Longtemps dédaigné par les historiens, le costume fait aujourd’hui l’objet d’un retour en force dans les études historiques et sociologiques. Élément essentiel de la culture matérielle, il est l’un des marqueurs de toute société humaine, véritable langage destiné à signifier et pas seulement à protéger ou à orner. Le costume, mais aussi la façon de le porter, de le regarder et de l’interpréter, sont les reflets des normes sociales. Comme le souligne Daniel Roche : « l’histoire du vêtir témoig...

Jaegwon Kim’s influential exclusion argument attempts to demonstrate the inconsistency of nonreductive materialism in the philosophy of mind. Kim’s argument begins by showing that the three main theses of nonreductive materialism, plus two additional considerations, lead to a specific and familiar picture of mental causation. The exclusion argument can succeed only if, as Kim claims, this picture is not one of genuine causal overdetermination. Accordingly, one can resist Kim’s conclusion by denying this claim, maintaining instead that the effects of the (...) mental are always causally overdetermined. I call this strategy the ‘ overdetermination challenge’. One of the main aims of this paper is to show that the overdetermination challenge is the most appropriate response to Kim’s exclusion argument, at least in its latest form. I argue that Kim fails to adequately respond to the overdetermination challenge, thus failing to prevent his opponents from reasonably maintaining that the effects of the mental are always causally overdetermined. Interestingly, this discussion reveals a curious dialectical feature of Kim’s latest response to the overdetermination challenge: if it succeeds, then a new, simpler and more compact version of the exclusion argument is available. While I argue against the consequent of this conditional, thereby also rejecting the antecedent, this dialectical feature should be of interest to philosophers on either side of this debate. (shrink)

Citizenship rights have become vital to our sense of personal identity and social membership in modern society. Roche argues that today we have to shift from the conventional postwar politics of social rights to a new politics of social obligations and personal responsibility.

This paper criticizes two accounts of the normativity of practical principles: the empiricist account and the rationalist or realist account. It argues against the empiricist view, focusing on the Humean texts that are usually taken to be its locus classicus. It then argues both against the dogmatic rationalist view, and for the Kantian view, through a discussion of Kant's own remarks about instrumental rationality in the second section of the Groundwork. It further argues that the instrumental principle cannot stand alone. (...) Unless there are normative principles directing us to the adoption of certain ends, there can be no requirement to take the means to our ends. The familiar view that the instrumental principle is the only requirement of practical reason is incoherent. (shrink)

Is there some general reason to expect organisms that have beliefs to have false beliefs? And after you observe that an organism occasionally occupies a given neural state that you think encodes a perceptual belief, how do you evaluate hypotheses about the semantic content that that state has, where some of those hypotheses attribute beliefs that are sometimes false while others attribute beliefs that are always true? To address the first of these questions, we discuss evolution by natural selection and (...) show how organisms that are risk-prone in the beliefs they form can be fitter than organisms that are risk-free. To address the second question, we discuss a problem that is widely recognized in statistics – the problem of over-fitting – and one influential device for addressing that problem, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). We then use AIC to solve epistemological versions of the disjunction and distality problems, which are two key problems concerning what it is for a belief state to have one semantic content rather than another. (shrink)

I begin by discussing forms of cosmopolitanism that motivate challenges to distributive accounts of global justice. I then use Sen's version of the capabilities approach to show how distributive accounts fall short, why an overarching theory of justice is not needed, and that democracy understood as the exercise of public reasoning can do the work of identifying and addressing injustices. That said in favor of Sen, I argue that his account fails to attend to the kinds of injustices emerging from (...) relationships of power and the institutions and structures in which these relationships are embedded. To show this, I outline features of a feminist relational approach, which I then apply to Canada's attempt to address historic harms through the Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While I agree with Sen that we do not need a theory of global justice that is universal, ideal, impartial, or abstracted from context, I aim to broaden the scope of justice beyond both distributive accounts and Sen's version of the capabilities approach. (shrink)

