Les hypothèses sur l’innéité d’un trait formulées par les sciences cognitives – l’hypothèse d’une faculté innée de langage, par exemple – peuvent-elles échapper à la tautologie? Aucune définition générale de l’innéité ne semble pleinement satisfaisante. En tant que notion dispositionnelle, l’innéité rencontre le « problème de la tautologie » mis en évidence par Locke. Les jugements en matière d’innéité, qu’ils relèvent d’une théorie innéiste ou d’une théorie empiriste , dépendent toujours d’une vision particulière du développement cognitif. Ce fait ne condamne (...) pourtant pas ces jugements à la tautologie mais offre au contraire un critère opératoire externe qui permet de les justifier : une explication développementale jugée pertinente permettra de formuler des hypothèses solides en matière d’innéité. (shrink)

Les hypothèses sur l’innéité d’un trait formulées par les sciences cognitives – l’hypothèse d’une faculté innée de langage, par exemple – peuvent-elles échapper à la tautologie? Aucune définition générale de l’innéité ne semble pleinement satisfaisante. En tant que notion dispositionnelle, l’innéité rencontre le « problème de la tautologie » mis en évidence par Locke. Les jugements en matière d’innéité, qu’ils relèvent d’une théorie innéiste ou d’une théorie empiriste (puisque même les empiristes doivent en formuler), dépendent toujours d’une vision particulière du (...) développement cognitif. Ce fait ne condamne pourtant pas ces jugements à la tautologie mais offre au contraire un critère opératoire externe qui permet de les justifier : une explication développementale jugée pertinente permettra de formuler des hypothèses solides en matière d’innéité. (shrink)

L’article se propose d’explorer l’usage que Chomsky fait de la référence à la philosophie de Descartes. À partir des années 1950, le linguiste et philosophe Noam Chomsky remet l’innéisme sur le devant de la scène en défendant l’existence d’une faculté innée de langage. Comme l’indique sans équivoque le titre de son ouvrage paru en 1966, La linguistique cartésienne, Chomsky inscrit sa pensée dans la tradition cartésienne. Mais ce que Chomsky entend par « faculté innée » est-il vraiment similaire à ce (...) que Descartes nomme « idée innée »? L’usage que fait Chomsky de Descartes relève-t-il simplement d’un procédé rhétorique, comme le soutiennent certains commentateurs, ou est-il le signe d’une authentique proximité conceptuelle? Selon certains commentateurs, cet usage est purement rhétorique. D’une part, le tournant naturaliste opéré au XXe siècle a déplacé la réflexion sur l’esprit d’un plan métaphysique purement a priori à un plan scientifique purement empirique. D’autre part, le domaine où s’exerce prioritairement la pensée de Chomsky – le domaine linguistique – est un domaine largement ignoré par Descartes. Enfin, concevoir l'esprit comme contenant des facultés spécifiques innées paraît incompatible avec le caractère indifférencié et uniforme de l’esprit cartésien. L’article entend montrer au contraire que l’usage que fait Chomsky de Descartes révèle un véritable air de famille entre innéisme chomskyen et innéisme cartésien. D’une part, c’est bien le caractère a priori des principes que Chomsky postule qui fait écho aux idées innées cartésiennes. D’autre part, Chomsky dessine une tradition linguistique de type rationaliste qui pose l’universalité des structures grammaticales au nom de l’universalité même des caractères distinctifs fondamentaux de l’esprit que l’on trouve chez Descartes. Enfin, Descartes et Chomsky défendent tous deux un innéisme dispositionnel. En somme, l’article conclut que ce qui relie Chomsky à Descartes n’est pas la définition de la grammaire universelle innée, que ce dernier n’aurait, sans doute, pas acceptée ; c’est une manière similaire de poser le problème de l’acquisition de la connaissance, et partant de le résoudre. (shrink)

