Essay delivered at 4th Embassy of Poland Annual Lecture, University of Ottawa, on November 6, 2002. It renders main studies on Janusz Korczak published in special issues of Dialogue and Universalism (nos. 9-10/1997, 9-10/2001), putting emphasis on the philosophical dimensions of Korczak’s vision of society.

The overreliance on verbal models and theories in psychology has been criticized for hindering the development of reliable research programs (Harris, 1976; Yarkoni, 2020). We demonstrate how the conceptual space framework can be used to formalize verbal theories and improve their precision and testability. In the framework, scientific concepts are represented by means of geometric objects. As a case study, we present a formalization of an existing three-dimensional theory of emotion which was developed with a spatial metaphor in mind. Wundt (...) posits that the range of human emotion can be represented along three axes of basic emotions (pleasure/displeasure, excitement/inhibition, tension/relaxation), just as color vision can be represented using three basic colors. We use dimensions to represent basic emotions, points to represent emotional states, and regions to represent broader emotional concepts. We then compare our formalization to an existing structuralist formalization of Wundt’s theory. Further, we discuss the empirical predictions that our formalization generates, such as comparisons of similarity and intensity. We conclude by demonstrating how the tools developed in the conceptual space framework can be used to formulate a theory of emotion based on empirical observation. (shrink)

The skeptical solution is based on two assumptions — the rejection of semantic facts and the denial of semantic nihilism. On the basis of the non-factualist interpretation of this solution, these two assumptions are reconciled by stating that meaning ascriptions possess non-descriptive function. Nonetheless, Alexander Miller argues that this position is self-refuting since, as despite its non-descriptivism, by rejecting any kind of semantic facts, it inevitably leads to semantic nihilism. In this text, I demonstrate that Miller’s argument is not sound. (...) I argue that a coherent non-factualist way of formulating the conditions of correct use of meaning ascriptions may be performed by rejecting the closure principle of assertibility of meaning ascriptions. On this basis, I demonstrate that argument formulated against non-factualist interpretation by Miller may be refuted. What is more, I argue that rejection of the closure principle should be regarded as the central aspect of Kripke’s skeptical solution. (shrink)

This book stands at the intersection of two topics: the decidability and computational complexity of hybrid logics, and the deductive systems designed for them. Hybrid logics are here divided into two groups: standard hybrid logics involving nominals as expressions of a separate sort, and non-standard hybrid logics, which do not involve nominals but whose expressive power matches the expressive power of binder-free standard hybrid logics.The original results of this book are split into two parts. This division reflects the division of (...) the book itself. The first type of results concern model-theoretic and complexity properties of hybrid logics. Since hybrid logics which we call standard are quite well investigated, the efforts focused on hybrid logics referred to as non-standard in this book. Non-standard hybrid logics are understood as modal logics with global counting operators ) whose expressive power matches the expressive power of binder-free standard hybrid logics. The relevant results comprise: 1. Establishing a sound and complete axiomatization for the modal logic K with global counting operators ), which can be easily extended onto other frame classes, 2. Establishing tight complexity bounds, namely NExpTime-completeness for the modal logic with global counting operators defined over the classes of arbitrary, reflexive, symmetric, serial and transitive frames ), MT), MD), MB), MK4) with numerical subscripts coded in binary. Establishing the exponential-size model property for this logic defined over the classes of Euclidean and equivalential frames ), MS5).Results of the second type consist of designing concrete deductive systems for standard and non-standard hybrid logics. More precisely, they include: 1. Devising a prefixed and an internalized tableau calculi which are sound, complete and terminating for a rich class of binder-free standard hybrid logics. An interesting feature of indicated calculi is the nonbranching character of the rule, 2. Devising a prefixed and an internalized tableau calculi which are sound, complete and terminating for non-standard hybrid logics. The internalization technique applied to a tableau calculus for the modal logic with global counting operators is novel in the literature, 3. Devising the first hybrid algorithm involving an inequality solver for modal logics with global counting operators. Transferring the arithmetical part of reasoning to an inequality solver turned out to be sufficient in ensuring termination.The book is directed to philosophers and logicians working with modal and hybrid logics, as well as to computer scientists interested in deductive systems and decision procedures for logics. Extensive fragments of the first part of the book can also serve as an introduction to hybrid logics for wider audience interested in logic.The content of the book is situated in the areas of formal logic and theoretical computer science with some elements of the theory of computational complexity. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the differences between ontic and epistemic conceptions of scientific explanation, mainly in relation to the so-called new mechanical philosophy. I emphasize that the debate on conceptions of scientific explanation owes much to Salmon’s ontic/epistemic distinction, although much has changed since his formulations. I focus on the interplay between ontic and epistemic norms and constraints in providing mechanistic explanations. My conceptual analysis serves two aims. Firstly, I formulate some suggestions for recognising that both sets of norms (...) and constraints, ontic and epistemic, are necessary for scientific theorising. Secondly, I emphasize that there are multiple dimensions involved in scientific explanation, rather than clear-cut alternatives between ontic and epistemic aspects. I conclude with a general observation that although contextual aspects of explanations are unavoidable, the epistemic-relativity of our categories, explanations and models can in fact be compatible with their objectivity. Instead of making hastily drawn ontological implications from our theories or models, we should carefully scrutinize them from the ontic-epistemic perspective. (shrink)

