Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 1 Seiten: 51-74.

Busca-se neste artigo fazer alguns breves apontamentos acerca do conceito de modernidade na obra do pensador dinamarquês Søren Kierkegaard. Com efeito, argumentarei que ainda que tal conceito não esteja presente em sua produção enquanto tal, sua presença, não obstante, se faz sentir de diversas maneiras, o que, por sua vez, faz de sua produção um dos constructos teóricos mais importantes em termos de uma reflexão crítica acerca desse mesmo tema.

De novembro de 1833 a agosto de 1834 foi publicado em fascículos no Reino Unido o Bildungsroman de título Sartor Resartus, o qual, escrito em 1830 pelo pensador e crítico social escocês Thomas Carlyle, profundamente influenciado pelo movimento do romantismo alemão, e mais particularmente por Goethe, do qual era correspondente, buscava atrair os leitores britânicos para a tarefa da formação subjetiva tal qual formulada a partir deste. Neste sentido, busca-se neste artigo abordar as compreensões carlyleanas tanto do processo de autoconhecimento (...) ou formação individual tal qual desenvolvida nessa obra, quanto de sua contrapartida, ou seja, a ideologia da modernidade, uma vez que Sartor Resartus se coloca polemicamente como uma obra em oposição a tal ideologia. Assim, argumentaremos que Sartor Resartus se caracteriza por ser uma obra efetivamente existencialista, uma vez que tem como um de seus temas principais precisamente a existência humana. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt realized through her confrontation with Eichmann in Jerusalem that totalitarian regimes and, in a more general sense, modernity promote “thoughtlessness,” understood as the inability to think from an ethical point of view. As such, I argue that Eichmann’s figure is entirely comprehensible from a Kierkegaardian perspective, inasmuch as Kierkegaard had already comprehended in the mid-nineteenth century that modernity was accountable for the fomenting of “nobodies” characterized precisely by “thoughtlessness.” In this sense, my article seeks to promote an approximation (...) between Kierkegaard’s and Arendt’s works (with special reference to Eichmann in Jerusalem) with the intention of discussing the centrality of the Socratic-Augustinian notions of “conscience” and “individuality” in their conceptions of ethics and politics. In sum, I argue that what links both Kierkegaard’s and Arendt’s thought is a form of “Socratic citizenship.”. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) works have as their starting point, aside from a couple of newspaper articles published around the middle of the decade of the 1830s, a literary review of a novel written by a contemporary of his who was to achieve international fame still in life, viz. the writer Hans Christian Andersen (1805-1875). Notwithstanding, I argue that what was meant to be a literary review hides a vigorous anticipation of a problem that was meant to interest Kierkegaard throughout his (...) entire production, that is, the problem of nihilism. In this sense, the present article is based on a reading of both Andersen’s novel as well as Kierkegaard’s review, which leads me to explore the more profound connotations of Kierkegaard’s critique of the former also in terms of the context these works were produced. In sum, my argument is that both Andersen and Kierkegaard were dealing with the first signs of the arrival of nihilism in Denmark. (shrink)

Resumo: Em 1835, Kierkegaard escrevia que “o que de fato falta para mim é encontrar uma verdade que seja uma verdade para mim, encontrar a ideia pela qual eu viverei e morrerei”. Ora, mais de 50 anos antes Rousseau escrevera que “[s]ua filosofia [a dos filósofos sistemáticos] é para os outros; ser-me-ia necessária uma para mim”. O curioso, porém, é que Kierkegaard desenvolveria sua produção independentemente da de Rousseau, com a qual ele viria a ter contato apenas por volta de (...) 1850, quando a maior parte de seus escritos já havia sido produzida e publicada. Assim, diante de tais coincidências, proponho uma confrontação entre alguns dos principais conceitos existenciais presentes nas obras desses pensadores, com o que pretendo não apenas iluminar os laços existentes entre suas obras, como também reavaliar o papel de proeminência de Rousseau em termos do desenvolvimento da chamada filosofia da existência. Palavras-chave: existência; indivíduo; subjetividade; consciência; sistema; filosofia da existência. (shrink)

