¿Fue realmente la necesidad de responder a los retos del escepticismo –y, en concreto, del escepticismo de Montaigne– lo que incitó a Descartes a formular el argumento del cogito? Este artículo defiende una respuesta negativa, pues no fue la herencia del escepticismo sino la del estoicismo clásico, también revitalizado en el Renacimiento, lo que fue determinante en el surgimiento del internalismo epistémico moderno.Palabras claves: Montaigne, Descartes, Epicteto, escepticismo, estocismo, internalismo epistémico moderno.Was Descartes’ Cogito argument an answer to the challenges of (...) Scepticism and, in particular, to Montaigne’s version of it? This paper claims that the answer to this question should be negative, since it was not the influence of Scepticism, but the one of classic Stoicism –a trend that was also retrieved in the Renaissance– the one that had the main role in the rise of modern epistemic internalism.Keywords: Montaigne, Descartes, Epictetus, Scepticism, Stoicism, modern epistemic internalism. (shrink)

Es preciso practicar una cierta arqueología para encontrar, tras el texto de los Ensayos , los vestigios de un poderoso esfuerzo: aquel que realizó su autor para transformar los textos de otros en lenguaje acerca de sí. La obra de Montaigne surge así a partir de lo ajeno, atraviesa los caminos del yo, y vuelve a encontrar al otro en la figura del lector.It's necessary to practice some kind of archeology in the text of the Essays, to find the signs (...) of a powerful effort: the one that its author took to transform other's text in language about himself. Montaigne's work emerges from the others and crosses the way of the self, to meet again the other as a reader. (shrink)

BackgroundScientific literature on posttraumatic growth after terrorist attacks has primarily focused on persons who had not been directly exposed to terrorist attacks or persons who had been directly exposed to them, but who were assessed few months or years after the attacks.MethodsWe examined long-term PTG in 210 adults directly exposed to terrorist attacks in Spain a mean of 29.6 years after the attacks. The participants had been injured by a terrorist attack or were first-degree relatives of people who had been (...) killed or injured by a terrorist attack. They completed diagnostic measures of emotional disorders and measures of PTSD and depression symptomatology, optimism, and PTG.ResultsMultiple regression analyses revealed gender differences and a positive linear relationship between PTG and cumulative trauma after the terrorist attack. Some PTG dimensions were significantly associated with PTSD symptomatology, these associations being linear, not curvilinear. However, PTG was not associated with depression symptomatology, diagnosis of emotional disorders, age, elapsed time since the attack, or optimism. In comparison with survivors assessed 18 years after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Spanish victims of terrorism showed higher levels of appreciation of life, but lower levels of relating to others and spiritual change.ConclusionThe findings underscore the influence of gender on PTG and provide support to the hypothesis that some emotional distress may be a necessary condition of PTG. Future studies on PTG after terrorist attacks should take into consideration the characteristics of the terrorist attack itself and the contexts of violence and threat in which it occurred. The political, social, and cultural characteristics of the community affected by it and the profile and characteristics of other traumatic events suffered after the attack should also be taken into account in further research. (shrink)

We may succeed in the fulfillment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallelism between practical and epistemic rationality, building (...) on Williamson’s (2002) suggestion that we should commence with successful performances as the foundation for both domains, be it action or knowledge. By highlighting the limitations of higher-order regulative approaches in epistemology, exemplified by Sosa (2007, 2011, 2015, 2021), the paper introduces a form of teleological epistemic constitutivism inspired by Velleman (2000, 2009). The proposal is that epistemic ownership is not attained in the mere pursuit of truth or knowledge, but requires furthermore a struggle to understand what we know. (shrink)