In their article, Sahan and colleagues have presented ethical dilemmas faced by clinical scientists working in genomics.1 This is a welcome development since thus far little has been published on the ethical issues faced by clinical scientists in general. In their article, the authors present the three themes which emerged from discussions with clinical scientists in respect to three case studies: ‘(1) the redistribution of labour and responsibilities resulting from the practice of genomic medicine; (2) the interpretation and certainty of (...) results and (3) the proposal that better standardisation and consistency of ethical approaches (for example, more guidelines and policy) could resolve some of the challenges arising’.1 One theme which appeared not to emerge is that of ethics education received by clinical scientists during their training, and this is the theme on which this commentary will focus. As noted elsewhere, ‘Clinical Scientists receive some lectures on clinical and research ethics as part of their training, but it amounts to only to a couple of hours of lectures (references omitted)’.2 The usual route to becoming a clinical scientist involves undertaking the 3-year postgraduate Scientist Training Programme (STP), though the ‘equivalence’ route is quite commonly taken by clinical scientists working in …. (shrink)

Úvodní část kritické stati stručně představuje autorku a prezentuje strukturu a obsah knihy Rámce války: za které životy netruchlíme?. Zohledněn je širší kontext a zvláštní ohled je věnován představení dosavadní publikační činnosti Judith Butlerové. Cílem je poukázat na to, že tematické zaměření a hlavní ideová východiska knihy mají v celém díle autorky nepopiratelnou kontinuitu.Následující pasáže se zaměřují na zprostředkování vybraných myšlenek více do hloubky, s důrazem zejména na rozbor autorčiny pozice k fenoménu my a oni a vztahu já k druhému. (...) Kromě toho je pozornost věnována i konceptu rámování, v jehož osvojení tkví zvláštní význam pro porozumění hlavním autorčiným závěrům. Hlavní výhrady a polemika příležitostně prostupují celou prací, závěr poskytuje pouze shrnutí. The introductory part of the critical essay briefly introduces the author and presents the structure and content of the book Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?. Special regard is given to the broader context, particularly to referring to other works of Judith Butler that have already been published. The purpose is to point out the fact that the thematic interest and ideological basis of the book are deeply rooted and have undeniable continuity across Butler`s work. The following passages aim to present selected ideas in more detail, with a special focus on the analysis of the author's position to the Us and Them phenomenon or relation between Self and the Other. Besides this, attention is paid to the explanation of the concept called framing, in order to understand its particular importance for drawing key conclusions of the author. Major objections and reasons for disputation occasionally appear throughout the essay, the final part offers summary only. (shrink)

