This book examines the contributions of William James, John Dewey, F.C.S. Schiller, C.S. Peirce, George Herbert Mead, and Jane Addams to a case for a pragmatist philosophy of history. Together, they expand our understanding on how we process the past, which impacts our present and our future.

What is an Author? What’s in a name? Marnie Binder asks if it matters who’s writing, and other questions of authorship.

Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset and German philosopher Karl Jaspers were both born in 1883, and they both maintained the position that humans are principally historical beings. Therefore, as attested by this notion itself, there are points in which their philosophy coincides. Ortega argued that human beings have no nature, only history. His argument is that history as such is human nature; what is most natural about being human is the fact of being historical and thus always having historicity. (...) Jaspers maintained the same position that in contemplating historicity, one's focus should not be on human nature in the strictly hereditary sense, because it is one's traditions, not the genetic makeup, that most make one to be human. Jaspers emphasizes the conversion of an existential historic consciousness into a consciousness of historicity that is similar to what can be understood in Ortega as historical perspectivism imbued with pragmatism. (shrink)

This paper argues that a principle manner in which Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset’s historicist maxim ’man has no nature, what he has is history’ can be understood is through a pragmatist basis of anti-dualism, in part inherited from American philosopher John Dewey. The thesis here is that it is not that man has no nature, per se, rather that history is his nature because the two are anti-dualistic concepts; history is our nature because it is comprised of, as (...) famously posited by Ortega, “myself and my circumstance”. Hence, neither philosopher negates that “preparedness”, or “nature”, influences our being and behavior, rather they are arguing, more importantly, that “plasticity”, or nurture, plays a greater role given that this encompasses “nature” when we relate Ortega’s application of “history” to Dewey’s use of “experience”. Our “experiences” create our history, and interpretations as to the nature of them are not only potentially infinite, but they are primarily just that - interpretations, which can also change over time. Hence what we truly are is our history. Although these two philosophers are not frequently linked, there is a clear connection in this basic, Deweyen pragmatist anti-dualism as an elder of Ortega. And even though Dewey, unlike Ortega, wrote little on specifically the discipline of history, much of it was indeed fundamentally historical. (shrink)

This article posits a pragmatist philosophy of history as exemplified in the work of British Philosopher F.C.S. Schiller (1864–1937). Part of this argument for a pragma-tist philosophy of history resides on pragmatism’s key notion of “experience” be-ing presented here as both related to human forces that are operant in history, and the particularly important “temporal” nature within the term, making it also in part “historical.” The goal is to more generally broaden scholarship in pragmatism as both containing important elements of (...) a unique and coherent philosophy of history, and to bring Schiller closer into the academic circle of the history of pragmatist thought. Available for download. (shrink)

José Ortega y Gasset In the roughly 6,000 pages that Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset wrote on the humanities, he covered a wide variety of topics. This captures the kind of thinker he was: one who cannot be strictly categorized to any one school of philosophy. José Ortega y Gasset did not want … Continue reading Gasset, José Ortega y →.

The theory of history is a central topic in Ortega’s writings. The American pragmatists wrote little on history. Ortega had fervent critiques of American Pragmatism. The argument presented here is that there are similarities in his theory on history with a pragmatist view, nonetheless, which can be summarized as a pragmatist perspectivism on the philosophy of history and historiography. Historical data selected for recording is largely determined by pragmatic reasoning; the historical details are useful, meaningful, relevant, and interesting –and continue (...) to be– as they help us solve problems, since a study of the past is effective in helping us better prepare for the future. There is important epistemological and metaphysical value to be found in a pragmatist perspective on history and historiography. (shrink)

