I selectively and critically review the state of knowledge about human evolution and the place of humans vis-à-vis living apes, with emphasis on bipedal posture and locomotion, expansion of the brain and associated cognitive capacities, speech, tool behavior, culture, and society. I end with a personal perspective on God and Heaven.

Although Dilthey is increasingly recognized as a seminal philosopher whose thought finds significant expression in the works of Heidegger, Husserl, Jaspers, Mannheim, Weber, Spranger, Simmel, Troeltsch, and Buber, his writings are available in English in only the scantiest of excerpts. Book-size English commentaries on Dilthey can be counted without exhausting the fingers of one hand. The present, slim volume would, therefore, be of interest for no other reason than that it adds a reference to an all-too skimpy library. Fortunately, it (...) is of value for much better reasons. What Tuttle has attempted is the first systematic exposition of Dilthey's life-long attempt to establish an objectively valid basis for his theory of Verstehen and Nacherlebnis.. This may belie the subtitle of the book, but it can hardly be denied that the exposition is at least equal in importance to the critical analysis which follows it. The reconstruction of Dilthey's arguments consists of a description of: his concept of the special nature of human life which permits the subject and object of historical knowledge to be the same; the original descriptive psychology which Dilthey worked out as the basis for the study of history and of all the human sciences; his somewhat equivocal abandonment of psychology because of its ahistorical and law-like character in favor of an emphasis on empirical life assertions which are internalized by the method of Verstehen; his notion of human nature and the tension between its historically changing aspect and its unchanging epistemological aspect; the role of motives in Dilthey's system as causes of historical action; and his theory of ideal types as a methodological device for generalizing without having to utilize the causal explanations of natural science. The book begins and ends on the same note; namely, that Dilthey is unable to verify that the re-experience of the historian is actually a duplicate of the experience of the historical agent. But in between the opening statement and its repetition at the end, a wealth of insight into Dilthey's thought is provided.--H. B. (shrink)

Although Dilthey is increasingly recognized as a seminal philosopher whose thought finds significant expression in the works of Heidegger, Husserl, Jaspers, Mannheim, Weber, Spranger, Simmel, Troeltsch, and Buber, his writings are available in English in only the scantiest of excerpts. Book-size English commentaries on Dilthey can be counted without exhausting the fingers of one hand. The present, slim volume would, therefore, be of interest for no other reason than that it adds a reference to an all-too skimpy library. Fortunately, it (...) is of value for much better reasons. What Tuttle has attempted is the first systematic exposition of Dilthey's life-long attempt to establish an objectively valid basis for his theory of Verstehen and Nacherlebnis.. This may belie the subtitle of the book, but it can hardly be denied that the exposition is at least equal in importance to the critical analysis which follows it. The reconstruction of Dilthey's arguments consists of a description of: his concept of the special nature of human life which permits the subject and object of historical knowledge to be the same; the original descriptive psychology which Dilthey worked out as the basis for the study of history and of all the human sciences; his somewhat equivocal abandonment of psychology because of its ahistorical and law-like character in favor of an emphasis on empirical life assertions which are internalized by the method of Verstehen; his notion of human nature and the tension between its historically changing aspect and its unchanging epistemological aspect; the role of motives in Dilthey's system as causes of historical action; and his theory of ideal types as a methodological device for generalizing without having to utilize the causal explanations of natural science. The book begins and ends on the same note; namely, that Dilthey is unable to verify that the re-experience of the historian is actually a duplicate of the experience of the historical agent. But in between the opening statement and its repetition at the end, a wealth of insight into Dilthey's thought is provided.--H. B. (shrink)

This article aims to read feminist new materialisms (Barad), together with ‘postulated’ linguistic or cultural primacy of Queer Theory (Butler), to show how both are engaged in similar critical-ethical endeavours. The central argument is that the criticism of Barad and new materialisms misses Butler’s materialistic insights due to a narrow interpretation of Butler's alleged social-constructivist position. There is, therefore, a specific focus on where they both make similar ethical appeals. Moreover, the article relies on Adorno's negative dialectic to highlight an (...) interpretation of Barad and Butler as being part of the same dialectical movement, in which materialism and idealism fluctuate in their mutual criticisms, thus continuing the procession towards 'new knowledge' and emancipation, or freedom, through their motions back and forth. (shrink)

This is a study of the nature of time. In it, redeploying an argument first presented by McTaggart, the author argues that although time itself is real, tense is not. He accounts for the appearance of the reality of tense - our sense of the passage of time, and the fact that our experience occurs in the present - by showing how time is indispensable as a condition of action. Time itself is further analysed, and Dr Mellor gives answers to (...) most of the metaphysical questions it provokes, concerning the relation of time to space, the dissection of time, and its relation to change and causation. (shrink)

"First published by Oxford University Press, 1916."--Title page verso.