A history of logic -- Patterns of reasoning -- A language and its meaning -- A symbolic language -- 1850-1950 mathematical logic -- Modern symbolic logic -- Elements of set theory -- Sets, functions, relations -- Induction -- Turning machines -- Computability and decidability -- Propositional logic -- Syntax and proof systems -- Semantics of PL -- Soundness and completeness -- First order logic -- Syntax and proof systems of FOL -- Semantics of FOL -- More semantics -- Soundness and (...) completeness -- Why is first order logic "First Order"? (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to discuss Kant’s concept of juridical state as the foundation of the contemporary rule of law. Therefore, the article tries to answer two questions: (1) what character can be attributed to Kant’s concept of juridical state taking into account the obligations arising from it; (2) can the analysis of the Kantian juridical state have any impact on the contemporary understanding of the rule of law and if so, what can this impact be. In order (...) to accomplish this task, moral presuppositions of Kant’s juridical state are discussed, according to the commonly accepted view that Kant’s political philosophy is closely linked with his moral and ethical reflection. Then, two interpretations of Kant’s juridical state – the liberal one and the authoritarian one – are analysed. The crucial difference between these interpretations lies in establishing the circumstances in which the duty of obedience to state power should be carried out. Then, Kantian juridical state is compared with two ways of understanding the rule of law – the material one and the formal one – in order to evaluate whether the rule of law should be considered as continuity of or rupture with the Kantian concept. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to justify the belief that there are biological normative mechanisms that fulfill non-trivial causal roles in the explanations (as formulated by researchers) of actions and behaviors present in specific systems. One example of such mechanisms is the predictive mechanisms described and explained by predictive processing (hereinafter PP), which (1) guide actions and (2) shape causal transitions between states that have specific content and fulfillment conditions (e.g. mental states). Therefore, I am guided by a specific (...) theoretical goal associated with the need to indicate those conditions that should be met by the non-trivial theory of normative mechanisms and the specific models proposed by PP supporters. In this work, I use classical philosophical methods, such as conceptual analysis and critical reflection. I also analyze selected studies in the field of cognitive science, cognitive psychology, neurology, information theory and biology in terms of the methodology, argumentation and language used, in accordance with their theoretical importance for the issues discussed in this study. In this sense, the research presented here is interdisciplinary. My research framework is informed by the mechanistic model of explanation, which defines the necessary and sufficient conditions for explaining a given phenomenon. The research methods I chose are therefore related to the problems that I intend to solve. In the introductory chapter, “The concept of predictive processing”, I discuss the nature of PP as well as its main assumptions and theses. I also highlight the key concepts and distinctions for this research framework. Many authors argue that PP is a contemporary version of Kantianism and is exposed to objections similar to those made against the approach of Immanuel Kant. I discuss this thesis and show that it is only in a very general sense that the PP framework is neo-Kantian. Here we are not dealing with transcendental deduction nor with the application of transcendental arguments. I argue that PP is based on reverse engineering and abduction inferences. In the second part of this chapter, I respond to the objection formulated by Dan Zahavi, who directly accuses this research framework of anti-realistic consequences. I demonstrate that the position of internalism, present in the so-called conservative PP, does not imply anti-realism, and that, due to the explanatory role played in it by structural representations directed at real patterns, it is justified to claim that PP is realistic. In this way, I show that PP is a non-trivial research framework, having its subject, specific methods and its own epistemic status. Finally, I discuss positions classified as the socalled radical PP. In the chapter “Predictive processing as a Bayesian explanatory model” I justify the thesis according to which PP offers Bayesian modeling. Many researchers claim that the brain is an implemented statistical probabilistic network that is an approximation of the Bayesian 7 rule. In practice, this means that all cognitive processes are to apply Bayes' rule and can be described in terms of probability distributions. Such a solution arouses objections among many researchers and is the subject of wide criticism. The purpose of this chapter is to justify the thesis that Bayesian PP is a non-trivial research framework. For this purpose, I argue that it explains certain phenomena not only at the computational level described by David Marr, but also at the level of algorithms and implementation. Later in this chapter I demonstrate that PP is normative modeling. Proponents of the use of Bayesian models in psychology or decision theory argue that they are normative because they allow the formulation of formal rules of action that show what needs to be done to make a given action optimal. Critics of this approach emphasize that such thinking about the normativity of Bayesian modeling is unjustified and that science should shift from prescriptive to descriptive positions. In a polemic with Shira Elqayam and Jonathan Evans (2011), I show that the division they propose into prescriptivism and Bayesian descriptivism is apparent, because, as I argue, there are two forms of prescriptivism, i.e. the weak and the strong. I argue that the weak version is epistemic and can lead to anti-realism, while the strong version is ontic and allows one to justify realism in relation to Bayesian models. I argue that a weak version of prescriptivism is valid for PP. It allows us to adopt anti-realism in relation to PP. In practice, this means that you can explain phenomena using Bayes' rule. This does not, however, imply that they are Bayesian in nature. However, the full justification of realism in relation to the Bayesian PP presupposes the adoption of strong prescriptivism. This position assumes that phenomena are explained by Bayesian rule because they are Bayesian as such. If they are Bayesian in nature, then they should be explained using Bayesian modeling. This thesis will be substantiated in the chapters “Normative functions and mechanisms in the context of predictive processing” and “Normative mechanisms and actions in predictive processing”. In the chapter “The Free Energy Principle in predictive processing”, I discuss the Free Energy Principle (hereinafter FEP) formulated by Karl Friston and some of its implications. According to this principle, all biological systems (defined in terms of Markov blankets) minimize the free energy of their internal states in order to maintain homeostasis. Some researchers believe that PP is a special case of applying this principle to cognition, and that predictive mechanisms are homeostatic mechanisms that minimize free energy. The discussion of FEP is important due to the fact that some authors consider it to be important for explanatory purposes and normative. If this is the case, then FEP turns out to be crucial in explaining normative predictive mechanisms and, in general, any normative biological mechanisms. To define the explanatory possibilities of this principle, I refer to the discussion of its supporters on the issue they define as the problem of continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. A critical analysis of this discussion and the additional arguments I have formulated have allowed me to revise the explanatory ambitions of FEP. I also reject the belief that this principle is necessary to explain the nature of predictive mechanisms. I argue that the principle formulated and defended by Friston is an important research heuristic for PP analysis. 8 In the chapter “Normative functions and mechanisms in predictive processing”, I start my analyzes by formulating an answer to the question about the normative nature of homeostatic mechanisms. I demonstrate that predictive mechanisms are not homeostatic. I defend the view that a full explanation of normative mechanisms presupposes an explanation of normative functions. I discuss the most important proposals for understanding the normativity of a function, both from a systemic and teleosemantic perspective. I conclude that the non-trivial concept of a function must meet two requirements which I define as explanatory and normative. I show that none of the theories I have invoked satisfactorily meets both of these requirements. Instead, I propose a model of normativity based on Bickhard's account, but supplemented by a mechanistic perspective. I argue that a function is normative when: (1) it allows one to explain the dysfunction of a given mechanism; (2) it contributes to the maintenance of the organism's stability by shaping and limiting possible relations, processes and behaviors of a given system; and when (3) (according to the representational and predictive functions) it enables explaining the attribution of logical values of certain representations / predictions. In such an approach, a mechanism is normative when it performs certain normative functions and when it is constitutive for a specific action or behavior, despite the fact that for some reason it cannot realize it either currently or in the long-term. Such an understanding of the normativity of mechanisms presupposes the acceptance of the epistemic hypothesis. I argue that this hypothesis is not cognitively satisfactory, and therefore the ontic hypothesis should be justified, which is directly related to adopting the position of ontic prescriptivism. For this reason, referring to the mechanistic theory of scientific explanations, I formulate an ontical interpretation of the concept of a normative mechanism. According to this approach, a mechanism or a function is normative when they perform such and such causal roles in explaining certain actions and behaviors. With regard to the normative properties of predictive mechanisms and functions, this means that they are the causes of specific actions an organism carries out in the environment. In this way, I justify the necessity of accepting the ontic hypothesis and rejecting the epistemic hypothesis. The fifth chapter, “Normative mechanisms and actions in predictive processing”, is devoted to the dark room problem and the related exploration-exploitation trade-off. A dark room is the state that an agent could be in if it minimized the sum of all potential prediction errors. I demonstrate that, in accordance with the basic assumption of PP about the need for continuous and long-term minimization of prediction errors, such a state should be desirable for the agent. Is it really so? Many authors believe it is not. I argue that the test of the value of PP is the possibility of a non-trivial solution of this problem, which can be reduced to the choice between active and uncertainty-increasing exploration and safe and easily predictable exploitation. I show that the solution proposed by PP supporters present in the literature does not enable a fully satisfactory explanation of this dilemma. Then I defend the position according to which the full explanation of the normative mechanisms, and, subsequently, the solution to the dilemma of exploration and exploitation, involves reference to the existence of constraints present in the environment. The constraints 9 include elements of the environment that make a given mechanism not only causal but also normative. They are therefore key to explaining the predictive mechanisms. They do not only play the role of the context in which the mechanism is implemented, but, above all, are its constitutive component. I argue that the full explanation of the role of constraints in normative predictive mechanisms presupposes the integration of individual models of specific cognitive phenomena, because only the mechanistic integration of PP with other models allows for a non-trivial explanation of the nature of normative predictive mechanisms that would have a strong explanatory value. The explanatory monism present in many approaches to PP makes it impossible to solve the problem of the dark room. Later in this chapter, I argue that the Bayesian PP is normative not because it enables the formulation of such and such rules of action, but because the predictive mechanisms themselves are normative. They are normative because they condition the choice of such and such actions by agents. In this way, I justify the hypothesis that normative mechanisms make it possible to explain the phenomenon of agent motivation, which is crucial for solving the dark room problem. In the last part of the chapter, I formulate the hypothesis of distributed normativity, which assumes that the normative nature of certain mechanisms, functions or objects is determined by the relations into which these mechanisms, functions or objects enter. This means that what is normative (in the primary sense) is the relational structure that constitutes the normativity of specific items included in it. I suggest that this hypothesis opens up many areas of research and makes it possible to rethink many problems. In the “Conclusion”, I summarize the results of my research and indicate further research perspectives. (shrink)

