This article presents the story of S. A. Yanovskaya's epiphany—particularly, her shift from hard-line communist orthodoxy and hostility towards ‘bourgeois minded’ Soviet-Russian mathematicians to vigorous support of mathematical logic. In light of this evidence, S. A. Yanovskaya (1896–1966) may be considered as a spiritual leader and administrative founder of modern mathematical research and education in the USSR/russia.

The article examines the main ideological content of the work of the community of scientists and philosophers, which entered the history of philosophy under the name “The Vienna Circle”. Representatives of this association viewed their main methodological task in the logical analysis of the language of science in order to eliminate metaphysical – pseudoscientific – concepts. They investigated the structure of scientific theories, the functions of the theory – explanation and prediction, the processes of justification, confirmation and refutation of theories. (...) Their results were widely recognized, set down essential influence on scientific problems as well as style of philosophical and academic studies, and are still included in textbooks on the philosophy of science. The members of the Vienna Circle created the first holistic concept of science, which gave impetus to subsequent developments in the philosophy of science and served as example for the construction of similar concepts. The socio-ideological prerequisite of this philosophical movement was the task of creating a new scientific view of the world, opposing philosophical pessimism and anti-scientism. This worldview, however, was not naive-scientististic, but presented a synthetic project at the intersection of natural science, philosophy, art and social pedagogy. (shrink)

The author analyzes proof and argumentation as a form of appeal to a scientific community with deep ethical meaning. He presents proof primarily as an effort to persuade a scientific community rather than a search for true knowledge, as an instrument by which responsibility is taken for the correctness of the thesis being proved, which usually originates in a sudden flash of insight.

The paper deals with the factors which enabled N. A. Vasiliev to put forward in 1910 - 12 the idea of logics free of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, the idea of metalogic and to construct his imaginary logic as novel non-classical system. It is shown that background of Vasiliev’s ideas lies deeply in Russia’s culture and particular approach to logical discourse. Several Russian scholars expressed ideas similar to Vasiliev’s though not in such explicit form. This period might (...) be called the prehistory of paraconsistency. Real history of paraconsistency starts with N.C.A. da Costa’s works. (shrink)

The author argues that the decline of philosophical thought and research in Russia is over. He describes the state of present-day philosophy in Russia, its background, and prospects for development citing concrete examples and little known facts.Any survey of the state of the philosophy in post-Communist Russia is a complicated task requiring accuracy and completness. Whether I succeed in this task remains to be seen, although I shall be content if I manage to present a clear picture. It will of (...) course be subjective and reflect my interests and preferences, remaining in this sense quite incomplete. But I aim to present a concise survey, identifying the most important trends, personalities, and topics of discussion. (shrink)

This reply draws attention to the importance of taking into account the results of the study of the phenomenon of reflexivity in scientific knowledge, which have been obtained in the domestic philosophical and methodological tradition. We believe that taking this kind of results into account could enrich the analysis of the strong programme in the STS. We touch the origins of reflexive tendencies, the reflexive and non-reflexive in scientific knowledge, personal and transpersonal forms, the types and levels of reflexion in (...) science, as well as denote the mechanisms that allows taking an external position in relation to the subject about which reflexive procedures are carried out. (shrink)

This is review of the book: M. Dafermos. Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory. A Dialectical Perspective to Vygotsky. (Springer: Singapore, 2018. IX, 309 P. ISBN 978‒981‒13‒0190‒2. Doi: 10.1007/978‒981‒13‒0191‒9). The book is devoted to the making of the cultural-historical approach in psychology in the works of Vygotsky. The author claim that Vygotsky, relying on the ideas of Spinoza, Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx, developed this approach by mastering the dialectical method in his Hegel-Marxist version. The atmosphere of the storm and the onslaught in the (...) social and cultural life of the 1920s – early 1930s contributed to the formation of Vygotsky as a thinker with broad interests and deep philosophical background, who experienced several crises in his intellectual development. These crises forced him to qualitatively revise his ideas and, thus, substantially deepen and improve them. The author shows that Vygotsky’s literary origins allow his life compare with a drama, which accompanied by drama and the proliferation of ideas. This, in particular, expressed in his criticism of Gestalt psychology, theory of J. Piaget, ultimately a divergence of views with a number of his students who created Kharkov psychological school. Vygotsky left a great scientific legacy, which includes an analysis from the standpoint of the cultural-historical approach of the nature of consciousness, the relationship between thinking and language, the evolution of personality, a multitude of other psychological problems and art. (shrink)