"Using hundreds of examples from newsrooms large and small, author Ron F. Smith challenges readers to determine how they would face moral dilemmas on the job. Chapters evaluate the search for principles, accountability, truth and objectivity, errors and corrections, diversity, "faking" the news, reporters and their sources, privacy, the government watch, deception, compassion, the business of news, journalists and their communities, and financial concerns. New to this edition: a chapter on improving coverage of minorities, expanded discussion of broadcast journalism and (...) reporting on the Internet, and stories from recent front pages and TV news programs."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

Le temps est un grand maître en médecine. Il fait évoluer la maladie, le malade et sa relation avec le médecin. Il revient à ce dernier d'en prendre la mesure pour la maîtriser et l'exploiter plutôt que de s'en laisser dominer. C'est ce que l'auteur fait approcher par petites touches au fil d'une cinquantaine de réflexions puisées dans son expérience et ses lectures, alimentés de données parfois dérangeantes. Elles doivent aider à gérer une denrée précieuse, d'une manière simple, mais qui (...) ne va pas toujours de soi et peut contredire un bon sens élémentaire. Il en va de la qualité d'une pratique médicale et des satisfactions que patients comme soignants peuvent en retirer, en choisissant plutôt qu'en subissant. (shrink)

According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of the agent's desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been criticised both for conflating two types of attitudes and for committing agents to attitudes that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it has been suggested that an agent's attitudes to risk should be captured by a risk function that is independent of her utility and probability functions. The main (...) problem with that approach is that it suggests that attitudes to risk are wholly distinct from people's (non-instrumental) desires. To overcome this problem, we develop a framework where an agent's utility function is defined over chance propositions (i.e., propositions describing objective probability distributions) as well as ordinary (non-chance) ones, and argue that one should explain different risk attitudes in terms of different forms of the utility function over such propositions. (shrink)

The book challenges the values of much of contemporary bioethics and health care policy by confronting their failure to secure the moral norms they seek to apply.

In the Categories Aristotle defined substance as that which is neither predicable of nor in another. In saying that a substance is not predicable of another, Aristotle meant to exclude genera and species from the category substance. Aman is a substance but not man. In saying that a substance is not in another, Aristotle meant to exclude property particulars from the category. A man is a substance, not his color. The Categories treats substances as simples. Though a particular substance, Bucephalus (...) the horse, has parts, it is nevertheless a single entity in the category substance and, hence, incomplex in the way a black thing or a running man are not. Black things and runners are complex because they are aggregates of substances and property particulars. Even if a horse is one substance and, thus, an entity, a horse is made of parts and one may wonder how it is related to its parts, as well as how its being made of parts coheres with the definition of substance given in the Categories. (shrink)

Provability, Computability and Reflection.

This paper argues that proper functions are proximal functions. In other words, it rejects the notion that there are distal biological functions – strictly speaking, distal functions are not functions at all, but simply beneficial effects normally associated with a trait performing its function. Once we rule out distal functions, two further positions become available: dysfunctions are simply failures of proper function, and pathological conditions are dysfunctions. Although elegant and seemingly intuitive, this simple view has had surprisingly little uptake in (...) the literature. Indeed, our position departs from that of almost every theorist who has engaged with the issue at any depth. We start by presenting three arguments for the position that proper functions are proximal: one from the specificity of functions, one from their relation to intervention, and one from their relation to pathology. We then consider two case studies evidencing the trouble that accepting distal functions causes for philosophical reflection on the nature of pathological conditions. Finally, we anticipate and respond to three objections: that there can be failure of function without dysfunction; that our account is unacceptably revisionary in respect of normal function-talk; and that our thesis over-generalises from a narrow set of cases. (shrink)

Metaphysics -- Bacon -- Locke -- Kant -- Comte -- Logical positivism -- Russell -- Analysis -- Quine and science -- Wittgenstein.

Multi-volume work with 4 of the 5 volumes published. -/- -- 1. Medieval Authors (in two books) -- 2. Renaissance authors -- 3. Index initorum-index finium -- 5. Bibliography of secondary literature.

This is the first complete, one-volume English translation of the ancient Chinese text Xunzi, one of the most extensive, sophisticated, and elegant works in the tradition of Confucian thought. Through essays, poetry, dialogues, and anecdotes, the Xunzi articulates a Confucian perspective on ethics, politics, warfare, language, psychology, human nature, ritual, and music, among other topics. Aimed at general readers and students of Chinese thought, Eric Hutton’s translation makes the full text of this important work more accessible in English than ever (...) before. Named for its purported author, the Xunzi has long been neglected compared to works such as the Analects of Confucius and the Mencius. Yet interest in the Xunzi has grown in recent decades, and the text presents a much more systematic vision of the Confucian ideal than the fragmented sayings of Confucius and Mencius. In one famous, explicit contrast to them, the Xunzi argues that human nature is bad. However, it also allows that people can become good through rituals and institutions established by earlier sages. Indeed, the main purpose of the Xunzi is to urge people to become as good as possible, both for their own sakes and for the sake of peace and order in the world. In this edition, key terms are consistently translated to aid understanding and line numbers are provided for easy reference. Other features include a concise introduction, a timeline of early Chinese history, a list of important names and terms, cross-references, brief explanatory notes, a bibliography, and an index. (shrink)

Philosophers ask just whose expression, if anyone’s, we hear in lyric poetry. Walton provides a novel possibility: it’s the reader who “uses” the poem (just as a speech giver uses a speech) who makes the language expressive. But worries arise once we consider poems in particular social or political settings, those which require a strong self-other distinction, or those with expressions that should not be disassociated from the subjects whose experience they draw from. One way to meet this challenge is (...) to consider the poem expressive of a plural subject, which frees us from looking for a particular individual whose voice we hear in the work, whether she be fictional or actual. Some lyrics give voice to a group whose experience is attended to in the work. This may be done through a posited fictional speaker, but the ontology of the speaker is shown to be less important. Attending to a group whose concerns are voiced allows us to explain how poems can manage to address our-worldly concerns even when lacking actual persons whose expressions we encounter in the poems. (shrink)