Despite their ethical intentions, ethically minded consumers rarely purchase ethical products (Auger and Devinney: 2007, Journal of Business Ethics76, 361–383). This intentions–behaviour gap is important to researchers and industry, yet poorly understood (Belk et al.: 2005, Consumption, Markets and Culture8(3), 275–289). In order to push the understanding of ethical consumption forward, we draw on what is known about the intention–behaviour gap from the social psychology and consumer behaviour literatures and apply these insights to ethical consumerism. We bring together three separate (...) insights – implementation intentions (Gollwitzer: 1999, American Psychologist54(7), 493–503), actual behavioural control (ABC) (Ajzen and Madden: 1986, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology22, 453–474; Sheeran et al.: 2003, Journal of Social Psychology, 42, 393–410) and situational context (SC) (Belk: 1975, Journal of Consumer Research2, 157–164) – to construct an integrated, holistic conceptual model of the intention–behaviour gap of ethically minded consumers. This holistic conceptual model addresses significant limitations within the ethical consumerism literature, and moves the understanding of ethical consumer behaviour forward. Further, the operationalisation of this model offers insight and strategic direction for marketing managers attempting to bridge the intention–behaviour gap of the ethically minded consumer. (shrink)

Responding to the increasingly influential role of Hannah Arendt's political philosophy in recent years, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Total Domination: The Holocaust, Plurality, and Resistance, critically engages with Arendt's understanding of totalitarianism. According to Arendt, the main goal of totalitarianism was total domination; namely, the virtual eradication of human legality, morality, individuality, and plurality. This attempt, in her view, was most fully realized in the concentration camps, which served as the major "laboratories" for the regime. While Arendt focused (...) on the perpetrators' logic and drive, Michal Aharony examines the perspectives and experiences of the victims and their ability to resist such an experiment. The first book-length study to juxtapose Arendt's concept of total domination with actual testimonies of Holocaust survivors, this book calls for methodological pluralism and the integration of the voices and narratives of the actors in the construction of political concepts and theoretical systems. To achieve this, Aharony engages with both well-known and non-canonical intellectuals and writers who survived Auschwitz and Buchenwald concentration camps. Additionally, she analyzes the oral testimonies of survivors who are largely unknown, drawing from interviews conducted in Israel and in the U.S., as well as from videotaped interviews from archives around the world. Revealing various manifestations of unarmed resistance in the camps, this study demonstrates the persistence of morality and free agency even under the most extreme and de-humanizing conditions, while cautiously suggesting that absolute domination is never as absolute as it claims or wishes to be. Scholars of political philosophy, political science, history, and Holocaust studies will find this an original and compelling book. (shrink)

In a recent series of papers, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order attitude, with a question as its content. In this paper, I offer a critique of Friedman’s project. I begin by responding to her arguments against reductive higher-order propositional accounts of suspended judgment, and thus undercut the negative case for her own view. Further, I raise worries about the details of her positive account, and in particular about her claim that one suspends judgment about (...) some matter if and only if one inquires into this matter. Subsequently, I use conclusions drawn from the preceding discussion to offer a tentative account: S suspends judgment about p iff S believes that she neither believes nor disbelieves that p, S neither believes nor disbelieves that p, and S intends to judge that p or not-p. (shrink)

As clinical ethics consultants move toward professionalization, the process of certifying individual consultants or accrediting programs will be discussed and debated. With certification, some entity must be established or ordained to oversee the standards and procedures. If the process evolves like other professions, it seems plausible that it will eventually include a written examination to evaluate the core knowledge competencies that individual practitioners should possess to meet peer practice standards. The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities has published core knowledge (...) competencies for many years that are accepted by experts as the prevailing standard. Probably any written examination will be based upon the ASBH core knowledge competencies. However, much remains to be done before any examination may be offered. In particular, it seems likely that a recognized examining board must create and validate examination questions and structure the examination so as to establish meaningful, defensible parameters after dealing with such challenging questions as: Should the certifying examination be multiple choice or short-answer essay? How should the test be graded? What should the pass rate be? How may the examination be best administered? To advance the field of health care ethics consultation, thought leaders should start to focus on the written examination possibilities, to date unaddressed carefully in the literature. Examination models—both objective and written—must be explored as a viable strategy about how the field of health care ethics consultations can grow toward professionalization. (shrink)