1. Being an Animal Human beings are animals: phylum: chordata, class: mammalia, order: primates, family: hominids, species: homo sapiens, subspecies: homo sapiens sapiens. According to current scientific opinion, we evolved approximately 200,000 years ago in Africa from ancestors whom we share with the other great apes. What does it mean that we are animals? Scientifically speaking, an animal is essentially a complex, multicellular organism that feeds on other life forms. But what we share with the other animals is not just (...) a definition: it is a history – that is, it is a story – and a resulting set of attributes and circumstances, and an ecosystem, and a planet. What is the story? Living things are homeostatic systems – they maintain themselves through a process of nutrition that enables them to work constantly at replacing the fragile materials of which they are composed. Living things also work at reproducing, or contributing to the reproduction, of other living things that maintain themselves in essentially the same way. To engage in those activities is essentially what it means to be alive. And in order to engage in those activities, a living thing must be, in some way, responsive to conditions in its environment. Plants, for instance, respond to dryness, by growing deeper roots, or to sunshine, by turning their leaves in its direction. Even a unicellular organism is drawn to some things and recoils from others. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider the question of whether there exists an essential relation between emotions and wellbeing. We distinguish three ways in which emotions and wellbeing might be essentially related: constitutive, causal, and epistemic. We argue that, while there is some room for holding that emotions are constitutive ingredients of an individual’s wellbeing, all the attempts to characterise the causal and epistemic relations in an essentialist way are vulnerable to some important objections. We conclude that the causal and epistemic (...) relation between emotions and wellbeing is much less strong than is commonly thought. (shrink)

We argue in Roche and Sober (2013) that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in that Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O), where H is a hypothesis, O is an observation, and EXPL is the proposition that if H and O were true, then H would explain O. This is a “screening-off” thesis. Here we clarify that thesis, reply to criticisms advanced by Lange (2017), consider alternative formulations of Inference to the Best Explanation, discuss a strengthened screening-off thesis, and consider how (...) it bears on the claim that unification is evidentially relevant. (shrink)

Hempel’s Converse Consequence Condition (CCC), Entailment Condition (EC), and Special Consequence Condition (SCC) have some prima facie plausibility when taken individually. Hempel, though, shows that they have no plausibility when taken together, for together they entail that E confirms H for any propositions E and H. This is “Hempel’s paradox”. It turns out that Hempel’s argument would fail if one or more of CCC, EC, and SCC were modified in terms of explanation. This opens up the possibility that Hempel’s paradox (...) can be solved by modifying one or more of CCC, EC, and SCC in terms of explanation. I explore this possibility by modifying CCC and SCC in terms of explanation and considering whether CCC and SCC so modified are correct. I also relate that possibility to Inference to the Best Explanation. (shrink)

After discussing de Sousa's view of emotion in akrasia, I suggest that emotions be viewed as nonconceptual perceptions of value (see Tappolet 2000). It follows that they can render intelligible actions which are contrary to one's better judgment. An emotion can make one's action intelligible even when that action is opposed by one's all-things-considered judgment. Moreover, an akratic action prompted by an emotion may be more rational than following one's better judgement, for it may be the judgement and not the (...) perception which is in error. By contrast, "cool" akrasia is genuinely puzzling; it is not clear whether it exists. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a metasemantics for relaxed moral realism. More precisely, I argue that relaxed realists should be inferentialists about meaning and explain that the role of evaluative moral vocabulary is to organise and structure language exit transitions, much as the role of theoretical vocabulary is to organise and structure language entry transitions.

This contribution considers whether or not it is possible to devise a coherent form of external skepticism about the normative if we ‘relax’ about normative ontology by regarding claims about the existence of normative truths and properties themselves as normative. I answer this question in the positive: A coherent form of non-normative error-theories can be developed even against a relaxed background. However, this form no longer makes any reference to the alleged falsity of normative judgments, nor the non-existence of normative (...) properties. Instead, it concerns a specifically inferentialist construal of error-theories which suggests that error-theorists should abstain from any claims about normative ontology to focus exclusively on claims about the inferential role of normative vocabulary. As I will show, this suggestion affords a number of important advantages. However, it also comes at a cost, in that it might not only change the letter, but also the spirit of traditional error-theories. (shrink)