Spanish Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset advanced a number of strong criticisms of American pragmatism, yet some pragmatist notions can also be detected in his own philosophy. Within Ortega’s pragmatist perspectivism one can locate the possibility of overcoming one of the principal perceived problems of pragmatism: namely, its tendency toward relativism. This paper focuses on the ways in which Ortega’s discussion of pragmatism pertains to history and historiography. Ortega’s position that history is written from a select number of perspectives is (...) congenial to pragmatist pluralism. What is recorded and continues to thrive in the annals of history is, within a pragmatist framework, whatever continues to be interesting, relevant, useful, and meaningful because it makes a difference – from and for these perspectives. The more of these perspectives we study, the closer we approach what, on Ortega’s view, constitutes the “eternal truth which every period has lived,” because materials initially gathered and framed for pragmatic reasons can later on provide important opportunities for the reflexive analysis of historical knowledge. (shrink)

Spanish Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset advanced a number of strong criticisms of American pragmatism, yet some pragmatist notions can also be detected in his own philosophy. Within Ortega’s pragmatist perspectivism one can locate the possibility of overcoming one of the principal perceived problems of pragmatism: namely, its tendency toward relativism. This paper focuses on the ways in which Ortega’s discussion of pragmatism pertains to history and historiography. Ortega’s position that history is written from a select number of perspectives is (...) congenial to pragmatist pluralism. What is recorded and continues to thrive in the annals of history is, within a pragmatist framework, whatever continues to be interesting, relevant, useful, and meaningful because it makes a difference – from and for these perspectives. The more of these perspectives we study, the closer we approach what, on Ortega’s view, constitutes the “eternal truth which every period has lived,” because materials initially gathered and framed for pragmatic reasons can later on provide important opportunities for the reflexive analysis of historical knowledge. (shrink)

A pragmatist philosopher of history asks what practical difference it makes for this or that historical “fact” to be taken as “useful and meaningful,” and then consider that the principal motivation behind what is recorded, what continues to circulate, and to what extent, in the annals of historical texts. Part of the methodology of pragmatism is derived from history, since usefulness is attested over time. History and historiography are shaped, in part, by pragmatic interests. This discussion is indispensable for the (...) era of digital humanities that is upon us, with all the new materials and interpretations that are to come as a result. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Pragmatist Philosophy of History by Marnie BinderPiers H. G. StephensA Pragmatist Philosophy of History Marnie Binder. Lexington Books, 2023.Looking at current scholarship and opinion in American philosophy, one can easily conclude that there has been much more work done on studying the history of pragmatist philosophy than there has been on what pragmatist philosophy can give to the study of history. Ever since the (...) resurrection of interest in pragmatism in the late twentieth century, we have seen a range of publications offering new interpretations for the ideas of the classical pragmatists, as well as important new applications for philosophical pragmatism and the moving to center stage of historically sidelined individuals and groups. What we have seen relatively little of, however, aside from a 2016 symposium in the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, is sustained engagement with the question of what a classically pragmatist approach to historical inquiry might contribute, entail, or imply. It is this important niche in the ecosystem of American philosophy that Marnie Binder's A Pragmatist Philosophy of History seeks to partially fill in.Binder, who is perhaps best known for her past writings on José Ortega y Gasset, is at pains from the start to indicate both the humility and the utility of her project. As befits the tradition, there are no grandiose philosophical pretensions here, with the "goal in presenting a pragmatist philosophy of [End Page 112] history" merely being "to add another apparatus to the toolkits of the philosopher and the historian," an extra perspective that is "meant to complement other methodologies" (xi; emphasis in original), as she explains in her introduction. At the same time, pragmatism can offer something distinctive, firstly through asking the pragmatic question of what difference is meant by the accepting of particular presumed facts as being true, and secondly, being able to better understand why certain historical details have relevance, value, and meaning for us as a result of answering the first question. A pragmatist philosophy of history is helpful then, Binder maintains, as it "is in a unique position to bridge the speculative analytic divide" (xiii), and her approach to doing this is to draw upon the resources found in the works of a succession of the familiar classical pragmatists, building toward a synthesis and a cashing out of insights in her concluding reflections.Structurally the work consists of an explanatory introduction followed by six chapters, each dedicated to a particular pragmatist and their insights, leading finally to an extended concluding section drawing the component parts together and answering possible objections to the project. Pragmatism, as Binder recognizes, is seldom thought of as a historically orientated philosophy, but she argues that for each of these thinkers—William James, John Dewey, F. C. S. Schiller, Charles Sanders Peirce, George Herbert Mead, and Jane Addams—there is at least the germ of a philosophy of history that can be unearthed and developed, eventually helping to inform understanding of what is needed to bring a pragmatist ethics into practical reality, the last of which is manifested primarily by Addams. Thus, the treatment of William James in chapter 1 homes in on James's psychological insights into the way that experienced reality forms a temporal continuum; our consciousness necessarily selects from the experiences of the past, ascribing interpretations and assuming levels of facticity and relevance, since no individual can know all the facts or select among them with perfect impartiality. The continuum will be one that speaks to the inquirer's concerns with accuracy, practicality, meaningfulness, and coherence, as all knowledge comes about through temporal processes, and since past events are continuously added to and can be continuously reinterpreted, it can have no real or ultimate beginning or end. Accordingly, for a Jamesian pragmatist account, the "continuum of history is the way in which we construct a meaning for history of the connected past experiences with the present and in view of the future—this is what we call 'history'" (7; emphasis in original), and Binder draws upon José Medina's recent work to further illuminate how such history can and will be continuously critically reconstructed. In addition, she observes, such reconstruction [End Page... (shrink)

