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  1. On Quine's epistemological objection to Carnap's analyticity.Joseph Bentley & Thomas Uebel - 2024 - In Alan W. Richardson & Adam Tamas Tuboly (eds.), Interpreting Carnap: Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  2. Analyticity and the Semantics of Predicates.Carsten Held - 2001 - In Predrag Cicovacki, Allen Wood, Carsten Held, Gerold Prauss, Gordon Brittan, Graham Bird, Henry Allison, John H. Zammito, Joseph Lawrence, Karl Ameriks, Ralf Meerbote, Robert Holmes, Robert Howell, Rudiger Bubner, Stanley Rosen, Susan Meld Shell & Yirmiyahu Yovel (eds.), Kant's Legacy: Essays in Honor of Lewis White Beck. Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer. pp. 93-116.
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  3. Analyticity, necessity, and apriority.R. G. Swinburne - 1987 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), A priori knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  4. Indeterminate Analyticity.Martin Montminy - 2023 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 11 (5).
    W. V. Quine is commonly read as holding that there are no analytic truths and no a priori truths. I argue that this is a misreading. Quine’s view is that no sentence is determinately analytic or determinately a priori. I show that my reading is better supported by Quine’s arguments and general remarks about meaning and analyticity. I then briefly reexamine the debate between Quine and Carnap about analyticity, and show that the nature of their disagreement is different than what (...)
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  5. Analyticity and Apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine.Hilary Putnam - 1983 - In Realism and reason. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 115-138.
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  6. Logical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - unknown - In Filippo Ferrari, Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher & Florian Steinberger (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Once upon a time, logical conventionalism was the most popular philosophical theory of logic. It was heavily favored by empiricists, logical positivists, and naturalists. According to logical conventionalism, linguistic conventions explain logical truth, validity, and modality. And conventions themselves are merely syntactic rules of language use, including inference rules. Logical conventionalism promised to eliminate mystery from the philosophy of logic by showing that both the metaphysics and epistemology of logic fit into a scientific picture of reality. For naturalists of all (...)
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  7. Analyticity.Paul Artin Boghossian - 2017 - In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 578–618.
    This chapter aims to provide materials with which to substantiate the claim that, under the appropriate circumstances, the notion of analyticity can help explain how one might have a priori knowledge even in the strong sense. It argues that Implicit Definition, properly understood, is completely independent of any form of irrealism about logic. The chapter defends the thesis of Implicit Definition against Quine's criticisms, and examines the sort of account of the apriority of logic that this doctrine is able to (...)
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  8. Quine, Analyticity, and Transcendence.Ernie Lepore - 2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Gilbert Harman (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 203–218.
    Martin Gustafsson: Quine's Conception of Explication – and Why It Isn't Carnap's: This chapter clarifies Quine's conception of explication and identifies its place in his overall view of the aims and methods of philosophy. It does so by way of comparing his conception with Carnap's, Carnap being the philosopher from whom Quine got the notion of explication to begin with. In contravention of Quine's own suggestion, and against the view of some commentators, it is argued that Quine's and Carnap's conceptions (...)
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  9. Concepts, Understanding, Analyticity.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - In The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 497–537.
    A case in point is Frank Jackson’s talk of “conceptual possibility” and “conceptual necessity.” He writes as if the issue between us is the relative methodological priority for philosophy of conceptual modalities and metaphysical modalities. In addition to the uncritical reliance on conceptual modality, another fallacy is surfacing. Paul Boghossian developed an epistemology of logic based on understanding‐assent links corresponding to fundamental rules of logic. His paradigm was modus ponens: a necessary condition for understanding “if” was supposed to be willingness (...)
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  10. Metaphysical Conceptions of Analyticity.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - In The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 50–74.
    Many philosophers consciously seek conceptual connections, conceptual necessities, conceptual truths, and conceptual analyses. Philosophers of mind and language dispute whether there is a language of thought; whatever the answer, it is no conceptual truth. Moral and political philosophers and philosophers of art appeal to empirically discovered human cognitive limitations, and so on. This chapter examines a variety of attempts to develop a metaphysical account of analyticity. It also explores epistemological account of analyticity, also with negative results. The overall upshot is (...)