L’article se propose d’explorer l’usage que Chomsky fait de la référence à la philosophie de Descartes. À partir des années 1950, le linguiste et philosophe Noam Chomsky remet l’innéisme sur le devant de la scène en défendant l’existence d’une faculté innée de langage. Comme l’indique sans équivoque le titre de son ouvrage paru en 1966, La linguistique cartésienne, Chomsky inscrit sa pensée dans la tradition cartésienne. Mais ce que Chomsky entend par « faculté innée » est-il vraiment similaire à ce (...) que Descartes nomme « idée innée »? L’usage que fait Chomsky de Descartes relève-t-il simplement d’un procédé rhétorique, comme le soutiennent certains commentateurs, ou est-il le signe d’une authentique proximité conceptuelle? Selon certains commentateurs, cet usage est purement rhétorique. D’une part, le tournant naturaliste opéré au XXe siècle a déplacé la réflexion sur l’esprit d’un plan métaphysique purement a priori à un plan scientifique purement empirique. D’autre part, le domaine où s’exerce prioritairement la pensée de Chomsky – le domaine linguistique – est un domaine largement ignoré par Descartes. Enfin, concevoir l'esprit comme contenant des facultés spécifiques innées paraît incompatible avec le caractère indifférencié et uniforme de l’esprit cartésien. L’article entend montrer au contraire que l’usage que fait Chomsky de Descartes révèle un véritable air de famille entre innéisme chomskyen et innéisme cartésien. D’une part, c’est bien le caractère a priori des principes que Chomsky postule qui fait écho aux idées innées cartésiennes. D’autre part, Chomsky dessine une tradition linguistique de type rationaliste qui pose l’universalité des structures grammaticales au nom de l’universalité même des caractères distinctifs fondamentaux de l’esprit que l’on trouve chez Descartes. Enfin, Descartes et Chomsky défendent tous deux un innéisme dispositionnel. En somme, l’article conclut que ce qui relie Chomsky à Descartes n’est pas la définition de la grammaire universelle innée, que ce dernier n’aurait, sans doute, pas acceptée ; c’est une manière similaire de poser le problème de l’acquisition de la connaissance, et partant de le résoudre. (shrink)

Facultés, concepts, théories et modules innés... Le débat philosophique contemporain sur la structure naturelle de l'esprit multiplie les références aux idées innées. Noam Chomsky lui-même, défenseur d'une faculté innée de langage, s'inscrit dans la lignée de la philosophie moderne. Mais les idées innées contemporaines ont-elles le même sens que celles posées par Descartes et Leibniz? Les progrès des sciences biologiques et cognitives permettent-ils d'attester ou d'infirmer l'existence des idées innées? L'étude analyse les théories modernes et contemporaines des idées innées puis (...) propose une définition de l'innéisme qui démontre l'actualité du débat amorcé à l'âge classique entre innéisme et empirisme."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Is it possible, and in the first place is it even desirable, to define what "development" means and to determine the scope of the field called "developmental biology"? Though these questions appeared crucial for the founders of "developmental biology" in the 1950s, there seems to be no consensus today about the need to address them. Here, in a combined biological, philosophical, and historical approach, we ask whether it is possible and useful to define biological development, and, if such a definition (...) is indeed possible and useful, which definition can be considered as the most satisfactory. (shrink)

A commitment to receive input from stakeholders is often obligatory in the crafting of environmental policies. This requirement is presumed to satisfy certain conditions of democracy. In this article, by drawing from pragmatism, we examine the logic of participation and prerequisites of the meaningful game of asking for and giving reasons. We elaborate the nature and significance of three components—the game, the pleadings, and the reasons. We conclude by offering the conditions under which the stakeholder game might be considered legitimate.

This comprehensive and up-to-date textbook gives a clear account of the different philosophical and theoretical approaches to psychology and discusses major philosophical questions such as free will and the relation between mind and body.

There are some arguments supporting the pessimistic meta-induction, coming from the direction of quantum theory (A. Kukla and J. Walmsley), from the direction of Laudan’s list with successful but false theories, and from the specific direction of the phlogiston theory (whom Kukla Walmsley, and S. Psillos consider to be false). Against these arguments we believe we can successfully oppose, in the first case the interactive quantum realism of I. Niiniluoto, in the second case the realism of the theoretical theoretical constituents (...) responsible for the empirical success of the theories of S. Psillos, and in the third case the analysis of the phlogiston theory done by V. Verronen, R. Vihalemm and E. McMullin (who suggested that this theory was simultaneously insufficiently mature and approximately true). Our conclusion does not necessary prove that the perspective of the scientific realism is true, but rather that the pessimistic meta-induction attack against it proves to be unconvincing. (shrink)

Trait Selective Abortions (TSA) have come under critique as a medical practice that presents potential disabled infants as burdens and lacking the potential for meaningful lives. This paper, using the author’s background as a disabled person, contends that the philosophy underpinning TSAs reflects liberal society’s lack of a theory of needs. The author argues for a care ethics based approach informed by disability analyses to engage with TSAs.