Speech Acts, Criteria and Intentions What makes a speech act a speech act? Which are its necessary and sufficient conditions? I claim in this paper that we cannot find an answer to those questions in Austin's doctrine of the infelicities, since some infelicities take place in fully committing speech acts, whereas others prevent the utterance from being considered as a speech act at all. With this qualification in mind, I argue against the idea that intentions—considered as mental states accomplishing a (...) causal role in the performance of the act—should be considered among the necessary conditions of speech acts. I would thus like to deny a merely ‘symptomatic’ account of intentions, according to which we could never make anything but fallible hypotheses about the effective occurrence of any speech act. I propose an alternative ‘criterial’ account of the role of intentions in speech acts theory, and analyse Austin's and Searle's approaches in the light of this Wittgensteinian concept. Whether we consider, with Austin, that speech acts ‘imply’ mental states or, with Searle, that they ‘express’ them, we could only make sense of this idea if we considered utterances as criteria for intentions, and not as alleged behavioural effects of hidden mental causes. (shrink)

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge-how and knowledge-that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge-how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge-how is in fact resilient to being undermined by (...) the very kinds of traditional (propositional) epistemic defeaters which clearly defeat the items of propositional knowledge which intellectualists identify with knowledge-how. Second, we aim to fill an important lacuna in the contemporary debate, which is to develop an alternative way in which epistemic defeat for knowledge-how could be modelled within an anti-intellectualist framework. (shrink)

Knowledge, like other things of value, can be faked. According to Hawley (2011), know-how is harder to fake than knowledge-that, given that merely apparent propositional knowledge is in general more resilient to our attempts at successful detection than are corresponding attempts to fake know-how. While Hawley’s reasoning for a kind of detection resilience asymmetry between know-how and know-that looks initially plausible, it should ultimately be resisted. In showing why, we outline different ways in which know-how can be faked even when (...) a given performance is successful; and in doing so, we distinguish how know-how can be faked (no less than know-that) via upstream and downstream indicators of its presence, and within each of these categories, we’ll distinguish (in connection with detection resilience) both faking symptoms and (various kinds of) criteria. The unappreciated resilience of faked knowledge-how to successful detection highlights a largely overlooked dimension of social-epistemic risk – risk we face not just in our capacity as recipients of testimony, but in our capacity as both (would-be) apprentices and clients of knowledge-how. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe ‘Scientific Culture at Enterprises’ project aims to identify the different factors that characterize the image of science held by entrepreneurs and business managers, explore the relationships among these factors, and shed light on the role they play in defining this image and ultimately in developing a culture of science in the business sector. This article is based on the results of the SCe 2016 survey with a specially designed telephone survey questionnaire of a representative sample of Spanish companies. The (...) novelty of our approach lies in the application of a model developed in the fields of Social Studies of Science and Public Understanding of Science to the business sector, in order to obtain information on the dispositions of perception, interest, knowledge and action and their relationships with science and innovation in the business sector in Spain. Using the PIKA model of the image of science, we found this image in the business sector to be shaped by entrepreneurs... (shrink)

Ernesto Sosa tiene el mérito de haber sido pionero en lo que podría describirse, quizás sin demasiada exageración, como un cambio de paradigma en la epistemología contemporánea: el que supuso el tránsito desde una epistemología centrada en el problema de la estructura de la justificación hasta una nueva concepción del conocimiento enfocada en la naturaleza del agente epistémico. Un aspecto de este cambio que conviene no tratar con negligencia es el cambio de las analogías fundamentales, que pasaron de ser arquitectónicas (...) a ser deportivas o prácticas, entre las que destaca la analogía del arquero. Nuestro objetivo en este capítulo es describir someramente dicho cambio para apuntar dos sentidos en los que creemos que la propuesta de Sosa podría «deslimitarse», es decir, desprenderse de límites que él mismo ha impuesto a su planteamiento. Un primer límite está relacionado con la dimensión temporal de la gnoseología (que, a diferencia de la ética de la creencia, habría de adoptar, según Sosa, un planteamiento esencialmente instantáneo o sincrónico). Un segundo límite es relativo a la identidad del agente epistémico, en la medida en que el planteamiento de Sosa parece asumir un enfoque individualista de difícil aplicación en casos de agentes colectivos. Sostendremos que ambos límites aparecen si mantenemos la analogía del arquero con el agente de conocimiento, al ser la suya una actividad instantánea y radicalmente individual. Si en su lugar adoptamos otras analogías para la acción epistémica, como las que aquí proponemos, salta a la vista que la sincronía y la individualidad son limitaciones contingentes para una epistemología de virtudes télica. En nuestra opinión, el abandono de esos dos límites podría abrir nuevos y prometedores horizontes para la epistemología social. (shrink)