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  11. Epistemological Conceptions of Analyticity.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - In The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 75–135.
    One proposal is to generalize UAl to define an epistemological notion of analyticity: a sentence s is analytic just in case, necessarily, whoever understands s assents to s. This chapter considers what is epistemically available simply on the basis of linguistic and conceptual competence. It deals with a provisional sketch of some obstacles to extracting epistemological consequences from understanding‐assent links and of some attempts to overcome them. A trickier question is whether such possibilities of an illusion of understanding have negative (...)
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  12. Analyticity and apriority, beyond Wittgenstein and Quine.Hilary Putnam - 1987 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), A priori knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
  13. Grammar and analyticity: Wittgenstein and the logical positivists on logical and conceptual truth.Kai Michael Büttner - 2023 - Philosophical Investigations 46 (2):196-220.
    Wittgenstein's conception of logical and conceptual truth is often thought to rival that of the logical positivists. This paper argues that there are important respects in which these conceptions complement each other. Analyticity, in the positivists' sense, coincides, not with Wittgenstein's notion of a grammatical proposition, but rather with his notion of a tautology. Grammatical propositions can usually be construed as analyticity postulates in Carnap's sense of the term. This account of grammatical and analytic propositions will be illustrated by appeal (...)
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  14. Analyticity in externalist languages.Gillian Russell - 2009 - In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New waves in philosophy of language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  15. Naming and analyticity.Antonio Capuano - 2022 - Theoria 89 (1):57-72.
    My aim in this paper is to connect naming and analyticity and to argue that, like “Hesperus is Hesperus”, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is analytic. In the paper, I also discuss several other unexpected cases of analytic truth like “Aristotle existed”.
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  16. Contextual analyticity.Gregory Bochner - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (4):268-276.
    My double aim in this paper is to argue for the claims that, when they are formed in certain ways, some judgements expressed by “I am here now” are both (a) apriori (although not solely in virtue of their meaning), and (b) necessary (albeit trivially so). I will submit that such judgements are “analytic” in the same sense that some judgements are “immune to error through misidentification” when this notion is understood in a relativistic way: in both cases, no component (...)
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  17. Kant on Why We Cannot Even Judge about Things in Themselves.Guido Kreis - 2023 - In Jens Pier (ed.), Limits of Intelligibility: Issues from Kant and Wittgenstein. Routledge.
    This paper develops its exegetical claim by building mainly on a reconstruction of a central argument in the Critique of Pure Reason and supporting it with material from Kant’s other critical works. It argues that Kant’s philosophy does not permit us any judgment about things in themselves whatsoever. This could be called a form of ignorance, albeit a unique one. On the developed reading, Kant claims that there cannot be any objectively valid judgment about things in themselves, and since so-called (...)
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  18. Quine, Analyticity, and Transcendence.Ernie Lepore - 2013 - In Gilbert Harman & Ernest LePore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  19. Correction to: Metaphysical analyticity and the epistemology of logic.Gillian K. Russell - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2417-2418.
    Recent work on analyticity distinguishes two kinds, metaphysical and epistemic. This paper argues that the distinction allows for a new view in the philosophy of logic according to which the claims of logic are metaphysically analytic and have distinctive modal profiles, even though their epistemology is holist and in many ways rather Quinean. It is argued that such a view combines some of the more attractive aspects of the Carnapian and Quinean approaches to logic, whilst avoiding some famous problems.
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  20. Analyticity.Tom Donaldson - 2020 - In Michael J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. New York, USA: pp. 288-299.
    I consider the claim that analytic statements are "true in virtue meaning", giving the claim a ground-theoretic interpretation.
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  21. Analyticity, Platonism, and A Priori Knowledge.Deke Gould - 2011 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
    In this dissertation, I defend a view that combines an analytic conception of a priori knowledge with a version of reliabilist platonism. Roughly put, the analytic theory is the view that our a priori knowledge can be explained by our grasp of analytic truths. Platonism is the view that there are abstract objects and those objects are partly responsible for some of our knowledge. My primary goal is to show that the hybrid account I develop solves central problems that arise (...)