According to the orthodox view, the goodness of a life depends exclusively on the things that actually happened within it, such as its pleasures and pains, the satisfaction of its subject’s preferences, or the presence of various objective goods and bads. In this paper, I argue that the goodness of a life also depends on what could have happened, but didn’t. I then propose that this view helps us resolve ethical puzzles concerning the standards for a life worth living for (...) animals and the significance of a life’s shape. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie nauczania Kościoła jako wykraczającego poza błędny i rozłączny podział etyki na deontologię i teleologię. Autor przypomina szerokie tło przemian kulturowych, które towarzyszyły kontrowersjom wokół encykliki bł. Pawła VI "Humanae vitae". Teologiczna kontestacja nauczania Magisterium była powodem napisania przez św. Jana Pawła II encykliki "Veritatis splendor". Papież rozwiewa doktrynalne wątpliwości zasiane przez proporcjonalistów, przedstawiając im niezwykle przemyślaną i tradycyjną koncepcję źródeł moralności. Wychodząc od priorytetu celowości ludzkiego działania Papież podkreślił wagę przedmiotu czynu. Dla moralnego dobra ludzkiego czynu (...) konieczne jest jego podwójne właściwe odniesienie: wertykalnie do celu ostatecznego, czyli Boga, oraz horyzontalnie wobec człowieka poprzez przedmiotową zgodność działania z ludzkim dobrem. Papieskie rozważania zostają uzupełnione komentarzem do "Summy Teologii" św. Tomasza, który w analogiczny sposób przedstawia źródła moralności ludzkiego czynu. Rozróżniając wewnętrzny i zewnętrzny akt woli, św. Tomasz pokazuje właściwe źródła moralności każdego z tych aktów. W pierwszym przypadku jest to właściwy przedmiot woli, który jest tożsamy z dobrem; natomiast w drugim – konieczny jest ponadto właściwy przedmiot innych władz. Właściwa antropologia przywraca fundament pod adekwatne rozumienie zarówno prawa naturalnego, jak i potrzebę etyki cnót, która okazuje się wielką praktyczną pomocą dla człowieka w drodze do właściwej mu doskonałości. Przedstawione podstawowe prawdy nauczane od lat przez Magisterium o tyle domagają się przypomnienia, że współczesna dominująca kultura wytrwale dekonstruuje racjonalny porządek tego nauczania czyniąc zeń karykaturę. Papieskie analizy pozwalają oczyścić etyczne kryteria rozeznawania dobra i zła, przypominając o zaproszeniu do piękna teologalnego życia w Chrystusie. Umożliwia ono zdrowy krytyczny osąd konkretnych sytuacji, jak również możliwość uniknięcia rozpowszechnionych współcześnie błędów i wynikającego z nich kryzysu tożsamości. (shrink)

The twentieth century saw intensive intellectual exchange between Eastern and Central Europe and the West. Yet political and linguistic obstacles meant that many important trends in East and Central European thought and knowledge hardly registered i.

While mainstream CSR research has generally explored and argued for positive ethical, social and environmental performance, critical CSR scholars argue that change has been superficial—at best, and not possible in any substantial way within the current capitalist system. Both views, however, only address the role of business within larger systems. Little attention has been paid to the everyday material CSR practice of individual managers. We go inside the firm to investigate how the micro-level acts of individual managers can aggregate to (...) drive transformation of the macro-level business logic. We draw on the strategy-as-practice approach to organize our research. The study reveals two orientations towards the integration of personal ethics into the workplace: abdication and activism. These orientations are supported by managerial practice such as reproductive and coping tactics and covert and overt tactics ; and, three enabling conditions of activist practice: empowerment and psychological safety, moral shock, and morality praxis. While our findings illustrate the tremendous challenges managers face when attempting to influence organizational practices towards their ethical and environmental aspirations, we also show that under specific conditions, individual managers can become fully engaged advocates and drivers of positive change from the inside. In so doing, our individual-level analysis of intrapreneurship provides a more complex picture of the possibilities for positive change than have been previously put forth by mainstream and critical CSR research. (shrink)

This essay presents the Aestheticism of the 19th century as the foundational movement of modernist-formalist aesthetics of the 20th century. The main principle of this movement is what I denominate “productive opacity”. Aestheticism has not been recognized as a philosophical aesthetic theory. However, its definition of artwork as an exclusive kind of form—a deep, opaque form—is among the most precise ever given in the discipline. This essay offers an interpretation of aestheticism as a formalist theory, referred to here as “deep (...) formalism”, focusing on the thinking of leading aestheticists, Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde, and James Whistler. These three thinkers defined artwork as a form saturated with an inextricable content, viz. opaque form. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the usage of the term “just-so story.” I attempt to show that just-so storytelling can be seen as an epistemic concept that, in various ways, tackles the epistemological an...

