could have given Hume pointers for the organization, tone and characters of his own Dialogues. On a large view, the whole of Pialogues Concerning Natural Religion, with their artful match of position and counter-position, can be seen as a statement of the design argument. But on a close view, we can distinguish specific elements in Hume's statement; and for three of these elements we can show a close parallelism between Hume and More. The elements in Hume's statement to be considered here are.· (1)Cleanthes' introduction of the design argument in Part II, paragraph 5; (P 143) (2)"instances of design" offered by Cleanthes; (D 154, 185) and 306 (3) completing Hume's exposition of the design argument, Parts X and XI of the Dialogues, with their questions about the implications of human misery and the ill-workings of the world for the wisdom and benevolence of the universe maker (D 193-213). In addition to parallelisms between Hume and More at these points, there are a few straws in the wind that are worthy of mention. To pave the way for these comparisons, let me set out More's statements of the design argument. There are three of them. (1) More's first statement of the design argument occurs in An Antidote against Athéisme, (1652). The second of this work's three books is devoted to the design argument. Here is one of the earliest statements of the design argument in English; and it may be its first statement in an English work that is philosophical, rather than devotional or theological, and intended to convince solely on the basis of reasonable arguments. More sets out of the argument in three parts. First, there is the introductory remark: "...I would have my atheist walk with me awhile in the wide theater of this outward world, and diligently to attend to those many and most manifest marks and signs that I shall point to in this outward frame of things, that naturally signify unto us that there is a God" (AA 37-38). The 'walk' covers the next sixty pages, wherein More lists feature after feature of the world that he finds to instance divine design. At the end of this extensive catalogue, More then draws his conclusion: Wherefore the whole creation in general and every part thereof being so ordered as if the most exquisite reason and knowledge had contrived 307 them, it is natural to conclude that all this is the work of a wise God, as at first sight to acknowledge that those inscribed urns and coins digged out of the earth were not the products of unknowing nature, but the artifice of man (AA 97). (2)More's second statement of the design 7 argument is in The Immortality of the Soul (1659). More establishes to his satisfaction that matter is in motion, because "...when God created it, he D superadded an impress of Motion upon it...." That conclusion paves the way for the following paragraph: We have discovered out of the simple phenomenon of motion, the necessity of the existence of some incorporeal essence distinct from matter: but there is a further assurance of this truth, from the consideration of the order and admirable effect of this motion in the world. Suppose matter could move itself, would mere... (shrink)

The ArgumentMany inventors, engineers, and scientists think in verbal images. Elmer Sperry (1860–1930), a noted American inventor, was able to “operate” in his mind's eye the machines he was developing. For inventors, engineers, and experimental scientists, visualization is often followed by construction of a physical model of the invention, which can be an experimental apparatus. The model, or apparatus, is then tested in increasingly complex environments and changes are made in the physical artifact until it is ready to be (...) used. Examples of this process of development are Sperry's development of a ship stabilizer for the U.S. Navy and a revolving mirror to be used by Albert Michelson in the determination of the speed of light. Thomas Edison called experimentation his development of an invention through the building and testing of a series of models. So, both scientists and inventors experiment. They are not discovering the “secrets of nature”: they are observing how artifacts – their physical creations – behave. These physical models of thought reflect the characteristics of the tools with which they were made. They are socially constructed, as well. (shrink)

The requirement of gauge invariance for the Schwinger-DeWitt equations, interpreted as a manifestly covariant quantum theory for the evolution of a system in spacetime, implies the existence of a five-dimensional pre-Maxwell field on the manifold of spacetime and “proper time” τ. The Maxwell theory is contained in this theory; integration of the field equations over τ restores the Maxwell equations with the usual interpretation of the sources. Following Schwinger's techniques, we study the Green's functions for the five-dimensional hyperbolic field (...) equations for both signatures ± [corresponding to O(4, 1) or O(3, 2) symmetry of the field equations] of the proper time derivative. The classification of the Green's functions follows that of the four-dimensional theory for “massive” fields, for which the “mass” squared may be positive or negative, respectively. The Green's functions for the five-dimensional field are then given by the Fourier transform over the “mass” parameter. We derive the Green's functions corresponding to the principal part ΔP and the homogeneous function Δ 1 ; all of the Green's functions can be expressed in terms of these, as for the usual field equations with definite mass. In the O(3, 2) case, the principal part function has support for x2⩾τ2, corresponding to spacelike propagation, as well as along the light cone x2=0 (for τ=0). There can be no transmission ofinformation in spacelike directions, with this propagator, since the Maxwell field, obtained by integration over τ, does not contain this component of the support. Measurements are characterized by such an integration. The spacelike field therefore can dynamically establish spacelike correlations. (shrink)

This popular reader has been vastly updated with ten stimulating new selections on the natural and the social sciences: feminism; postmodernism, relativism, and science; confirmation, acceptance, and theory; explanatory unification; and science and values. Retaining the best essays from the previous editions, the editors have added important new pieces to maintain this influential text's relevance.

Kenneth Kipnis (2006) presents a normative defense of strict confidentiality, but it follows from an empirical claim that allowing breach would result in all parties being worse off, including, par...

Finding the heart of God -- Finding God's heart -- Have you seen God's face? -- Why does God sing? -- Searching God's mind -- When God is silent -- Did you know God thinks about you? -- God has unique plans for every unsaved person -- God remembers no longer -- Did you know God reads and writes? -- The unknowable of God -- God whispers -- DoesGod have a nose? -- Wax in God's ears -- God loves to (...) provide for our needs -- God's eyes see all -- What God hates -- God heals protectively -- A laughing God -- A tired Jesus -- What angers God? -- God is love -- The holiness of God -- God is good -- God is person -- God is the all-powerful God -- God is all-knowing -- God is everywhere present -- God is spirit -- God does not change -- The Trinity three in one. (shrink)

This book is an examination of the philosophy of G.E. Moore, one of the foremost Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of the twentieth century. It focuses on Moore's epistemological writings and aims to present an exhaustive overview of Moore's work on analytic epistemology. This book seeks to redress an imbalance in analytic philosophy by making a case for the relevance of analytically oriented historical studies to contemporary problems.