Synthese 199 (1-2):4097-4126 (2021)

Authors
Gabe Broughton
Princeton University
Abstract
Carnap’s seminal ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ makes important use of the notion of a framework and the related distinction between internal and external questions. But what exactly is a framework? And what role does the internal/external distinction play in Carnap’s metaontology? In an influential series of papers, Matti Eklund has recently defended a bracingly straightforward interpretation: A Carnapian framework, Eklund says, is just a natural language. To ask an internal question, then, is just to ask a question in, say, English. To try to ask an external question is to try, absurdly, to ask a question in no language at all. Finding that so trivial an I/e distinction can’t help to explain Carnap’s deflationary metaontology, Eklund is led to attribute to Carnap a view he calls ontological pluralism. In this paper, I show that Eklund misreads Carnap, and I argue that this misreading obscures fundamental features of Carnap’s philosophy. I then defend an account of frameworks as what Carnap called semantical systems, and I place this account in the context of Carnap’s philosophical program of explication. Finally, I discuss the role that frameworks and the I/e distinction play in ESO, showing that ESO provides no reason to attribute the doctrine of ontological pluralism to Carnap.
Keywords Metaphysics  Ontology  Metaontology  Carnap  Explication  Analyticity
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-020-02971-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,579
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.Willard van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.

View all 62 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Carnap and Quine on Sense and Nonsense.James Andrew Smith - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (10):1-28.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Linguistig Frameworks and Metaphysical Questions.James W. Comman - 1964 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):129 – 142.
Carnap and Ontological Pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 130--56.
Internal and External Questions Revisited.Jared Warren - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (4):177-209.
Ontological Trivialism?Seyed N. Mousavian - forthcoming - New Content is Available for Grazer Philosophische Studien.
Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?Stephen Yablo - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):229 - 283.
How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):645-668.
Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?Stephen Yablo & Andre Gallois - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 72:229-283.
Ontological Trivialism?Seyed N. Mousavian - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):38-68.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-01-07

Total views
73 ( #150,701 of 2,461,985 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #39,686 of 2,461,985 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes