IFG logic is a variant of the independence-friendly logic of Hintikka and Sandu. We answer the question: “Which IFG-formulas are equivalent to ordinary first-order formulas?” We use the answer to prove the ordinary cylindric set algebra over a structure can be embedded into a reduct of the IFG-cylindric set algebra over the structure.

It is not uncommon to hear that poor school performance, welfare dependancy, youth unemployment, and criminal activity result more from shortcomings in the personal makeup of individuals than from societal forces beyond their control. Are American values declining as so many suggest? And are those values at the root of many social problems today?Shaped by experience and public policies, people's values and social norms do change. What role can or should a democratic government play in shaping values? And how do (...) these values conditon the efficacy of public policy?In this book, six distinguished social scientists identify trends in America's values and their consequences, and consider public policy tools with which some of those values might be changed.Daniel Yankelovich begins with a discussion of how American values have shifted in the last half-century, and argues that affluence is the driving force behind these changes in values. James Q. Wilson argues that destructive habits which can lead to social pathologies, like crime and drug use, are set early in life; he examines how public policy might intervene when children are young to promote better values. David Popenoe maintains that America has veered too far towards industrialist values, and explores the resulting decline of families and many attendant social ills. Nathan Glazer describes the history and present status of the dispute over multicultural education. Jane Mansbridge examines the process of building cooperation, consensus, and public spirit. And George Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen discuss the problem of gang criminality.Inthe past, social scientists have often sidestepped questions about values as undefinable, unquantifiable, and somehow unscientific. The essays in this volume address these questions at last.Henry J. Aaron, director of the Economic Studies program at Brookings, is the authorof numerous books, including most recently Serious and Unstable Condition: Financing America's Health Care (1991), and coeditor of Setting Domestic Priorities (1992). Thomas E. Mann is director of the Brookings Governmental Studies program, coeditor of Media Polls in American Politics (1992), and coauthor of the Renewing Congress series (1993). Timothy Taylor is managing editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives at Stanford University. (shrink)

When making substituted judgments for incapacitated patients, surrogates often struggle to guess what the patient would want if they had capacity. Surrogates may also agonize over having the (sole) responsibility of making such a determination. To address such concerns, a Patient Preference Predictor (PPP) has been proposed that would use an algorithm to infer the treatment preferences of individual patients from population-level data about the known preferences of people with similar demographic characteristics. However, critics have suggested that even if such (...) a PPP were more accurate, on average, than human surrogates in identifying patient preferences, the proposed algorithm would nevertheless fail to respect the patient’s (former) autonomy since it draws on the ‘wrong’ kind of data: namely, data that are not specific to the individual patient and which therefore may not reflect their actual values, or their reasons for having the preferences they do. Taking such criticisms on board, we here propose a new approach: the Personalized Patient Preference Predictor (P4). The P4 is based on recent advances in machine learning, which allow technologies including large language models to be more cheaply and efficiently ‘fine-tuned’ on person-specific data. The P4, unlike the PPP, would be able to infer an individual patient’s preferences from material (e.g., prior treatment decisions) that is in fact specific to them. Thus, we argue, in addition to being potentially more accurate at the individual level than the previously proposed PPP, the predictions of a P4 would also more directly reflect each patient’s own reasons and values. In this article, we review recent discoveries in artificial intelligence research that suggest a P4 is technically feasible, and argue that, if it is developed and appropriately deployed, it should assuage some of the main autonomy-based concerns of critics of the original PPP. We then consider various objections to our proposal and offer some tentative replies. (shrink)

A systematic introduction suitable for readers who have little familiarity with logic. Provides numerous examples and complete proofs.

Hintikka and Sandu’s independence-friendly logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic that allows one to consider semantic games with imperfect information. In the present article, we first show how several variants of the Monty Hall problem can be modeled as semantic games for IF sentences. In the process, we extend IF logic to include semantic games with chance moves and dub this extension stochastic IF logic. Finally, we use stochastic IF logic to analyze the Sleeping Beauty problem, leading to (...) the conclusion that the thirders are correct while identifying the main error in the halfers’ argument. (shrink)

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback.

