This discussion of pride, shame, and guilt centers on the beliefs involved in the experience of any of these emotions. Through a detailed study, the author demonstrates how these beliefs are alike--in that they are all directed towards the self--and how they differ. The experience of these three emotions are illustrated by examples taken from English literature. These concrete cases supply a context for study and indicate the complexity of the situations in which these emotions usually occur.

Gabriele Taylor presents a philosophical investigation of the "ordinary" vices traditionally seen as "death to the soul": sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust, and gluttony. In the course of a richly detailed discussion of individual and interrelated vices, which complements recent work by moral philosophers on virtue, she shows why these "deadly sins" are correctly so named and grouped together.

Gabriele Taylor; VIII*—Love, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 June 1976, Pages 147–164, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/76.1.

Gabriele Taylor; VIII*—Love, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 June 1976, Pages 147–164, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/76.1.

The characterization of the vices as ‘deadly’ has been explained in terms of the fatal harm they bring to those who possess them. Little has as yet been said about their effect on others, though there have been indications that at least potentially, they are likely to be harmful to others as well. A question is raised on whether the disposition of the vicious is such that by possessing a particular vice, they have further vicious tendencies as well.

The vicious are self-destructive in their attitude towards themselves. A countervailing virtue should then be, in some way, a good to that self; where the vices destroy and corrupt, a countervailing virtue should heal and hold the self together. Such ‘self-healing’ virtues are not necessarily what might be regarded as strictly ‘moral’ virtues, which require some form of altruistic motivation. A self-healing virtue offers the agent a manner of escape from the burden of his or her self, which provides him (...) or her with the opportunity of leading a happier life. (shrink)

This chapter explores the particular vice of acedia or sloth. Sloth is a paralyzing vice, with the slothful carrying the burden of a useless self. Awareness of this condition explains occurrent moods of indolence, hopelessness, and despair. If, like Oblomov, they manage nonetheless to achieve a relatively contented state of mind then this is because they have found some mental busyness and are given to idle daydreams, which may, at least for periods of time, conceal their burden from themselves.

This chapter focuses on the miserly avaricious. It is argued that the miserly avaricious defeat their own purposes. The possession of money, which is supposed to be of such value to them does, on the contrary, lead to frustration. They live in a shrinking world and lose control over their lives, for they are at the mercy of their dominating desire. In all its forms, vicious envy spoils the good it covets. In this, as in other respects, the structural features (...) of this vice resemble those of avarice. As in the case of avarice, the desired good is not the superficially obvious one, namely, others’ and one’s own possessions, respectively. The object of their desire is a more fundamental one, namely the self under a specific description. (shrink)

The structural similarities between the different vices means that there will be overlaps between them, or that those in the grip of one of these vices should also naturally be exposed to another. One example is the relation between resentment and envy. The resentful and the envious share feelings of impotence and of hostility towards others. These are miserable feelings, and suffering them will reinforce both their sense of failure and their vengeful attitude towards the world. The avaricious, envious, proud, (...) and resentful can all be said to be inordinate in their desire to have a certain position for themselves secured or maintained. Covetousness is a prominent component of lust and gluttony, and thus be that which links these to the other vices. (shrink)

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the vices considered in this essay, namely, sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust, and gluttony. It argues that these so-called ‘deadly sins’ were correctly named and correctly classed together. Irrespective of their theological background, they are similar in structure in that the agent’s thoughts and desires, while differing in content depending on the vice in question, focus primarily on the self and its position in the world. They are similar also in that (...) in each case they are destructive of that self and prevent its flourishing. (shrink)

Pride is vice which most patently involves consciousness of self and self-evaluation. The assessment of its nature and implicit harm will depend on the features of the self set out in the preceding chapter. There are different types of pride and, as in the case of envy, not all of them are corruptive.

This chapter explores the nature of self and self-consciousness. The self is that which gives a person her identity as she herself sees it, and that means that she has sufficient complexity to be able to form intentions, to evaluate and select. Self-consciousness is itself constitutive of the self, and constituent of the self are consequently evaluations and decisions about what it is worthwhile to do and what to avoid, about the sort of life one wants to lead, and the (...) kind of person one wants to be. The interdependence of the elements of the shape of experiences means that they will be ‘edited’, that some experiences will be seen as important and others as negligible according to how they fit into existing frameworks of beliefs and inclinations. (shrink)

I am interested in those vices which appear on lists of ‘deadly sins’, not from any theological point of view but because of the insight revealed in their selection as being ‘death to the soul’, which I understand as ‘corruptive of the self’. ‘Corruption’ is here to be taken in a literal sense as ‘destruction or dissolution of the constitution of a thing which makes that thing what it is’. Such corruption is to be found in the structure of the (...) will. Aquinas thought that vice consists in desire gone wrong because uncontrolled by reason. Perhaps what follows can be seen as an interpretation and filling out of this view. (shrink)