In this book, Binder shows that at the heart of the most prominent arguments in favour of value-neutral approaches to overall freedom lies the value freedom has for human agency and development. Far from leading to the adoption of a value-neutral approach, however, ascribing importance to freedom’s agency value requires one to adopt a refined value-based approach. Binder employs an axiomatic framework in order to develop such an approach. She shows that a focus on freedom’s agency value has (...) far reaching consequences for existing results in the freedom ranking literature: it requires one to move beyond a person’s given all-things-considered preferences to the values underlying a person’s preference formation. Furthermore, it requires, as Binder argues, one to account for those differences between choice options which really matter to people. Binder illustrates the implications of her analysis for the evaluation of public policy and human development with the capability approach: only if sufficient importance is ascribed to freedom’s agency value can the capability approach keep its promises. ​. (shrink)

Accordingto the mass media, a postfeminist era emerged in the 1990s. The first objective is to develop a definition of the postfeminist perspective. Based on an informal content analysis of popular articles, the authors identify four postfeminist claims: overall support for the women’s movement has dramatically eroded because some women are increasingly antifeminist, believe the movement is irrelevant, and have adopted a “no, but..”.version of feminism. The second objective is to determine the extent of empirical support for these claims. Usingexistingpublic (...) opinion data, the authors find little support for the four postfeminist claims. Implications of the unsubstantiated post-feminist argument are discussed. (shrink)

When Kai Kupferschmidt writes about CRISPR-based gene editing in German, he faces an obstacle: there's no exact translation for “editing” that has the same connotations as it has in English. Instead, as he explained last fall at The Hastings Center's preconference symposium on new genetic technologies at the World Conference of Science Journalists, he draws on a variety of phrases, including “genome surgery,” which conveys precision in Kupferschmidt's assessment, and “gene scissors,” which communicates CRISPR's mechanistic nature. But in any language, (...) explaining CRISPR is difficult. It's a challenge I face at The Hastings Center, where I write about biotechnology for a public audience. (shrink)

Explains and gives examples of the mathematical concept of infinity.