We present a compositional semantics for first-order logic with imperfect information that is equivalent to Sevenster and Sandu’s equilibrium semantics (under which the truth value of a sentence in a finite model is equal to the minimax value of its semantic game). Our semantics is a generalization of an earlier semantics developed by the first author that was based on behavioral strategies, rather than mixed strategies.

This important new study offers a powerful exposition of the ethical theory underlying Hegel's philosophy of society, politics, and history. Professor Woodshows how Hegel applies his theory to such topics as human rights, the justification of legal punishment, criteria of moral responsibility, and the authority of individual conscience. The book includes a critical discussion of Hegel's treatment of other moral philosophers, provides an account of the controversial concept of 'ethical life', and shows the relation between the theory and Hegel's critical (...) assessment of modern social institutions. The book is nontechnical and should interest anyone concerned with Hegel's ethical and political thought, including philosophers, political scientists, intellectual historians and students of German culture. (shrink)

This book follows hard upon Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity. Both present the author's influential version of a Kantian theory of normative ethics and metaethics. Whereas The Sources of Normativity was a systematic investigation of "normativity" written as a single unit, the present volume is a collection of previously published papers, some of them already well known and much discussed, dating between 1983 and 1993. By the nature of the case, one might expect less thematic unity in this book than (...) in the other one, but the present book is a deeper and more wide ranging presentation of the author's views. Korsgaard's historical focus in The Sources of Normativity is less on Kant and more on the British moralists. Creating the Kingdom of Ends deals quite explicitly with the interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. The papers in this book contain, in my judgment, the heart of Korsgaard's work: a variety of fresh and illuminating insights into Kant's moral theory and its relation to contemporary ethical theory which have helped to reshape the image of Kant's ethics and to refocus the issues dealt with in current moral philosophy. Or to make claims less grand but of more immediate relevance to this review, there is no question that some of the papers in this book have helped to reshape both the present writer's image of Kant's ethics and his conception of the way questions of ethical theory should be addressed. I hope below to say something both about where I think Korsgaard has gotten these matters right, and where I find her position either unclear or dubious. (shrink)

The doctrine of divine simplicity, the doctrine that God has no physical or metaphysical complexity whatsoever, is not a doctrine designed to induce immediate philosophical acquiescence. There are severe questions about its coherence. And even if those questions can be answered satisfactorily in favour of the doctrine, there remains the question why anyone should accept it. Thomas V. Morris raises both sorts of questions about a version of the doctrine which I have put forward. In the following pages I shall (...) respond to what I take to be the most serious of Morris's objections. I shall argue that the doctrine survives Morris's onslaught, but that one observation of his points it in a direction I had hitherto not taken seriously. The bulk of Morris's paper raises questions of the first sort; perforce the bulk of my paper will also. I shall offer, at the end, a reason for thinking that neither of us is yet in a position to pronounce categorically on the second question. My remarks in this paper constitute an interim report on how I think things presently stand with divine simplicity. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that exploitation is unjust; some think it is part of the very meaning of the word 'exploitation' that it is unjust. Those who think this will suppose that the just society has to be one in which people do not exploit one another, at least on a large scale. I will argue that exploitation is not unjust by definition, and that a society (such as Our own) might be fundamentally just while nevertheless being pervasively exploitative. I (...) do think that exploitation is nearly always a bad thing, and will try to identify the moral belief which makes most of us think it is. But I will argue that its badness does not always consist in its being unjust. (shrink)

When we read Karl M&IX,S descriptions of the capitalist mode of production in Capital amd other writings, all our instincts tell us that these are descriptions of an unjust social system. Marx describes a. society in which one small class of persons lives in comfort and idleness while another class, in ever-increasing numbers, lives in want and vvrctchedncss, laboring to produce thc Wealth enjoyed by the fixst. Marx speaks constantly of capitalist "exploitation" of the worker, and refers to the creation (...) of surplus value as the appropriation of his "unpaid 1abor" by capital. Not 0nly docs capitalist society, as Marx describes it, strike us as unjust, but his own descriptions of it themselves seem to connote injustice. When we look in the writings of Marx and Engels for a detailed account 0f the injustices of capitalism, however, We discover at once that not only is there no attempt at all in their writings to provide an argument that capitalism is unjust, but there is not even the explicit claim that capitalism is unjust 01* incquitablc, 01* that it violatcs anyonds rights. We find, in fact, explicit denunciations and sustained criticisms of social thinkers (such as Pierre P:roudhon and Ferdinand Lassalle) who did condemn capitalism for its injustices or advocated some form of socialism as a. means of securing justice, equality, or the rights of man. We even find, perhaps to our surprise, some faixly explicit statements to the effect that capitalism, with all its manifold defects, cannot be faultcd as far as justice is concerned. Whatever else capitalism may be for Marx, it docs not seem that it is unjust. (shrink)