Quasi-realist expressivists have developed a growing liking for minimalism about truth. It has gone almost unnoticed, though, that minimalism also drives an anti-Archimedean movement which launches a direct attack on expressivists’ non-moral self-image by proclaiming that all metaethical positions are built on moral grounds. This interplay between expressivism, minimalism and anti-Archimedeanism makes for an intriguing metaethical encounter. As such, the first part of this dissertation examines expressivism’s marriage to minimalism and defends it against its critics. The second part then turns (...) to the anti-Archimedean challenge to expressivism and shows how to ward off this challenge by securing expressivism’s non-moral, metaethical status without having to abandon minimalism about truth. (shrink)

I argue elsewhere (Roche 2014) that evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off. Tal and Comesaña (2017) argue that my appeal to screening-off is subject to two objections. They then propose an evidence of evidence thesis involving the notion of a defeater. There is much to learn from their very careful discussion. I argue, though, that their objections fail and that their evidence of evidence thesis is open to counterexample.

Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske’s theory on which the knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the knowledge denied by its negative side? The (...) second puzzle, PUZZLE 2, is substantive. Each of the following theses has some prima facie plausibility: there is introspective knowledge of thoughts, knowledge requires evidence, and there are no experiences of thoughts. It is unclear, though, that these claims form a consistent set. These puzzles are not unrelated. Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is a potential solution to PUZZLE 2 in that Dretske’s theory is meant to show how,, and can all be true. We provide a solution to PUZZLE 1 by appeal to Dretske’s early work in the philosophy of language on contrastive focus. We then distinguish between “Closure” and “Transmissibility”, and raise and answer a worry to the effect that Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge runs counter to Transmissibility. These results help to secure Dretske’s theory as a viable solution to PUZZLE 2. (shrink)

We argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr = Pr. We defended this screening-off thesis by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called (...) “SOT*”, and contends that it too gives the wrong result. We here reply to Climenhaga’s arguments and suggest that SOT provides a criticism of the widely held theory of inference called “inference to the best explanation”. (shrink)

The reflection of global justice demands an innovative revision of traditional patterns of argument of political theory. How can moral responsibility be defined in connection with intergovernmental action? Ethical, institutional, and logical implications of a human legal foundation of intergovernmental justice are discussed in three theoretical chapters in this book. Further chapters deal with the structure of intergovernmental responsibility in connection with ethics of peace, humanitarian intervention, the fight against poverty, as well as migration. Moreover, the book analyzes governmental liability (...) and collective political duties towards individuals, who are citizens of other states. (shrink)

The concept of vulnerability is widely used in research ethics to signal attention to participants who require special protections in research. However, this concept is vague and under‐theorized. There is also growing concern that the dominant categorical approach to vulnerability (as exemplified by research ethics regulations and guidelines delineating vulnerable groups) is ethically problematic because of its assumptions about groups of people and is, in fact, not very guiding. An agreed‐upon strategy is to move from categorical towards analytical approaches (focused (...) on analyzing types and sources of vulnerability) to vulnerability. Beyond this agreement, however, scholars have been advancing competing accounts of vulnerability without consensus about its appropriate operationalization in research ethics. Based on previous debates, we propose that a comprehensive account of vulnerability for research ethics must include four components: definition, normative justifications, application, and implications. Concluding that no existing accounts integrate these components in a functional (i.e., practically applicable) manner, we propose an integrative and functional account of vulnerability inspired by pragmatist theory and enriched by bioethics literature. Using an example of research on deep brain stimulation for treatment‐resistant depression, we illustrate how the integrative‐functional account can guide the analysis of vulnerability in research within a pragmatist, evidence‐based approach to research ethics. While ultimately there are concerns to be addressed in existing research ethics guidelines on vulnerability, the integrative‐functional account can serve as an analytic tool to help researchers, research ethics boards, and other relevant actors fill in the gaps in the current landscape of research ethics governance. (shrink)

The concept of rationality, predominantly in the guise of rational choice theory, plays a key role in the social sciences. Yet, whilst rational choice theory is usually understood as part of positive political science, it is also widely employed within normative political theories. In this paper, we examine how allegedly positive rational choice arguments can find application within normative political theories. To this effect, we distinguish between two interpretations of rationality ascriptions, one empirical, the other normative. Since, as we demonstrate, (...) empirical readings of the rationality assumption cannot convincingly explain the role of rational choice arguments in normative theories, we argue that the rationality assumption should be given a normative interpretation. We conclude by considering what this result implies for the use of rational choice arguments in normative and positive political science. (shrink)