O propósito deste artigo é trazer à luz os pressupostos românticos que animam o livro de Hannah Arendt de título Eichmann em Jerusalém. De maneira a fazê-lo, explorarei na parte II a concepção romântico-alemã de “cultura” enquanto formação subjetiva da alma ; após isso, abordarei na parte III determinadas teses de cunho romântico articuladas por diferentes pensadores do século XIX relativas ao processo de massificação e, no seu entender, ao esvaziamento dos indivíduos na modernidade; por fim, na parte IV, a (...) sutil reelaboração arendtiana de várias dessas teses. Argumentarei, portanto, que o conceito romântico de “cultura” opera como premissa central na interpretação que Arendt fez do criminoso nazista Otto Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann, em suma, teria cometido os crimes que cometeu por não ter sido formado, cultivado, como um verdadeiro ser humano. (shrink)

Resumo: Lopes dos Santos, ao colocar o Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus no que denomina “tradição crítica”, mostra que Wittgenstein delimita o alcance da filosofia ao eliminar sua pretensão de ser um tipo de conhecimento que, como a ciência, possa formular proposições verificáveis sobre objetos. E Wittgenstein faz isso de modo distinto da crítica moderna à metafísica, pois elimina o sujeito do problema: não é preciso recorrer a faculdades subjetivas para fazer essa delimitação, mas apenas à linguagem na qual o pensamento se expressa. (...) Por outro lado, na perspectiva da “tradição lógica”, há na mesma obra uma identificação entre a essência do “logos” que pode enunciar algo verdadeiro sobre o ser e do próprio ser do qual se fala nesse discurso. Nosso objetivo é destacar este vínculo com a “tradição lógica” para defender que, para além de uma “virada linguística”, há no Tractatus uma espécie de “metafísica silenciosa” que coloca problemas tais como o do sujeito e o da “essência” do mundo em seu correto lugar após passá-los pelo crivo da crítica. (shrink)

Em O ser e o nada, para que haja o fenômeno, é preciso o concurso de um ser que seja suaprópria descompressão de ser, um ser que, sendo seu próprio nada, faça com que o mundo sefenomenalize enquanto assombrado (hanté) por este nada, em direção a uma totalização que nuncapode se totalizar, pois o fechamento em uma totalidade compacta seria anular a descompressão de serque é abertura do próprio fenômeno enquanto fenômeno. Este movimento de totalização que nunca sepreenche caracteriza a (...) ipseidade do para-si. O fenômeno, quer o consideremos da perspectiva ôntica doque nos aparece no mundo cotidiano ou da perspectiva ontológica dos modos de ser implicados no queaparece, pressupõe a estrutura ontológica da ipseidade. Além disso, a questão do fenômeno em O ser eo nada não se resume a uma questão ontológica, pois, ao interrogar à gênese do fenômeno, Sartrecircunscreve o problema em uma metafísica que indaga sobre o que teria ocorrido para que o em-si,antes do surgimento da realidade-humana, se descomprimisse para tornar-se para-si. A concepção defenômeno como tendo origem no próprio modo de ser do para-si como ipseidade e a passagem entre aontologia e a metafísica marcam a originalidade do modo como Sartre assimila a fenomenologia em Oser e o nada. Com esta leitura, apoiada em Flajoliet e Bento Prado Jr, reforçamos as linhasinterpretativas que exigem o estudo da obra de Sartre em toda sua variedade de expressões, pois estavariedade não está circunscrita apenas na relação entre filosofia e ficção, visto que na própria obrafilosófica de Sartre há “modalidades” distintas de expressões filosóficas como a ontologiafenomenológica e a metafísica que, ao serem atravessadas, tornam mais profunda a compreensão daipseidade. (shrink)