Capturing the lively modernist milieu of Kenneth Burke's early career in Greenwich Village, where Burke arrived in 1915 fresh from high school in Pittsburgh, this book discovers him as an intellectual apprentice conversing with "the moderns." Burke found himself in the midst of an avant-garde peopled by Malcolm Cowley, Marianne Moore, Jean Toomer, Katherine Anne Porter, William Carlos Williams, Allen Tate, Hart Crane, Alfred Stieglitz, and a host of other fascinating figures. Burke himself, who died in 1993 at the (...) age of 96, has been hailed as America's most brilliant and suggestive critic and the most significant theorist of rhetoric since Cicero. Many schools of thought have claimed him as their own, but Burke has defied classification and indeed has often been considered a solitary, eccentric genius immune to intellectual fashions. But Burke's formative work of the 1920s, when he first defined himself and his work in the context of the modernist conversation, has gone relatively unexamined. Here we see Burke living and working with the crowd of poets, painters, and dramatists affiliated with Others magazine, Stieglitz's "291" gallery, and Eugene O'Neill's Provincetown Players; the leftists associated with the magazines The Masses and Seven Arts; the Dadaists; and the modernist writers working on literary journals like The Dial, where Burke in his capacity as an associate editor saw T. S. Eliot's "The Wasteland" into print for the first time and provided other editorial services for Thomas Mann, e.e. cummings, Ezra Pound, and many other writers of note. Burke also met the iconoclasts of the older generation represented by Theodore Dreiser and H. L. Mencken, the New Humanists, and the literary nationalists who founded Contact and The New Republic. Jack Selzer shows how Burke's own early poems, fiction, and essays emerged from and contributed to the modernist conversation in Greenwich Village. He draws on a wonderfully rich array of letters between Burke and his modernist friends and on the memoirs of his associates to create a vibrant portrait of the young Burke's transformation from aesthete to social critic. (shrink)

English summary: Since Herodotus and Thucydides the assumption that the historic structures of the past sooner or later reappear in the present and future has provided a methodological basis for all serious historic philosophical debate, and the ultimate social self-justification within historical disciplines. In addition to a broad methodological introduction to the subject, this volume contains selected contributions to the cyclical and biological patterns of thought in the philosophy of history including such diverse thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Sallust, Virgil, (...) Livy, Seneca, Orosius, Simplicius, Proclus, Joachim of Fiore, Machiavelli, Vico, Kant, Hegel, Spengler, Thomas Mann, Toynbee, Huntington and Fukuyama. German description: Seit Herodot und Thukydides gilt die Annahme, daa die historischen Strukturen der Vergangenheit fruher oder spater auch in Gegenwart und Zukunft wiederkehren, als methodologische Grundlage allen echten geschichtsphilosophischen Argumentierens und als ultimative gesellschaftliche Selbstbegrundung der historischen Disziplinen. Unter den verschiedenen diesbezuglichen Denkschulen, welche sich in der Antike und im Abenland herausgebildet haben, war die Vermutung, politische oder kulturelle Einheiten konnten sich analog zum Lebenszyklus naturlicher Korper verhalten und biologistische bzw. zyklische Etappen wie Geburt, Wachstum, Reife, Alter und Tod bzw. Neubeginn erleben, ganz besonders wirkmachtig und pragt auch heute noch unter dem Schlagwort vom Aufstieg und Niedergang der groaen Hochkulturen unser Verstandnis von den notwendigen Etappen einer jeden Zivilisation. Vorliegender Band beinhaltet, neben einer breiten methodologischen Einfuhrung in das Thema, ausgewahlte Beitrage zu zyklischen und biologistischen Denkstrukturen in der Geschichtsphilosophie so unterschiedlicher Denker wie Platon, Aristoteles, Polybios, Sallust, Vergil, Livius, Seneca, Orosius, Simplikios, Proklos, Joachim von Fiore, Machiavelli, Vico, Kant, Hegel, Spengler, Thomas Mann, Toynbee, Huntington und Fukuyama. (shrink)

_Why Plato Wrote_ argues that Plato was not only the world’s first systematic political philosopher, but also the western world’s first think-tank activist and message man. Shows that Plato wrote to change Athenian society and thereby transform Athenian politics Offers accessible discussions of Plato’s philosophy of language and political theory Selected by Choice as an Outstanding Academic Title for 2011.