According to robust versions of virtue epistemology, the reason why knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck is that justified true beliefs must be achieved by the agent . In a recent set of papers, Pritchard has challenged these sorts of views, advancing different arguments against them. I confront one of them here, which is constructed upon scenarios affected by environmental luck, such as the fake barn cases. My objection to Pritchard differs from those offered until now by Carter (...) , Jarvis or Littlejohn in that it is based on the claim that cognitive performances may not be properly considered as achievements beyond the scope of the agent’s intentional action—an idea that confers more explanatory power on my argument, and contributes to stregthening links between knowledge and agency. (shrink)

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard’s views are introduced in section 1, the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard’s model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non‐occurrence (...) of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation’s past, considering it the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation’s future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event. (shrink)

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still (...) need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined. (shrink)

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still (...) need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined. (shrink)

The questions ‘Do I know p?’ and ‘shall I take p as a reason to act?’ seem to belong to different domains — or so claims Ernest Sosa in his Judgment and Agency, the latest version of his virtue epistemology. According to Sosa, we may formulate the first question in a purely epistemological way — a matter of knowledge “full stop” —, while the second one is necessarily intruded by pragmatic factors — a matter of “actionable knowledge”. Both should be (...) answered, in his view, considering the reliability of my belief, but the former could be faced in total abstraction from my personal practical concerns. In this paper I dispute Sosa’s view, and claim that no purely epistemic level of knowledge “full stop” is conceivable, at least within a reliabilist framework. A case is put forward in order to show that some given belief may not be considered as reliable by itself, as a token, but always as a member of a type, belonging to some class of reference of other beliefs. And the relevant class of reference may only be chosen considering personal practical interests. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle famously denied that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, a thesis that has been contested by so-called “intellectualists.” I begin by proposing a rearrangement of some of the concepts of this debate, and then I focus on Jason Stanley’s reading of Ryle’s position. I show that Ryle has been seriously misconstrued in this discussion, and then revise Ryle’s original arguments in order to show that the confrontation between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists may not be as insurmountable as it seems, (...) at least in the case of Stanley, given that both contenders are motivated by their discontent with a conception of intelligent performances as the effect of intellectual hidden powers detached from practice. (shrink)

Nowadays philosophy is characterized by such heterogeneous intellectual practices that its very unity and coherence seem endangered. What is especially disconcerting is that most authors manage to largely ignore the very existence of methodological positions radically different from their own. Fortunately, there have been exceptions, and the present volume focuses on one of them: the failed debate that took place between John Searle and Jacques Derrida. -/- This book thoroughly analyses that exchange, contextualizing it within the respective philosophical traditions of (...) the two thinkers, with the general aim of turning their dispute into what it was not: a respectful, sensible and fruitful controversy. This episode is thus taken as an opportunity to reflect on the peculiar nature of philosophy as an intellectual practice, and to discuss some of its main themes: language as an instrument for communication, the intentionality of consciousness, and difference as a constitutive element of every text. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said. It specifically targets John Searle’s account of this idea, focussing on his Principle of Expressibility (PE henceforth). In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity (1) and its relevance for the philosophy of language (2), mind (3), society and action (4). In the critical part, the notion of (...) Background is taken into account in order to re-evaluate two basic distinctions: the one between sentence and utterance meanings (5), and the one between native and type speakers (6). PE is reconsidered in the light of the previous arguments as a methodological strategy that does not prevent uses of language from eventual semantic excesses and deficits (7), and a complementary Principle of Expression Fallibility is finally proposed (8). (shrink)