This paper examines the existential context of physical and mental health. Hans Georg Gadamer and The World Health Organization’s conceptualizations are discussed, and current medicalized and idealized views on health are critically examined. The existential dimension of health is explored in the light of theories of selfhood consisting of different parts, Irvin Yalom’s approach to “ultimate concerns” and Martin Heidegger’s conceptualization of “existentials.” We often become aware of health as an existential concern during times of illness, and health and illness (...) can co-exist. The paper discusses how existential suffering in Western culture is described, to an increasing degree, as disorders or psychological deficits, and perfectionistic health goals easily can become a problem. We seek to avoid suffering rather than relate to it, with all the tension that may create. The paper argues that suffering is an unavoidable aspect of people’s experience of their lives, and actively relating to suffering must be regarded as a fundamental aspect of health. The need and usefulness of a concept of “existential health” is discussed. (shrink)

En este artículo tomamos como punto de partida la Fuga y Masacre de Trelew (agosto de 1972), pero nuestro eje principal será el ciclo de conflictividad docente en la región (1969-1972) en el marco del Plan de Lucha Nacional que condujo el Acuerdo de Nucleamientos Docentes. El nexo entre ambas situaciones es la presencia de Mario Abel Amaya (docente, miembro de la Asociación Gremial de Abogados, dirigente de la UCR y presidente de la recién constituida Asociación de Docentes del Este (...) de Chubut), en el aeropuerto de Trelew al momento en que se producía la fuga de presos políticos del penal U6 de Rawson. Por su mediación en ese momento con las fuerzas represivas para garantizar la rendición pacífica de lxs 19 guerrillerxs fugadxs, fue acusado de complicidad y detenido por la dictadura militar. Esto sucedió hasta que la movilización popular del “Trelewazo” consiguió su libertad tres meses más tarde. Ese es nuestro punto retrospectivo de partida, para analizar la unidad que se fue forjando entre los sectores docentes y el incremento de su combatividad, en el marco del primer acto de terrorismo de estado. Encontramos en la figura de Amaya una trama de relaciones que nos permiten hilvanar analíticamente las luchas políticas y económicas de la región. (shrink)

Franz Brentanos (1838-1917) Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte aus dem Jahre 1874 gehört zu den Klassikern der Philosophie und der Psychologie. Mit diesem Werk, das den Ausgangspunkt sowohl für die phänomenologische Tradition als auch für die heutige Philosophie des Geistes markiert, konnte sich Brentano im damaligen philosophischen Panorama durchsetzen - sein Name ist auch heute noch unauflöslich mit diesem Werk verknüpft. Die Entdeckung bzw. Wiederentdeckung der Grundstruktur psychischer Phänomene, d. h. deren Intentionalität, stellt wohl den wichtigsten Beitrag Brentanos zum Aufbau einer (...) Analytik des Geistes dar. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood's name is familiar to historians and history educators around the world. Few, however, have charted the depths of his reflections on what it means to be educated in history. In this book Marnie Hughes-Warrington begins with the facet of Collingwood’s work best known to teachers — re-enactment — and locates it in historically-informed discussions on empathy, imagination and history education. Revealed are dynamic concepts of the a priori imagination and education that tend towards reflection on the presuppositions (...) that shape our own and others’ forms of life. (shrink)

Scholars in both digital humanities and media studies have noted an apparent disconnect between computation and the interpretive methods of the humanities. Alan Liu has argued that literary scholars employing digital methods encounter a “meaning problem” due to the difficulty of reconciling algorithmic methods with interpretive ones. Conversely, the media scholar Friedrich Kittler has questioned the adequacy of hermeneutics as a means of studying computers. This paper argues that that this disconnect results from a set of contingent decisions made in (...) both humanistic and mathematical disciplines in the first half of the nineteenth century that delineated, with implications that continue to resonate in the present day, which aspects of human activity would come to be formalized in algorithms and which would not. I begin with a discussion of Nicolas de Condorcet, who attempted, at the height of the 1789 revolution, to turn algebra into a universal language; his work, I argue, exemplifies the form of algorithmic thinking that existed before the Romantic turn. Next, I discuss William Wordsworth’s arguments about the relationship of poetry and science. While Wordsworth is sometimes viewed as a critic of science, I argue that his polemic is specifically targeted at highly politicized projects like Condorcet’s that sought to supplant existing modes of thought with scientific rationality. Finally, I demonstrate the importance of Romantic thought for George Boole, creator of the logic system that would eventually form the basis of digital electronics. The reason Boole was able to succeed where Condorcet had failed, I argue, was that Romantic notions of culture enabled him to reconcile a mechanical view of mathematical reasoning with an organic view of the development of meaning—a dichotomy that remains a key assumption of computer interfaces in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