Kant holds that the moral principle is a priori, not empirical. But consistently with this, important parts of Kantian ethics, including his formulations of the moral principle, depend on a rich and interesting empirical theory of human nature.

Which nonhuman animals experience conscious pain?1 This question is central to the debate about animal welfare, as well as being of basic interest to scientists and philosophers of mind. Nociception—the capacity to sense noxious stimuli—is one of the most primitive sensory capacities. Neurons functionally specialized for nociception have been described in invertebrates such as the leech Hirudo medicinalis and the marine snail Aplysia californica (Walters 1996). Is all nociception accompanied by conscious pain, even in relatively primitive animals such as Aplysia, (...) or is it the case, as some philosophers continue to maintain, that conscious experiences are the exclu- sive province of human beings? What philosophical and scientific resources are presently available for assessing claims lying between these extremes? (shrink)

The potential for biases being built into algorithms has been known for some time, yet literature has only recently demonstrated the ways algorithmic profiling can result in social sorting and harm marginalised groups. We contend that with increased algorithmic complexity, biases will become more sophisticated and difficult to identify, control for, or contest. Our argument has four steps: first, we show how harnessing algorithms means that data gathered at a particular place and time relating to specific persons, can be used (...) to build group models applied in different contexts to different persons. Thus, privacy and data protection rights, with their focus on individuals, do not protect from the discriminatory potential of algorithmic profiling. Second, we explore the idea that anti-discrimination regulation may be more promising, but acknowledge limitations. Third, we argue that in order to harness anti-discrimination regulation, it needs to confront emergent forms of discrimination or risk creating new invisibilities, including invisibility from existing safeguards. Finally, we outline suggestions to address emergent forms of discrimination and exclusionary invisibilities via intersectional and post-colonial analysis. (shrink)

'Evidentialism' is the conventional name (given mainly by its opponents) for the view that there is a moral duty to proportion one's beliefs to evidence, proof or other epistemic justifications for belief. This essay defends evidentialism against objections based on the alleged involuntariness of belief, on the claim that evidentialism assumes a doubtful epistemology, that epistemically unsupported beliefs can be beneficial, that there are significant classes of exceptions to the evidentialist principle, and other shabby evasions and alibis (as I take (...) them to be) for disregarding the duty to believe according to the evidence. Evidentialism is also supported by arguments based on both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations. (shrink)

One of the principal aims of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, especially of the Doctrine of Virtue, is to present a taxonomy of our duties as human beings. The basic division of duties is between juridical duties and ethical duties, which determines the division of the Metaphysics of Morals into the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. Juridical duties are duties that may be coercively enforced from outside the agent, as by the civil or criminal laws, or other social (...) pressures. Ethical duties must not be externally enforced (to do so violates the right of the person coerced). Instead, the subject herself, through her own reason and the feelings and motives arising a priori from her rational capacities -- the feelings of respect, conscience, moral feeling and love of other human beings, must constrain herself to follow them (MS 6:399-404).1 Among ethical duties, the fundamental division is between duties to oneself and duties to others. Within each of these two main divisions of ethical duty, there is a further division between duties that are strictly owed, requiring specific actions or omissions, and whose violation incurs moral blame, and duties that are wide or meritorious, the specific actions not strictly owed, but deserving of moral credit or merit. Kant treats these latter as ‘duties’ (eschewing any category such as ‘supererogation’) because the actions in question are conceived as fit objects of self-constraint – things we can make ourselves do through the exercise of reason and the moral feelings arising from the application of practical reason to our faculty of desire. Regarding duties to oneself, this division is between ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ duty; regarding duties to others, the strict or narrow... (shrink)