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  22. The Logicality of Language: Contextualism versus Semantic Minimalism.Guillermo Del Pinal - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):381-427.
    The logicality of language is the hypothesis that the language system has access to a ‘natural’ logic that can identify and filter out as unacceptable expressions that have trivial meanings—that is, that are true/false in all possible worlds or situations in which they are defined. This hypothesis helps explain otherwise puzzling patterns concerning the distribution of various functional terms and phrases. Despite its promise, logicality vastly over-generates unacceptability assignments. Most solutions to this problem rest on specific stipulations about the properties (...)
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  23. Engaging Putnam.Sanjit Chakraborty & James Ferguson Conant (eds.) - 2022 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.
    About this book Hilary Whitehall Putnam was one of the leading philosophers of the second half of the 20th century. As student of Rudolph Carnap's and Hans Reichenbach's, he went on to become not only a major figure in North American analytic philosophy, who made significant contributions to the philosophy of mind, language, mathematics, and physics but also to the disciplines of logic, number theory, and computer science. He passed away on March 13, 2016. The present volume is a memorial (...)
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  24. Simposio del libro Sobre el análisis de Axel Barceló. Précis de Sobre el análisis.Axel Barceló - 2021 - Dianoia 66 (87):101-108.
    Resumen La metáfora de la "descomposición" domina aún nuestra manera usual de pensar el análisis conceptual. Se trata de una herramienta muy útil para pensar este proceso tan abstracto, pero tiene limitaciones importantes. Por ejemplo, nos hace pensar que los componentes de un concepto deben estar en algún sentido contenidos en él o que la única manera en que dos conceptos pueden estar relacionados es que uno contenga al otro. Estas limitaciones no nos permiten dar cuenta de conceptos complejos cuya (...)
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  25. Quine vs. Quine: Abstract Knowledge and Ontology.Gila Sher - 2020 - In Frederique Janssen-Lauret (ed.), Quine, Structure, and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford. pp. 230-252.
    How does Quine fare in the first decades of the twenty-first century? In this paper I examine a cluster of Quinean theses that, I believe, are especially fruitful in meeting some of the current challenges of epistemology and ontology. These theses offer an alternative to the traditional bifurcations of truth and knowledge into factual and conceptual-pragmatic-conventional, the traditional conception of a foundation for knowledge, and traditional realism. To make the most of Quine’s ideas, however, we have to take an active (...)
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  26. Semantic Rules, Modal Knowledge, and Analyticity.Antonella Mallozzi - 2023 - In Duško Prelević & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology. New York, NY: Routledge.
    According to Amie Thomasson's Modal Normativism (MN), knowledge of metaphysical modality is to be explained in terms of a speaker’s mastery of semantic rules, as opposed to one’s epistemic grasp of independent modal facts. In this chapter, I outline (MN)'s account of modal knowledge (§1) and argue that more than semantic mastery is needed for knowledge of metaphysical modality. Specifically (§2), in reasoning aimed at gaining such knowledge, a competent speaker needs to further deploy essentialist principles and information. In response, (...)
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  27. Carnapian frameworks.Gabriel L. Broughton - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4097-4126.
    Carnap’s seminal ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ makes important use of the notion of a framework and the related distinction between internal and external questions. But what exactly is a framework? And what role does the internal/external distinction play in Carnap’s metaontology? In an influential series of papers, Matti Eklund has recently defended a bracingly straightforward interpretation: A Carnapian framework, Eklund says, is just a natural language. To ask an internal question, then, is just to ask a question in, say, English. (...)
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  28. Debating the a Priori.Paul Boghossian & Timothy Williamson - 2020 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Edited by Timothy Williamson.
    The book records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate extended over more than fifteen years. Its subject matter is the nature and scope of reason. A central case at issue is basic logical knowledge, and the justification for basic deductive inferences, but the arguments range far more widely, at stake the distinctions between analytic and synthetic, and between a priori and a posteriori. The discussion naturally involves problems about the conditions for linguistic understanding and (...)