Akratic actions are often being thought to instantiate a paradigmatic self-control failure. . If we suppose that akrasia is opposed to self-control, the question is how akratic actions could be free and intentional. After all, it would seem that it is only if an action manifests self-control that it can count as free. My plan is to explore the relation between akrasia and self-control. The first section presents what I shall call the standard conception, according to which akrasia and self-control (...) are contraries, and introduces the puzzle that this conception raises. The second section turns to the arguments for and against the possibility of free and intentional akratic actions. The third section questions the claim that akratic actions are necessarily opposed to actions manifesting self-control. (shrink)

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...) serving the 'somatic nervous system[. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and “low level” than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is 'descriptive' (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than 'normative' (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness. (shrink)

Les savants de langue syriaque - une branche de l'arameen - ont joue un role aujourd'hui reconnu dans la transmission du patrimoine philosophique et scientifique grec aux auteurs de langue arabe, et cela grace aux nombreuses traductions qu ...

The aim of the present study was to further examine the impact over time of single‐sex and coeducational school environments on girls’ motivation in language arts and mathematics. Two cohorts comprising 340 girls from eight coeducational and two single‐sex schools were followed during a period of three academic years in a longitudinal research scheme. Data were collected with a self‐reported questionnaire including several scales: parental and teachers’ support, competence beliefs, utility‐value and achievement goals. In general, mixed‐design repeated measures analyses of (...) variance indicated no effect of the environment or of the interaction between environment and time of measurement. Significant time effects on several variables indicated a general decline of achievement motivation over time. Consequently, the multiplication of non‐mixed high schools, as proposed by some, would constitute an expensive and inefficient social policy, as far as girls’ motivation is concerned. (shrink)

Feminism and Ecological Communities presents a bold and passionate rethinking of teh ecofeminist movement. It is one of the first books to acknowledge the importance of postmodern feminist arguments against ecofeminism whilst persuasively preseenting a strong new case for econolocal feminism. Chris J.Cuomo first traces the emergence of ecofeminism from the ecological and feminist movements before clearly discussing the weaknesses of some ecofeminist positions. Exploring the dualisms of nature/culture and masculing/feminine that are the bulwark of many contemporary ecofeminist positions and (...) questioning traditional traditional feminist analyses of gender and caring, Feminism and Ecological Communities asks whether women are essentially closer to nature than men and how we ought to link the oppression of women, people of colour, and other subjugated groups to the degradation of nature. Chris J.Cuomo addresses these key issues by drawing on recent work in feminist ethics as well as teh work of diverse figures such as Aristotle, John Dewey, Donna Haraway adn Maria Lugones. A fascinating feature of the book is the use of the metaphor of the cyborg to highlight the fluidity of the nature/culture distinction and how this can enrich econfeminist ethics and politics. An outstanding new argument for an ecological feminism that links both theory and practice, Feminism and Ecological Communities bravely redraws the ecofeminist map. It will be essential reading for all those interested in gender studies, environmental studies and philosophy. (shrink)

It would be easy enough to support the claim that the man who introduced post-Kantian idealism into the French universities did so primarily because he found in this system a way to demonstrate the Spiritualist doctrine which came from Biran, the Eclectics, and particularly from Ravaisson. Idealism, in effect, was to Jules Lachelier more of a premise than a conclusion. Now although it might be true that post-Kantianism had been able to provide the right kind of support for the main (...) Spiritualist beliefs, notably the thesis of the reality of Spirit, its presence in nature, and indeed its primacy over nature, the fact remains, and this is what I shall attempt to show, that this idealism is incompatible with a notion that plays a prominent role in the Spiritualist doctrine: that of the existence of a transcendent God. Here, then, is what I should like to claim: that the same principles which were used to prove the Spiritual nature of both thought and matter should render impossible not only the proof of a transcendent God, but also the mere entertaining of the hypothesis of such a being. (shrink)