Ethical analyses of biomedical human enhancement often consider the issue of authenticity — to what degree can the accomplishments of those utilizing biomedical enhancements be considered authentic or worthy of praise? As research into Brain-Computer Interface technology progresses, it may soon be feasible to create a BCI device that enhances or augments natural human intelligence through some invasive or noninvasive biomedical means. In this article we will review currently existing BCI technologies and to what extent these can be said to (...) enhance or augment the capabilities of the respective users, describe one hypothetical type of BCI device that could augment or enhance a specific aspect of human knowledge — namely, mathematical ability, and relate these concepts to the active externalism view of the extended mind as espoused by Clark and Chalmers in order to argue that knowledge of mathematics derived from the usage of a BCI and the application thereof constitutes authentic knowledge and achievement. (shrink)

Die literarische Figur des verrückten Wissenschaftlers ist heute vor allem über Filme bekannt. Tatsächlich hat Hollywood diese Figur, die auf Englisch mad scientist genannt wird, seit seinen Gründungstagen mit zahlreichen Filmen zu einem eigenen Genre entwickelt: Ein älterer Mann mit zerzaustem Haar, Laborkittel und Brille arbeitet besessen und einsam in seinem Labor an einer großen Erfindung, mit der er die ganze Welt verändern will. Typischerweise ist dieser Wissenschaftler entweder gutwillig und naiv, nur naiv oder skrupellos. Ist er gutwillig und (...) naiv, dann will er die Welt retten oder zum Besseren wenden; doch in seiner Besessenheit und Engstirnigkeit verkennt er die Welt und die große Erfindung entgleist ihm und wird zu einer Bedrohung der Welt, bis am Ende ein guter Held die Gefahr bannt und die Welt rettet. Falls er nur naiv ist, dann entreißt ein Böser ihm die Erfindung im entscheidenen Moment, um die Welt zu bedrohen, bis am Ende der Gute die Sache wieder ins Reine bringt. Ist er hingegen skrupelos, dann treibt ihn seine Besessenheit dazu, immer größere Opfer für sein Werk zu erbringen, nicht nur, indem er sich selber gesundheitlich und finanziell aufreibt, sondern auch, indem er die Gesundheit und das Leben von Unbeteiligten aufs Spiel setzt. Treibt er dies zu weit, ohne rechtzeitig Reue zu zeigen, dann muss er am Ende um der Gerechtigkeit willen sterben, in der Regel als Opfer seiner eigenen besessenen Forschertaten. Die Figur des verrückten Wissenschaftlers ist heute so einschlägig, dass sie das öffentliche Bild der Wissenschaft in der westlichen Welt entscheidend mitgeprägt hat. Das ärgert natürlich die Wissenschaftler, die darum heftigst auf Hollywood schimpfen. Doch Hollywood hat nur aufgegriffen, stereotypisch vereinfacht und bilderreich ausgemalt, was Schriftsteller des 19. Jahrhunderts in fast allen westlichen Ländern in Form von Romanen, Theaterstücken, Kurzgeschichten und Gedichten vorgebildet haben. Denn der verrückte Wissenschaftler ist tatsächlich eine literarische Erfindung des 19.. (shrink)

(Ak 10:74).[1] During the so-called ‘silent decade’ of the 1770s, when Kant was working on the Critique of Pure Reason, he promised repeatedly not only that he would soon finish that work but also that he would soon publish a “metaphysics of morals” (Ak 10:97, 132, 144).[2] Yet it was not until four years after the first Critique that Kant finally wrote a work on ethics, and even then he merely laid the ground for a metaphysics of morals by identifying (...) and establishing the supreme principle on which a system of duties would be based (G 4:392). Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant once again dealt entirely with foundational questions in moral philosophy. Kantian ethics is primarily known, especially among English-speaking philosophers, through these two ethical works of the 1780s, neither of which contains anything like a ‘metaphysics of morals’. (shrink)

Is exploitation always unjust? Is it by definition unjust? If we answer both these questions negatively, as I do, then we need to ask: when is exploitation unjust and when is it not? Exploitation is the use of a vulnerability for the exploiter's ends. This is sometimes morally wrong, even when it is not unjust. But it is unjust when it violates the exploited person's rightful freedom. When is labor for hire exploitative? Whenever the terms of the labor contract permit (...) either the employer or the employee to make use of the vulnerability of the other. But when is such exploitation unjust? When it involves the ownership by either of the conditions of life of the other, because then one is in a position of control over the other and deprives the other of a free mode of life. In capitalist wage labor, this is often the case—the employer, or a class to which the employer belongs, owns the conditions of life for the employed. When this is so, the employed do not have the free life which is basic to human rights. (shrink)