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  29. Concept Diagrams and the Context Principle.Jens Lemanski - 2020 - In Language, Logic, and Mathematics in Schopenhauer. Cham, Schweiz: Birkhäuser (Springer nature). pp. 47-73.
    What is the primacy of logic? Concepts, judgments, or inferences? Whereas representationalists traditionally argue for a primacy of the conceptual, rationalists, referring to the context principle and the use theory of meaning, consider judgments and inferences to be primary. This dispute also seems to be applicable to logic diagrams: Whereas “Euler-type diagrams” are actually only for judgments and inferences, “concept diagrams” represent ontologies by using concepts. With reference to Schopenhauer, the paper develops a position called “rational representationalism.” According to this (...)
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  30. Fluctuating maximal God.Anne Jeffrey, Asha Lancaster-Thomas & Matyáš Moravec - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (3):231-47.
    This paper explores a variety of perfect being theism that combines Yujin Nagasawa’s maximal God thesis with the view that God is not atemporal. We argue that the original maximal God thesis still implicitly relies on a “static” view of divine perfections. Instead, following the recent re-evaluation of divine immutability by analytic philosophers, we propose that thinking of divine great-making properties as fluctuating but nevertheless remaining maximal either for every time t or across all times strengthens the original maximal God (...)
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  31. The Logicality of Language: A new take on triviality, `ungrammaticality', and logical form.Guillermo Del Pinal - 2017 - Noûs 53 (4):785-818.
    Recent work in formal semantics suggests that the language system includes not only a structure building device, as standardly assumed, but also a natural deductive system which can determine when expressions have trivial truth‐conditions (e.g., are logically true/false) and mark them as unacceptable. This hypothesis, called the ‘logicality of language’, accounts for many acceptability patterns, including systematic restrictions on the distribution of quantifiers. To deal with apparent counter‐examples consisting of acceptable tautologies and contradictions, the logicality of language is often paired (...)
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  32. Kripkean Theory of Reference: A Cognitive way,.Roshan Praveen Xalxo - 2014 - Jadavpur Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):89-101.
    This paper is an attempt to present a Kripkean (Causal) picture of Reference where the cognitive content in fixing reference plays a vital role. It also points out that Kripke is not a pure causal theorist. By introducing Thomas Kuhn and his theory on vulnerability of the rigid designation, I have shown that there is a danger for causal theory of reference. However Kuhn’s argument fails to have an impact if a Knowledge aspect is augmented to Kripkean theory of reference. (...)
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  33. Stipulations and Requirements: Reply to Horden.Louis deRosset - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10:74-84.
    In "Analyticity and Ontology," I argued that there are counterexamples to the claim that the sentences analytically entailed by a claim $\phi$ require nothing more of the world for their truth than does $\phi$. The counterexamples involve sentences which, I argued, are analytically entailed by certain truths, but which nevertheless require more of the world for their truth. John Horden has offered two interesting criticisms of this argument. First, he contends that its conclusion is inconsistent. Second, he contends that the (...)
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  34. What are these Familiar Words Doing Here?A. W. Moore - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:147-171.
    This essay is concerned with six linguistic moves that we commonly make, each of which is considered in turn. These are: stating rules of representation; representing things categorically; mentioning expressions; saying truly or falsely how things are; saying vaguely how things are; and stating rules of rules of representation. A common-sense view is defended of what is involved in our doing each of these six things against a much more sceptical view emanating from the idea that linguistic behavior is fundamentally (...)
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  35. Truth by Convention.W. V. Quine - 1936 - In Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead. London: Longmans, Green & Co.. pp. 90–124.
  36. I_– _Elliott Sober.Elliott Sober - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):237-280.
    In ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, Quine attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction and defends a doctrine that I call epistemological holism. Now, almost fifty years after the article’s appearance, what are we to make of these ideas? I suggest that the philosophical naturalism that Quine did so much to promote should lead us to reject Quine’s brief against the analytic/synthetic distinction; I also argue that Quine misunderstood Carnap's views on analyticity. As for epistemological holism, I claim that this thesis does not follow (...)