According to the standard view, Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian doubts would be in the origin of Descartes’ radical Sceptical challenges and his cogito argument. Although this paper does not deny this influence, its aim is to reconsider it from a different perspective, by acknowledging that it was not Montaigne’s Scepticism, but his Stoicism, which played the decisive role in the birth of the modern internalist conception of subjectivity. Cartesian need for certitude is to be better understood as an effect of the Stoic (...) model of wisdom, which urges the sage to build an inner space for self-sufficiency and absolute freedom. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said. It specifically targets John Searle's account of this idea, focusing on his Principle of Expressibility . In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity and its relevance for the philosophy of language , mind , society and action . In the critical part, the notion of Background is (...) taken into account in order to re-evaluate two basic distinctions: the one between sentence and utterance meanings , and the one between native and type speakers . PE is reconsidered in the light of the previous arguments as a methodological strategy that does not prevent uses of language from eventual semantic excesses and deficits , and a complementary Principle of Expression Fallibility is finally proposed. (shrink)

Claims of epistemic credit in social context Resumen: En este ensayo explico la propuesta fundamental de Conocimiento expropiado (Broncano 2020) en el marco agencial y fiabilista que asume el autor. A continuación, me centro en su análisis de las situaciones de injusticia testimonial, contraponiendo los caminos seguidos por Miranda Fricker (enfocado en el prejuicio del intercambio testimonial) y Broncano (enfocado en el desajuste estructural). Tras señalar las deficiencias de cada modelo, apunto una propuesta alternativa: la injusticia testimonial se produce cuando (...) la atribución de credibilidad es efecto de un juicio identitario, ya sea este ajustado o no, con respecto al colectivo al que pertenece la testigo. Abstract: In this essay, I explain the main claim of Conocimiento expropiado (Broncano 2020) against the background of the agential and reliabilist framework that its author assumes. I then focus on his analysis of situations of testimonial injustice, opposing Miranda Fricker’s approach (focused on prejudice in testimonial exchanges) and Broncano’s one (focused on structural imbalances). By pointing out the shortcommings of both models, I skech an alternative proposal: testimonial injustice is produced when the credibility assessment results from an identity judgment, whether it is effectively appropriate regarding the collective or not. Palabras clave: Epistemología política, fiabilismo agencial, injusticia testimonial, credibilidad. Keywords: Political Epistemology, agent reliabilism, testimonial injustice, credibility. (shrink)

AbstractAccording to the standard view, Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian doubts would be in the origin of Descartes’ radical Sceptical challenges and his cogito argument. Although this paper does not deny this influence, its aim is to reconsider it from a different perspective, by acknowledging that it was not Montaigne’s Scepticism, but his Stoicism, which played the decisive role in the birth of the modern internalist conception of subjectivity. Cartesian need for certitude is to be better understood as an effect of the Stoic (...) model of wisdom, which urges the sage to build an inner space for self-sufficiency and absolute freedom.KeywordsScepticism, Stoicism, subjectivity, Michel de Montaigne, René DescartesResumenSegún el punto de vista general, las dudas pirronianas de Montaigne se situarían en el origen de los desafíos escépticos radicales del argumento cogito de Descartes. Si bien este artículo no niega tal influencia, nuestro objetivo es reconsiderarla desde una perspectiva diferente mediante el reconocimiento de que no fue el escepticismo de Montaigne sino su estoicismo el que jugó un papel decisivo en el nacimiento del concepto moderno internalista de la subjetividad. La necesidad cartesiana de certeza se entiende mejor como un efecto del modelo estoico de sabiduría, el cual impulsa al sabio a construir un espacio interior para la autosuficiencia y la libertad absoluta.Palabras claveEscepticismo, estoicismo, subjetividad, Michel de Montaigne, René Descartes. (shrink)