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, Soviet Russian philosophy did away with ideology in the fields of Science; but until the mid-1980s, scientists could not escape intense ideological scrutiny. A great number of Soviet scientists did their best to avoid this ideological supervision, and pursued their research, remaining neutral toward Marxist ideology. Among these fields of research were so called “philosophical problems of natural sciences”. Some Soviet Russian philosophers put forward original conceptions of scientific development, the structural features (...) of science, and/or provided novel interpretations of certain scientific principles and ideas. These thinkers had deep roots in Marxism, though not orthodox Marxism. They, so to speak, overcame classical Marxism and proposed innovative ideas largely based upon epistemological considerations. The legacies of I. S. Alekseev and M. A. Rozov are especially worthy of attention for their original epistemological contributions to the philosophy of science. (shrink)

The assessment of Soviet logic and philosophy of logic development in the 20th and even the dawn of the twenty-first century shows the tight correlation between state policy towards higher education and the official attitude towards these fields of research. Progressive stages of Russia’s/Soviet State evolvement are marked with positive treatment of logic and philosophy of logic. Reactionary stages may be described in the context of the so-called ideologized science phenomenon, and they are marked by negative treatment of philosophy of (...) logic and even logic as a field of research, stagnation, or, at worst, total abandonment of logical education. This correlation has not been studied well enough. We will fulfill this lacuna from the social studies of science perspective. (shrink)

The paper deals with the heuristic prerequisites of paraconsistent logic in the case of imaginary logic of N.A. Vasiliev proposed in 1910.

The paper deals with the heuristic prerequisites of paraconsistent logic in the case of imaginary logic of N.A. Vasiliev proposed in 1910.

The paper reveals some mostly unnoticed and unexpected trends in reception of novel ideas in science. The author formulates certain principles of the reception of these ideas by scientific communities and justifies them by examples from modern mathematics and non-classical logic.

The paper reveals some mostly unnoticed and unexpected trends in reception of novel ideas in science. The author formulates certain principles of the reception of these ideas by scientific communities and justifies them by examples from modern mathematics and non-classical logic.

This is a review of the book: Sheehan H. Marxism and the Philosophy of Science. A Critical History. The First Hundred Years. (L.: Verso, 2017. XII. 450 p.). The keynote of the book serves the conviction that Marxism is a sort of “super-theory” that can explain not only any social and political life, but also profound philosophy of science, including natural science. Science is presented in the book as a form of social practice. The main idea of the Marxist philosophy (...) of science is the status of the theory of dialectical materialism. The author shows that Marxist ideas could be considered as the origins of many disciplines: the sociology of science, the history of science, the history of technology; they had a noticeable effect on non-Marxist thought as well. However, Stalinism and Lysenkoism significantly decelerated the development of the Marxist philosophy of science. (shrink)

An article by T. Rockmore, published in the journal “Epistemology and Philosophy of Science” in 2009 (Vol. XXII. No. 4, pp. 14‒29), claim that naturalism is by its nature an example of anti-Kantianism, for it treats philosophy as a continuation science and recognizes science as a legitimate source of knowledge, does not allow a priori, relies on an a posteriori approach, empiricism in the pre-Kantian sense, and insists on the possibility of revising the knowledge acquired. This article has a goal (...) to show that T. Rockmore point of view should be revised due to the progress of modern cognitive research and, first of all, neuroscience, in which all the features of the naturalistic approach are implemented and in which the “Kantian program” of brain research is developed. In the context of this program, the existence on the ontological level (i.e., in the brain) of certain neural structures that make it possible and play a crucial role in the cognitive activity of a person is recognized. Those concepts that Kant treated as components of cognitive activity in modern neuroscience acquired ontological status in the form of the activity of certain neural structures, which turn out to be prerequisites and components of this activity. We claim that in the context of the Kantian research program in neuroscience, the metaphor “Kantian brain” naturally entered the vocabulary of neuroscientists, and certain specific operations and functions of the brain began to be associated with individual elements of Kant's ideas. It is in this context attempts are made to comprehend the mechanisms of the brain in the “stimulus – activity” mode, when an external effect leads to the excitation of certain neural structures. The brain is capable to anticipate the long-term results of certain actions of the subject. In the case of foresight, the brain generates “internal” models and uses for their correction external data that constantly provided from reality across the subject. At the same time, some kind of self-correcting mechanisms implements, which from a formal point of view described by the Bayes theorem, using a priori evaluations of upcoming events and changes in these evaluations as result of experience. Thus, naturalism and Kantianism understood in the context of the progress of modern science, despite T. Rockmore idea, are completely compatible. (shrink)