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  37. A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis.Mark Balaguer & Terry Horgan - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):3-7.
    The paradox of analysis asks how a putative conceptual analysis can be both true and informative. If it is true then isn’t it analytic? And if it is analytic then how can it be informative? Our proposed solution rests on a distinction between explicit knowledge of meaning and implicit knowledge of meaning and on a correlative distinction between two kinds of conceptual competence. If one initially possesses only implicit knowledge of the meaning of a given concept and the associated linguistic (...)
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  38. Are Samnyasa and Tyaga Synonyms in The Bhagwadgita?Arvind Sharma - 1978 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1):135-144.
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  39. The Paradox of Analysis.Jeffrey Lamont Cobb - 1987 - Dissertation, Brown University
    Chapters 1-5 develop and criticize a solution to the paradox of analysis based on some recent work in the theory of reference and the analysis of propositional attitudes. This solution holds that the analysandum and analysans in a true analysis are the same property, and that sentences like: being a male sibling analyzes being a brother; and being a brother analyzes being a brother, express the same proposition. It holds that the property referent of "being a brother" and "being a (...)
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  40. Die Lebenswelt. Eine Philosophie des konkreten Apriori. [REVIEW]S. R. - 1972 - Review of Metaphysics 25 (4):745-746.
    Brand begins his book with a statement of the philosophical and cultural crisis of contemporary life, a crisis brought about by science. The idealizing methods and technology of contemporary science lead to a loss of self-understanding, and to a replacement of ordinary lived experience by scientific constructs; science in its turn has lost its human and philosophical meaning. An exploration of the life-world that provides the basis for science may help remedy this situation. Brand then explores the theme of a (...)
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  41. In The Last Analysis. [REVIEW]K. B. L. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 10 (4):715-715.
    A thoughtful inventor-businessman's statement of the simple truth about the world: All is energy, with causal order everywhere, and with such forces dominating as to justify optimistic trust in the necessary course of events.--L. K. B.
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  42. Synonyms and Identity of Denotation.Pavlo Sodomora - 2008 - Semiotics:745-750.
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  43. Metaphysical analyticity and the epistemology of logic.Gillian K. Russell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):161-175.
    Recent work on analyticity distinguishes two kinds, metaphysical and epistemic. This paper argues that the distinction allows for a new view in the philosophy of logic according to which the claims of logic are metaphysically analytic and have distinctive modal profiles, even though their epistemology is holist and in many ways rather Quinean. It is argued that such a view combines some of the more attractive aspects of the Carnapian and Quinean approaches to logic, whilst avoiding some famous problems.
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  44. Conceptual Analysis and the Connectionist Account of Concepts.William Ramsey - 1996 - In J. Ezquerro A. Clark (ed.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 35--57.
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  45. An hypothesis concerning the generation and use of synonyms.William M. Lepley - 1950 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 40 (4):527.
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  46. The Inaugural Address: Conceptual Truth.Timothy Williamson - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):1 - 41.
    The paper criticizes epistemological conceptions of analytic or conceptual truth, on which assent to such truths is a necessary condition of understanding them. The critique involves no Quinean scepticism about meaning. Rather, even granted that a paradigmatic candidate for analyticity is synonymy with a logical truth, both the former and the latter can be intelligibly doubted by linguistically competent deviant logicians, who, although mistaken, still constitute counterexamples to the claim that assent is necessary for understanding. There are no analytic or (...)
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  47. Are Apeiria and Aoristia Synonyms?Leo Sweeney - 1956 - Modern Schoolman 33 (4):270-279.
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  48. Experience and the Analytic. [REVIEW]L. K. B. - 1959 - Review of Metaphysics 13 (1):190-190.
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  49. The Age of Analysis. [REVIEW]V. C. C. - 1955 - Review of Metaphysics 9 (2):365-365.
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  50. Towards the Definition of Philosophy.Roger Caldwell - 2001 - Philosophy Now 32:46-47.
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