Globalisation has given rise to a new field of debate due to the growing mobility of the workers and the consequent cultural diversity inside companies. In this sense, a complex world like ours demands a review of the professional profile which should include the so called intercultural competences as a structuring element of companies’ policy and strategic plan. Subsequently it is suggested that, as the intercultural competences affect the cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects, they actually imply a transformation of the (...) person’s identity. (shrink)

Ante la imposibilidad de alcanzar un análisis reductivo del concepto de mentira, Tobies Grimaltos y Sergi Rosell han propuesto una concepción basada en sus condiciones paradigmáticas, entre las que destaca la de engañar al oyente. La relación entre la mentira y el engaño sería, si bien fundamental para entender los casos prototípicos del concepto, meramente contingente —una tesis que tiene importantes implicaciones para su valoración moral—. Presento aquí su propuesta y avanzo tres objeciones a la misma: primero, que la teoría (...) de la mentira debería de construirse sobre una teoría de la aserción, que ya de por sí delimita lo propiamente dicho en los usos parasitarios del lenguaje (como la metáfora o la ironía). Segundo, que es preciso distinguir los usos de la mentira de sus aspectos constitutivos, entre los cuales destaca la intención de mentir, y no la de engañar. Y tercero, que un modelo paradigmático de la mentira debería de asumir una condición epistémica, y no meramente doxástica, según la cual mentir es, paradigmáticamente, decir algo que uno sabe falso. (shrink)

Después del decreto de expulsión o conversión forzosa de población musulmana en Navarra (1516) apenas contamos con estudios sobre la población morisca en el reino o sobre sus relaciones con otras comunidades moriscas en los territorios fronterizos de Castilla y Aragón. Este artículo se centra en tres etapas del conflicto cristiano-morisco: la primera, la de la conversión o expulsión de los mudéjares (1516), y en especial los problemas derivados de la propiedad de las tierras; la segunda relacionada con la rebelión (...) de las Alpujarras de los moriscos granadinos (1568-1570) y el miedo colectivo que afectó a los pueblos navarros de la frontera con Aragón; y, finalmente, la expulsión general (1609-1614), cuando Navarra fue lugar de paso para los desterrados. (shrink)

Strictly speaking, it is not possible to make psychology of Saint Teresa of Jesus, to study her experience or psychic reality, since we do not have direct access to her as an historical subject. Psychology can, however, legitimately approach her texts and study them through their language, since written texts are intentionally communicative. Cognitive psychology has tools which are suited to this type of analysis. I will examine texts written by Saint Teresa of Jesus as human conduct and (...) as especially suited to psychology as an explicative-causal and comprehensive-intentional science, though I do prefer to look at them as a mix of the two, explicative-comprehensive — a combination of both levels of reality. (shrink)

Las sociedades humanas se estructuran según el principio de la organización holográfica: en ellas, las partes -básicamente, los sujetos que las constituyen- reflejan -y, en cierto modo, son- el todo social en el que habitan. Por esta causa, ese todo es algo más que la suma de sus partes -es una realidad infinitamente reflexiva y, así, autotrascendente. A diferencia de lo que ocurre con los hologramas ópticos o biológicos, el holograma social humano no se configura en el espacio ni en (...) la materia física, sino que tiene como medio propio el ámbito de las conciencias. Se trata de un ámbito transubjetivo, cuya forma peculiar de objetividad es justamente esa transubjetividad. De ahí que la ontología clásica, objetivista, no pueda representarlo. Una intuición adecuada del mismo exige una ontología capaz de capturar el carácter fractal -ontológicamente fracturado- del objeto social. Esta obra explora las bases de esa ontología a través del examen de la competencia social propia de nuestra especie, de la socialidad humana y la compleja estructura modal que la caracteriza. "Por primera vez -que yo sepa- tenemos una propuesta puesta al día de una ontología en sentido fuerte de la socialidad humana... Estamos -creo- ante un hito importante en el desarrollo de las ciencias noológicas» (Jesús Ibáñez). "...una notable incursión en las ideas de clausura organizacional y apertura informacional, y otras nociones similares como autoorganización de la vida y de la evolución social» (Gordon Pask). (shrink)