O debate contemporâneo nas teoria das relações internacionais é marcado por duas perspectivas: de um lado a perspectiva do realismo político que concebe a paz como um ideal inacessível e a guerra como meio necessário para a aquisição e manutenção do poder; e de outro lado a perspectiva do normativismo ou idealismo que pensa o fim das relações internacionais para além dos conflitos de interesse e da luta por poder. A primeira perspectiva trata as relações internacionais em nível do ser, (...) a segunda em nível do dever ser. Tendo em vista esse cenário, a nossa ideia neste artigo consiste em abordar o problema da guerra e da paz a partir de um estudo interdisciplinar mediante contribuições do Direito Internacional Público e da Filosofia de Kant. Num primeiro momento analisaremos o paradoxo da guerra, em seguida o papel do Direito Internacional Público para a problemática da paz, e por último as contribuições de Kant para a redefinição normativa do direito internacional a partir do seu projeto republicano da liga de paz. (shrink)

Bd. 1. A-B -- Bd. 2. C-F -- Bd. 3. G-Inn -- Bd. 4. Ins-Loc.

The Simple Counterfactual Analysis (SCA) was once considered the most promising analysis of disposition ascriptions. According to SCA, disposition ascriptions are to be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. In the last few decades, however, SCA has become the target of a battery of counterexamples. In all counterexamples, something seems to be interfering with a certain object’s having or not having a certain disposition thus making the truth-values of the disposition ascription and of its associated counterfactual come apart. Intuitively, however, (...) it would seem that, if all interferences were absent, the disposition ascription and its associated conditional would have the same truth-value. Although this idea may seem obvious, it is far from obvious how to implement it. In fact, it has become widely assumed that the content of qualifying ceteris paribus clauses (such as ‘if all interferences were absent’) cannot be specified in a clear and non-circular manner. In this paper, I will argue that this assumption is wrong. I will develop an analysis of disposition ascriptions, the Interference-Free Counterfactual Analysis, which relies on a clear and non-circular definition of the notion of interference and avoids the standard counterexamples to SCA while vindicating the intuition that disposition ascriptions and counterfactual conditionals are intimately related. (Please note that an erratum has been issued for the published version of this paper. It is recommended to read the self-archived version of the paper.). (shrink)

The volume deals with the history of logic, the question of the nature of logic, the relation of logic and mathematics, modal or alternative logics (many-valued, relevant, paraconsistent logics) and their relations, including translatability, to classical logic in the Fregean and Russellian sense, and, more generally, the aim or aims of philosophy of logic and mathematics. Also explored are several problems concerning the concept of definition, non-designating terms, the interdependence of quantifiers, and the idea of an assertion sign. The contributions (...) concerned with Wittgenstein's investigations into the philosophy of logic and mathematics pursue issues relating to logical necessity, the undeniability of the law of the excluded middle, and the source of self-evidence, often characterized in the literature as the "rule-following considerations". Additionally, they examine Wittgenstein's attitudes towards the very idea of set-theory as a possible foundation for arithmetic. The volume also includes a number of contributions on specific issues concerning Wittgenstein's views on moral and religious judgements. (shrink)

This important collection of lectures and essays was regarded by Gabriel Marcel as the best introduction to his thought.

v. 1. Reflection & mystery -- v. 2. Faith & reality.

Research on unethical leadership has predominantly focused on interpersonal and high-intensity forms of harmful leader behavior such as abusive supervision. Other forms of harmful leader behavior such as excessively pressuring subordinates or acting in self-centered ways have received less attention, despite being harmful and potentially occurring more frequently. We propose a model of four types of harmful leader behavior varying in intensity and orientation : Intimidation, Lack of Care, Self-Centeredness, and Excessive Pressure for Results. We map out how these relate (...) to other constructs in the unethical leader behavior field in order to integrate the existing work on how leaders can cause harm to followers. Next, in five studies, we develop and test a new survey instrument measuring the four proposed types of perceived HLB. We provide initial validity evidence for this new measure, establish its psychometric properties, and examine its nomological network by linking the four types of HLB to related leadership constructs and soft and hard outcome correlates at the individual and team level. We find that HLB is negatively related to constructive forms of leadership and positively to unethical ones. HLB is also related in the expected direction to job satisfaction, engagement, psychological safety, knowledge sharing, knowledge hiding, deviance, and objectively recorded team-level stress-related absenteeism. (shrink)