The article discusses some facts of C. G. Jung's direct appeal to the ideas of I. Kant. The main part of the article is preceded by statistical data on the mention of various philosophers in the Collected Works of Jung. It is not surprising that Kant leads in the number of links to his ideas or personality in Jung’s heritage. Then I show examples of the mention of Kant in Jung’s correspondence, which allow understand the fundamental philosophical background of analytical (...) psychology better. For this purpose in particular I give excerpts from which it becomes clear that the creator of the analytical psychology, unlike his predecessor C. G. Carus, never hypostasized the collective unconscious, because Jung believed that this is a thing in itself. Also by correspondence it is clear that Jung grasped Kant’s criticism of the rational proofs of existence of God well. Then I point out how apriorism is manifested in analytical psychology. Also I explain briefly how to understand that archetypes and instincts are necessary a priori conditions for the formation of psychic experience. In conclusion, the reasons are given for which Kant and Jung rejected the fundamental possibility of the existence of psychology in the status of strict science. -/- В статье рассматриваются некоторые факты прямого обращения К. Г. Юнга к идеям И. Канта. Основная часть статьи предваряется статистическими данными по упоминанию различных философов в 20-томном академическом собрании сочинений Юнга. Совершенно не удивительно, что по количеству ссылок лидирует Кант. Далее приводятся конкретные примеры упоминания родоначальника немецкой классической философии в переписке Юнга, что позволяет лучше понять фундаментальную философскую подоплёку аналитической психологии. Так, приводятся отрывки, из которых становится ясно, что создатель аналитической психологии, в отличие от своего предшественника К. Г. Каруса, никогда не гипостазировал коллективное бессознательное, считая, что это вещь в себе. Также по переписке видно, что Юнг усвоил произведённую Кантом критику доказательств бытия Божия. Затем в статье указывается, каким образом в аналитической психологии проявляется априоризм. Кратко объясняется, как следует понимать то, что архетипы и инстинкты являются необходимыми априорными условиями формирования психического опыта. В заключение приводятся основания, по которым Кант и Юнг отвергали принципиальную возможность существования психологии в статусе строгой науки, и которые до сих пор не преодолены. (shrink)

Crosslinguistically, the same modal words can be used to express a wide range of interpretations. This crosslinguistic trend supports a Kratzerian analysis, where each modal has a core lexical entry and where the difference between an epistemic and a root interpretation is contextually determined. A long-standing problem for such a unified account is the equally robust crosslinguistic correlation between a modal’s interpretation and its syntactic behavior: epistemics scope high (in particular higher than tense and aspect) and roots low, a fact (...) which has led to proposals that hardwire different syntactic positions for epistemics and roots (cf. Cinque’s hierarchy). This paper argues that the range of interpretations a modal receives is even more restricted: a modal must be keyed to certain time-individual pairs, but not others. I show that this can be captured straightforwardly by minimally modifying the Kratzerian account: modals are relative to an event—rather than a world—of evaluation, which readily provides a time (the event’s running time) and (an) individual(s) (the event’s participants). I propose that this event relativity of modals can in turn explain the correlation between type of interpretation and syntactic position, without stipulation of an interpretation-specific height for modals. (shrink)

In this article, I critically reassess Iris Marion Young's late works, which centre on the distinction between liability and social connection responsibility. I concur with Young's diagnosis that structural injustices call for a new conception of responsibility, but I reject several core assumptions that underpin her distinction between two models and argue for a different way of conceptualising responsibility to address structural injustices. I show that Young's categorical separation of guilt and responsibility is not supported by the writings of Hannah (...) Arendt, which Young draws on, and that it is also untenable on independent systematic grounds. Furthermore, I argue that several of Young's other criteria fail to clearly demarcate two distinct phenomena. I therefore propose to transcend Young's distinction between two models in favour of a related, but conceptually different distinction between two forms of responsibility: interactional and structural. Embracing this terminology facilitates the conceptualisation of the general features of responsibility that are shared by both forms, including their retrospective and prospective time-direction and their applicability to individual, joint and group agency. The distinction between interactional and structural responsibility also yields a more compelling general account of the role of background structures, and of blame within ascriptions of political responsibility. (shrink)