New Waves in Philosophy, a book collection that stands out for giving a snapshot of research in all areas of philosophy is a successful editorial project addressed by Vincent F. Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard. New Waves in Philosophy of Action is one of its last titles, edited by Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff and Keith Frankish. -/- The book is aimed at the researchers of all fields and readers in general interested in this sub-discipline of philosophy very difficult to (...) localize (is it part of a sub-discipline such as metaphysics or maybe part of the philosophy of mind?). What is and how can we know the nature of intentions and its role in action? (shrink)

La revolución cubana es un proceso en el cual la producción de imágenes es parte fundamental para explicar su desarrollo histórico. A través de una fotografía de Fidel Castro, capturada por el fotorreportero español Enrique Meneses, se muestra la posibilidad de hacer una historia -en apego a la propuesta de John Mraz- con y de fotografías. Dicha representación iconográfica, toma de Fidel Castro en Sierra Maestra en los primeros meses de 1958, y que se integró en la edición de un (...) libro del mismo fotógrafo, ofrece una buena oportunidad para reflexionar sobre los aportes que tiene la iconología en el Circuncaribe, y toda América Latina. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza una fotografía de Fidel Castro que es muy lejana a la etapa épica del guerrillero, pero que forma parte de la iconografía en torno a este personaje. Se trata de un retrato de Fidel a los tres años, tomado en Birán, en 1929, estudiado con el objeto de comprender los intereses y las inten ciones alrededor de su producción, así como los usos actuales de esa misma imagen. Partiendo de la consideración de la fotografía como una práctica (...) social y cultural que integra significados, ella debe ser incorporada en el estudio de la historia como un documento que permite aportar información de sus contextos de producción y reproducción. A partir de estas consideraciones, se pudo observar el significado de la representación iconográfica de Fidel a los tres años, quien fue fotografiado utilizando convenciones que resaltaban las favorables condiciones económicas de las que gozaba la familia Castro Ruz, sin embargo, la investigación revela que se le han añadido significados en sus posteriores usos, producto de intereses políticos en torno a la trayectoria guerrillera de Fidel. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como propósito criticar y reformular la teoría de valores del autor y filósofo argentino Risieri Frondizi. Para ello, se someterán a falsacionismo las tesis según las cuales la cualidad estructural es, primero, estructuralista y no analítica y, segundo, empírica, de acuerdo con la metodología holista de la ciencia. La crítica, así, se desarrollará a partir de los siguientes interrogantes. Inicialmente, ¿el autor acude al holismo o al reduccionismo como enfoques metodológicos de desarrollo? Finalmente, ¿cuál es la (...) distinción lógica entre el valor como cualidad sui géneris y el valor como cualidad estructural? (shrink)

«Fortaleza» y «debilidad» son dos adjetivos que se han utilizado prolijamente en la literatura científica sobre institucionalismo para describir la permanencia o, por el contrario, la porosidad y maleabilidad de las reglas y principios rectores en los que están atrincheradas las instituciones que sobreviven en equilibrio y, por tanto, no son alteradas unilateralmente.

In this article, I focus on the work of the Movement of Victims of State Crimes in Colombia. The work of Movice, I suggest, is an example of how the category of “victim” from international law discourse is adopted and used from below by victims of mass atrocities. I show that, through this category, Movice attempts to introduce an alternative narrative of the internal armed conflict in which the state is a perpetrator of violence against civilian population as part of (...) a practice of elimination of political opposition through violent means. To do this, I focus on three political opportunities in which Movice deployed the category of victim between 2005 and 2016. I suggest that Movice is an example of how a movement of victims can adopt categories of international law to frame their struggles and, in doing so, infuse them with new contents. (shrink)