Famously, in the essay Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality (Prize Essay), Kant attempts to distance himself from the Wolffian model of philosophical inquiry. In this respect, Kant scholars have pointed out Kant’s claim that philosophy should not imitate the method of mathematics and his appeal to Newton’s “analytic method.” In this article, I argue that there is an aspect of Kant’s critique of the Wolffian model that has been neglected. Kant presents a powerful (...) attack of the idea that philosophy should proceed through the analysis of concepts and argues that we should give up the aim of arriving at “complete” concepts as one of its fundamental desiderata. Importantly, this attack of philosophy conceived as conceptual analysis is distinctive and original if one compares it with Kant’s critique of analysis in the Critique of Pure Reason, which rests on the idea that analysis is insufficient to ground substantial metaphysical truths. I also make an additional point: Scholars have debated whether the appeal to Newton’s analytic method involves a form of empiricism. I submit that this debate is ill-conceived because Kant uses a notion of “given concepts” that is indeterminate with respect to their a priori or a posteriori status. (shrink)

This discussion of pride, shame, and guilt centers on the beliefs involved in the experience of any of these emotions. Through a detailed study, the author demonstrates how these beliefs are alike--in that they are all directed towards the self--and how they differ. The experience of these three emotions are illustrated by examples taken from English literature. These concrete cases supply a context for study and indicate the complexity of the situations in which these emotions usually occur.

This edition of Marcel's inspiring Homo Viator has been updated to includle fifty-seven pages of new material available for the first time in English, making this the first English-language edition to conform to the standard French edition. Here, Christianity's foremost existentialist of the twentieth century gives us a prodigious personal insight on 'man on the way' that will reinforce and commend our own pilgrimages in hope. Book jacket.

This paper revisits the Kantian concept of law, observing principally its moral groundwork and then brings to the discussion the Habermas’ concept of law, culminating in some appreciations on the content and validity of the critique of Habermas to Kant, namely, the hypothesis of a dilution of Kantian law in the moral. For Habermas, the law is an autonomous sphere and should not be based on moral a priori, but must perforce draw support in the ethics of discourse and in (...) consensus. (shrink)

The primary objective of this book is to open space for rethinking the relationship between art and politics. It seeks to combat one of the fundamental assumptions that has plagued many of the previous debates on this issue: that art and politics are distinct entities definable in terms of common properties, and that they have privileged points of intersection, which can be determined once and for all in terms of an established formula. This common sense assumption is rooted in a (...) transcendent illusion according to which there are more or less fixed characteristics that unify our terms, concepts, and practices in such a way as to guarantee their meaning. Against this substantialist approach, Radical History & the Politics of Art argues for a praxeological account that begins the other way around by analyzing specific cultural practices without presupposing a conceptual unity behind them. Such an orientation is radically historicist in the sense that it recognizes that all of our practices—be they linguistic, theoretical, aesthetic or political—are historically constituted and that they are necessarily part of a temporal dynamic. Hence the contingent nature of the labels used to classify various practices or even identify ‘practice’ as such. Radical history thereby proposes a significant departure from the extant debates on art and politics by maintaining that there is no ‘art’ or ‘politics’ in general, nor a singular relation between them. There are only historically constituted practices in various conjunctures, some of which have been labeled, through practical acts of denomination, as ‘artistic’ or ‘political.’ Instead of proposing one more response to the oft-repeated question ‘what is the relationship between Art and Politics?’ this book seeks to overcome the presuppositions that plague such a question. It thereby changes the very nature of the investigation by asking: ‘how do the diverse aspects of practices identified as ‘aesthetic’ and ‘political’ overlap, intertwine and sometimes merge in precise socio-historical force fields of action? (shrink)

The intellectual resistance to totalitarian regimes can take many forms. This remarkable volume portrays one such story of resistance in Romania during the reign of Ceausescu: that of Constantin Noica, one of the country's foremost intellectuals. The Paltinis Diary is a wonderful homage to an intellectual master and to the power of intellect and freedom. The book will be of interest to philosophers, non-philosophers alike, and to anyone who seeks to grasp the true meaning of survival under totalitarian conditions.

