At the end of Being and Nothingness, Sartre defines the spirit of seriousness in the following way: “The spirit of seriousness has two characteristics: it considers values as transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity, and it transfers the quality of ‘desirable’ from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution.” My aim in this paper is to show how Sartre is susceptible to a tu quoque in terms of how he describes the threataspect of the world of objects. (...) That is, in works such as Nausea, Sartre appears to regard the world of objects as inherently threatening, and thus he has transferred the quality of threatening from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution. (shrink)

At the end of Being and Nothingness, Sartre defines the spirit of seriousness in the following way: “The spirit of seriousness has two characteristics: it considers values as transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity, and it transfers the quality of ‘desirable’ from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution.” My aim in this paper is to show how Sartre is susceptible to a tu quoque in terms of how he describes the threataspect of the world of objects. (...) That is, in works such as Nausea, Sartre appears to regard the world of objects as inherently threatening, and thus he has transferred the quality of threatening from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A commitment to receive input from stakeholders is often obligatory in the crafting of environmental policies. This requirement is presumed to satisfy certain conditions of democracy. In this article, by drawing from pragmatism, we examine the logic of participation and prerequisites of the meaningful game of asking for and giving reasons. We elaborate the nature and significance of three components—the game, the pleadings, and the reasons. We conclude by offering the conditions under which the stakeholder game might be considered (...) legitimate. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explore the possibility that studies in cerebral commissurotomy (severing of the corpus callosum) may shed some light on Jean-Paul Sartre's account of bad faith. I shall examine this issue from both a descriptive and an explanatory point of view. My conclusion will be that Sartre and various neuroscientists seem generally to agree on the description of self-deception, but they substantially disagree on how the phenomenon is to be explained. I shall argue that Sartre's (...) account does not seem fully adequate, while the neuroscientific approach may have explanatory potential if certain conceptual issues are resolved. I shall also argue that, carefully delimited, the neuroscientific .. (shrink)