This paper critically assesses the possibility of moral enhancement with ambient intelligence technologies and artificial intelligence presented in Savulescu and Maslen (2015). The main problem with their proposal is that it is not robust enough to play a normative role in users’ behavior. A more promising approach, and the one presented in the paper, relies on an artifi-cial moral reasoning engine, which is designed to present its users with moral arguments grounded in first-order normative theories, such as Kantianism or utilitarianism, (...) that reason-responsive people can be persuaded by. This proposal can play a normative role and it is also a more promising avenue towards moral enhancement. It is more promising because such a system can be designed to take advantage of the sometimes undue trust that people put in automated technologies. We could therefore expect a well-designed moral reasoner system to be able to persuade people that may not be persuaded by similar arguments from other people. So, all things considered, there is hope in artificial intelli-gence for moral enhancement, but not in artificial intelligence that relies solely on ambient intelligence technologies. (shrink)

This paper offers a theoretical framework that can be used to derive viable engineering strategies for the design and development of robots that can nudge people towards moral improvement. The framework relies on research in developmental psychology and insights from Stoic ethics. Stoicism recommends contemplative practices that over time help one develop dispositions to behave in ways that improve the functioning of mechanisms that are constitutive of moral cognition. Robots can nudge individuals towards these practices and can therefore help develop (...) the dispositions to, for example, extend concern to others, avoid parochialism, etc. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to measure professional and personal values among nurses, and to identify the factors affecting these values. The participants were 323 Israeli nurses, who were asked about 36 personal values and 20 professional values. The three fundamental professional nursing values of human dignity, equality among patients, and prevention of suffering, were rated first. The top 10 rated values all concerned nurses' responsibility towards patients. Altruism and confidentiality were not highly rated, and health promotion and nursing (...) research were rated among the last three professional values. For personal (instrumental) values, honesty, responsibility and intelligence were rated first, while ambition and imagination were rated 14th and 16th respectively out of 18. Significant differences (P < 0.05) were found among some personal and professional values rated as functions of culture, education, professional seniority, position and field of expertise. The results may assist in understanding the motives of nurses with different characteristics and help to promote their work according to professional ethical values. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest analiza dwóch problemów – obcości oraz przemocy – w ramach opracowywanej przez Bernharda Waldenfelsa fenomenologii responsywnej. Autor pokazuje, w jaki sposób oba te fenomeny wymagają zradykalizowanej formy redukcji fenomenologicznej, która zostaje określona jako redukcja responsywna. Pozwala to na uchwycenie centralnej roli, jaką problemy obcości i przemocy odgrywają w rozwijanej przez Waldenfelsa responsywnej etyce.

We give a few results concerning the notions of causal completability and causal closedness of classical probability spaces . We prove that any classical probability space has a causally closed extension; any finite classical probability space with positive rational probabilities on the atoms of the event algebra can be extended to a causally up-to-three-closed finite space; and any classical probability space can be extended to a space in which all correlations between events that are logically independent modulo measure zero event (...) have a countably infinite common-cause system. Collectively, these results show that it is surprisingly easy to find Reichenbach-style ‘explanations' for correlations, underlining doubts as to whether this approach can yield a philosophically relevant account of causality. 1 Introduction2 Basic Definitions and Results in the Literature3 Causal Completability the Easy Way: ‘Splitting the Atom’4 Causal Completability of Classical Probability Spaces: The General Case5 Infinite Statistical Common-Cause Systems for Arbitrary Pairs6 ConclusionAppendix A. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Schopenhauer's argument against suicide has served as a punching bag for many modern-day commentators. Dale Jacquette, Sandra Shapshay, and David Hamlyn all argue that the premises of this argument or its conclusion are inconsistent with Schopenhauer's wider metaphysical and ethical project. This paper defends Schopenhauer from these charges. Along the way, it examines the relations between suicide, death by voluntary starvation, negation of the will, compassion, and Schopenhauer's critiques of cynicism and stoicism. The paper concludes that there may be (...) gaps in Schopenhauer's system, but not where the aforementioned commentators tried to locate them. (shrink)

We analyze the structure of strongly dominating sets of reals introduced in Goldstern et al. (Proc Am Math Soc 123(5):1573–1581, 1995). We prove that for every κ (...) class l of Baire sets for the Laver category base and compare the σ-ideal of sets which are not strongly dominating with the Laver ideal l0. (shrink)

Modern physics is founded on two mainstays: mathematical modelling and empirical verification. These two assumptions are prerequisite for the objectivity of scientific discourse. Here we show, however, that they are contradictory, leading to the ‘experiment paradox’. We reveal that any experiment performed on a physical system is—by necessity—invasive and thus establishes inevitable limits to the accuracy of any mathematical model. We track its manifestations in both classical and quantum physics and show how it is overcome ‘in practice’ via the concept (...) of environment. We argue that the unravelled paradox induces a new type of ‘ontic’ underdetermination, which has deep consequences for the methodological foundations of physics. (shrink)