The idea that healthcare should become more person-centred is extremely influential. By using recent English policy developments as a case study, this article aims to critically analyse an important element of person-centred care, namely, the belief that to treat patients as persons is to think that care should be ‘co-produced’ by formal healthcare providers and patients together with unpaid carers and voluntary organizations. I draw on insights from political philosophy to highlight overlooked tensions between co-production and values like equality and (...) liberty. Regarding equality, I argue that co-production compounds both problems of gender inequality in the distribution of care labour and the challenges associated with securing equal access to care. Turning to liberty, I identify important commonalities between co-production and republicanism in political philosophy, given their shared insistence on common citizens’ civic virtue. Then, I use against co-production some liberal arguments against republicanism, to highlight a problem of over-demandingness. In bringing my argument to a close, however, I wish to caution against hastily rejecting co-production as a policy programme. (shrink)

From mass murder to genocide, slavery to colonial suppression, acts of atrocity have lives that extend far beyond the horrific moment. They engender trauma that echoes for generations, in the experiences of those on both sides of the act. Gabriele Schwab reads these legacies in a number of narratives, primarily through the writing of postwar Germans and the descendents of Holocaust survivors. She connects their work to earlier histories of slavery and colonialism and to more recent events, such as South (...) African Apartheid, the practice of torture after 9/11, and the "disappearances" that occurred during South American dictatorships. Schwab's texts include memoirs, such as Ruth Kluger's _Still Alive_ and Marguerite Duras's _La Douleur_; second-generation accounts by the children of Holocaust survivors, such as Georges Perec's _W_, Art Spiegelman's _Maus_, and Philippe Grimbert's _Secret_; and second-generation recollections by Germans, such as W. G. Sebald's _Austerlitz_, Sabine Reichel's _What Did You Do in the War, Daddy?_, and Ursula Duba's _Tales from a Child of the Enemy_. She also incorporates her own reminiscences of growing up in postwar Germany, mapping interlaced memories and histories as they interact in psychic life and cultural memory. Schwab concludes with a bracing look at issues of responsibility, reparation, and forgiveness across the victim/perpetrator divide. (shrink)

Recent epidemiological research on the social determinants of health has been used to attack an important framework, associated with Norman Daniels, that depicts healthcare as special. My aim is to rescue the idea that healthcare has special importance in society, although specialness will turn out to be mainly limited to clinical care. I build upon the link between Daniels's theory and the work of John Rawls to develop a conception of public justification liberalism that is suitable to the field of (...) justice and health. I argue that, from the perspective of public justification liberalism, (clinical) healthcare deserves special status. (shrink)

The involvement of the public in the governance of genomics has become a topic of growing interest among scholars, practitioners and policy-makers. The implementation of public involvement programmes may be quite expensive, and the design and evaluation of public participation is a matter of controversy. Thus, this paper examines the justifications for public participation in the governance of genomic research to help understand whether public involvement is worthwhile and to provide a guide to the design of public participation. I identify (...) four primary justifications in support of public involvement. I argue that three of them have serious flaws: neither an increase in the stability of institutions, nor the positive effects on the virtues of individuals, nor the epistemic merits of participatory activities provide a solid ground for the engagement of the public in the governance of genomics. However, the ideal of legitimacy in the exercise of coercive power appears to lend strong support to public involvement programmes. Given that the reasons why public involvement is sought shape the design of the participatory activities, restricting the range of valid justifications promises to simplify the task of designing and evaluating public involvement. (shrink)

Intimacy: From Transformation to Transmutation The paper reflects the historical and current dynamism of the concept of intimacy. Besides differences between scientific disciplines in understanding what the substance of intimacy is, the recent discourse on change in intimacy has been dominated by the transformation theme introduced by Anthony Giddens (1992). Led by reflections of Richard Sennett (1986) the author draws attention to the opposite aspect of change in intimacy—the change in content, or the "transmutation" of intimacy. Transmutation of intimacy—the substitution (...) of the satisfaction of intimate needs with identity creation—not only contests the very essence of intimacy, but also constitutes a significant challenge for the project of intimate citizenship (Plummer 2003). (shrink)