This study examines to what extent perceived corporate social responsibility reduces employee cynicism, and whether trust plays a mediating role in the relationship between CSR and employee cynicism. Three distinct contributions beyond the existing literature are offered. First, the relationship between perceived CSR and employee cynicism is explored in greater detail than has previously been the case. Second, trust in the company leaders is positioned as a mediator of the relationship between CSR and employee cynicism. Third, we disaggregate the measure (...) of CSR and explore the links between this and with employee cynicism. Our findings illustrate that the four distinct dimensions of CSR of Carroll are indirectly linked to employee cynicism via organizational trust. In general terms, our findings will help company leaders to understand employees’ counterproductive reactions to an organization, the importance of CSR for internal stakeholders, and the need to engage in trust recovery. (shrink)

This paper discusses the interaction of aspect and modality, and focuses on the puzzling implicative effect that arises when perfective aspect appears on certain modals: perfective somehow seems to force the proposition expressed by the complement of the modal to hold in the actual world, and not merely in some possible world. I show that this puzzling behavior, originally discussed in Bhatt (1999, Covert modality in non-finite contexts) for the ability modal, extends to all modal auxiliaries with a circumstantial modal (...) base (i.e., root modals ), while epistemic interpretations of the same modals are immune to the effect. I propose that implicative readings are contingent on the relative position of the modal w.r.t. aspect: when aspect scopes over the modal (as I argue is the case for root modals), it forces an actual event, thereby yielding an implicative reading. When a modal element scopes over aspect, no actual event is forced. This happens (i) with epistemics, which structurally appear above tense and aspect; (ii) with imperfective on a root modal: imperfective brings in an additional layer of modality, itself responsible for removing the necessity for an actual event. This proposal enables us to solve the puzzle while maintaining a standardized semantics for aspects and modals. (shrink)

How do children learn the meanings of propositional attitude verbs? We argue that children use information contained in both syntactic distribution and pragmatic function to zero in on the appropriate meanings. Specifically, we identify a potentially universal link between semantic subclasses of attitude verbs, their syntactic distribution and the kinds of indirect speech acts they can be used to perform. As a result, children can use the syntax as evidence about the meaning, which in turn constrains the kinds of pragmatic (...) enrichments they do and do not make in understanding these verbs in conversation. (shrink)

Cumulative technological culture can be defined as the progressive diversification, complexification, and enhancement of technological traits through generations. An outstanding issue is to specify the cognitive bases of this phenomenon. Based on the literature, we identified four potential cognitive factors: namely, theory-of-mind, technical-reasoning, creativity, and fluid-cognitive skills. The goal of the present study was to test which of these factors—or a combination thereof—best predicted the cumulative performance in two experimental, micro-society conditions differing in the nature of the interaction allowed between (...) participants. The task was to build the highest possible tower. Participants were also assessed on the four aforementioned cognitive factors in order to predict cumulative performance and attractiveness. Our findings indicate that technical-reasoning skills are the best predictor of cumulative performance, even if their role may be restricted to the specific technological domain. Theory-of-mind skills may have a facilitator role, particularly in the Communication condition. Creativity can also help in the generation of novel ideas, but it is not sufficient to support innovation. Finally, fluid cognition is not involved in cumulative technological culture. Taken together, these findings suggest that domain-specific knowledge remains critical for explaining cumulative technological culture. (shrink)

This special issue is a result of The Bucharest Colloquium in Analytic Philosophy dedicated to Frege's philosophy of mathematics and language. It was held at the Research Center for Logic, H...