The article presents the results of research on relationships between types of social participation and emotion regulation. In the study, Gratz’ and Roemer’s perspective on emotion regulation and Reinders’ and Butz’s concept of types of social participation were applied. Participants were 1151 students from three types of vocational schools: basic vocational school, technical upper secondary school, and specialized upper secondary school. The results of studies conducted with the use of Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale and Social Participation Questionnaire indicate that (...) there are small, however, significant, differences in the levels of social participation dimensions and the frequency of particular types of social participation between students from the three investigated types of vocational schools. The level of transitive orientation turned out to be higher among students from the basic vocational schools than among students from the specialized upper secondary schools and the technical upper secondary schools. In each educational group, the level of transitive orientation was significantly higher than the level of moratorium orientation. The hypothesis about the relationship between dimensions of emotion regulation and types of social participation, particularly with respect to the dimension of “lack of emotional awareness”, was confirmed. The most effective style in terms of emotion regulation turned out to be the assimilation type. The highest level of emotion dysregulation proved to be connected with the segregation type. (shrink)

Stanley Cavell (1926–2018) jest jednym z tych filozofów, którzy świadomie wychodząc od założenia wzajemnego dopełniania się filozofii i literatury, rozwijają swą refleksję teoretyczną na przecięciu obu tych dziedzin, traktując ową refleksję jako formę pisarstwa. W opinii Cavella literatura w niczym nie ustępuje poznawczo filozofii w kategoriach wartości poznawczych. Cavell posuwa się nawet do zakwestionowania zasadności sztywnego, nieprzezwyciężalnego podziału na te dwie dziedziny, zaś własne pisarstwo określa mianem krytyki epistemicznej, będącej swego rodzaju krytyką literacką. Choć sam wywodzi się ze szkoły analitycznej, (...) Cavell pozostaje niezwykle krytyczny wobec tej tradycji filozofowania, zarzucając jej, jak sam to ujmuje, „zapomnienie o ludzkim głosie”, utratę kontaktu z rzeczywistością, jak również wyalienowanie się z życia – ostatecznie nazywając filozofię analityczną „dyscypliną najbardziej obcą życiu i pisaniu”. Równocześnie sam zwraca się ku tradycji kontynentalnej, próbując połączyć te dwie odmienne tradycje intelektualne w ramach własnej refleksji filozoficznej. Tak oto Cavell sytuuje się na skrzyżowaniu rozmaitych obszarów i nurtów intelektualnych, zaś jego pole badawcze jest niezwykle szerokie i zróżnicowane – obejmuje filozofię, literaturę, film, teatr i muzykę. W niniejszym artykule zamierzam skupić się na kilku wybranych aspektach dzieła Cavella, nadal nie do końca rozpoznanych w ramach poświęconych mu studiów – takich jak użytek z pojęć filozoficznych oraz wybrane metody, wykorzystywane przez Cavella do interpretacji tekstów literackich, jak problem parafraz, metoda literalizacji języka (w kontekście Cavellowskiej analizy _Końcówki _Becketta), problem dzieła otwartego, zagadnienie zwyczajności związane z Cavellowską wersją filozofii języka potocznego (w kontekście wybranych cech filozofii Wittgensteina). Pod koniec tekstu kilka uwag poświęcam również hermeneutyce Cavella i sugeruję kontekst, w jakim można ją powiązać z innymi nurtami filozofii, zwłaszcza z filozofią Innego, wypracowaną przez Emmanuela Levinasa. (shrink)

Apart from the Treaty of human nature, political philosophy of David Hume's not systematic. This fact is probably associated with Hume's skepticism, disbelief in the philosophical, abstract synthesis, which necessarily reduces the complexity of the world to just one aspect. Most distinct evidence of this belief are philosophical essays, often recognized for popularizing some of the ideas contained in the Treaty. Popularization of the former no doubt, but there were also more than that. Hume They analyzed human reason and morality (...) in a very broad historical context. Essays are full of details taken from the history of culture, politics and the economy in both England and the ancient peoples. Greeks and Romans had for special esteem for Hume, and ancient historians considered it his pattern, moreover, does not mean that he was against them uncritically. (shrink)

This article is a short presentation of the problem of individual liberty – as we understand it today – in the context of the problematic of Goodness in Plato’s philosophy of politics as presented in his two main political dialogues: the Republic and the Laws. The crucial distinction is for me dichotomy: negative vs. positive liberty as defined by Isaiah Berlin following Benjamin Constant. In this article I also consider to what extent justifiable is liberal critique of Plato as a (...) totalitarian. At the end of the text I suggest that the best interpretation of Plato’s vision would be its treatment not so much as a strictly political one but rather as a program of education of the soul based on specific understanding of politics derived from Plato’s anthropology. (shrink)