This paper examines the psychology of existential guilt with Martin Heidegger and Rollo May’s conceptualizations as the point of departure. The concept of existential guilt describes preconditions for responsibility and accountability in life choices and the relationship to the potential given in the life of a human. It might also be used as a starting point to examine an individual’s relationship to the potential offered in their life and life context and, in this way, the hitherto unlived life of an (...) individual. The following questions are discussed in contexts of identity development, perfectionism, and current cultural shifts in conceptualizations of selfhood: How can humans relate to the fact that only limited parts of who they might be can ever be actualized? Moreover, how can they relate to the fundamental ambiguity and “groundlessness” in the contexts of life where choices are made? There are striking parallels between the role of exploration in the Eriksonian approaches to healthy identity development and the ontological groundlessness that stands out as a premise for existential guilt. There are also parallels between identity fore-closure and normative identity styles and “falling” into das Man in the existential framework. Perfectionistic ideals easily become an objectivization – and closure – of possible alternatives and choices. In contemporary theories of constructions of selfhood, the dangers of alienation from the community on the one hand and escape into what might become totalitarian collectivism on the other is pointed out. The contextualization of personal responsibility offered through the concept of existential guilt might address both dangers. It provides a perspective on how personal responsibility is embedded in contexts of human relationships, relationships to nature, and the finitude, freedom, uncertainties, and suffering that is given through human existence. Existential guilt can wake sorrow and regret over opportunities overlooked and lost. However, most of all, it can be seen as a drive toward repair in the relationship toward both oneself and the other. It takes the form of receptivity, an openness to a life not yet lived, and creative use of imagination. (shrink)

The use of computers to support learning at work has for long been propagated. Although a large bulk of experience exists in this field, it is still an open question what role computer applications play and can play in the process of learning. It can even be questioned if the learning processes themselves are sufficiently well understood to enable designers and others to provide relevant support. In this article these questions are addressed with reference to experience gained with two projects (...) on computer support for shop floor learning. The projects involved the future users actively in the design process and it is argued that this involvement reached far beyond the mere shaping of the learning artefacts. (shrink)

The most widely repeated retributivist argument against the utilitarian theory of punishment is that utilitarianism permits punishment of the innocent. While defenders of utilitarianism have shown that a publicly announced policy of punishing the innocent is unlikely to serve utility, critics have insisted that utilitarianism morally obliges officials to deceive the public by framing the innocent. Yet philosophers and legal scholars have heretofore failed to test this claim against the writings of the theory's originators. We directly examine the writings of (...) Jeremy Bentham and other eighteenth and nineteenth century utilitarians and demonstrate that the originators of utilitarian penology clearly opposed both punishment of the innocent and deception of the public. We argue that utilitarianism originated as a legal theory that emphasized several institutional conditions for the public pursuit of utility, including security of person and property, legality, legislative supremacy, democratic accountability, publicity and transparency. These institutional conditions would preclude both systematic and ad hoc framing of the innocent. We show that the original utilitarians considered individuals incompetent to determine and pursue the public welfare, and that the contemporary conception of utilitarianism as an ethical standard governing individuals is a modern innovation. Bentham's theory of punishment did not derive from any general ethical theory. Bentham, like his chief forebears Hume, Helvetius and Beccaria, thought of public utility as a standard of value for public action, such as legislation. He assumed that private action was ruled by self-interest (i.e. private utility) so that there was little point in directing arguments about the general welfare to individual ethical actors. In assessing public action, Bentham was far less concerned about consequences than has generally been supposed and far more concerned about process. He identified utility with security of expectations and the rule of law. As a consequence, he endorsed public actions that could be seen to have emerged from a rational and well-informed debate about their consequences for the public welfare. Utility was not a definition of the good or a guide to conscience, but a standard designed for use in public, deliberative debate. Utilitarianism was not so much a philosophical theory as a rhetorical practice, understood as a transparent language of analysis and argument for use in political deliberation.We elaborate the procedural conditions presupposed by utilitarian discourse, beginning with Bentham's commitment to a conception of legality involving legislative promulgation of formal rules faithfully applied by rigidly constrained bureaucrats and judges. Next, we demonstrate Bentham's commitment to democratic representation of the public in devising legislation. Finally, we emphasize Bentham's commitment to publicity in government decisionmaking. Utilitarian policy required public scrutiny of all decisions and the information and reasons considered in making them. In sum, Bentham's utilitarianism was primarily concerned with the problem of how to design government so that it could accurately identify and faithfully pursue the public good while being openly seen to do so. It follows that Bentham's utility principle does not require him to endorse deceiving the public and framing an innocent person. (shrink)