It would be easy enough to support the claim that the man who introduced post-Kantian idealism into the French universities did so primarily because he found in this system a way to demonstrate the Spiritualist doctrine which came from Biran, the Eclectics, and particularly from Ravaisson. Idealism, in effect, was to Jules Lachelier more of a premise than a conclusion. Now although it might be true that post-Kantianism had been able to provide the right kind of support for the main (...) Spiritualist beliefs, notably the thesis of the reality of Spirit, its presence in nature, and indeed its primacy over nature, the fact remains, and this is what I shall attempt to show, that this idealism is incompatible with a notion that plays a prominent role in the Spiritualist doctrine: that of the existence of a transcendent God. Here, then, is what I should like to claim: that the same principles which were used to prove the Spiritual nature of both thought and matter should render impossible not only the proof of a transcendent God, but also the mere entertaining of the hypothesis of such a being. (shrink)

This article is a reflection on the relation between two currents of classical philosophy, postkantian idealism and cartesian spiritualism, as they are found in the work of J. Lachelier. It studies why it was expected that postkantian idealism would bring strong evidence in support of the spiritualist affirmations, even though the kantian critique placed the method that traditionaly justified those affirmations in a state of crisis, and even though ideas as important as those of an afterlife and of a transcendant (...) God where excluded from this new system and taken over by religious belief. However, the analysis of the concept of idealism invites us to think that, even as beliefs, such ideas will always remain redhibitory for a system that begins with the negation of anything beyond thought. (shrink)

Maine de Biran passe à raison pour avoir rénové l'empirisme. Mais il semble qu'on n'ait pas toujours aperçu à quelle distance il a porté de son origine la méthode issue de Locke et de Condillac. Nous voudrions montrer ici comment il a pu infléchir la tradition empiriste dans un sens complètement opposé aux doctrines de ses fondateurs, comment il en a pu tirer une anthropologie tout à fait nouvelle, où l'homme n'apparaissait plus comme un élément de la nature, non plus (...) d'ailleurs que de la pensée, mais comme le principe absolu de tout ce qui est susceptible d'exister pour lui. Nous laisserons de côté le problème purement historique qu'a pu poser l'évolution personnelle de l'auteur par rapport à sa propre philosophic, et qui s'est notamment manifesté par l'abandon de la morale stoïcienne dans la dernière période de sa vie, de même que par la conversion tardive à certaines thèses, platoniciennes et substantialistes, sur la nature du moi. Ce qui sera examiné, c'est le biranisme tel qu'il fut, tel qu'il commença de se constituer, aux alentours de 1799, avec le premier Mémoire sur l'habitude. (shrink)

Any inquiry into the meaning and implications of the prolongation of the human lifespan requires an investigation of its metaphysical basis and its ethical outcomes. This chapter explains a series of metaphysical and ethical claims about lifespan extension. It highlights a number of arguments that are typically put forward against these claims, and shows the ways in which they are mistaken. Two such claims given in the chapter are: (1) aging and life stages are neither wholly constituted by biological givens, (...) nor wholly understandable in terms of biological parameters; instead, aging and life stages are, in crucial ways, socially constructed; and (2) death is bad, and other things being equal, a longer life is a better life. (shrink)

The man and his times -- Early epistemology -- The new scientific mind -- Fragmentation and the temptation of ontology -- Fire, water, and the material imagination -- Air, earth, and the dynamic imagination -- A phenomenology of the creative imagination.

This book evaluates the major debates around which the discipline of international relations has developed in the light of contemporary feminist theories. The three debates (realist versus idealist, scientific versus traditional, modernist versus postmodernist) have been subject to feminist theorising since the earliest days of known feminist activities, with the current emphasis on feminist, empiricist standpoint and postmodernist ways of knowing. Christine Sylvester shows how feminist theorising could have affected our understanding of international relations had it been included in (...) the three debates. She elaborates a feminist method of empathetically cooperative conversation which challenges the identity politics of IR, and illustrates that method with reference to the Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp and the efforts of Zimbabwean women to negotiate international funding for their local producer cooperatives. (shrink)

There are several types of characters in video games: the main protagonist/hero, the countless non-player characters (NPCs), and persistent non-player characters (PNPCs). While there is a substantial body of research about PNPCs from a game design point of view, they have been largely ignored by the academic community from a narrative perspective. The current essay aims to evaluate whether video game playing experience has an impact on a player’s reliance on the guidance of PNPCs in game play and if a (...) higher degree of experience enables a player to have a better appreciation for the narrative qualities of PNPCs as well as their complexity as characters. (shrink)