In this paper, I distinguish three general approaches to public trust in science, which I call the individual approach, the semi-social approach, and the social approach, and critically examine their proposed solutions to what I call the problem of harmful distrust. I argue that, despite their differences, the individual and the semi-social approaches see the solution to the problem of harmful distrust as consisting primarily in trying to persuade individual citizens to trust science and that both approaches face two general (...) problems, which I call the problem of overidealizing science and the problem of overburdening citizens. I then argue that in order to avoid these problems we need to embrace a (thoroughly) social approach to public trust in science, which emphasizes the social dimensions of the reception, transmission, and uptake of scientific knowledge in society and the ways in which social forces influence both positively and negatively the trustworthiness of science. (shrink)

1. Směry, osobnosti, problémy -- 2. Biograficko-bibliografický slovník.

Carnap’s seminal ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ makes important use of the notion of a framework and the related distinction between internal and external questions. But what exactly is a framework? And what role does the internal/external distinction play in Carnap’s metaontology? In an influential series of papers, Matti Eklund has recently defended a bracingly straightforward interpretation: A Carnapian framework, Eklund says, is just a natural language. To ask an internal question, then, is just to ask a question in, say, English. (...) To try to ask an external question is to try, absurdly, to ask a question in no language at all. Finding that so trivial an I/e distinction can’t help to explain Carnap’s deflationary metaontology, Eklund is led to attribute to Carnap a view he calls ontological pluralism. In this paper, I show that Eklund misreads Carnap, and I argue that this misreading obscures fundamental features of Carnap’s philosophy. I then defend an account of frameworks as what Carnap called semantical systems, and I place this account in the context of Carnap’s philosophical program of explication. Finally, I discuss the role that frameworks and the I/e distinction play in ESO, showing that ESO provides no reason to attribute the doctrine of ontological pluralism to Carnap. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop Mauricio Suárez’s distinction between denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation. I then outline an interpretational account of epistemic representation, according to which a vehicle represents a target for a certain user if and only if the user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, which would allow them to perform valid (but not necessarily sound) surrogative inferences from the model to the system. The main difference between the interpretational conception I (...) defend here and Suárez’s inferential conception is that the interpretational account is a substantial account—interpretation is not just a “symptom” of representation; it is what makes something an epistemic representation of a something else. (shrink)

Per una sociosemiotica della comunicazione musicale -- Per una sociosemiotica dei generi musicali -- Per una sociosemiotica della novità in musica -- Per una sociosemiotica del dubstep.

I respond to Karin de Boer, Thomas Land, and Claudio La Rocca’s comments on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics (CUP 2023). I first provide a quick outline of some of the main claims I make in the book. I then directly address their criticisms, which I group into three categories. The first group of comments raises doubts concerning my characterization of the central tasks of the critique of pure reason. The second targets the fact that (...) I downplay faculty analysis as an essential characteristic of the critique. The third has to do with my claim that the Critique of Pure Reason aims to show that metaphysics is capable of architectonic unity, where this unity is only achievable when we construe metaphysics according to the worldly concept of philosophy. (shrink)

Gabriel Richardson Lear presents a bold new approach to one of the enduring debates about Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the controversy about whether it coherently argues that the best life for humans is one devoted to a single activity, namely philosophical contemplation. Many scholars oppose this reading because the bulk of the Ethics is devoted to various moral virtues--courage and generosity, for example--that are not in any obvious way either manifestations of philosophical contemplation or subordinated to it. They argue that (...) Aristotle was inconsistent, and that we should not try to read the entire Ethics as an attempt to flesh out the notion that the best life aims at the "monistic good" of contemplation. In defending the unity and coherence of the Ethics, Lear argues that, in Aristotle's view, we may act for the sake of an end not just by instrumentally bringing it about but also by approximating it. She then argues that, for Aristotle, the excellent rational activity of moral virtue is an approximation of theoretical contemplation. Thus, the happiest person chooses moral virtue as an approximation of contemplation in practical life. Richardson Lear bolsters this interpretation by examining three moral virtues--courage, temperance, and greatness of soul--and the way they are fine. Elegantly written and rigorously argued, this is a major contribution to our understanding of a central issue in Aristotle's moral philosophy. (shrink)