Franz Brentano gilt als einer der einflussreichsten Philosophen an der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert. Dennoch sind die Philosophiehistoriker noch zu keinem endgültigen Urteil über seine Bedeutung gelangt. Der Grund hierfür ist vor allem darin zu suchen, dass Brentanos Werk bis heute nur unzureichend zugänglich ist, was vor allem daran liegt, dass der größte Teil davon nur in handschriftlicher Form existiert: Nach seinem unvollendet gebliebenen Hauptwerk, der Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, hat Brentano keine größere Arbeit mehr veröffentlicht. Im ersten (...) Teil analysiert Binder die Gründe für Brentanos zurückhaltende Publikationstätigkeit, wobei einerseits der konfliktbehaftete biographische Hintergrund und die komplexe Persönlichkeit des Philosophen, andererseits theoretische Probleme, eine psychologische Einheitswissenschaft zu formulieren, die ihn an der Fertigstellung seines Hauptwerks scheitern ließen, im Vordergrund stehen. Im zweiten Teil verfolgt der Autor die wechselhafte Geschichte von Brentanos philosophischem Nachlass, die ihrerseits die Rezeption seiner philosophischen Theorien stark behindert hat. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Critical Legal Studies as Analytic Jurisprudence: The Critique of Liberal Rights Theory Critical Legal Studies as Social Theory Conclusion References.

For more than 20 years, research has proven the beneficial effect of natural frequencies when it comes to solving Bayesian reasoning tasks (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). In a recent meta-analysis, McDowell & Jacobs (2017) showed that presenting a task in natural frequency format increases performance rates to 24% compared to only 4% when the same task is presented in probability format. Nevertheless, on average three quarters of participants in their meta-analysis failed to obtain the correct solution for such a task (...) in frequency format. In this paper, we present an empirical study on what participants typically do wrong when confronted with natural frequencies. We found that many of them did not actually use natural frequencies for their calculations, but translated them back into complicated probabilities instead. This switch from the intuitive presentation format to a less intuitive calculation format will be discussed within the framework of psychological theories (e.g., the Einstellung effect). (shrink)

Im Februar 1930 beschloß das Parlament der tschechoslowakischen Republik, Präsident Th. G. Masaryk aus Anerkennung seiner Verdienste um die Republiksgründung eine Summe von 20 Millionen Kronen zu widmen. Aus Dankbarkeit seinem philosophischen Lehrer Franz Brentano gegenüber ermöglichte Masaryk mit einem Teil dieser Summe im darauffolgenden Jahr die Gründung einer Brentano-Gesellschaft und eines Brentano-Archives in Prag unter der Leitung von Oskar Kraus. Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht die Vorgeschichte und die Geschichte der Gesellschaft bis zu ihrer endgültigen Auflösung im Jahre 1955 und (...) damit ein Stück vergessener Wissenschaftsgeschichte zu rekonstruieren. Besonderes Augenmerk wird dabei auf die Rolle gelegt, die die Brentano-Gesellschaft im Bemühen um den wissenschaftlichen Nachlaß Brentanos spielte. (shrink)