Metasemantics for the Relaxed

In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 16. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 108-133 (2021)
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Abstract

In this paper, I develop a metasemantics for relaxed moral realism. More precisely, I argue that relaxed realists should be inferentialists about meaning and explain that the role of evaluative moral vocabulary is to organise and structure language exit transitions, much as the role of theoretical vocabulary is to organise and structure language entry transitions.

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Author's Profile

Christine Tiefensee
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Citations of this work

Practical Commitment in Normative Discourse.Pekka Vayrynen - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).
.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
What is (Neo-)Pragmatists’ Function?Sebastian Köhler - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):653-669.
Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):107-121.
Handling rejection.Derek Baker & Jack Woods - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):159-190.

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References found in this work

Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.

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