In this conceptual paper, we propose that both skill set development and mindset development would be desirable dimensions of negotiation training. The second dimension has received little attention thus far, but negotiation mindsets, i.e., the psychological orientations by which people approach negotiations, are likely to have a considerable influence on the outcome of negotiations. Referring to empirical and conceptual mindset studies from outside the negotiation field, we argue that developing mindsets can leverage the effectiveness of skills and knowledge, increase learning (...) transfer, and lead to long-term behavioral changes. We introduce an integrative negotiation mindset that comprises three inclinations which complement each other: a collaborative, a curious, and a creative one. We also discuss activities that help people to develop and enhance this mindset both in and out of the classroom. Our general claim is that by moving beyond the activities of conventional negotiation training, which focuses on skills and knowledge, mindset-oriented negotiation training can increase training effectiveness and enable participants to more often reach what we define as sustainable integrative agreements. (shrink)

In this article, I set out Suárez's conception of the demon's obstinacy. For Suárez, the demons’ obstinacy is a divine punishment. It is the result of the free and awful choice to turn away from God that the demons have decided to make, the main consequence of which is the loss of the freedom to will and to do the good. Taking up Aquinas’s conception, Suárez considers that the demonic nature is irredeemably corrupt and obstinate in evil. Demons are provided (...) only with a miserable freedom, consisting of the possibility to choose between different evils. Perpetually sinful and eternally constrained to remain so, they are condemned to wretchedness, to complacency in evil, and to the unremitting torments of hell. (shrink)

This study focuses on the differences in the perception of business ethics across two groups of management students from France and Romania (n = 220). Data was collected via the ATBEQ to measure preferences for three business philosophies: Machiavellianism, Social Darwinism, and Moral Objectivism. The results show that Romanian students present more favorable attitudes toward Machiavellianism than French students; whereas, French students valued Social Darwinism and Moral Objectivism more highly. For Machiavellianism and Moral Objectivism the results are consistent with the (...) literature and our hypotheses. However, contrary to our expectations, we find that Social Darwinism is more important in France than Romania. The results indicate that religious practice does not influence preferences for the three business philosophies. In terms of gender differences, women have less favorable attitudes toward Machiavellianism and more favorable attitudes toward Moral Objectivism than men. (shrink)

Consumer boycotts have become a frequent form of social protest in the digital age. The corporate malpractices motivating them are varied, including environmental pollution, lack of minimum labour standards, severe mistreatment of animals, lobbying and misinformation campaigns, collaboration or complicity with illegitimate political regimes, and systematic tax evasion and tax fraud. In this article, I argue that organised consumer boycotts should be regarded as a legitimate and purposeful instrument for structural change, provided they conform to a number of normative criteria. (...) In order to show this, the practice and empirical context of consumer boycotts are first outlined. I then lay out and refute three general objections to this practice. Although each of these objections fails, their discussion generates insights concerning the normative standards with which boycotters must comply if they want their campaigns to be both legitimate and successful. These normative criteria are detailed along the lines of two guiding principles, proportionality and transparency. In the final step, I elaborate on structural change as the deeper purpose of consumer boycotts. (shrink)

This study intends to show that the question whether faith can be justified without proofs can be resolved by importing ideas from Kierkegaard’s and Plantinga’s affirmative take on the matter. There is a deep similarity between the way they understand belief in God and belief in Christianity: for both the first is considered universal human knowledge and the second seen as a gift from God. Against the charge that such an understanding is irrational Plantinga offers an externalist epistemological model which (...) allows those beliefs to be warranted. The authors also share the modern idea that there is an objective truth, combining it with the postmodern stance that no method exists which would guarantee access to it. A specific contribution on Kierkegaard’s part to the understanding of the rationality of transitions toward a Christian stage of existence is to show in detail the way in which such transitions are mediated through inwardnes - a perspective akin to Michael Polanyi’s scientific epistemology. One can see in both authors not only a deep commonality of ideas, but also a remarkable way in which their understandings augment each other. Whereas Plantinga’s inquiry contributes to the rational plausibility of a “Justified Faith without Reasons” project, Kierkegaard’s venture balances such a logical-analytic effort with a deep existential inquiry. (shrink)

Accusations of hypocrisy are a recurring theme in the public debate on climate change, but their significance remains poorly understood. Different motivations are associated with this accusation, which is leveled by proponents and opponents of climate action. In this article, I undertake a systematic assessment of climate hypocrisy, with a focus on lifestyle and political hypocrisy. I contextualize the corresponding accusation, introduce criteria for the conceptual analysis of climate hypocrisy, and develop an evaluative framework that allows us to determine its (...) moral significance. I argue that different instances of climate hypocrisy are problematic to different degrees, depending on how detrimental they are to an agent's attainment of environmental integrity. The resulting framework helps clear the confusion caused by disinformation campaigners, by distinguishing objectionable uses of the climate hypocrisy charge from constructive ones motivated by genuine concern for integrity. (shrink)