The 2023 doctors’ strikes in the UK have elicited a familiar moral outcry that such strikes are morally wrong. We consider five arguments that might be thought to show doctors’ strikes are morally impermissible but show that they all fail. The most we can conclude from such arguments is that doctors’ strikes are morally permissible in a narrower range of circumstances than strikes in other sectors.We then outline two independent but compatible justifications for doctors’ strikes, one that appeals to doctors’ (...) interests in fair pay and working conditions and one that appeals to doctors’ duty to protect public health. We also suggest that doctors’ strikes can be supererogatory when they aim to correct a government failing in its own duty to protect public health. Finally, we assess the 2023 UK doctors’ strikes. We conclude that they are justified and there is a case for considering them supererogatory. (shrink)

Wood reiterated his previous papers of view - "For Marx, economic, trade or social system of justice or not depends on its mode of production with the established relationship" that Hussami the "justice is not only determined by the mode of production and determined by class position, "the view attributed to Marx is a misconception that Marx was a capitalist from the standards of justice to go after the critique of capitalist society, it is a misreading of Marx's text. In (...) his view, Marx's critique of capitalism is based on the analysis of the overall critique of social production, the criticism is based on freedom, community and self-realization and other non-moral good criticism, and not based on moral rights or justice, good criticism. (shrink)

Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) technology is a promising research area in many domains. Brain activity can be interpreted through both invasive and non-invasive monitoring devices, allowing for novel, therapeutic solutions for individuals with disabilities and for other non-medical applications. However, a number of ethical issues have been identified from the use of BCI technology. In this paper, we review the academic discussion of the ethical implications of BCI technology in the last five years. We conclude that some emerging applications of BCI (...) technology—including commercial ventures that seek to meld human intelligence with AI—present new and unique ethical concerns. Further, we seek to understand how academic literature on the topic of BCIs addresses these novel concerns. Similar to prior work, we use a limited sample to identify trends and areas of concern or debate among researchers and ethicists. From our analysis, we identify two key areas of BCI ethics that warrant further research: the physical and psychological effects of BCI technology. Additionally, questions of BCI policy have not yet become a frequent point of discussion in the relevant literature on BCI ethics, and we argue this should be addressed in future work. We provide guiding questions that will help ethicists and policy makers grapple with the most important issues associated with BCI technology. (shrink)

Es gehört zu den wirksamsten Dogmen der Aufklärungsforschung, dass die deutschsprachige Philosophie keine materialistische Theorie ausgebildet habe Die Texte Michael Hißmanns (1752-1784) zeigen dagegen, dass sich im Kontext der Göttinger empiristischen Schule im späten 18. Jahrhundert durchaus ein ambitionierter Materialismus entwickelte. Hißmann hat seine materialistische Grundlagentheorie auf vielerlei Feldern der Philosophie umzusetzen gesucht; so in der Psychologie, Anthropologie, praktischen Philosophie, in den Geschichtswissenschaften, der Sprachphilosophie und Poetik. Vor dem grundsätzlich materialismuskritischen Hintergrund der deutschen Spätaufklärung wirkt diese affirmative Aufnahme und systematische (...) Ausarbeitung eines Materialismus durch Michael Hißmann besonders auffällig, und sie wurde daher von vielen Zeitgenossen argwöhnisch begleitet. Dieser Band versammelt erstmalig Texte Michael Hißmanns aus allen - z. T. schwer zugängigen - Werkbereichen, so den popularphilosophischen,,Briefen über Gegenstände der Philosophie" sowie eine vollständige Präsentation seines Hauptwerkes,,Psychologische Versuche" von 1777. Darüber hinaus werden Studien und Aufsätze zum Naturrecht, zur Philosophiegeschichte und Geschichtsphilosophie sowie zur Religionsphilosophie und Ästhetik vorgestellt und kommentiert, die ein facettenreiches Bild des Materialismus in der deutschen Aufklärung bieten. (shrink)