The impact of social factors upon the philosophical investigations in a broad sense is quite evident. Nevertheless their impact upon epistemology as a branch of philosophy, logic, and history of science as fields of research with noticeable philosophical content is not evident enough. We are keen to claim that this impact exists within some limits, although it is not so overtly evident. Moreover in the case of Marxism it is of a paradoxical nature. Marxism always puts the accent on the (...) role of social and economic factors in the development, development of science included. To a large extent due to Marxism, externalism emerged; the key idea of externalism may be expressed through the statement that social and economic reasons are the main sources of development of science. B.M. Hessen declared and did his best in 1931 to justify this statement through the example of the emergence of classical mechanics. Meanwhile the social milieu of Marxist countries placed a taboo on the externalist approach towards epistemology, the interpretation of logic, and history of science. All these fields of knowledge were evolved in the Marxist era in the USSR and Eastern Europe - despite the spirit of Marxism - within strict internalist boarders. We offer the explanation of this contradiction. (shrink)

This paper assesses, from a philosophical point of view, the latest cultural neuroscience results that suggest the traditional interpretation of subject of cognition be essentially reconstructed. We must move from a universalistic interpretation of cognitive process to an interpretation taking into explicit account the socio-cultural context of the subject’s activity, as well as often its biological nature. The principle of cultural and cognitive neurobiological determination of knowledge acquisition is proposed. We claim that subject of cognition is fixed in the historical (...) and cultural context and it neurobiologically determined, and thus classical Kantian transcendentalism should be reconsidered in light of recent neuroscience research. (shrink)

The article deals with the dramatic opposition of psychologism and anti-psychologism. Due to the evident success of classical branches of mathematical logic in XX century psychologism was eliminated for its conceptual insufficiency. However, nonclassical logics and recent neuroscience vigorous development have contributed to the renaissance of psychologism. Author makes an attempt to analyze the reasons for the revival of psychologism and some prospects for keeping its leading position among the other modern cognitive science conceptions. Author claims that the revival of (...) psychologism is closely connected with current neuropsychological studies. The ontogenetic mechanisms of acquisition of socio-cultural experiences by defining the general principles of the construction and configuration of neural circuits of the brain are responsible for the shaping of psychological organization and the nature of the cognitive activity. An analysis of the epigenetic landscape of different people and cultures makes it possible to use the notion of social psychologism. This notion is aimed to reflect some cognitive qualities in their connection with the epigenetic features of certain social communities. (shrink)

Author discusses the specifics of the orthodox Marxist-Leninist philosophical principles in the context of ideological pressure in 1970–1980 s. He analyzes the concepts and approaches that have given rise to some new Post-Marxist ideas. He shows that the revision of the orthodox Marxism was possible exclusively due do the delicate usage of Marxist-Leninist conceptual background. He claims that it was necessary to in order to avoid accusations in revisionism and popularization of ideologically alien views. The author pays special attention to (...) activity approach, which was represented in the works by I.S. Alexeev and M.A. Rozov. He argues that the development of this approach was one of the most significant achievements of non-orthodox Marxism in the Soviet era. (shrink)

. In the XIXth century there was a persistent opposition to Aristotelian logic. Nicolai A. Vasiliev (1880–1940) noted this opposition and stressed that the way for the novel – non-Aristotelian – logic was already paved. He made an attempt to construct non-Aristotelian logic (1910) within, so to speak, the form (but not in the spirit) of the Aristotelian paradigm (mode of reasoning). What reasons forced him to reassess the status of particular propositions and to replace the square of opposition by (...) the triangle of opposition? What arguments did Vasiliev use for the introduction of new classes of propositions and statement of existence of various levels in logic? What was the meaning and role of the “method of Lobachevsky” which was implemented in construction of imaginary logic? Why did psychologism in the case of Vasiliev happen to be an important factor in the composition of the new ‘imaginary’ logic, as he called it? (shrink)