Among others, the recent work of Janine Idziak presents Andrew of Neufchateau (†1400) as a fervent advocate of “divine command ethics,” a promoter of radical voluntarism, according to which moral values depend solely on the divine will. One example that illustrates this theory is the “hatred of God” (odium Dei ), often discussed in the fourteenth century. Since moral values depend on the divine will, it can be morally good to hate God if that is his command. Andrew has been (...) seen and is still seen today as a supporter of this view. The present paper aims to reconsider this interpretation. (shrink)

The international #MeToo campaign against sexual harassment constitutes the most prominent contemporary campaign against sexual harassment worldwide. It exposed the issue by undermining the ‘culture of silence’ prevailing in several contexts, including political institutions. This article analyses one specific variant of #MeToo, the campaign MeTooEP that emerged in the European Parliament. MeTooEP is unique in many ways: it was the first collective action against sexual harassment in parliaments emerging in the #MeToo aftermath and it was the first collective action within (...) the EP led by members of the staff, which eventually drove some internal policy changes. Using a unique, large interview dataset, the analysis shows how the actors behind MeTooEP were crucial in shaping the campaign. Their knowledge of institutional rules, practices and daily presence in the EP facilitated their advocacy and transformed the Parliament into an enabling platform for their actions. With the help of Feminist Institutionalism, the analysis demonstrates how the formal and informal institutional EP bodies with their rules and regulations shaped MeTooEP in ways that constrained and empowered it. (shrink)

Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed (...) to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not thesufficient and necessaryconditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy. (shrink)

We compare two different elicitation methods for measuring risk attitudes on a sample of French farmers. We consider the lottery tasks initially proposed by Holt and Laury (Econ Rev 92:1644–1655, 2002) and by Eckel and Grossman (Evol Hum Behav 23:281–295, 2002; J Econ Behav Org 68:1–7, 2008). The main empirical result from this within-subject study is that risk preference measures are affected by the type of mechanism used. We first show that this risk preference instability can be related to non-expected (...) utility preferences of farmers. Using a risk-taking psychometric questionnaire, we then demonstrate that risk preferences of farmers are context-dependent. This may be another explanation of the observed risk preference instability. (shrink)

The co-evolutionary concept of Three-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined by descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctly) parameters simultaneously, that cannot be instrumental reduced to others ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the trends of biological, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic human evolution by two gear mechanism ˗ gene-cultural co-evolution and techno- humanitarian balance. (...) The resultant each of them can estimated by the ratio of socio-psychological predispositions of humanization/dehumanization in mentality. Explanatory model and methodology of evaluation of creatively teleological evolutionary risk component of NBIC technological complex is proposed. Integral part of the model is evolutionary semantics (time-varying semantic code, the compliance of the biological, socio-cultural and techno-rationalist adaptive modules of human stable evolutionary strategy). (shrink)

Le présent est le miroir du passé et la préfiguration du futur. L’histoire des Roumains, comme celle de nombreuses autres nations européennes, ne déroge pas à cette remarque de sens commun. L’histoire est faite de mentalités collectives, d’accidents politiques, de stratégies sociales et d’actions de personnalités providentielles. L’histoire récente des Roumains ne fait qu’actualiser..

The goal of the paper is to offer an explanation why Frege has changed his Begriffsschrift account of identity to the one presented in Über Sinn und Bedeutung.The main claim of the paper is that in order to better understand Frege’s motivation for the introduction of his distinction between sense and reference, which marks his change of views, one should place this change in its original setting, namely the broader framework of Frege’s fundamental preoccupations with the foundations of arithmetic and (...) logic. The Fregean thesis that mathematics is contentful, and its defense against formalism and psychologism, provides us an valuable interpretative key. Thus, Fregean senses are not just the mere outcome of some profound reflections on language, rather they play an important role in the articulation of Frege’s program in the foundations of arithmetic. (shrink)